

## **Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia**

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### **Published by**

Dream Catcher Graphic (Bangkok)

for the

Center for Southeast Asian Studies

Kyoto University

2004

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ISBN 974-92227-4-1

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## Introduction

Donna J. Amoroso

The *Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia* was launched by the Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University, in March 2002 to promote exchange among the intellectual communities of Southeast Asia. Our goal is to bring news of important publications, debates, and ideas that circulate within various *national* discourses into the growing *regional* discourse of intellectuals in and outside the universities. We pursue this goal in various ways.

First, we recognize that the number of national languages in the region is a key obstacle to deepening mutual knowledge. We therefore use translation – into English and into regional languages – to facilitate informed discussion. While English is now and for the foreseeable future the lingua franca of the region and our main language of publication, it is essential to reach beyond it to the intellectual currents represented in the national and regional languages. Authors are therefore invited to write in the language of their choice and encouraged to write about local publications. Then, we include a substantive summary of our main articles in Bahasa Indonesia, Filipino, Japanese, and Thai to help readers gain entrée into the discussion. In recent issues, we have also begun to feature one longer, or less generally accessible, text in full translation.

Second, we promote more sustained engagement between university-based intellectuals and those working in NGOs, journalism, and cultural production. Each *KRYE-A* issue is organized around a theme and includes different kinds of writing: major review essays and shorter book reviews of scholarly work; reprints (often translated) from popular fora like newspapers; and features ranging from interviews, profiles, and commentary to research and documentation notes, conference reports, and short scholarly articles. In all categories, we take seriously the quality and accessibility of writing, encouraging scholars to write not just for specialists, but for a wider audience.

Finally, we decided to publish *KRSEA* primarily on the internet. In terms of cost, multilinguality, and distribution, the decision was easy, and it has helped to expand our network of readers and contributors. Another advantage: communities far from national centers, as well as countries developing research capacities, gain internet access more quickly than they can build traditional research libraries.

With this publication of essays from *KRSEA*, we provide libraries and individuals with an archive copy of selections from the first four issues. The articles here – mostly review essays – were chosen as those most useful to educators and other readers looking for a “state of the art” introduction to the topic covered.

Issue 1 is devoted to politics and the exercise of power. One striking note is the unanimity and moral certainty of calls to strengthen institutions and the rule of law, to reform states paralyzed by bureaucratic rigidity, and to end “dirty” politics. Yet answers remain elusive, as neither the rise of the middle class nor electoral democracy have proved a cure for corruption and authoritarianism. Some of our writers examine the blurred boundary of the public and private and the related pairing of charismatic authority and state power. Others ask for greater nuance in analyzing relations between state and society. Along with the recent visibility of the poor in civil society actions, we hope that these portend a new kind of popular engagement in politics.

Issue 2 focuses on environmental disaster and efforts by communities, NGOs, and governments to rehabilitate damaged forests and other resources. As our contributors make clear, natural habitat recovery is not simply an ecological and economic question, but also concerns the rights and livelihoods of people who have traditionally maintained the land. The issue traces the evolution of community forestry and ecological studies; examines the complicated nature of illegal logging, community management, and gender and development; and reports on examples of mangrove management, ecotourism, participatory planning, and reforestation.

Issue 3 appraises the particular strength of nationalist historiography in shaping and dominating narratives of Southeast Asia's postcolonial past. The review essays survey political, methodological, and technological challenges to dominant historiographies and recent attempts to uncover alternative narratives that have been marginalized. Related features, reprints, and short reviews look at the intertwining of individual and national histories, raising questions about violence, love of nation, ideology, aspirations, ethnicity, exclusion, universalism, and how we remember. Many authors also touch on the disjuncture between academic historiography and popular historical perception.

Issue 4 focuses on two overlapping facets of economic integration within East and Southeast Asia: the migration of labor within the region and Japan's economic ties with Southeast Asia. It is vital for an informed regional discourse to develop in step with the quickening flow of capital, goods, labor, and ideas about economic governance. There is also a tremendous gap between the work of professional economists and the NGOs that deal "on the ground" with the human costs of economic change. Bridging this gap would go far toward developing a socially informed economic discourse.

We hope readers will seek out (and freely download) the full contents of our website at <<http://kyotoreview.cseas.kyoto-u.ac.jp>>.

With this publication, I would like to acknowledge some of the many people who have made *KRSEAS* possible. Kasian Tejapira (Thammasat University) conceived the original idea; it was developed with the encouragement of Takashi Shiraishi, many hours of discussion with Caroline Hau and Patricio Abinales (all of CSEAS, Kyoto University), and input from colleagues in Malaysia (especially Rahman Haji Embong and Diana Wong, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia), the Philippines (especially Resil Mojares, San Carlos University, and Jose Cruz, S.J., and Germelino Bautista, Ateneo de Manila University), and Thailand (especially Coeli Barry, Thammasat University). Financial support for development and the first three issues came from the COE (Center of Excellence) project at CSEAS, headed by Takashi Shiraishi, while the fourth issue was

supported by the Toyota Foundation.

Our initial network was appreciably expanded with the help of Yoko Hayami (CSEAS), Sumit Mandal (Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia), and Michael Montesano (National University of Singapore). As the project progressed, it benefited from the strong backing of the director of CSEAS, Tanaka Koji, and collaborators in Southeast Asia such as Khoo Boo Teik (Universiti Sains Malaysia), Patrick Jory (Walailak University), Chris Baker, and Andreas Harsono.

The preparation and distribution of this volume has been helped by our collaboration with the Regional Studies Program of Walailak University, Nakhon Sri Thammarat. (A young program in a new university far from the national center, it trains students in the language, history, and society of Thailand's neighbors to the south.) And many thanks to the staff of Dream Catcher Graphic for their meticulous handling of five languages.

Finally, I want to draw attention to the translators in Japan and Southeast Asia whose work is the core of this project. I especially thank those who have worked with us – either translating or arranging translations – on more than one issue: Sofia Guillermo for her exceptionally fine Tagalog (Filipino); the students of the Graduate School of Asian and African Area Studies, Kyoto University, for their translations into Japanese; Wahyu Prasetyawan and Melani Budianta for always being willing to help; and Jiranthara Srioutai and Somjit Jiranthiporn of the Chalermprakiat Center of Translation and Interpretation at Chulalongkorn University, whose professionalism has made my life much easier.

Issue 1 / March 2002

# Power and Politics

## Issue 1 / Power and Politics / March 2002

### Editorial

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Power and Politics, by Donna J. Amoroso

### Review Essays

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Provincializing Thai Politics, by Nishizaki Yoshinori

Writing Reformasi, by Khoo Boo Teik

Of Strongmen and the State, by Caroline S. Hau

Studies in the Political Economy of New Order Indonesia, by Vedi R. Hadiz

### Features

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*Interview:* Marites Dañguilan Vitug on Philippine Politics and Journalism

*Report:* The Human Rights Collection at the University of the Philippines

*Profile:* Area Studies at Kyoto University

*Conference Report:* Southeast Asian Studies in Asia

*Commentary:* Colin Nicholas on Orang Asli Leadership in Malaysia

### Reprints

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Voice of the Poor, by Vanida Tantiwithayaphithak

On the Horns of a Dilemma, by Kasian Tejapira

Thaksinomics, by Nidhi Eoseewong

The Cost of Race Economics, by Sumit Mandal

In Golkar's Grip, by Mochtar Pabottingi

Police and Society, by Ongkhokham

### Books of Note

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M. Dawam Rahardjo, *Independensi Bank Indonesia dalam Kemerdekaan Politik* (Bank Indonesia's independence in political turbulence), by Wahyu Prasetyawan

Murai Yoshinori et al., *Soeharto Family no Chikuzai* (The Soeharto family's accumulation of wealth) / Akio Satoko, *Unmei no Chogo: Soekarno no Musume, Megawati no Hansai* (Destiny's eldest daughter: The early life of Soekarno's daughter Megawati) / Kano Hiroyoshi, *Indonesia Ryoran* (Indonesia in confusion), by Murakami Saki and Morishita Akiko

Ji Giles Ungpakorn, Suthachai Yimprasert et al., *Atchayagarn Rat Wigit Garnpienpaeng* (Crimes committed by the state: Transition in crisis) / Chonthira Sattawattana, *Grid Phae Glad Nong Grong Khawmying Dai Phuying Hok Tula* (The women of 6th October: Sifting out the truth by opening old wounds), by Viengrat Nethipo

- Iwasaki Ikuo, *Ajia Seiji o Miru Me: Kaibatsu Dokuritu kara Shiminshakai e* (How to look at Asian politics: From development dictatorship to civil society), by Aizawa Nobuhiro
- I. Wibowo, ed., *Harga yang Harus Dibayar: Pergulatan Etnis Cina di Indonesia* (The price to be paid: The ethnic Chinese encounter in Indonesia), by Benny Subianto
- Nemoto Kei, *Aung San: Fun Sareta Dokuritu Biruma no Yume* (Aung San: The locked away dream of Burmese independence) / Takahashi Akio, *Gendai Myanma no Nason Keizai: Iko Keizaka no Nomin to Hi-Nomin* (Myanmar's village economy in transition: Peasants' lives under the market-oriented economy), by Nakanishi Yoshihiro
- Karl M. Gaspar, *The Lumad's Struggle in the Face of Globalization*, by Ishii Masako
- Ikehata Setsuho and Ricardo Trota Jose, eds., *The Philippines under Japan: Occupation Policy and Reaction*, by Temario C. Rivera
- Ban Kah Choon, *Absent History: The Untold Story of Special Branch Operations in Singapore 1915-1942*, by Onimaru Takeshi
- Kaneko Yoshiki, *Marehia no Seiji to Etnisbun: Kajin Seiji to Kokumin Togo* (Politics and ethnicity in Malaysia: Chinese politics and national integration), by Shinozaki Kaori
- Francis Loh Kok Wah and Khoo Boo Teik, eds., *Democracy in Malaysia: Discourses and Practices*, by Donna J. Amoroso

# Provincializing Thai Politics

Nishizaki Yoshinori

*Corruption and Democracy in Thailand*

Pasuk Phongpaichit and Sungsidh Piriyarangsan  
Chiang Mai / Silkworm Books / 1994

*Money and Power in Provincial Thailand*

Edited by Ruth McVey  
Honolulu / University of Hawaii Press / 2000

Thailand has undergone two great changes in the last several decades: democratization and capitalist growth. Whether Thailand has democratized in substance is debatable, but there is little doubt that since the student-led "revolution" of 1973, it has made a determined, if slow, move away from military rule toward a more inclusionary form of political representation. Political change has been accompanied by rapid industrialization, which has irreversibly transformed the structure of Thailand's formerly agriculture-based economy. To date, scholars have analyzed the causes and effects of these changes with a primary focus on the capital city of Bangkok as if it constituted the whole of Thailand. Democratization and industrialization, however, have transformed rural, provincial Thailand just as much, to the point, in fact, where the stereotyped image of a backward peasant society no longer holds true. A detailed study of new rural Thailand has been overdue.

This is the significance of the two books under review. While not concerned exclusively with rural Thailand, *Corruption and Democracy in Thailand*, written by the country's two foremost political economists, does aim to delineate the impact of ongoing democratization on rural politics and society. In particular, the book highlights the seedier aspects of the countryside, such as corruption,

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murder, and violence, which the authors regard as the direct consequences of democratization. *Money and Power in Provincial Thailand*, edited by Ruth McVey, a respected doyen of Southeast Asian studies, has a much more explicit rural focus, analyzing how new patterns of political and economic domination have emerged out of the growing rural-Bangkok nexus. While falling short of advancing well-formulated frameworks for analysis, both books still throw much light on the dynamics of rural transformations and help remedy the Bangkok-centric focus that has marked the bulk of the Thai politics literature.

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These books describe and analyze three specific social phenomena in Thailand: the rise of local bosses or gangsters known as *chao pho*, the growth of politically active provincial capitalist and middle classes; and the rising level of corruption. Such phenomena point to an increasingly rural tilt to Thai politics as a whole, which can no longer be understood with reference to politicians, capitalists, and state officials in Bangkok alone. Furthermore, these changes call into serious question two existing conceptual models of Thailand's political system: Fred Riggs' well-known "bureaucratic polity" (1966) that sees Thai politics as essentially dominated by the military and civil service to the exclusion of non-bureaucratic forces, and Anek Laothamatas's more recent "liberal corporatism" (1991) that argues for a much more inclusionary form of group-based interest representation. I will suggest that Thailand's post-1973 polity can be better understood as "patrimonial democracy," a type of politics that synergistically combines Max Weber's well-known notion of patrimonialism with emerging electoral practices. Much more inclusionary than bureaucratic polity, the patrimonial democracy model sees participants as articulating their personal or particularistic interests, rather than the collective interests of Anek's liberal corporatist model.

### **The rise of *chao pho***

The political ascendance of violence-prone rural *chao pho* (literally godfathers) is perhaps the most unsavory aspect of post-1973 Thai democratization. As such, these "men of (dark) influence" are discussed at length in both books. In *Money and Power*, after McVey's neat stage-setting introduction, three successive

chapters, written by Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, Sombat Chantornvong, and James Ockey, analyze the historical process through which *chao pho* have acquired their current power as key players occupying the “middle distance between capital and countryside.” Likewise, Pasuk and Sungsidh’s *Corruption and Democracy* devotes its longest and most informative chapter to five representative *chao pho*.

These chapters overlap considerably in content, analyzing the same phenomenon from essentially the same perspective. Minor differences aside, they concur on the trajectory of *chao pho*’s incremental growth through three roughly divided phases. The starting point is before 1960, a period when two local conditions laid the foundation for the rise of *chao pho*. First, provincial Thai culture favored (and still favors) *nak leng*-type leaders, men with manly, tough, daring, decisive, and law-breaking attributes (incidentally quite similar to Machiavelli’s notion of *virtu* in *The Prince*). Second, despite King Chulalongkorn’s administrative reforms initiated in the late 19th century, the state’s control and surveillance of the countryside was far from effective. The attendant institutional vacuum, coupled with the local cultural template, enabled *chao pho* involved in illicit and highly profitable trades to emerge as paternal yet feared community leaders, to whom locals could turn for protection against state and capitalist encroachment. *Chao pho* thus began to wield enormous informal influence (*itthiphon*) in their communities beyond the gaze and reach of the central state.

From the 1960s to 1973, a big impetus to *chao pho*’s growth was the massive amount of capital that the US-backed, anti-communist military regime of Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat (1958-63) and his crony General Thanom Kittikachorn (1963-73) infused into rural areas for infrastructure-building. *Chao pho* capitalized on the consequent construction boom, using the wealth they accumulated to build and cement a pyramid of local clients extending from state officials to peasants. No less important, the military regime, ostensibly committed to clamping down on criminals, allowed *chao pho* to exist and grow because their cooperation was needed for efficient local taxation to finance rapid urban industrialization. The state even appointed *chao pho* as sub-district chiefs and village heads. This local-level *modus vivendi* between a “weak state” and a “strong

society” contributed to the consolidation of *chao pho*’s already well-established local spheres of influence.

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Finally, electoral politics, introduced after the fall of military rule in 1973, has ushered in *chao pho*’s rise to power at the *national* level. With vast local patronage and coercive resources at their disposal, *chao pho* now emerged as much sought-after *hua kbanaen* (vote harvesters) for Bangkok’s politicians and parties. Some *chao pho* have used their vote-mobilizing capacity to put themselves or their cronies in office. A few notable *chao pho* have even obtained cabinet positions in the central state, as shown by the appointments of Narong Wongwan (an alleged drug trafficker denied entry to the US) and the son of Kamnan Po (reputedly one of the most violent “godfathers” from Chonburi). Where *chao pho* once exercised informal (illegitimate) influence in the provinces outside the confines of the state, the post-1973 democratic transition, by linking the countryside to Bangkok, has catapulted them deep into the state as legitimate, national-level power holders with the “right” to use their public positions to enrich themselves and their supporters. The economic boom of the late 1980s to early 1990s enabled *chao pho* to branch into legal businesses and further consolidate their economic and political base. The consequent dominance of *chao pho* at present has reversed their traditional relationship with state officials: *chao pho* (and their supporters) now subordinate state officials, as demonstrated by Ockey’s account of the transfer of Phichit’s governor in 1989.

Competent as it is, this analysis of the origin and *modus operandi* of *chao pho* contains little that is wholly novel or provocative. Since Benedict Anderson published “Murder and Progress in Modern Siam” (1990), those scholars on the academic bandwagon of provincial bossism – notably Ockey and Sombat – have made the same point elsewhere. (One may detect an element of uniformist Thai scholarship that Anderson deplored back in 1978.) Moreover, this analysis relies almost exclusively on secondary sources, like newspapers published in Bangkok, adducing little but circumstantial and anecdotal evidence to paint a picture of Thai rural politics as viewed by Bangkok-based, western-educated intellectuals. The above analysis therefore can’t explain why some prominent *chao pho* have suffered humiliating electoral losses. Further studies of *chao pho*

and their dominance (or lack thereof) need to be based on more extensive and anthropological fieldwork, not on the assumptions that academics in air-conditioned ivory towers make about the thoughts and behavior of rural voters.

This critique notwithstanding, the analysis does describe, in general and jargon-free terms, how *chao pho* have emerged as the new provincial and national elites by depending on, colluding with, and plundering the weak institutional state in the broad context of growing democratization and rapid capitalist development. The rise to power of *chao pho* has been an integral part of these twin changes.

### Provincial capitalist/middle classes

*Chao pho* hardly constitute the whole provincial capitalist class, although they are part of it. There are actually many provincial capitalists who come from legitimate market backgrounds. Equally noteworthy is the growth of an increasingly well-educated, organized, and politically assertive middle class. The growth of these two classes is only tangentially noted by Pasuk and Sungsidh, but directly addressed in the second, more interesting part of McVey's volume that comprises five chapters. While differing in quality, these chapters, all based on extensive fieldwork, give an insight into locally specific contexts in which nation-level politics and economy shape, and are shaped by, the growth of provincial capitalist and middle classes.

The first four of these chapters deal with the origin, make-up, economic activities, and political involvement of increasingly powerful non-*chao pho* capitalists. The historian Michael Montesano's empirically rich and very interesting chapter takes a "biographical approach" to trace the origin, rather than the operation, of two powerful, arbitrarily chosen, provincial business elites: Surin Tothaphiang, president of Trang's Provincial Chamber of Commerce, and Suchon Champhunot, Phisanulok's veteran member of parliament. This sharply focused, individual-level analysis enlivens Thailand's broad institutional milieu, which is often flattened and made faceless in the hands of positivist political scientists. Next, the political scientist Daniel Arghiros analyzes the (limited) utility of Ayutthaya's Brick Manufacturing Association in helping its members

win local office. He illuminates the specific workings of an ostensible economic interest group as a quasi-political machine and examines patron-client ties and business conflicts at the village level, intricacies which remain hidden behind Sombat and others' sweeping, generalized accounts of rural politics. The economist Yoko Ueda gives a more descriptive (and dry) profile of Nakhon Ratchasima City's sixty-seven important businessmen selected on the basis of membership in local business organizations. Finally, Kevin Hewison and Maniema Thongyou take a similar look at an unrepresentative sample of twenty young, predominantly Sino - Thai capitalists - the "Young Turks" of Khon Kaen Province.

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Three commonalities emerge from these analyses which apply to Bangkok-based capitalists as well. First, while Chinese or Sino -Thais control or dominate the bulk of provincial business, the importance of Chinese ethnic identity to business success is waning due to their growing assimilation into mainstream Thai society. Membership in Chinese associations was initially instrumental in establishing business contacts, but these widely known "Chinese connections" are being replaced by non-exclusive general business organizations that include indigenous Thais alongside Chinese and Sino-Thais. What Hewison and Maniema call the "Thai-ification" of provincial capitalists is in progress.

Second, and more important for this essay, personal connections developed through organizational networks are crucial to business success. Local business organizations or associations provide the means for their members, Chinese and non-Chinese, to develop an incipient form of what Robert Putnam (1993) calls "social capital," norms of interpersonal trust, cooperation, and reciprocity. Such norms allow distinctive local business practices to develop, such as the extension of informal loans and the illegal discounting of post-dated checks, and these practices, as discussed by Arghiros and Ueda, prove to be indispensable for initial capital accumulation. Equally important, organizational networks help members establish personal (and often corrupt) ties with important local and national-level politicians and Bangkok-based capitalists. As Montesano says, for instance, Trang's market society network linked Surin to Bangkok's capital, especially to military-controlled Channel 7, which turned out to be a major break

for his business empire. Nakhon Ratchasima's Chamber of Commerce also functions, in no small part, to help its members develop personal connections with Bangkok-based businesses. It is from this context, in which personal connections "talk," that powerful provincial economic elites have emerged. This pattern of growth is hardly confined to provincial capitalism; it is in fact quite consistent with the way Bangkok-based capital has grown, as Akira Suehiro has so richly documented (1989).

Third, participation in electoral politics has now become another important way provincial capitalists forge and institutionalize what might otherwise seem like corrupt personal patronage ties with "big people" in the state. Montesano's account of Suchon is a good case in point. Suchon's fortunes swelled after his election to parliament in 1969 brought him into legitimate contact with Prasit Kanchanawat, an executive of the powerful Bangkok Bank and close ally of General Praphat Charusathien who, along with Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn, ruled Thailand between 1963 and 1973. Following this pattern, many provincial capitalists now participate, directly or indirectly, in local- or national-level electoral politics. Such participation, as Pasuk and Sungsidh say, has become "very much part of business. It is part of building the network of contacts needed for doing business." In addition to providing contacts, political office provides spoils of office. The intimate links between office and wealth, according to Pasuk and Sungsidh, are among the sad yet persistent legacies of Sarit and his military successors, who accumulated phenomenal wealth while in office. Businessmen-politicians who seek electoral office now are simply "responding to the demonstration effect." They "consider [electoral] politics a natural extension of their accumulative efforts," according to McVey. Intensified to a level where electoral candidates are willing to kill each other (see Anderson 1990), their competition for office is essentially a scramble for political patronage, favors, rents, and other *particularistic* benefits. Simply put, their participation in electoral politics is motivated less by their concern for the public good than by sordid personal interests. It is no coincidence, then, that Chatchai's coalition government and cabinet, occupied by an all-time high percentage of provincial capitalists, are found by Pasuk and Sungsidh to be the most corrupt since Sarit's era.

In the last chapter of McVey's volume, James LoGerfo spotlights the nascent middle class in the six provinces, which, in the name of "clean politics," spearheaded the multi-class protest of May 1992 against General Suchinda Kraprayoon's assumption of power. This comparative macro-level analysis leaves much to be desired, however. In the first place, as LoGerfo himself admits, it fails to show any strong correlation between the occurrence of protest movements and the size of the middle class (or other key socio-economic indicators). The small and unrepresentative nature of his cases-six out of seventy-three provinces-would in any case have called any correlation into question. Second, he uses the undisaggregated, faceless middle class as the unit of analysis, seeing it as wonderfully unified behind the noble cause of "clean politics" and "democracy." This view is based on the untenable, idealist assumption that every social class promotes its own reified "general class interests" in collective action movements, an assumption that dates back to Karl Marx and, more recently, to the widely read class analyses of Barrington Moore (1966), Theda Skocpol (1979), and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyn Stephens, and John Stephens (1992). LoGerfo ignores the fact that the middle class was deeply divided between pro-Suchinda, anti-Suchinda, and apathetic elements. Moreover, the fact that some well-educated members of the middle class took part in the anti-Suchinda protest doesn't necessarily mean that their action was inspired by a commitment to "clean politics." No doubt, some protest participants were sincerely interested in "clean politics," but it is not farfetched to suppose that some local politicians, state officials, and small- and medium-sized capitalists (subsumed by LoGerfo under the rubric of middle class) were not uniformly motivated by a noble public principle. Given local elites' rent-seeking behavior, their opposition to Suchinda may have stemmed from their calculation that his rise to power would bring to an end vibrant electoral politics that had afforded easy and personal access to power and wealth. It is worth remembering that a fair number of middle class people were beneficiaries of "dirty politics," having attained wealth and social status precisely through personalistic and nepotistic practices that pervaded (and still pervade) rural Thailand. Thus it is a bit facile to make participation in the anti-Suchinda movement synonymous with a commitment to "clean politics." Likewise, it is simplistic to see pro-Suchinda people and parties as dirty or anti-democratic. On the whole, LoGerfo's analysis too neatly and falsely dichotomizes

provincial society on the basis of support for or against "clean politics." This critique is not meant as a plea for cynicism; rather, it calls for us not to ignore murky and seedy aspects of politics and society in attempting to apply a theory of collective action developed in the West.

In LoGerfo's defense, however, I note that his analysis, one of the first to spotlight the role of the provincial middle class in collective action, does plausibly suggest (if not convincingly demonstrate) that at least some of its members, as organized in PollWatch, the Union for Civil Liberties, and other non-governmental organizations (NGOs), have come to form the core of an increasingly robust civil society in provincial Thailand, a development that Pasuk and Sungsidh view as key to checking the resilient power of *chao pho*. Some middle-class people, whatever their motives, have joined with people from other classes to openly challenge the intentions of the Bangkok-based state. As protest movements have spread to the countryside, the passivity of rural people can no longer be taken for granted. Stated broadly, LoGerfo's chapter and those on provincial capitalism hint at a much more complex provincial social structure than the current scholarship may lead us to believe, and this complexity inextricably links the provinces to political and economic developments in Bangkok.

## Corruption

Office-based corruption – the misuse of office for private gain or the appropriation of public funds – has now reached epidemic proportions in Thailand. This is no surprise, given the growing involvement of rent-seeking provincial businessmen-politicians (both *chao pho* and non-*chao pho*) in electoral politics. Pasuk and Sungsidh take up this issue directly as another unsavory aspect of Thai-style democratization and capitalist growth. McVey's volume also refers to it, in passing, under the more general rubric of "money politics."

Pasuk and Sungsidh discuss the rise of political corruption in a historical context, starting with Sarit Thanarat's authoritarian rule (1959-63), which first brought office-based corruption to the surface as a politically contentious issue,



and ending with the democratic administration of Chatichai Choonhavan (1988-91), whose corrupt cabinet dominated by rural *chao pho* capitalists prompted the military to stage a coup in 1991. Pasuk and Sungsidh go beyond historical analysis to make a valiant attempt to measure the extent of corruption, a variable few scholars regard as amenable to quantification. Their interesting result: as Thailand made the transition from authoritarianism to democracy, the quantitative level of corruption increased in absolute terms and also as a percentage of the state budget and Gross Domestic Product. This is ironic, considering that popular opposition to corruption is said to have galvanized opposition to military rule in the past.

The reliability and validity of the official data (estimates of the Office of Auditor General and the Counter Corruption Committee), on which Pasuk and Sungsidh's rudimentary quantitative analysis is based, are actually rather dubious. But their finding – quite a plausible one – of a correlation or causal link between corruption and democracy is worth further investigation. It lends support to Ueda and others' argument that businessmen-politicians participate in electoral politics in search of rent-seeking opportunities. (Such investigation would also be of great interest to those concerned about corruption in other semi-democracies like the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Russia, Mexico, and Brazil.) Equally important, Pasuk and Sungsidh's finding suggests that office-based corruption, traditionally concentrated in Bangkok, has spread down to village-level branches of the state to an alarming extent; the Ministries of Interior, Agriculture, and Communications, directly concerned with rural infrastructure development, are all implicated in corruption. These ministries and the departments they control – Highway, Irrigation, Public Works, Provincial Police, Local Administration – easily come into lucrative contact with provincial capitalists, especially construction contractors, most of whom now participate in all levels of electoral politics. What has made such contact a "normal" or institutionalized aspect of state-society and Bangkok-rural linkages is no doubt Chatichai's unprecedentedly corrupt government whose "buffet cabinet" consisted largely of rural construction contractors or those with close links to the provincial construction industry. These cabinet ministers, by paying hefty kickbacks to the government departments concerned, channeled a large number

of "pork-barrel" projects to their respective constituencies to the benefit of their own or their cronies' companies. The growing provincialization of Thai politics, as indicated by the political rise of *chao pho* and provincial capitalists, has thus almost inevitably entailed a growing provincialization of corruption, too.

What is responsible for this spread of corruption is not simply the widely noted salience of patron-client ties in Thai society, but also the broad institutional milieu in which the rule of law is still deficient. Embodying this institutional weakness is the instrumental, yet cozy, symbiosis between the police and *chao pho*. Pasuk and Sungsidh highlight Nakhon Sawan's district police chiefs to show that badly paid provincial police officers at all levels eagerly take protection money from illegal businesses run by *chao pho*. Effectively co-opted, some even moonlight as personal guards and professional gunmen for *chao pho* and other violence-prone businessmen, whose illicit business, including murder, is then more easily accomplished. (It may be no accident that Chonburi, Kamnan's Po's turf, has the highest crime rate of all provinces.) Unscrupulous non-*chao pho* capitalists and their bureaucratic patrons have similarly bought police connivance or legal impunity. Thus, the state's law-enforcement officers, who should be in the vanguard of the fight against crooked capitalists, have instead played a pivotal role in maintaining their dominance and the accompanying rise of corruption in Bangkok and the provinces. This, of course, doesn't mean that all police officers are venal; the presence of Seri Temiyawait, Chonburi's provincial police chief who combated Kamnan Po, and other like-minded officers indicates that outright pessimism is unjustified. But they fight an uphill battle. Not surprisingly, the public lacks respect for, and trust in, the police and is becoming deeply cynical about the rule of law, as shown by the results of Pasuk and Sungsidh's questionnaire. This poor public image, in turn, saps officers' incentive to "shape up," pushing them into a spiral of corruption.

## A new model?

These recent developments compels a critical reappraisal of the existing conceptual models of Thai politics. Thailand's political system has long been analyzed in terms of Fred Riggs's bureaucratic polity. In this model the

bureaucracy, comprising the military and civil service, is the sole wielder of power. Non-bureaucratic forces such as political parties and capitalists are effectively excluded from power or rendered dependent on the bureaucracy for access to power. In the late 1980s, Anek Laothamatas called this model into question, arguing that the rise of extra-bureaucratic forces like organized business signaled the end of the bureaucratic polity. Thailand's present system, according to Anek, can be better understood as a form of liberal corporatism, a pluralist system in which organically connected and more or less autonomous interest-based groups and organizations effectively voice their demands on the state. The two books reviewed here indicate that neither of these models is entirely accurate.

The bureaucratic polity model is clearly no longer relevant. The introduction of electoral politics and the attendant diffusion of power to the provinces have expanded the scope of political competition to include provincial business people and local politicians who had formerly been excluded. There are now strong indications that these extra-bureaucratic forces are effectively making their voices heard, as exemplified by the success of Phichit's locally elected *kaanman* (sub-district chiefs) in engineering the transfer of their centrally appointed governor in 1989. To argue that the bureaucratic polity model is still applicable in the face of this and other hard evidence is not terribly convincing.

But to view the appearance of non-bureaucratic forces as indicating the advent of liberal corporatism may be equally inaccurate. As the contributors to McVey's volume describe them, many of the new provincial organizations are far from the unified lobbying/interest groups associated with the liberal corporatist model. As Arghiros shows, for instance, the Brick Manufacturers Association of Ayutthaya is riddled with personal strife among its members. It is little more than a loosely organized, pseudo-political group that exists primarily to serve the political ambitions of individual members; it does not represent and champion what plural political economists might call the collective sectoral interests of brickmakers. Thus, it doesn't matter whether this association consists of brickmakers or not, as suggested by the presence of *non*-brickmakers in its membership. Similarly, leading entrepreneurs in Khorat have formed local groups such as "Klum Mit Pracha," "Friends Unite Group," and "Friendly Get-Together

'31," but as Ueda argues, these are essentially politically motivated springboards from which their members seek political office in search of rent-seeking opportunities. Moreover, many local capitalists exert their influence over civil servants, not formally through organized groups, but informally through personal contacts that electoral politics help to establish. If local business is organized in the form of clubs, associations, and chambers, it is because such organization enables members to establish and institutionalize privileged personal access to power holders.

If we can derive any generalization from the books under review, it is that Thailand has evolved from a bureaucratic polity into patrimonial democracy, a system characterized by the apparently happy synergy between patrimonial elements as described by Weber (1964, 1978) and the form (as opposed to the substance) of democracy. Patrimonialism, which marked Thailand's state-society relations in the era of the bureaucratic polity (see Jacobs, 1971), has not faded away with the introduction of democracy. In fact, it persists, and indeed thrives, within the shell of democracy. Democratization has merely changed the form of political participation, while keeping the long-standing patrimonial nature of state-society interaction intact. It is this continuity that explains the rise of *chaos pho*, new classes, and corruption in rural Thailand.

Police complicity in corruption and crime typifies the most salient feature of patrimonialism – the weak boundary between the public and private, the inability or unwillingness of state officials to differentiate between public and private interests. Police officers show little moral compunction about using their power to put their own interests above society's, turning public office, in effect, into personal fiefs. Misuse of office by the police is actually nothing new, but democratization has made this particularistic behavior a national epidemic by multiplying juicy points of contact between the state and society, not only in Bangkok but also throughout the provinces. It comes as little surprise, then, that bribery, fraud, violence, murder, and injustice have come to the fore since 1973.

The blurred distinction between public and private has also aided the

growth of provincial capitalism. In patrimonial society, Weber says, only one type of capitalism can grow, "politically oriented capitalism" in which political connections, networks, and patronage are of paramount importance to one's business success. This nicely describes the way many prominent provincial (and Bangkok) capitalists have built their current wealth. The "spirit of capitalism" – an ascetic work ethic – may keep one from starving, but alone would not make one wealthy. To go far in the business world requires personal links with political "big shots" in the state. The Thai state, contrary to the recently advanced view of some political economists, continues to be riddled with favoritism and nepotism, and harnessing its power through personal contacts is just as crucial to attaining wealth in the present democratic period as in the authoritarian past. In fact, democratization has made it easier for those formerly constrained by the bureaucratic polity, particularly provincial capitalists, to establish personal connections, not just with one or two power holders in Bangkok, but with politicians and officials throughout the state at every level, and to use these connections for private economic gain. As a result, a competitive brand of politically oriented capitalism emerged to promote rapid economic growth both in Bangkok and rural Thailand from the late 1980s, until its long-term detrimental effects came to the surface in 1997, ushering in the present financial crisis. This turn of events, however, has not wholly undermined politically oriented capitalism, but only reduced the size of the economic pie. Longstanding patrimonial state-society relations, while subjected to increasingly severe criticism, still remain largely intact. To view the workings of Thailand's political economy in purely instrumental, squeaky-clean terms of formal "input" by interest groups only conceals and distorts the persistently patrimonial nature of the state-society ties that fundamentally caused Thailand's recent economic boom and bust.

Contrary to popular expectations, the transition to democracy has not killed patrimonialism but has actually reinforced it. Because of this, those who are in a position to reap handsome personal benefits from the blurred line between public and private – *chao pho*, provincial capitalists, state officials, and their friends and relatives in parliament – have every reason to support democracy as it has emerged since 1973. If patrimonialism and democracy are not incompatible with each other in the Thai context (and in many other contexts, for that matter),

perhaps we should incorporate this symbiosis into our understanding of democracy. It is what makes democracy "tick" in Thailand, especially rural Thailand.

Given this, substantial obstacles may lie ahead in moving the current form of democracy in a more rational-legal direction. Many Thai scholars tend to advance a moralistic argument that politicians, especially rural-based politicians, must put public interests before private interests. Fair enough, but we should recognize that the patrimonial nature of democracy has benefited crooked politicians so much that they have few incentives to change their behavior. Their interests lie precisely in maintaining the status quo. Given their numerical and local-level strength, these politicians can effectively sabotage any sincere efforts that a few honest, well-intentioned leaders might make to build a more transparent regime.

Some scholars may argue that economic development will gradually cause patrimonialism to disappear, but to the extent that economic growth in rural Thailand is generated by rents and other personal favors, it serves to strengthen, not weaken, capitalists' support for the current form of patrimonial democracy. Economic growth may produce a large, well-educated middle class with an interest in "clean politics," but this class ultimately lacks the capacity to impose its will; it doesn't have the money (not to mention the guns) to participate directly in politics. All this class can do is to protest against serious abuses of power and rampant corruption, as it did in 1992. NGOs may play an important part in remedying some specific problems, like population growth, child labor, and environmental degradation, but can do little to change longstanding features of state-society relations. Even a powerful international organization like the International Monetary Fund can only impose liberalization, privatization, or deregulation in some sectors of the Thai economy. Given Thailand's relatively light dependence on foreign capital, it is doubtful, too, that multi-national corporations, even in the much-touted age of globalization, can exert sufficient structural pressure on the Thai state to build transparent institutions, though they may be able to win specific policy changes. It is easy to talk about the need to root out patrimonialism, but it may be quite hard to achieve in practice.

Similarly, it is rather off the mark to argue normatively that Thai democracy, which benefits only a tiny number of elites, should move in a plural direction, as Pasuk and Baker seem to do in concluding that *chao sua* (Bangkok-based capitalists) and *chao pbo* "have to make their peace with the *chao tbi*" (peasants). This rather hackneyed conclusion misses the point that the dominance of *chao sua* and *chao pbo* rests precisely on the subordination of peasants. This subordination is essential for the stability of patrimonial democracy, allowing elites, especially rural-based elites, to monopolize particularistic benefits without fear of lower-class political activism. As long as peasants remain economically and politically weak, *chao pbo* and other rural elites can continue to enhance their populist appeal by paying lip service to peasants' chronic problems, holding local charity rituals in the image of the benevolent King, or otherwise displaying their paternal leadership. Again, the interests of the dominant class lie in maintaining the current form of democracy. They have few incentives to change it.

The books under review show that the dynamics of present-day Thai politics cannot be understood without reference to the countryside and its links with Bangkok. It is now incumbent on Thai scholars to use the major findings of the books to critically examine existing models of Thai politics and develop an appropriate theoretical framework within which the growing "ruralization" of Thai politics can better be understood.

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## Mempropinsikan Politik di Thailand

*Nishizaki Yoshinori*

Esai ini menimbang dua buku yang menggambarkan dan menganalisa tiga gejala sosial terakhir di Thailand: kemunculan lokal boss atau gangster yang dikenal sebagai *chao pho*; pertumbuhan kapitalis tingkat propinsi yang aktif dalam politik dan kelas menengah; dan meningkatnya korupsi di Thailand. Pengarang buku *Corruption and Democracy in Thailand* melihat kemunduran yang terjadi di wilayah pedesaan Thailand seperti korupsi, pembunuhan dan kekerasan adalah hasil langsung dari proses demokratisasi. Sementara *Money and Power in Provincial Thailand* meneliti bentuk dominasi baru ekonomi dan politik yang mempengaruhi hubungan antara Bangkok dan pedesaan. Secara keseluruhan, kedua buku ini membuktikan kemunculan menguatnya politik di tingkat pedesaan yang secara lebih umum mempengaruhi politik Thailand.

Kedua karya ini secara implisit mempertanyakan relevansi dua perspektif teori yang sangat dominan dalam menggambarkan Thailand sebagai "pemerintahan birokrasi" atau "pemerintahan korporasi-liberal." Kritik terhadap perspektif ini mesti didorong lebih jauh. Fenomena yang dijelaskan di sini-munculnya *chao pho* di pedesaan, patronase mereka dengan politisi tingkat nasional, meningkatnya kekerasan elektoral politik, dan menyebarnya korupsi-mengindikasikan ketahanan "demokrasi patrimonial," kondisi yang membuat negara Thailand terus berada dalam teka-teki antara favoritisme, nepotisme dan kekuasaan yang akan sangat ditentukan oleh kontak personal. Bentuk kompetisi politik berubah dari intra-birokrasi menjadi perebutan di tingkat elektoral, tetapi esensinya masih tetap sama.

Saat sarjana Thailand cenderung menganalisa masalah ini dari sisi moralitas, kita mesti melihat bahwa keadaan patrimonial dalam demokrasi telah memberikan banyak keuntungan pada politisi, dan agaknya susah untuk merubah perilaku mereka. Dengan kata lain, kepentingan kelas yang berkuasa sangat memiliki kepentingan untuk memelihara bentuk demokrasi yang sekarang.

Translated by Wahyu Prasetyawan

## Ang Pagsasalokal ng Pulitika sa Thailand

*Nishizaki Yoshinori*

Sinusuri sa sanaysay na ito ang mga aklat na naglalarawan at nag-aanalisa sa tatlong bagong-litaw na penomenong panlipunan sa Thailand: ang pag-usbong ng mga lokal na hepe o gangster, na kilala bilang *chao pbo*; ang pag-unlad ng mga kapitalista sa probinsya at panggitnang uri na aktibong nakikisangkot sa pulitika; at ang paglaganap ng katiwalian. Tinitingnan sa *Corruption and Democracy in Thailand* ang mas madilim na aspeto ng kanayunan, tulad ng katiwalian, pamamaslang, at karahasan, na tinitingnan ng mga may-akda bilang mga direktang resulta ng demokratisasyon. Sinusuri naman sa *Money and Power in Provincial Thailand* kung paano naaapektuhan ng bagong padron ng dominasyong pampulitika at pang-ekonomya ang relasyon sa pagitan ng Bangkok at ng kanayunan. Ang dalawang aklat na ito ay nagbibigay-patunay sa panlalawigang direksyon ng pulitikang Thai sa kabuuan.

Di-hayang na kinukuwestyon ng dalawang aklat ang patuloy na kaangkupan ng dalawang dominanteng perspektibong teoretikal na tumutukoy sa Thailand bilang “bureaucratic polity” o bilang “liberal-corporatist polity.” Ang kritikal na pagsuri sa mga perspektibong ito ay kinakailangan pang ipagpatuloy. Ang penomenong inilalarawan dito – ang pag-usbong ng *chao pbo* sa lalawigan, ang “patronage alliance” nito sa mga pambansang pulitiko, ang paglaganap ng karahasan sa mga halalang pulitikal, at ang paglaganap ng katiwalian – ay tanda ng pleksibilidad ng “patrimonial democracy,” isang kalagayan kung saan ang pamahalaang Thai ay patuloy na pinahihina ng paboritismo at nepotismo at kung saan ang kapangyarihan ay patuloy na kinakasangkapan sa pamamagitan ng mga personal na kuneksyon. Ang porma ng kumpetisyong pulitikal ay nagbago mula sa intra-burukratikong pag-aagawan patungo sa pag-aagawang pang-halalan, subalit nananatiling pareho ang esensya ng kumpetisyon.

Habang karamihan sa mga iskolar na Thai ay pumupuna sa penomenong ito sa usapin ng moralidad, kinakailangan nating kilalanin na ang katangiang patrimonyal ng demokrasya ay lubhang napakinabangan ng mga pulitiko kung kaya't kakaunti lamang ang natitirang insentibo upang baguhin ang kanilang nakagawian. Sa madaling sabi, ang interes ng naghaharing uri ay nakasalalay sa pagpapanatili sa kasalukuyang porma ng demokrasya.

Translated by Sofia Guillermo

## タイ政治の地方化

西崎義則 (Nishizaki Yoshinori)

本稿においては、近年タイで観察される3つの社会現象、チャオ・ポーとして知られる地方ボスの台頭、政治的に活動的な地方資本家と中産階級の成長、腐敗の拡大、の分析を評論する。Corruption and Democracy in Thailand (タイにおける腐敗と民主主義)において、パースックは汚職や殺人、暴力を民主化の直接的結果と捉え、こうした地方の腐敗した側面を分析する。Money and Power in Provincial Thailand (タイの地方における金と権力)は、新たな政治・経済支配の様式がバンコクと地方の関係にどのように影響を与えてきたかを分析したものである。これらの研究は共に、全体として、タイ政治に於いて地方がますます重要となっていることを示すものである。

両研究は、タイ政治を捉える2つの優勢な理論、「官僚国家」と「自由協同組合主義国家」が今後も適切であるかどうか疑いを挟んでいる。こうした批判はさらに進める必要がある。これらの研究において分析された現象（地方におけるチャオ・ポーの台頭、彼らと中央政治家の癒着、選挙政治における暴力の増大、腐敗の拡大）は、「家産制民主主義」の回復、つまりタイ国家においてひいきと縁故主義がなお蔓延し、個人的コネを通じて国家権力が利用され続けていることを示すものである。政治的競争の形式は官僚内の競争から選挙における競争に変化しても、その本質は変わっていない。

タイ人研究者はこうした現象を道徳的見地から論評する傾向が強い。しかし、我々としては、民主主義の家産制的性質が政治家を利するものであり、そのため政治家にはその行動を変えるインセンティブなどほとんどないものという認識しておく必要がある。つまり簡単に言えば、支配階級にとっては現にある民主主義体制を維持することが利益なのである。

Translated by Morishita Akiko (森下明子)

## อิทธิพลของท้องถิ่นในการเมืองไทย

*Nishizaki Yoshinori* (นิชิซากิ โยชิโนริ)

บทความชิ้นนี้เป็นการวิจารณ์หนังสือสองเล่ม ซึ่งอธิบายและวิเคราะห์สภาพปรากฏการณ์ทางสังคมในประเทศไทยที่เกิดขึ้นในระยะเวลาไม่นานมานี้ นั่นคือ การเกิดขึ้นของกลุ่มอันธพาลท้องถิ่นที่เรียกกันว่า เจ้าพ่อ การเติบโตของนายทุนและชนชั้นกลางท้องถิ่นที่เข้ามามีบทบาททางการเมือง และระดับของการคอร์รัปชันที่เพิ่มขึ้น หนังสือ *คอร์รัปชันกับประชาธิปไตยไทย* ให้ความสนใจด้านเลวร้ายที่เกิดขึ้นในท้องถิ่นไทย เช่น การคอร์รัปชัน ฆาตกรรมและการใช้ความรุนแรง ซึ่งผู้เขียนทั้งสองเห็นว่าเป็นผลมาจากการส่งเสริมการปกครองแบบประชาธิปไตยที่มีการเลือกตั้ง ส่วนหนังสือ *Money and Power in Provincial Thailand* สืบว่า การครอบงำทางการเมืองและเศรษฐกิจแบบใหม่ มีผลกระทบต่อความสัมพันธ์ระหว่างกรุงเทพฯ กับท้องถิ่นในวิถีทางอย่างไรบ้าง เมื่อนำมาพิจารณาาร่วมกัน หนังสือสองเล่มนี้ได้แสดงให้เห็นชัดเจนว่า ท้องถิ่นได้เข้ามามีอิทธิพลต่อความเปลี่ยนแปลงของการเมืองไทยโดยรวมมากขึ้น

หนังสือทั้งสองเล่มต่างก็ตั้งคำถามกับกรอบการมองทางทฤษฎีสองแบบที่เป็นกระแสหลักในขณะนี้ว่า ยังใช้ได้กับการเมืองไทยต่อไปหรือไม่ ไม่ว่าจะเป็นการมองในแบบ “องค์กรรัฐข้าราชการ” หรือ “องค์กรรัฐธุรกิจเสรีนิยม” อย่างไรก็ตาม การวิพากษ์กรอบการมองในทางทฤษฎีทั้งสองแบบนี้ควรมีการขยายความให้มากขึ้น ปรากฏการณ์ต่างๆ ที่บรรยายถึงไม่ว่าจะเป็นการเกิดขึ้นของ เจ้าพ่อ ท้องถิ่น ความสัมพันธ์ในเชิงอุปถัมภ์ที่มีกับนักการเมืองระดับชาติ ความรุนแรงที่ขยายวงกว้างมากขึ้นในการเลือกตั้ง และการแพร่ระบาดของคอร์รัปชัน ชี้ให้เห็นถึงความสามารถในการปรับตัวของ “ระบอบประชาธิปไตยแบบสืบทอดอำนาจ” อันเป็นเงื่อนไขที่ทำให้รัฐไทยยังเต็มไปด้วย

การเล่นพรรคเล่นพวกและระบบเครือญาติ และอำนาจรัฐยังคงถูกควบคุมโดยความสัมพันธ์ส่วนบุคคล แม้ว่ารูปแบบของการแข่งขันทางการเมืองได้เปลี่ยนแปลงไปจากการต่อสู้แย่งชิงในระบบราชการมาเป็นการต่อสู้แย่งชิงในการเลือกตั้ง แต่เนื้อหาของการแข่งขันยังคงเหมือนเดิม

นักวิชาการไทยมักจะวิพากษ์วิจารณ์ปรากฏการณ์นี้จากจุดยืนทางศีลธรรมแต่เราก็ควรตระหนักด้วยว่า ผลประโยชน์มหาศาลที่นักการเมืองได้รับจากระบบประชาธิปไตยแบบสืบทอดอำนาจต่างหาก ที่ทำให้พฤติกรรมของพวกเขาเปลี่ยนแปลงไปน้อยมาก กลางๆๆ คือ ผลประโยชน์ของพวกเขาผู้ปกครองยังอิงอยู่กับการรักษารูปแบบประชาธิปไตยที่เป็นอยู่ในปัจจุบันเอาไว้แน่นอน

Translated by Pakavadi Jitsakulchaidej

# Thaksinomics

*Nidhi Eoseewong*

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Dr. Kasian Tejapera calls the economic policy of the current government "Thaksinomics." This means, in essence, that the government bestows patronage on its affiliated crony capitalist groups on the one hand and garners support from the lower classes by increasing their economic power on the other.

This approach seems to make sense – the American-style liberal economic reform pursued by the previous Democrat Party government didn't bring about a sustained economic recovery, and Thailand's real economic power lies in the crony capitalism that has built up the economy until now. Thus, the argument goes, the government should no longer harm crony capital but patronize it, so as to jointly revive the economy. And if we are going to patronize crony capital anyway, wouldn't it be better to direct the patronage to our own cronies?

After all, while the export market remains in the doldrums, other markets

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must be sought. And what market could be more promising than the domestic one, of which the lower classes comprise the majority? Hence the various measures adopted to enhance the economic power of the lower classes – measures that will not only strengthen the domestic market but also win the government overwhelming popular political support.

Everybody seems to be happy with this. The Thaksin government has proposed several projects to serve the needs of these two groups, for example, a nationwide road construction project to tackle poverty. The opposition has attacked this particular project as representing an obsolete policy tried in vain by many previous governments. But as a matter of fact, this project is not quite the same as those that have gone before.

For one thing, instead of pumping fifty billion Baht into the export industry to see it through a time of shrinking foreign markets, the government uses this chunk of money to create jobs in the countryside. To be sure, the money does not fall directly into local people's hands but into the pockets of contractors from the top down to the local level, where they also function as vote canvassers. But since road construction creates employment, some money eventually trickles down into the villagers' hands and purchasing power in the countryside increases. Although it may not fully replace the shrinking American and Japanese markets, it does slightly lessen economic hardship, at least among lower-class villagers and contractors with political connections. So both crony capitalists and the grassroots benefit and are happy with Thaksinomics.

The trouble is this money will circulate swiftly back to the city, leaving the low-income market with its usual lack of purchasing power. If we want to generate sustainable purchasing power in the low-income market, we have to think of things that will enhance village productivity, rather than merely produce more roads. Such productivity schemes could range from developing pre-existing production bases to initiating social investment programs to develop individual and community strengths.

However, crony capital wouldn't get a satisfactory return from the latter



option, whereas road construction satisfies both parties. At least the villagers would feel it's better than getting nothing at all, and would be happy to have enough to spend comfortably for a while, even if it is not sustainable.

Thaksinomics should be able to maintain a strong and lasting political base if it can perpetually coordinate the interests of these two groups. But that will be impossible. The interests of the crony capitalists and the grassroots, despite the long co-existence of the two groups, aren't really in accord. This is particularly apparent when lower-class people stand up for their rights and interests on equal terms with other social groups, as is happening now.

The controversy over the policy to liberalize liquor production is a vivid example of the eventual incompatibility of their interests. Lower-class people have long urged the state to liberalize liquor production. None of the reasons given by the state for its monopoly of liquor production and its sale of concessions to a handful of capitalists is sound.

It is not the case that the concessionaires' liquor is without hazard to consumer health. On the contrary, it is quite evidently harmful. Neither have the monopoly and sale of concessions led to a decrease in alcohol consumption, because the supply of liquor, especially *lao khao* [literally "white liquor," a locally produced drink], is never short in the market. Nor have they led to the improvements in liquor production necessary to compete in the international market. And, of course, the cost of concession fees and the market monopoly make it impossible for the retail price of concessionaires' liquor to be low and fair.

In contrast, liquor produced by the villagers themselves using traditional techniques passed down through many generations is less harmful. There is less methyl alcohol in their liquor, for example. And if liquor were to be produced freely, it is unlikely that consumption would increase much from the current level.

Free production of liquor would lead to competition in the domestic

market and prices would fall to reasonable levels. (The mantra of free competition is more aptly preached in this matter than others since the low cost of production would make for a comparatively level playing field.) Competition would drive up quality to the point where local Thai liquor could be exported to compete successfully or at least find a niche in the world market.

The quality of distilled and fermented liquor depends not only on production techniques but also on the quality of the yeast used. The kind of yeast that creates fine and aromatic liquor can only come from a long process of selective breeding. Liberalizing liquor production would afford villagers an opportunity to develop their respective families' yeast strains which could be securely inherited by their children rather than easily stolen by the scientist-pirates. This is actually a model of development based on people's own traditional knowledge or local wisdom.

And yet the cabinet has just passed a resolution permitting free production of liquor with no more than 15 percent alcohol content. This means that the cabinet has yielded somewhat to village pressure but still obdurately protects the interests of crony capital. In "liquor-speak," the cabinet resolution reads as a liberalization of liquor fermentation only, involving drinks such as *kaebae*, *wak*, *namtan mao*, and *ou*, since the alcoholic content of fermented liquor cannot possibly exceed 15 percent. (Even so-called "strong beer," which is fermented twice, contains only about 12-15 percent alcohol.) Villagers may be able to produce fruit wine but since it does not belong to the tradition of Thai alcoholic beverages, it may not find a sufficient local market. A perforce dependence on external markets would make it impossible for the villagers to commercialize fruit wine production, because they lack the capital necessary for large-scale production and marketing.

At the same time, there is only a small local market for the kinds of fermented liquor the Thais are good at making, such as *kaebae* [pasteurized rice wine that has not matured], for it normally turns sour within a day. To control *kaebae*'s fermenting process to extend its shelf life requires filtering out the yeast, a technology whose investment cost is beyond villagers' means.

The only method known to Thai people to both produce liquor for a wider market and preserve it for an extended period is the distillation technique that transforms fermented into distilled liquor. Like other Asian peoples, Thais have long distilled liquor for their own consumption. Distilled liquor, however, has an alcohol content well over 15 percent. Apparently, those in power still forbid the free production of distilled liquor in order to reserve this segment of the market for their own capitalist cronies to make a killing.

The result? Thais have to buy lousy liquor from the capitalists even though they possess the knowledge to produce fine liquor for their own consumption. No sooner had the cabinet adopted the resolution than a large beer brewery announced its plan to produce *lao khao*. Of course, it's glaringly obvious that the *lao khao* market has now been protected and secured for crony capital.

This is a case of incompatibility between the interests of crony capitalists and villagers. Hence local people nationwide have announced the continuation of their campaign for the full liberalization of liquor production, rejecting the cabinet resolution that hinders the use of local wisdom.

It is hard to guess how this case will end. Meanwhile, the conflict between excise officers and local people will escalate. What can be surmised, however, is that many similar cases of incompatibility of interest will follow, such as the coal-powered electric plant project in Prachuab Kirikhan, the Thai-Malaysian gas-pipeline project in Songkhla, the community forest issue (even a community forest bill will not eliminate conflict between villagers and crony capitalists), the National Broadcasting Commission (NBC), the National Telecommunication Commission (NTC), etc.

I can't predict how Thaksinomics is going to end up. But it is rather implausible that it will remain the darling of these two groups, whose interests are so incompatible, for more than four years.

## Writing Reformasi

*Kloo Boo Teik*

"Perforated Sheets," a newspaper column

Amir Muhammad

Kuala Lumpur / *New Straits Times* / 2 September 1998-3 February 1999

*Face Off: A Malaysian Reformasi Diary (1998-99)*

Sabri Zain

Singapore / Options Publications / 2000

SHIT@Pukimak@PM (Novel Politik Yang Busuk Lagi Membusukkan)

(SHIT@Pukimak@PM: A political novel that stinks and creates stinks)

Shahnon Ahmad

Kubang Krian, Kelantan, Malaysia / Pustaka Reka / 1999

Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, now approaching his twenty-first year in office as Malaysia's fourth premier, has long treated politics as mostly a matter of economics, and supposedly hard-nosed economics, to correct "Malay relative backwardness" and to make Malaysia a "developed country." For him, culture held little attraction, especially the culture of his majority ethnic Malay community which he regarded as being deficient and in need of rectification. In 1998-99, Mahathir's regime was rocked by a Malay cultural revolt that arose after Mahathir dismissed his deputy, Anwar Ibrahim, on 2 September 1998.

Several events deepened the revolt against Mahathir's regime. Less than forty-eight hours after his dismissal, Anwar, whom UMNO had elected deputy president in 1993 and 1996, was expelled by the ruling party's Supreme Council. The state-controlled mass media sensationalized the "reasons" for Anwar's fall—chiefly allegations that Anwar had committed adultery with his secretary's wife

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(and other unnamed women) and sodomy with his driver, his speech writer, and his adopted brother. Perhaps Mahathir and his allies expected that the tawdry allegations of sodomy (a crime under Malaysian law and a sin against Islam), would stun Malaysian society, especially the Malay/Muslim community, into a cowed acceptance of Anwar's guilt. If so, they miscalculated. Mahathir, who had little empathy for Malay culture, had transgressed against a "social contract" going back to the Malay Annals that forbade a ruler from shaming the ruled (Cheah 1998).

Refusing to fade away, however, Anwar called for Reformasi – for reforms that opposed Mahathir's "cronyistic" responses to the 1997 East Asian financial crisis and that carried, in the Malay language, echoes from the Indonesian movement against *kolusi, korupsi, nepotisme* (collusion, corruption, and nepotism) that had toppled Suharto's New Order regime in May 1998. On 20 September 1998, balaclava-clad, submachine-gun-toting commandos broke into Anwar's home, arrested Anwar, and whisked him to the national police headquarters in Bukit Aman, Kuala Lumpur. There, a handcuffed and blindfolded Anwar was severely beaten by the Inspector-General of Police. Days later, an injured and black-eyed Anwar was officially charged with ten offenses in the first of two trials, which began in November 1998.

This constellation of events, briefly noted here, provoked huge, mostly spontaneous protests against Mahathir's regime. In towns and villages, within the civil service, on university campuses, among students studying overseas, and even at UMNO's lower levels, Malay popular opinion expressed moral revulsion at Anwar's shaming, his family's humiliation, and the community's disgrace. The revulsion deepened with the media's lurid descriptions of Anwar's alleged homosexual acts, the secret assault on him which Mahathir initially dismissed as being possibly "self-inflicted," and the prosecution's almost lewd conduct of parts of the trial. Moral outrage turned into political opposition as peaceful protesters were incessantly attacked by riot police in the streets, near mosques, and close to the courthouse where Anwar was being tried.

That turmoil produced political outcomes which cannot be covered by

this essay. But Reformasi blossomed as a cultural movement producing writings and art forms that variously criticized, challenged, and mocked Mahathir and his regime. Reformasi came to stand for alternative media of expression, communication, and debate which were unshackled by state censorship, if not quite liberated from state retribution. A notable example was the five-fold increase in circulation of *Harakah*, the twice-weekly organ of Parti Islam (PAS) (to 300,000 copies from 65,000 before Reformasi), despite legal restrictions on the sale of party newspapers to non-party members. New Malay-language magazines such as *Tamadun*, *Detik*, *Wasilah*, and *Eksklusif* flourished with a steady stream of criticism. Internet Reformasi websites mushroomed. Some belonged to opposition parties and non-governmental organizations. Some sites, like Raja Petra Kamaruddin's *The Malaysian* and *Kini*, were kept by individuals who disdained to conceal their names or goals. Many more sites were anonymously maintained but made clear their principal concerns by their designations and "links": *Laman Reformasi* (Reformasi Website), *Jiwa Merdeka* (Soul of Independence), *Anwar Online*, *freemalaysia*, et cetera. Yet others flaunted names like *Mahafiraun 2020* (Great Pharaoh 2020) or *Mahazalim* (Great Tyrant) in derision of Mahathir.

It would, of course, take more than a short essay to adequately interpret the immense literary output of Reformasi. This essay has the limited aim of taking some sounding of Reformasi's underlying social and political themes by offering a political reading of a set of newspaper articles, a diary, and a novel. These were written by Malay authors critical of the regime and/or sympathetic to Anwar to different degrees. All the writings were quite popular among dissident circles.

### Amir Muhammad: The arms of criticism

On 2 September 1998, the Literary & Books section of the English-language broadsheet *New Straits Times* carried an article, "The importance of being 'queer,'" in the fortnightly column "Perforated Sheets." Amir Muhammad, the columnist, would no doubt have found it uncanny that his article, bearing such a headline and speculating on links between literary talent and homosexuality, should have appeared the very day the Anwar affair began.

Yet the article (which had no reference to any local person) could scarcely have had Anwar in mind, let alone have divined his fate. Amir was then, as he is now, neither a prude nor a hack but a brilliant, young, independent literary and film critic who kept his column bristling with entertaining erudition and irreverent wit. And although he was capable of clever political asides, overt politics was not the main fare of "Perforated Sheets." That changed with Amir's first piece published after the Anwar affair began and continued until his last article appeared on 3 February 1999. During this period, as Kuala Lumpur seethed with Reformasi fervor, Amir employed biting sarcasm to make connections, or urge his readers to make their own connections, between art and life. In "We don't need monodramas" (16 September 1998), he derided the regime's blatantly partisan coverage of the Anwar affair as a "style of theater" mounted by "an uncharismatic monodramatist who insists on shoving all his views down my throat," leaving him feeling "dirty, ravaged and violated." Two weeks later came "The beginning of *The Trial*" (30 September 1998), which invited readers to ponder Joseph K's fate in Kafka's classic "allegory of totalitarian state control" and to thereby raise questions about Anwar's impending prosecution. "Megalomaniacs don't last" (14 October 1998) introduced Mark Leyner's novel, *Et Tu Babe*, that showed the "strange and horrible things that happen when the idea of dictatorship is taken to its logical conclusion." Two further articles ("Deny thy country, young man," 28 October 1998, and "Our patriotism running amok," 9 December 1998) ridiculed the regime's claim to all manner of patriotism, which it used to deflect local and international criticism. In the latter article, Amir flayed a bureaucratic "literary nationalism" that nominated Malaysian (Malay) literature for the Nobel Prize and "the Pulitzer and Booker prizes ... [forgetting] that the former is open only to American books while the latter only picks stuff published in Britain and written in the English language." "Justice in *The Crucible*" (11 November 1998) drew parallels between Arthur Miller's play about witch-hunts in seventeenth-century Salem, Massachusetts, and Anwar's ordeal to stress that a "pernicious cycle of cold lies and hot resentment" allowed "some people [to] seize [a] trial as a chance to settle old scores or pursue their own hidden agenda." Such a reading of *The Crucible* intimated associations between Umi Hafilda, one of the prosecution's "star witnesses," and "the scheming Abigail," and between Dr. Wan Azizah,

Anwar's wife, and "the virtuous Elizabeth."

Amir let fly his maverick imagination with his first piece for 1999: "20 books that we need" (6 January 1999). The truly funny "20 book ideas that I hope to see fully fleshed out... by the millenium's end" covered the "talking points" of the Anwar trial. Notable examples (and their subjects in real life) included: "Clothes coordination for siblings" (Umi Hafilda and her brother's wardrobe during Umi's court appearances); "Out, out, damn spot!" (a semen-stained mattress brought to court by the prosecution); "The allure of the black eye" (Anwar's bashed-up face); "An intelligent parent's guide to sodomy and other painful issues" (testimony by Anwar's ex-driver on Anwar's alleged sodomy); "Excuse me, are you an SB officer?" (the role of the Special Branch police); and "Tips for terrific turn-overs" (Special Branch interrogation techniques).

Amir's concluding lines deserve separate mention. The Kafka review exhorted: "For more answers, don't look at me. Get up and march-to a bookstore." The piece on "megalomaniacs" concluded: "But, hey, when he's got to go, he's got to go!" The article on *The Crucible* remarked that "Our real pity and loathing is reserved for the citizens who did not take a stand when their neighbors were victimised. By the time they realised that they were next on the list, it was already too late, since the forces of unreason had been permitted to hold dominion for so long." And at the end of "The comedy of *American Psycho*" (20 January 1999): "... at the very least, you realize that the task of parodying a society that's rapidly turning into a parody of itself can be murder."

To poke fun at a regime in trouble is to perforate its legitimacy, which was a large part of what Reformasi meant. It was presumably why Amir's popular column was wrapped up. But note Amir's preference for "unreason" over, say, "repression," which most dissidents would have seized upon, and his choice of "parody," which few others would have used to depict the tumultuous transformation of society. Amir's irony ill-concealed his disapprobation but his prose remained polished, arguably polite. No doubt Amir had an attitude, but it was generally anti-establishment rather than deliberately anti-regime at the 1998-99 conjuncture. In that Amir perhaps wrote as if Reformasi was staring at him



from the streets of Kuala Lumpur.

### Sabri Zain: A shopper's diary

I admire Amir's work and mean him no slight by saying that Sabri Zain, on the other hand, wrote from the streets. To be precise, Sabri (usually with his "significant other") moved between the street and the Net, between participating in "Reformasi events" and dashing home to spread the "alternative" news via his online Reformasi Diary. Sabri kept his diary and shared his insights at a time when no one in his right political mind believed the mainstream media.

*Face Off* is the print version of Sabri's original (and longer) diary. The book contains forty "entries" covering the year between 20 September 1998 and 19 September 1999, as well as an introduction and epilogue. Here, in the jottings of an "Internet journalist," one encounters the very stuff of politics as drama—protests in the streets, rallies in Merdeka Square, escapes from police attack, candlelight vigils outside prisons, trekking in mud to *ceramah* (political talks) under dark, queuing to enter the courthouse, and the launching of the National Justice Party (led by Wan Azizah) in a hotel. From Sabri's "participant observation" the reader gets a dissection of the dynamic of "face off" between ordinary, unarmed, peaceful protesters and baton-wielding "Red Helmets" (Federal Reserve Unit riot police) and plainclothes Special Branch personnel backed by water cannon. Here, with sincere and light-hearted humility, is a moving tribute to the nameless heroes and heroines Sabri met — "elderly men, middle-aged men and women, young girls... senior managers in the private sector... executives or civil servants, teachers, businessmen, lawyers," and "Rockers in leather jackets." In their ranks were hundreds of Orang Kena Tuduh (legalese for "the accused"), people who had been detained by the police for "illegal assembly." To them Sabri's book is dedicated. Their varied backgrounds reveal Reformasi's broad social front along which the regime's legitimacy was lost.

Sabri's accounts of landmark Reformasi events are unsurpassed for their accuracy, balance, and spirit. His choice of simple words often befits the occasion admirably. For example, when "not wishing to break the law Reform movement

organizers 'invited' Malaysians to join them 'shopping' in downtown Kuala Lumpur"; Sabri accepted the invitation and afterwards wrote "Shopping For Justice." The title phrase at once captured the spontaneous, fluid, and inchoate character of early Reformasi protests. Queuing in a forlorn attempt to get a seat in the packed courtroom of Anwar's trial inspired "Waiting For Justice," while "An Evening With Justice" recorded the equally packed Breaking of Ramadan Fast with Wan Azizah at the Renaissance Hotel on 16 January 1999. And, finally, "The Eye Of Justice" summed up several motifs in the founding of the National Justice Party: its logo was an eye formed of two blue crescents, its cause célèbre had suffered a black eye, and its first president was an ophthalmologist!

Any good diary must capture changing moods, colors, and sentiments. *Face Off* does exactly that. It not only records the fears, pains, and anger felt at street level. It also catches the broader cynicism via spoofs which Sabri created in the mold of lengthy internet jokes: "Malaysia's top brains answer the call for a PM 'replica,'" "A brief (but helpful) guide to reading the Malaysian press," "Protecting your child from politically-explicit online material," and "The Reformasi aptitude test." Above all, Sabri himself registers surprise at the rapid change in social and political attitudes. Almost unimaginable before Anwar's fall and Reformasi's emergence, elderly Chinese read *Harakah*, the Selangor Chinese Town Hall Civil Rights Committee forum features an all-Malay panel, Malays in large numbers attend the "Chinese" Democratic Action Party (DAP) forums, Malays keep a vigil for DAP's Lim Guan Eng whose defence of an underaged Malay girl led him to prison, and the oft-arrested and severely bashed Tian Chua becomes a hero to predominantly Malay protesters. There was also this perceptive sense of solidarity noted in the entry for 2 February 1999:

"The four of us posed for the camera and, as the flash dazzled my eyes for a moment, it suddenly dawned on me. Here were four people, from four different political parties – Keadilan, PRM, DAP, and PAS. We were standing arm in arm, not giving a damn about our political or ideological differences, but just united in celebrating the birth of yet another force for justice, and joined by a common desire for change in our country."

Sabri cryptically added, "I hope the picture turns out right." I don't know about the quality of the photograph, but six months later, the four opposition parties formed a coalition, Barisan Alternatif (Alternative Front).

### Shahnon Ahmad: By virtue of profanity

In fact, by the time Anwar was sentenced to six years' imprisonment upon his conviction on "Black 14" (14 April 1999), Malay popular opinion and dissident sentiment had stiffened. Reformasi supporters no longer reveled in "alternative media." They now exulted in the possibility of electing an "alternative government" in the next general election. The most explicit literary exposition of this mood swing came in the form of a novel written by National Laureate Shahnon Ahmad, first published in April 1999.

The full title of the novel is SHIT@Pukimak@PM (A political novel that stinks and creates stinks). The novel is an allegory located, as it were, in the bowels of the human body where bodily waste – in lumps (*ketulan*), piles (*longgakan*), and heaps (*lambakan*) – forms a "shit front" with one powerful lump, "PM," at its head. Malodorous emanations rise from the body to raise a terrible stink that permeates every nook, cranny, and crack. The way to end the unbearable stench is to expel the turds or to have them leave of their own accord, in either case via the normal "blessed hole" (*lobang keramat*). But both options are prevented by "PM," whose followers do nothing but continue "nodding" (*angguk*) in acquiescence, fearful that recalcitrance will bring swift punishment. As the situation deteriorates, one courageous lump (Wirawan, from *wira* meaning hero) opposes "PM," in particular the latter's "mega project MKKM" (*Masuk-ke luar keluar-masuk*, in-out out-in). So "PM" fixes Wirawan in a conspiracy that ejects him from the sheltered zone of power (*keawasan kekuasaan*) to be left to the mercy of the "people turds" (*ketulan rakyat jelata*) composed of the "wind, rain, earth, sun, trees and people." At that instant, Wirawan, though long alienated from the "axis of popular struggle" (*paksi perjuangan rakyat*), is cleansed of foulness by the gathering rain, finds popular support, and interjects "a term that he had hitherto kept to himself": Reformasi! Then comes a Wirawan-led expedition ("Anabasis") that succeeds in ejecting "PM" to face the popular

wrath, leaving Wirawan with the duty of working with the people to pave “a new highway” with “beauty, faith, justice and sincerity” (*keindahan, keimanan, keadilan dan keikhlasan*).

In the Reformasi milieu, the direct link between the novel's plot and Malaysia's tension and turmoil pre-and post-2 September is immediately recognizable. No savvy reader, Malay, non-Malay, or non-Malaysian, can overlook Shanon's barely disguised allusions: the antagonists, “PM” and “Wirawan”; a “stinking and stink-creating administration”; a sycophantic polity inhabited by nodding “yes shits”; the “Zenith Council”; and so on. The text is full of now titillating and thrilling, now offputting and tedious, descriptions of body parts, wastes, fluids, and movements. About the tone of the story, not much needs to be said other than this: it is viciously cynical before becoming, in hindsight, hopelessly wishful. But to read the novel politically is to grapple with its most controversial element, that is, Shanon's language, and specifically his excessive if not obsessive use of obscenities.

In the lexicon of the novel, “shit” (*taik*) is arguably the least offensive term, at any rate for squeamish readers. The most offensive word, though perhaps deliciously apt to other readers, is PukiMak. What does the term mean? Neither Sumit Mandal, who observed that “Shit is not easy bedtime reading” (Mandal 1999), nor Farish A. Noor, who considered “Shanon's tale [to be] a riot of metaphors, allegories and similes so confused that the reader is left clueless at times to understand what the message of the text is” (Farish 1999), referred to the word at all. Amir Muhammad, predictably too irreverent to ignore the “blistering display of iconoclasm and earthy hyperbole” – “it would take an ass not to respond to the life-affirming humour” – but perhaps limited by the morals of the regional press, called it “a common but harsh Malay expletive referring to female genitalia” (Amir 1999). Yet an unflinching reader would say, “Cunt” – in the tone one uses to say “Motherfucker!” – and be done with it.

Well, one cannot be done with it yet. *SHIT* was an immediate best-seller: an initial print run of 15,000 copies was quickly sold out. Whatever one thinks

of the novel *qua* novel, its popularity spoke to its effectiveness as an allegory specific to the political circumstances of the day. Part of the sub-title of the novel, *busuk dan membusukkan*, has been translated as “stinks and creates stinks.” More to the point, Shahnon’s scatological imagery, which relentlessly brings to mind pictures of filth, stench, and waste, evokes a miasma of corruption that has so defiled the body politic that all its institutional organs must be turned inside out for a public cleansing. That Shahnon quite happily spews out some of the most vulgar Malay swear words is partly explained by the author’s admission of a “repressed side” to his personality (Amir 1999). But amidst the rising tide of disgust at the unrestrained media and testimonial revelations of anal penetration, semen, and masturbation, perhaps one National Laureate’s catharsis – what other solution to repression is there? – offered cultural release to a community oppressed by *atib* (shame).

So along the “alternative information” superhighway Shahnon’s profanity sped and was swiftly, angrily, or joyously adopted as an anti-regime code. PukiMak, sometimes decorously given as P\*\*\*M\*\*, whether written with or without its aliases, became a favorite word in Reformasi cyberspace (along with “DSAI,” an abbreviation for Dato Seri Anwar Ibrahim). With UMNO’s severe loss of support in the “Malay heartland” in the November 1999 general election, it would seem unnecessary to argue whether a mass Malay readership was “clueless” about the “message” of SHIT.

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## Menulis Reformasi

*Kboo Boo Teik*

Pada 1998-99, pemerintahan Malaysia dibawah Perdana Menteri Mahathir Mohamad dikagetkan oleh revolusi budaya yang muncul setelah Mahathir menurunkan wakilnya, Anwar Ibrahim. Media massa yang dikontrol ketat oleh negara membumbui sensasi "alasan" kejatuhan Anwar-dengan tuduhan perzinahan dan sodomi-yang melanggar "kontrak sosial" yang melarang pemimpin untuk mempermalukan pemerintahan. Sebagai tambahan bagi manifestasi politiknya, Reformasi muncul sebagai bentuk gerakan budaya yang menghasilkan tulisan yang mengkritik, menantang dan mempermainkan rejim Mahathir. Reformasi tumbuh menjadi alternatif ekspresi dan perdebatan terhadap sensor negara yang begitu ketat. Esai ini menawarkan bacaan politik dari kolom di surat kabar, catatan harian, dan novel yang sangat populer di kalangan penentang Mahathir.

Amir Muhammad adalah anak muda brilian, penulis kritik sastra dan film independen yang kolomnya di surat kabar memakai kritik sastra sarkastik tajam untuk menghubungkan antara seni dan kehidupan. Dia menuliskan secara terbuka liputan media partisan, kontrol negara, patriotisme "mengamuk," dan pemburuan terhadap dukun pada masa abad ke tujuh belas. Kolom Amir memparodikan rejim bermasalah, yang sedang membuat lubang terhadap legitimasinya sendiri, walaupun demikian prosa yang ditulisnya masih sopan dan santun.

Sabri Zain menulis dari jalanan, ambil bagian dalam "peristiwa reformasi" dan menyebarkan media "alternatif" melalui Catatan Reformasi yang terhubung secara online ketika banyak orang yang tak percaya lagi terhadap media utama. Catatan hariannya mencatat perubahan wajah orang biasa, tidak bersenjata, pemprotes damai berhadapan dengan polisi anti huru-hara bersama dengan tank airnya. Dia mencatat perubahan

cepat pada sikap sosial dan politik yang mengarah kepada solidaritas dan pencarian keadilan.

Sastrawan Nasional Shahnnon Ahmad memakai alegori usus dalam tubuh manusia. Baginya usus dalam adalah tempat tubuh menghasilkan “barisan kotoran” yang dipimpin oleh “PM” yang sangat kuat. Administrasi “yang busuk lagi membusukkan” mengarah pada sikap politik yang menjilat dan selalu mengganggu “iya.” Ditengah perasaan muak yang terungkapkan lewat penetrasi anal, semen, dan masturbasi mungkin katarsis Sastrawan Nasional memberikan pelepasan budaya terhadap masyarakat yang sangat menekankan aib.

Translated by Wahyu Prasetyawan



## Ang Pagsusulat sa Reformasi

*Khoo Boo Teik*

Mula 1998 hanggang 1999, ang pamahalaan ni Mahathir Mohamad, ang Punong Ministro ng Malaysia, ay niyanig ng isang pag-aalsang kultural bunga ng kanyang pagtanggap sa pusisyon kay Anwar Ibrahim, ang kanyang dating kanang kamay. Ang mga “dahilan” para sa pagbagsak ni Anwar – mga alegasyon ng *adultery at sodomy* – ay pinagpiyestahan ng mass media na kontrolado ng estado na, dahil dito, ay lumabag sa “social contract” na nagbabawal sa isang pinuno na pahiyain ang pinamumunuan. Maliban pa sa mga pulitikal na manipistasyon nito, namukadkad ang Reformasi bilang isang kultural na pagkilos na nagbunga ng mga sulatin na pumupuna, humahamon, at kumukutya sa rehimeng Mahathir. Ang Reformasi ay kumatawan sa alternatibong pagpapahayag at debateng malaya sa gapos ng sensurang estado. Ang sanaysay na ito ay naghahain ng isang pulitikal na pagbasa sa isang kalipunan ng mga kolum sa pahayagan, isang diary, at isang nobela na naging popular sa mga sirkulo ng mga kumokontra sa pamahalaan.

Si Amir Muhammad ay isang mahusay, bata, at nagsasariling kritiko ng panitikan at pelikula na gumamit ng mapang-uyam na kritisismong pampanitikan upang gumawa ng kuneksyon sa pagitan ng sining at buhay. Nagsulat siya tungkol sa lantarang magkaisang-panig na *media coverage*, totalitaryang pangongontrol ng pamahalaan, pagkamakabayang nag-“amok” at mga *witch-hunt* na naganap noong ikalabingpitong dantaon. Sa kanyang kolum, ginawang kakatwa ni Amir ang rehimeng nanganganib at sinundot ang karapatan nitong mamuno; sa kabila nito, ang kanyang istilo ng pagsusulat ay nanatiling suwabe at malumanay.

Si Sabri Zain ay nagsulat mula sa mga lansangan, nakilahok sa mga “Reformasi event” at nagpalaganap ng “alternatibong” balita sa pamamagitan ng kanyang *online* na “Reformasi Diary” noong panahong walang naniniwala sa mainstream media. Itinatala sa kanyang diary ang

paghaharap ng mga karaniwang mamamayan, mga walang armas, at payapang demonstrador at ng mga may-batutang riot police na sinusuportahan ng mga *water cannon*. Isinasalaysay niya ang isang mabilis na pagbabago sa pagtinging panlipunan at pampulitika na humantong sa bagong kamalayan ng pagkakaisa na iniluwal ng paghahangad para sa katarungan.

Ang mabangis na alegorya ng National Laureate na si Shahnnon Ahmad ay nakalugar sa bituka ng katawan ng tao kung saan ang dumi ay bumubuo ng isang “shit front” na pinangungunahan ng isang makapangyarihang tumpok, si “PM.” Ang “administrasyong mabaho at lumilikha ng baho” ay namumuno sa isang sipsip na *polity* ng mga tumatangong “yes shits.” Sa kalagitnaan ng popular na pagkadiri sa mga rebelasyon ng sodomiya, semilya, at pagsasalsal, marahil na ang katarsis ng isang National Laureate ay nag-alok ng kultural na paglaya sa isang pamayanang sinusupil ng *aiib* (hiya).

Translated by Sofia Guillermo

## 「改革」を書く

クー・ブー・テック (Khou Boo Teik)

1998年から99年にかけて、マレーシアのマハティール政権はアンワル・イブラヒム副首相解任をうけて起きたマレー人の文化反乱によって動揺した。国家統制下のマス・メディアはアンワル失墜の「理由」（不倫・同性愛といわれる）をセンセーショナルに報道し、そのため、これは、統治者が国民の面目を潰してはならないという「社会契約」に違反するものとされた。「改革」は政治的に表明されたばかりでなく文化運動としても表現され、マハティール体制に挑戦し、批判、嘲笑する出版物が現れた。「改革」は、これまで国家の検閲によって抑えつけられていた表現や議論を代弁した。本稿においては、反体制派の間で広く読まれているそうした新聞コラムや日記、小説を政治的に解釈する。

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アミル・ムハマッドは才気溢れる若き独立した文芸・映画評論家である。彼の新聞コラムは、芸術と生活を結びつけるために、鋭く皮肉的な文芸批評を展開する。彼は、あからさまに党派的なメディア報道や全体主義的国家支配、「暴走する」愛国主義、17世紀の魔女狩りなどについて書く。アミルのコラムは混迷する体制をパロディ化し、その正当性をつつき穴を開けようするものである。しかしながら、その散文は上品であり、洗練されている。

サブリー・ザインは市井の人々の視点からものを書き、誰も主流メディアを信じていなかった時期に改革日記オンラインを通して「改革」に参加し、「既存のものに代わる」ニュースを広めた。彼の日記は、非武装で穏健な一般人反体制派と放水車を背後に警棒を振りまわす警察機動隊の対立を記録する。そこには、正義を求めて生まれた団結に新しい意味を付与した、社会や政治の態度の急激な変化が描かれている。

名著国民シヤフノン・アフマドの悪意ある寓話は、人間の腸内の話である。そこでは体内の汚物が、ある強力な大便の固まり「PM（首相）」率いる「大便戦線」を形成している。この「悪臭を放つ臭い政府」は、うなずいてばかりの「追従大便」たちが住む、おべっかだけの政治組織を指導する。肛門挿入、精液、自慰という暴露に対して大衆が愛想をつかさなか、この名著国民の排便は、面目を潰されたマレーシア人におそらく文化的なカタルシスをもたらしただろう。

Translated by Morishita Akiko (森下明子)

## เขียนปฏิรูป

Kboo Boo Teik (กู บู เท็ก)

ในช่วงปี 1989-99 รัฐบาลมาเลเซียภายใต้นายกรัฐมนตรี มหาธีร์ โมฮัมหมัดถูกสันเสเทือนจากแรงต่อต้านทางวัฒนธรรมที่เกิดขึ้นหลังจากที่ นายกรัฐมนตรีมหาธีร์สั่งปลด นายอันวาร์ อิบราฮิม รองนายกรัฐมนตรี สื่อมวลชนที่ถูกรัฐบาลควบคุมต่างก็พากันออกมาใส่สีตีไข่ "สาเหตุ" ของการตกจากเก้าอี้ของอันวาร์ อันเกิดจากหลักฐานที่ชวนให้เชื่อเกี่ยวกับพฤติกรรมทางเพศที่ไม่ปกติของอันวาร์นั้นคือการร่วมเพศทางทวารหนักอันถือเป็นการล้ำเส้น "สัญญาประชาคม" ของผู้นำที่ปราศจากความละอาย กลุ่มงานเขียนแนว "ปฏิรูป" ไม่ได้แค่ส่งผลทางการเมืองเท่านั้นแต่ยังถือเป็นรูปแบบหนึ่งของการเคลื่อนไหวทางวัฒนธรรม เป็นงานเขียนที่วิพากษ์, ทำทนาย และ มีผลทำลายความน่าเชื่อถือของรัฐบาลมาเลเซีย งานเขียนแนว "ปฏิรูป" เหล่านี้ ยืนยันต่อสู้เพื่อทางเลือกในการแสดงออกและการถกเถียงทางความคิด โดยไม่ยี่หระต่ออำนาจการเซ็นเซอร์จากรัฐบาล บทความนี้ เสนอ "การอ่านทางเมือง" จากงานเขียนคอลัมน์ทางหนังสือพิมพ์, บันทึกรประจำวัน และ นวนิยาย ที่เป็นที่นิยม ในหมู่ประชาชนในช่วงที่เกิดเหตุการณ์ระส่ำระสายนี้

อามิร์ มูฮัมหมัด เป็นนักวรรณกรรมและนักวิจารณ์ภาพยนตร์คนหนุ่มที่เก่งกาจ งานเขียนคอลัมน์วิจารณ์ที่ทั้งจิก กัด ประชดประชันในหน้าหนังสือพิมพ์ของเขานั้นแสดงให้เห็นถึงการเชื่อมโยงระหว่างชีวิตกับศิลปะ ในคอลัมน์ชุดนี้เขาเขียนถึงหน้าปกของสื่อต่างๆ ที่แสดงความลำเอียงออกมาอย่างเห็นได้ชัด, การถูกควบคุมโดยรัฐอย่างสิ้นเชิง, การรักประเทศชาติอย่างบ้าคลั่ง, และการใส่ร้ายป้ายสีผู้บริสุทธิ์อย่างปราศจากหลักฐาน ข้อเขียนอันเสียดเย้ยในคอลัมน์ของอามิร์ส่งผลให้รัฐบาลตกอยู่ในสภาวะที่แลดูน่าขบขัน ราวกับได้ป่วนลงบนความชอบธรรมของรัฐบาลจนพรวน อย่างไรก็ตาม เขายังรักษาหน้าเสียงสุภาพเรียบร้อยเอาไว้ในงานของเขา

งานของ ซาบรี เซน เป็นงานเขียนจากท้องถนน อันเนื่องมาจากการเข้าร่วม “ขบวนการปฏิรูป” และการเผยแพร่ข่าวสารทางเลือกผ่าน “บันทึกการปฏิรูป” ออนไลน์ของเขาในเวลาที่ไม่มีใครเชื่อถือข่าวสารจากสื่อกระแสหลักอีกต่อไป บันทึกประจำวันของเขาได้เขียนถึงเรื่องราวการประจันหน้าระหว่างสามัญชนที่เข้าร่วมประท้วงรัฐบาลอย่างสันติโดยปราศจากอาวุธกับกลุ่มตำรวจต้านจลาจลที่มีอาวุธครบมือ เขาได้บันทึกถึงความเปลี่ยนแปลงอย่างรวดเร็วในด้านทัศนคติทางการเมืองและสังคมที่นำไปสู่การเกิดสำนึกร่วมกันในการเสาะหาความยุติธรรม

ส่วนนวนิยายที่มีเนื้อหามุ่งมั่นของนักเขียนผลงานระดับชาติของมลายู ซาฮัน อามัตนั้นเป็นเรื่องราวที่เกิดขึ้นในลำไส้ของมนุษย์ ที่บรรดา “ชี” ที่อยู่ภายใต้การนำของหัวหน้าชีที่ชื่อ “นายกา” เกิดอาการคั่งค้างปั่นป่วนไม่ยอมปล่อยตัวเองออกมาภายนอก “ลำไส้” ก่อให้เกิดกลิ่นเหม็นคละคลุ้ง ความเหม็น และการสร้างระบบการบริหารเหม็นๆ นั้นนำไปสู่ระบบลูกขุนพลอยพยักที่คอยเลียแข้งเลียขาผู้เป็นใหญ่และเฝ้าแต่พูดคำว่า “ซอว์บชี” ท่ามกลางความขยะแขยงในหมู่ประชาชน นวนิยายเรื่องนี้ได้เปิดเผยภาพการร่วมเพศทางทวารหนัก อสุจิ และการช่วยตัวเองอย่างโจ่งแจ้ง บางทีนี้อาจจะเป็นความตั้งใจในการเสกงานศิลปะในรูปแบบที่นำขยะแขยงที่สุดเพื่อการผ่อนคลายเชิงวัฒนธรรมให้กับสังคมมลายูที่ถูกกดขี่อย่างรุนแรงจากแนวคิดเกี่ยวกับ “ความละอาย”

Translated by Lakkana Punwichai

# Of Strongmen and the State

Caroline S. Hau

*Capital, Coercion, and Crime: Bossism in the Philippines*

John T. Sidel

Stanford, U.S.A. / Stanford University Press / 1999

*Making Mindanao: Cotabato and Davao in the Formation of the Philippine Nation-State*

Patricio N. Abinales

Quezon City, Philippines / Ateneo de Manila University Press / 2000

The man whose testimony set off a chain reaction of events resulting in the impeachment and ousting from power of President Joseph Estrada in 2001 has the appearance and attributes of a stock character in the still-unfolding Philippine political drama. Luis "Chavit" Singson, current governor of the northern tobacco-producing province of Ilocos Sur, boasts a political pedigree linking him to the Crisologo clan, which dominated Ilocos Sur politics during the early postwar years. Singson's bitter feud with his maternal uncle, Representative Floro Crisologo, over control of the province's tobacco trade made him a chief suspect in the latter's spectacular assassination – gunned down during Mass at the Vigan Cathedral in 1970. Singson himself has survived six ambushes (including, he says, "the time they threw grenades at me – eleven people were killed, but not me – luckily, I was dancing with a fat woman at the time and she took all the shrapnel"), keeps his own private army, and enjoys a reputation as a sharpshooter. An altar boy who became a millionaire before the age of 25, a former chief of police who studied embalming, he gambles heavily in Las Vegas, shoots clay targets with a Bruncian prince, hunts moose in Sweden and Canada, and lives in a house known to the townspeople as Baluarte (Fort). Unfazed by initial failures in electoral politics, he succeeded after his uncle's

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murder in being elected governor and held the position until forced to vacate office in the wake of the 1986 "People Power Revolution." A year later, he ran for Congress and won. Finding himself cut out of a major deal that would replace the illegal numbers game *jueteng* with a legal computerized bingo game, Singson went public with revelations of having delivered *jueteng* payoffs to the president.

Singson has been depicted by the Philippine mass media as the quintessential gangster-politician, warlord, and local boss. Of these terms, the last owes its popularization to a book written by an American scholar, John T. Sidel, whose *Capital, Coercion, and Crime: Bossism in the Philippines* reintroduced into circulation a word that had long been used by American scholar-officials such as Joseph Ralston Hayden and Filipino journalists such as Nick Joaquin to give a face and name to the wheeling and dealing, the sordid and often lethal braiding of the official and the criminal that, on the face of it, characterizes so much of contemporary Philippine political culture.

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Singson's exposé competed in hogging national newspaper headlines with reports of the Abu Sayyaf's kidnap-for-ransom activities and the war being waged in Muslim Mindanao between the Estrada government and this radical splinter group of the Moro National Liberation Front. Filipino scholar Patricio N. Abinales' *Making Mindanao: Cotabato and Davao in the Formation of the Philippine Nation-State* enjoyed brisk sales among a reading public which sought to make sense of the roots of the drawn-out conflict by looking more closely at the fraught history of the southern region.

The timeliness of Sidel and Abinales' scholarly interventions in apparently different political arenas does not quite obscure the striking intellectual affinities and resonance between the two books. This is no doubt due to the shared material and intellectual context within which these two scholars initially formulated their arguments. Both books were based on doctoral dissertations for which research and writing were done almost concurrently (from the late 1980s to the mid 1990s) in the Philippines and at Cornell University, USA, under the supervision of prominent Southeast Asianist and scholar of

nationalism Benedict Anderson.

Moreover, Sidel and Abinales' projects are deeply informed by issues and debates within the discipline of American political science, especially theoretical approaches to the study of non-"western" political formations. Indeed, the conditions of their writing illustrate an enduring feature of scholarship on Philippine politics, namely, its mediation to an important extent by American academia, especially in the concepts and frameworks of analysis worked through or challenged either by Filipino and foreign scholars trained in American graduate schools or by Filipino scholars trained in the Philippines by American-trained academics.

Not surprisingly, what insistently haunts Sidel and Abinales' works, the ghost that their works seek to exorcize, is America itself. Sidel and Abinales' books attempt to construct a historical as well as critical genealogy of contemporary Philippine politics. Here, the American legacy of state-building—particularly the introduction of suffrage—in colonial Philippines during the early twentieth century assumes signal importance as a defining moment, one that was to establish the conceptual and actual parameters of politics, of what would come to be understood as "the political" in post-independence Philippines.

Sidel's decision to employ the American term "boss" in his work foregrounds the preponderant influence of US colonialism on Philippine political institutions, processes, and actors. His study of Philippine bosses in the early years of the 20<sup>th</sup> century draws from the empirically rich scholarship on American "courthouse cliques" and paints 19<sup>th</sup>- and early 20<sup>th</sup>-century contemporaneous American politics as the dark double—the doppelgänger—of Philippine electoral democracy. (Unfortunately, Sidel does not doggedly pursue this comparison, preferring instead to use a controversy-inviting extended direct quotation that compares 20<sup>th</sup>-century Philippines with 18<sup>th</sup>-century "Old Corruption" England.) Abinales' study highlights as well the distinctive character of American policies on the administration of Mindanao and the specific role of the American military in what he calls the "construction and metamorphosis of the state" in that region as compared to other provinces in the country. He concentrates on the



impact of state formation in delineating communal and social differences between and among Muslim and non-Muslim populations.

Sidel and Abinales' emphasis on the formative role of the state in determining the nature of local and national politics derives its impetus from the checkered career of "the state" as an analytical tool in American political science departments. Dismissed as a European "myth" in the Cold War and anti-Left 1950s, resurrected in the wake of Vietnam War protest and other oppositional movements and by the expansion of the welfare state in the 1960s and 1970s, the concept of the state in the 1980s was repeatedly challenged by the empirical facts of globalization and post-Fordism with their emphasis on increased transnational capital flows and flexible production; the so-called "decline of the nation-state" in Western Europe and North America; the emergence and growing visibility of regional, sub-national, local, and ethnic communities and nongovernmental organizations; neoliberal rhetoric and policies of "democratization"; and the loss in some nations of the state's monopoly over violence within their territories.

In addition, an intellectual shift within the social sciences had led to a questioning of political power and its bases. Scholars inspired, for example, by the work of French thinker Michel Foucault criticized theories of the state for their failure to account adequately for the diffusion of power and its decentralized manifestations. Theorists such as Niklas Luhmann argued that political systems could not be considered apart from other "function systems" in a given society. The state was also thought to be too unwieldy and simplistic a concept for examining and explaining the complex and protean relations among individual "actors."

Notwithstanding the climate of anti-state theory that dominated in the 1980s and 1990s, a series of publications such as *Bringing the State Back In* (1985), edited by Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschmeyer, and Theda Skocpol, sought to make a strong case for championing a state-centered approach which would treat states as "weighty actors" (in the words of Skocpol, in her influential introduction to the volume) and analyze how "states affected political and social

processes through their policies and their patterned relationships with social groups." However, the effort to argue in favor of the state as a significant "variable" vis-a-vis social forces inevitably embroiled scholars in a vexing debate over the relationship between "state" and "society" – attempts to contend with or overcome this dualism would in large measure serve as the fulcrum of numerous studies which adopted a state-centered perspective.

Debates on political power were beset with their own problems when they were posed specifically in relation to non-"western" states. For countries such as the Philippines which had been subject to colonial rule, postcolonial national agendas were dominated by modernization and development – a global project that presupposed and required the existence of states, preferably strong ones. It was, in fact, on the principal condition of taking the form of the state that nations could enter the "modern" world system. This condition was so basic to obtaining recognition in the international arena as to become commonsensical: where the concept of the state was subjected to criticism in studies of first-world societies, studies of third-world societies have tended, as Joel Migdal has pointed out, to take for granted the existence of states.

Moreover, scholars of non-"western" states have had to contend with the difficult legacy of German sociologist Max Weber's approach to the study of the state. It must be noted that Weber never undertook a comprehensive analysis of state making. One can glean from his works on non-"western" (and also "premodern" western) states his interest in explaining these state formations in terms of the determining role of cultural systems. The best-known example, of course, is his analysis of China and his argument that Confucianism frustrated the consolidation of capitalism in the country. What is interesting is that while Weber was willing in these cases to grant explanatory power to "culture" in determining state formation, he tended to downplay the role of culture in explaining the rise of the modern state in Europe. For Weber, rationality, the most basic characteristic of the modern state, was patently "non-cultural" in the sense that it is able to separate itself from the influence of the cultural systems which organized earlier European as well as present non-western states. One can, of course, argue that the very fact that states require legitimation at all makes

"culture" an inevitable if not crucial component of the very definition and mode of operations of the state. One can also argue, as George Steinmetz (to whom the preceding discussion is indebted) has done, that rationality itself can be considered a specific form of cultural practice. But Weber's argument concerning rationality remains rooted in the idea that rationality is "non-cultural."

To be fair to Weber, he does bring in cultural explanations in his analysis of modern states. Perhaps the most important example of this is his notion of charismatic authority. For Weber, charisma represents an alternative way of legitimizing the fact of domination, and he is careful to stress that it may be present even in modern societies. Charisma, however, is radically opposed to economic or instrumentalist rationality. For Weber, it is a revolutionary force that can become the basis for the founding of a new state form. Charisma, which invests individuals with supernatural attributes and originates in the "collective excitement" engendered by extraordinary events, resides in the perceptions of the followers of charismatic leaders. Although Weber argues that charisma is not confined to the early stages of political development, he nonetheless states that it is much more common "the further we go back in history." Despite its nuances, Weber's view of charisma is thus informed by his unconscious dualizing impulse to apply different approaches to the study of modern European states on the one hand and non-western and premodern states on the other.

Research on the state since Weber has often reinforced the tendency of scholars to treat western states as rational while seeking to explain non-western states in terms of their immersion in cultural systems. This differential and dichotomous treatment of western and non-western states has been subject to criticism, and charges of Orientalism have been leveled at scholars for treating non-western deviation from alleged "western" norms as rooted essentially in cultural differences. It is therefore not surprising that state-centered approaches of the 1970s and 1980s would explicitly reject cultural analysis, locating cultural determinations of the state in the realm of "society."

Sidel and Abinales' choice of strongmen (borrowed from so-called big-men studies in anthropology) as both focus and framework of analysis is revealing, since the idea of political strongmen analytically forges a necessary link between state and society. Moreover, the strongmen phenomenon affords excellent opportunities for scholars to explore the complex relations between the local and the national, between center and periphery, thereby illuminating the web of power relations that define politicking. This explains Sidel's decision to work on Cavite and Cebu, the first for its proximity to the national capital, the second as an important commercial hub outside Manila. Abinales similarly locates his project in the peripheral provinces of Davao and Cotabato, one a frontier zone, the other a Muslim-dominated province. For Sidel and Abinales, the strongman – typically parvenu rather than scion of a long-entrenched landed family – is part of society, yet does not exist apart from the state. State-formation does not develop separately from the rise of strongmen, but in fact lays the groundwork for the emergence of strongmen and the consolidation of strongman power.

For all the similarities in their basic approaches and concerns, Sidel and Abinales' books reveal their authors' divergent efforts to negotiate the uneasy tension between perspectives which see politics and culture as intimately linked and those which attempt to keep politics separate from culture. As an American scholar working on the Philippines, Sidel, in particular, is acutely sensitive to the fact that posing the unity of politics and culture would render him vulnerable to charges of "essentializing" Filipino culture. He singles out for criticism an influential school in Philippine scholarship which explains Philippine politics by employing cultural-social categories such as "patron-client," "utang na loob" (debt of gratitude), and reciprocal relations: "[T]his volume takes issue with those accounts that speak in terms of clientelism and personalism and paint the political culture, predispositions, and particularistic demands of local populations as essentially causing, legitimating, and bearing responsibility for the failings of democracy at the local level. Case studies suggest that the supply of local strongmen does not necessarily reflect popular demand; people do not, in other words, simply 'get the government they deserve'."

Sidel's focus is on patterns of political domination and capital accumulation. The term "boss" does not simply attest to the American colonial pedigree of the political strongmen, but plays up as well the often unacknowledged "coercive pressures" (in the form of violence and electoral fraud) exerted by bosses on their constituents as they seek a monopoly of both political and economic power in their bailiwicks. Critical of ideas of benevolent, paternalistic relations between "patrons" and their "clients," and arguing against Marxian ideas of the state as collective capitalist and instrument of an elite oligarchy whose wealth is founded on landholding, Sidel holds that access to state resources through electoral politics and through subordination of the state's coercive forces at the local level is crucial to explaining the dominance of Philippine politics by bossism (a network of bosses).

The subordination of the state to elected local and national officials took place within the context of "primitive accumulation," defined in *Capital, Coercion, and Crime* as a "phase of capitalist development in which a significant section of the population loses direct control over the means of production and direct access to means of subsistence and is reduced to a state of economic insecurity and dependence on scarce wage labor." Moreover, private property rights were not secure, even as the state itself was unable to achieve monopoly over the means of coercion and extraction, which left the means for violence within private or individual hands. It is this combined state of affairs that supposedly accounts for the Filipino voters' susceptibility to "clientelistic, coercive, and monetary pressures" by the bosses and makes running for public office such a highly profitable and much sought-after career. Sidel's account stresses the explanatory efficacy of "structural differences" between Cebu and Cavite based on variations in patterns of land use, employment, capital formation, and socio-economic transformations over time; he cogently documents the dark underside of "development," as seen in the exploitation and immiseration of the local population.

As a Filipino scholar, on the other hand, Abinales is less queasy about marrying political and cultural analyses. His own project engages the question of culture because it is critical of a different conceptual rubric applied to the study

of the so-called "Moro Problem." Abinales is critical of scholarship on Mindanao that employs a nationalist-versus-collaborationist framework in understanding the history and actions of the Muslims and that views Muslims in anachronistic terms as "Filipino nationalists" engaged in centuries of active resistance against Spanish and American colonizers. He is even more critical of scholarship that attributes the current Muslim conflict to religious and cultural differences between Muslim and Christian populations in the country. Religion is often assumed to play an important role in cementing the Sulus, Maguindanaos, and Maranaos' awareness of their difference from other non-Muslim peoples, but Abinales argues that it hardly constitutes a "primordial tie" that binds one Muslim ethnolinguistic group ineluctably to another across time and space.

"Moro" identity in fact was nurtured during the American colonial period with the active encouragement of the representatives of the colonial state. "Accommodation" with American colonial authorities allowed *datus* (chieftains) to retain if not effectively transform their power and standing within an increasingly "national" rather than "maritime Southeast Asian" arena. Education was an important element in the development of Moro identity. Through contact with each other and with "other" Filipinos, *datus* educated in Philippine public schools and colleges during the American and early post-independence periods grew to be self-conscious of an ethno-religio-political identity that transcended linguistic and geographical boundaries. This "insider-outsider" distinction was further strengthened when, during the years in which Mindanao was viewed and treated as a "frontier" by the government, a big influx of postwar internal migrants and government policies which favored Christian settlers (in logging and development, for example) created profound economic and social gaps between Muslim and Christian communities throughout Mindanao.

Moreover, according to Abinales, the cultural similarities that abound between Muslims and Christians raise doubts about the explanatory power of identity politics in the Philippines. Furthermore, communal identity was used often enough not to separate or assimilate minorities, but to integrate them into the larger Philippine body politic through the co-optation of "brokering"

leaders. As in the case of the indigenous peoples, the state had an interest in preserving Muslim cultural difference as part of the process of nation-building and state construction through "electoral democracy." Integration in many ways took the form of "ethnic juggling" – rather than ethnic cleansing – which functioned to dampen separatist appeals while providing access to the state for "loyal" Muslim allies. Ethnic identity politics could thus be used by elites and separatists alike who historically prized either participation in or separation from the Philippine state.

Following O.W. Wolters' study, Abinales locates the *datu* within the context of maritime Southeast Asian polities dominated by "men of prowess" (*orang besar*). With the imposition of American colonial rule, the *datu*s saw their power circumscribed by the colonial state and their field of influence narrowed and redefined by the boundaries set by the American colonizers. The interdependence of the strongmen and the state is a two-way process entailing both the pressures exerted by strongmen to use the state and its resources to further their personal and political interests and the pressures exerted by state practice to make strongmen conform to basic conventions of governance. Strongmen indeed played a middleman role, negotiating with the state as "traditional" representatives of their Muslim ethnic communities for a share of state allocations of resources and services, on the one hand, and cementing their power and influence in their respective communities as "modern" representatives of the state, on the other hand.

"To the extent that postcolonial states incorporate and thus legitimize traditional authority, the strong man's very basis of power is bound up with the state.... His power may consist largely of controlling 'critical resources, such as land, credit and jobs,' as well as in dictating 'the rules of behavior for much of the population' (Migdal 1988: 257). But he is also the state's representative who convinces, cajoles, and often coerces the communities under him to comply with state directives." Abinales sees the blurring between the official and the personal as a form of governance itself, rather than a deviation from governance: "Strong men regard their legitimacy as dual one: enhancing an already established place in the community by representing the state. Adding an official designation

magnifies the strong man's power, but it also requires him to fulfill, even if inadequately, certain functions of the state."

Ironically, it is this relation of mutual accommodation between strongmen and the state that for Abinales accounts for the resilience of the latter:

"Those in power understand that their preeminence hinges on being able to maintain social control as state leaders *and* as leaders in their respective social networks. The failure of one side will mean the weakening of the other, leading ultimately to the diffusion of all power. Thus, in order to be effective, state actors must be representatives of society and vice versa. This absence of distinction personalizes governance but also ensures a flexibility that makes the state surprisingly resilient."

"Further, the tenacious character of these states can be seen positively to rely on the survival of strong men. As the representatives of society who stand to lose the most from disorder and instability, strong men accept as intrinsic their responsibility to keep government running. As long as strong men keep up their end of the deal, and as long as leaders of the state accept the fusion of roles as part of the natural order of things at the local level, postcolonial states, though rundown, continue to run."

Provocative as it may be, this argument is also vulnerable to the criticism of serving as apology or, worse, justification for precisely the kind of governance that currently obtains in the Philippines, a governance that has been roundly and vociferously criticized by Filipinos who have had to live with the bad consequences of the state's "resilience."

Whereas Abinales posits a resilient weak state, Sidel argues the opposite, seeing a relatively strong, predatorial state whose subordination in its early stages of development to provincial and national elected officials and whose supreme susceptibility to manipulation by bosses in the present account for its "impressive capacity to penetrate society, regulate social relationships, extract resources and appropriate or use resources in determined ways." Bosses enjoy discretionary powers over pork-barrel funds and the appointment of Constabulary as well as



other officials in the local administration, and in Manila, they can influence the awarding of concessions, contracts, and franchises. Only the inherently chancy, risky business of elections and intervention by national bosses pose constraints on – though can also shore up – the local boss's power and influence.

The idea of a predatory state that is a creature of predatory bosses who are part of a complex network of bosses can only present a bleak picture of Philippine political reality and an even bleaker picture of the politicians who dominate it. Where Abinales traces the gradual transformation of the *datus* from charismatic men of prowess with bases in maritime Southeast Asia to elected officials of the nation-state, Sidel's account argues for the supplanting – if not the qualitative transformation – of precolonial and Spanish forms of authority by American-period strongmen whose access to the state is secured by highly competitive and often violent elections. Like Weber tended to do, Sidel locates the charismatic authority of strongmen squarely in the distant, precolonial past. Charisma as it is used in present-day Philippines functions more for Sidel as a ruse, a form of false consciousness which conveniently masks the bosses' exploitation of the populace through the "manipulation of scarcity."

This fundamental difference in perspective is highlighted in Sidel and Abinales' opposing attitudes toward the issue of violence. Where Sidel makes coercion the hallmark of bossism, Abinales takes accommodation as the key feature of the strongman's power. While Sidel documents cases of election-related violence, fraud, and manipulation of scarce resources that immiserate the populace, Abinales downplays the role of violence in Muslim politics, noting, for example, that instances of electoral violence were relatively low compared to general, everyday violence in the Muslim provinces. This divergent interpretation can be explained by the specific political economies of the provinces Sidel and Abinales study. For Abinales, the huge increase in the population of Davao during the postwar years made competition for land extremely keen and created tension between indigenous groups and settlers as the relative stability of social relations in frontier-like conditions gave way to class stratification and social unrest. The limits to strongman rule became readily apparent as a generational divide began to separate the Muslim politicians from young Muslim intellectuals

radicalized by their educational experiences in Cairo and Manila and by events within the Philippines and in the Muslim world. Moreover, the centralization of the Philippine state under Marcos in the late 1960s and early 1970s helped curtail strongmen's ability to impose control over their respective provinces.

For Sidel, Cavite's long historical standing as a hotbed of criminal activity has earned it a reputation for political violence and made it perhaps the exemplary illustration of the concept of bossism. Sidel selects case studies of district-level and municipal Cebu that bear out his argument regarding the coercive underside of strongman politics. But the biggest potential challenge to his idea of bossism is posed by the "dynastic" political family of Cebu, the Osmeñas, who have dominated provincial politics and national politics for many years. The Osmeñas are not prone to use violence, relying instead on technomedia and propaganda to build their reputations and advance their political agendas. Unlike most other bosses discussed in the book, the Osmeñas do not trace their wealth to political office and have not used their political power to acquire monopoly over the "commanding heights" of Cebu's economy. Given a boss's emphatically asserted command over coercion and capital accumulation, it becomes very difficult to explain how the Osmeña case fits into the general schema of bossism. Indeed, the Osmeñas are best studied through cultural analysis – brilliantly deployed by Filipino scholar Resil Mojares – of the politics of ideological domination and the construction and delimitation of political reality in the Philippines. As historians such as Reynaldo C. Ileto have incisively argued, the word "pulitika" itself contains an ironic commentary on Cebuano politics, exposing politicking as a combat-sports where dexterity and dissembling far outweigh issues and services.

Sidel treats the Osmeña case as one extreme of bossism, locating it at the furthest end of the spectrum that begins with the Cavite case. To some extent, the term "boss" allows him to do this. The strength of the concept is argued by James Scott (in a formulation owing something to Clifford Geertz), whom Sidel cites in his definition of bossism:

"'Boss' is a designation at once vague and richly connotative. Although a

boss may often function as a patron, the term itself implies (a) that he is the most powerful man in the arena and (b) that his power rests more on inducements and sanctions at his disposal than on affection or status. As distinct from a patron who may or may not be the supreme local leader and whose leadership rests at least partly on rank and affection, the boss is a secular leader par excellence who depends almost entirely on palpable inducements and threats to move people."

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But the supreme flexibility of the term – which can even be used in such quotidian contexts as "Boss, got a light?" – is also a potential liability for a scholarly book, the theoretical value of which hinges on the explanatory power and generalizability of its concepts. Since the cogency of bossism resides in its highlighting of coercion and capital accumulation – to argue otherwise would make "boss" no more generic than, say, "warlord" or "gangster" – Sidel's need to account for a wide range of political activities must contend with the unruliness of the empirical material. There is palpable throughout *Capital, Coercion, and Crime* the tension between its need to qualify bossism by anchoring it in geographically specific case studies and the countervailing need to claim for the concept a wider analytical berth than that afforded by specific case studies. The book's attempt to apply the term to a wide range of empirical evidence evinces itself on the rhetorical level in the sheer repetitiveness of the main argument. It is as if the book can hang together only by intermittent repetitions of the argument, often in nearly identical phrasing.

A bossism that both subordinates the state and makes it a predatory instrument for furthering bosses' ambitions ultimately makes for a rather despairing picture of the political future. The Philippines that Sidel paints resembles a Sartrean hell in which Filipinos are trapped in a room with no possibility of exit. History itself assumes the form of nightmarish eternal repetition. Not for nothing does Sidel begin his book with an account of three political killings that took place over a period of a hundred years. The perpetrators of these killings are all uniformly characterized as bosses. The earliest example, Emilio Aguinaldo, the first president of the Philippines, is described as a Cavite boss who engaged in shady land acquisition deals and whose power was curtailed

by another boss, Commonwealth president Manuel Quezon.

A strong case can be made for the book's project of demystifying "national heroes" by exposing their less-than-heroic machinations and civic failings. But in reducing these political characters to one-dimensional predatory bosses, it unwittingly mirrors the simplistic logic typical of politicians' self-aggrandizing mythmaking that it sets out to criticize. Moreover, however careful Sidel has been to stress at the end of the book the possibility and imperative of social activism aimed at changing the strongman-dominated predatory state, this argument can only appear weak and unconvincing in the wake of the book's tendency to reinforce the problematic dichotomy between an active, terrorist state and a passive, terrorized society. Excusing Filipinos from responsibility for bossism – "people do not... 'get the government they deserve'" – is as untenable as blaming them exclusively. An either/or formulation simply obscures important questions of agency, such as what kinds of activism are thinkable, realizable, and effective.

There are, in fact, responses both between and beyond accommodation and resistance. Abinales' more nuanced portrayal of the strongmen offers a possible antidote to a dualistic notion of state and society. His strongmen were not particularly law-abiding, yet many never needed compulsion to advance their agenda, and however predatory, they were sensitive to the need to prove themselves capable of governance and some degree of competence, however minimal. Seen through this prism, the portrait that emerges of Aguinaldo, or of Chavit Singson (whose brief history opens this essay) is less prone to dangerous simplification. Even though Abinales concentrates on the activities of strongmen, his book narrates specific moments in which social forces make themselves seen and heard, disrupting the strongman agenda. The world he chronicles is not populated by a typology of bosses, but is a world whose politicians and people feel and find themselves on the cusp of historical transformation, a vanishing frontier that would turn into a battleground on which the Muslim-Christian conflict would play out, and cultural and religious differences would not just be polarized but politicized, with devastating and all-too-tragic effects.

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## Orang Kuat dan Negara

*Caroline S. Han*

Artikel ini meresensi dua contoh kajian mengenai "politik orang kuat" di Filipina. Kedua buku tersebut mengambil isu yang diterima baik secara akademik dan populer, yaitu penjelasan mengenai patron-klien "tradisional" (Sidel) dan politik identitas (Abinales) dalam masalah politik di Filipina. Sidel memakai konsep "bossisme" dan Abinales menggunakan "orang kuat" untuk menganalisa kembali hubungan antara "masyarakat" dan "negara," dengan memberikan tekanan terhadap proses sejarah pembentukan negara sejak masa kolonial Amerika. Bagi kedua sarjana tersebut, pembentukan-negara tidak tumbuh secara terpisah dari kemunculan orang kuat, melainkan sangat memberikan dasar yang kokoh bagi konsolidasi dan kemunculannya. Lebih jauh, karena keduanya mengambil studi kasus bukan dari ibu kota Manila, mereka mengeksplorasi hubungan kompleks antara lokal dan nasional, sehingga mampu memberikan gambaran yang utuh mengenai hubungan politik yang mendefinisikan proses politisasi dan perwakilan.

Tetapi kedua karya tersebut berbeda secara mendasar dalam cara melihat hubungan antara orang kuat terhadap konstituennya dan pada penggunaan "paksaan" (dalam bentuk kekerasan dan penyelewengan elektoral). Abinales melihat garis kabur antara yang resmi dan personal sebagai bentuk pemerintahan itu sendiri, sementara Sidel melihat negara penghisap sebagai hasil ciptaan dari para boss yang juga penghisap, yang merupakan bagian dari jaringan kompleks para boss. Perbedaan interpretasi ini menyebabkan fokus yang berbeda terhadap isu dibawah ini: respon apa yang mungkin muncul dari orang kuat dan rakyat di Filipina? Sejauh mana penelitian ilmiah memiliki keterbatasan dalam memahami kompleksitas politik kekuasaan pada pasca kolonial Filipina?

Translated by Wahyu Prasetyawan

## Ang mga Maykapangyarihan at ang Estado

Caroline S. Hau

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Sinusuri sa sanaysay na ito ang dalawang bagong-labas na halimbawa ng pag-aaral hinggil sa "strongman politics" sa Pilipinas. Ang mga aklat na ito ay pumupuna sa akademiko at popular na pagtanggap sa pwersa ng "tradisyunal" na relasyong "patron-client" (Sidel) at "identity politics" (Abinales) sa paghubog sa sitwasyong pampulitika ng Pilipinas. Ginagamit ni Sidel ang konsepto ng "bosismo" at ni Abinales ang konsepto ng "strongmen" upang muling analisahin ang kuneksyon sa pagitan ng "estado" at "lipunan," habang nagbibigay-diin sa mga pamana ng prosesong historikal ng pagbubuo ng estado sa ilalim ng kolonyalismong Amerikano (American colonial state-formation). Para sa mga iskolar na ito, ang pagbubuo ng estado (state-formation) ay hindi naganap nang hiwalay sa pagbangon ng "strongman," bagkus ay inilatag nito ang pundasyon para sa paglitaw at konsolidasyon ng kapangyarihang "strongman." Dagdag pa, sapagkat ang mga *case study* ng dalawa ay nagmumula sa labas ng punong-lungsod ng Maynila, sinusuri nila ang kumplikadong relasyon sa pagitan ng lokal at pambansa, at sa gayo'y nagbibigay-liwanag sa kasalimuotan ng mga relasyon ng kapangyarihan na humuhugis sa pamumulitika at representasyon.

Sa kabila nito, ang dalawang aklat ay nagkakaiba sa usapin ng relasyon ng mga "strongman" sa kanilang nasasakupan at sa kanilang paggamit sa "coercive pressures" (sa pamamagitan ng karahasan at pandaraya sa halalan). Tinitingnan ni Abinales ang paglabo ng hangganan sa pagitan ng opisyal at ng personal bilang isang porma mismo ng pamamahala, samantalang ang nakikita naman ni Sidel ay isang estadong mandaragit na likha ng mga ganid na hepe na bahagi ng kumplikadong lambat ng mga hepe. Ang ganitong pagkakaiba sa interpretasyon ay nagpatingkad sa sumusunod na mga katanungan: Anong uri ng mga pagtugon ang bukas para sa mga Pilipinong "strongman" at sa mamamayan? Hanggang saan nalilimitahan ng akademikong pag-aaral mismo ang sarili nito sa pagkakaintindi sa masalimuot na katangian ng kapangyarihang pulitikal sa Pilipinas matapos ang kolonyalismo?

Translated by Sofia Guillermo



## 実力者と国家について

カロライン・S・ハウ (Caroline S. Hau)

フィリピンにおける「実力者政治」について近年なされた二つの研究例を書評したい。両研究は、フィリピンの政治景観を形作るものとして学界にも一般にも受け入れられている説明、つまり「伝統的」パトロン・クライアント関係 (Sidel) やアイデンティティ政治 (Abinales) に異議を唱える。Sidel と Abinales はそれぞれ、「ボシズム bossism」と「実力者 strongman」の概念を用いて、アメリカによる植民地国家形成の名残を強調しながら、「国家」と「社会」のつながりを見直している。彼らにとって国家形成とは、実力者の登場と別個に語りうるものではなく、むしろ実力者の力を生み出し、そして強める根底にあるものとして捉えられる。さらに、両者とも首都マニラ以外を事例としているため、地方と中央の間の複雑な関係を探り、それによって政治上の駆け引きと代表制を決定付ける権力関係の網の目を読み解くに至った。

しかし両者は、実力者の有権者との関係や彼らの「強制的圧力」(暴力や選挙違反を伴う)の使用をめぐる決定的に異なる。Abinales はそのような公私の混同を、支配そのもののひとつのあり方とみなし、一方 Sidel は国家が略奪的になる原因を、複雑なボスのネットワークの一部に位置する略奪的なボスに見出す。そのような対照的な解釈は、次のような問題を浮き上がらせる: フィリピンの実力者やその他の人々にとって、そのような状況 (公私混同や略奪的状況) に対してどのような対応が可能なのか。また、独立後のフィリピンの政治権力の複雑な性質を理解するにあたって、学問それ自体がどれほどまで限界を定めてしまっているのか。

Translated by Mumukarni Sali (村上 咲)

## ว่าด้วยผู้ทรงอิทธิพลกับรัฐ

Caroline S. Hau (แคโรลิน ฮาว)

บทความนี้พูดถึงงานศึกษาทางวิชาการสองเล่มที่เขียนขึ้นเร็วๆนี้ โดยที่ทั้งสองเล่มกล่าวถึง "การเมืองแบบผู้นำเหล็ก" ในประเทศฟิลิปปินส์ หนังสือทั้งสองเล่มนี้พูดถึงความสัมพันธ์ระหว่างผู้อุปถัมภ์-ผู้พึ่งพา "ตามแบบจารีตเดิม" (Sidel) และการเมืองว่าด้วยเรื่องอัตลักษณ์ (Abinales) ที่กำหนดโฉมหน้าทางการเมืองในประเทศฟิลิปปินส์ อันเป็นประเด็นที่ทั้งวงวิชาการและประชาชนทั่วไปต่างก็ยอมรับว่า มันเป็นคำอธิบายที่มีพลัง Sidel ใช้แนวความคิดเกี่ยวกับ "เจ้าพ่อ (bossism)" ส่วน Abinales ใช้แนวความคิดเกี่ยวกับ "ผู้ทรงอิทธิพล" เพื่อวิเคราะห์ความเชื่อมโยง ระหว่าง "รัฐ" กับ "สังคม" เสียใหม่ โดยให้ความสำคัญกับสิ่งที่ตกทอดมาจากกระบวนการทางประวัติศาสตร์ของการก่อตั้งรัฐภายใต้อาณานิคมอเมริกัน นักวิชาการทั้งสองเห็นร่วมกันว่า การก่อรูปของรัฐไม่อาจแยกออกจากการเติบโตของผู้ทรงอิทธิพลหรือเจ้าพ่อท้องถิ่น ทั้งยังเป็นรากฐานให้กับการเกิด, การสร้างความเป็นปึกแผ่นและอำนาจของพวกผู้ทรงอิทธิพล นอกจากนี้ การที่ทั้งคู่เลือกพื้นที่ท้องถิ่นที่ไม่ใช่กรุงมะนิลาเป็นกรณีศึกษา ทำให้สามารถสำรวจเข้าไปถึงความสัมพันธ์อันซับซ้อนระหว่างระดับท้องถิ่นกับระดับชาติ ช่วยให้เห็นภาพที่ชัดเจนขึ้นของเครือข่ายความสัมพันธ์ของอำนาจ ที่กำหนดการดำเนินกิจกรรมทางการเมืองและระบบการเมืองในระบบผู้แทนราษฎร

แต่ผลงานทั้งสองชิ้นนี้มีความแตกต่างกันอย่างสำคัญในประเด็นเกี่ยวกับความสัมพันธ์ระหว่างผู้ทรงอิทธิพลกับประชาชนผู้มีสิทธิออกเสียงเลือกตั้ง และ "การกีดกันในเชิงคุกคาม" (ในรูปของความรุนแรงและการโง่การเลือกตั้ง) ของบรรดาเจ้าพ่อ Abinales เห็นว่าเส้นแบ่งที่ไม่ชัดเจนระหว่างตำแหน่งหน้าที่กับตัวบุคคลเป็นรูปแบบการปกครองอย่างหนึ่งในตัวมันเอง ในขณะที่

Sidel มองว่าการมีผู้นำซึ่งเป็นส่วนหนึ่งของเครือข่ายที่ซับซ้อนของพวกเขา  
 เจ้าพ่อที่มุ่งใช้อำนาจแต่ในทางที่เลวร้าย ทำให้เกิดรัฐที่มุ่งคุกคามและ  
 เอาวัดเอาเปรียบประชาชน ความแตกต่างในการตีความเช่นนี้ทำให้เกิด  
 ประเด็นที่แหลมคมตามมาว่า: บรรดาผู้ทรงอิทธิพลหรือเจ้าพ่อท้องถิ่น  
 กับประชาชนฟิลิปปินส์จะได้ตอบต่อการวิพากษ์ที่นี้ได้อย่างไรบ้าง? วง  
 การวิชาการเองมีข้อจำกัดมากน้อยแค่ไหนในการทำความเข้าใจธรรมชาติ  
 อันซับซ้อนของอำนาจทางการเมืองในประเทศฟิลิปปินส์ยุคหลัง  
 อาณานิคม?

Translated by Pakavadi Jitsakulchaidej

# Studies in the Political Economy of New Order Indonesia

Vedi R. Hadiz

"State and Society: Indonesian Politics Under the New Order, 1966-1978"

Farchan Bulkin

PhD dissertation / University of Washington / 1983

Ekonomi dan Struktur Politik Orde Baru 1966-71

(New Order Economy and Political Structure 1966-71)

Mochtar Mas'Oed

Jakarta / LP3ES / 1989

"The State, the Rise of Capital and the Fall of Political Journalism: Political Economy of the Indonesian News Industry"

Daniel Dhakidae

PhD dissertation / Cornell University / 1991

That the three most important works – in the eyes of this reviewer – on Indonesian political economy by Indonesians were all written some time ago is reflective of how Soeharto's New Order marginalized analyses of capitalism and class by suggesting links to the Marxism that it outlawed. It is also noteworthy that they were all originally done as PhD dissertations in overseas (specifically, American) universities. With few exceptions, most of the other important work has been done by non-Indonesians: works by the Australian scholar Richard Robison (1986) and the American Jeffrey Winters (1996) perhaps come to mind most immediately. Apart from these three dissertations, one is hard-pressed to find many serious works of contemporary political economy by Indonesians.

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The most recent of the three works under consideration here is Daniel Dhakidae's thesis on the Indonesian press industry, completed almost exactly a decade ago at Cornell University. The two others were completed as early as 1983. One, on Indonesian state and society, was written by the late, could-have-been great, Farchan Bulkin, as a dissertation at the University of Washington in Seattle. Even now, it is not well known except to a handful of his old friends and colleagues. Mas'ood's work on bureaucratic authoritarianism and corporatism in the early New Order was a PhD thesis originally completed at Ohio State University in 1983, but translated and published as a book in the Indonesian language in 1989.

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It is interesting to note that both the PhD theses of Dhakidae and Bulkin remain unpublished, and furthermore, are unavailable in any shape or form in the Indonesian language. Bulkin's work is primarily remembered by Indonesian scholars through a series of articles partly based on his PhD thesis that he published in the mid-1980s in the Jakarta-based journal *Prisma*, then Indonesia's main scholarly publication, while Dhakidae has presented only portions of his thesis in seminar papers.

Bulkin's thesis arguably remains the most theoretically sophisticated work on political economy undertaken by an Indonesian scholar to this day. It is concerned with the social basis of the Indonesian state, relating it to features of "peripheral capitalism" and ups and downs in the political fortunes of the country's "middle class groups." Dhakidae's pioneering work on the print media is so grand, painstaking, and meticulous that it would no doubt be the major reference point for Indonesian media studies had it been published. Like Bulkin's work, it has clearly not received the recognition it deserves and is under-cited. Mas'ood's work helped to introduce a new generation of Indonesian students and academics in the 1980s to a body of theoretical literature and concepts – borrowed especially from studies of Latin America – by applying them to the Indonesia case in a studious, but not overly rigid manner. These were the concepts of bureaucratic authoritarianism and of corporatism, also explored at length by Bulkin and so often utilized by Indonesian scholars of politics and society until the very end of the New Order.

## State and society

Bulkin's approach is the most clearly historical of the three works considered – though all of his data sources are secondary – and comes armed with quite a complex theoretical framework with which he attempted to re-interpret this data. The way in which he did this was fairly novel at the time. Bulkin's main argument was that Indonesia was trapped within the structures of "peripheral capitalism," a concept borrowed from the noted scholar of the Indian sub-continent, Hamza Alavi (1972; 1982).

For Bulkin, peripheral capitalism had a colonial character, being overly reliant on primary production "with the result that manufactured goods required for domestic consumption had to be imported." It was dependent as well on the export of raw materials, causing vulnerability to international market fluctuations, and was distinguished by the fact that economic power remained in the hands of foreign corporations that repatriated profits overseas. The New Order, according to Bulkin, represented the reassertion of a peripheral capitalism damaged previously by war and economic depression – "with respect to the external dependence upon the international market and capital financing sources, economic structure and institutions." The residual influences of dependency theory were clearly displayed in Bulkin's work, as they were in Alavi's.

Among the other arguments proposed by Bulkin was that the New Order "was forced to legitimize and rationalize the objective conditions of peripheral capitalism" because its narrowly developmentalist economic policies alienated large sections of the population, including critical "middle class groups." He suggested that this placed its leaders in a contradictory situation: their "economic policies especially tended to delegitimize the regime, but to maintain a political structure in which they could pursue their economic interests required political legitimacy." The "essence of the problem," as Bulkin put it, was to "legitimize the conditions of peripheral capitalism for the sake of political stability and the social acceptance of the regime." Therefore, the "chief political projects" of the New Order were to create a political system that was "programmatic and pragmatic," and to maintain "a viable electorate machinery." Nevertheless, it was

also continuously concerned with the "cooptation of political, economic, and bureaucratic forces," as well as the "maintenance of political and bureaucratic institutions for repression and coercion."

For Bulkin, these projects had real and ideological repercussions. Foremost was the reification of a bureaucratically defined Pancasila as state ideology. This ultimately entailed the imposition of such ideas as the "dual function" of the armed forces, corporatism and organicism, developmentalism, and opposition to mass-based politics. These ideological manipulations concealed the "reconsolidation of the structure of peripheral capitalism" upon which bureaucratic and regime interests were dependent.

74 But the main story that Bulkin presents is that of the ups and downs in influence of Indonesia's small "middle class groups." (Significantly, this concept is nowhere as rigorously defined as the other key concept of peripheral capitalism.) For Bulkin, at least since the early twentieth century, the fortunes of these groups have fluctuated. Sometimes it seems that they are able to confidently ride the tide of history, but at other times, they appear to be completely overwhelmed as more powerful social actors, like the military, come to occupy center stage. Perhaps nothing illustrates this better than the failed period of parliamentary democracy in the 1950s, which saw middle class groups finally clear the political arena in favor of Soekarnoist policies that created the setting for the advance of authoritarianism. Clearly Bulkin was writing from a perspective that privileged the role of the middle class, perhaps especially its intellectual and business representatives, as a relatively unambiguous pro-democracy force. The absence of democracy in Indonesia was due mainly to the absence of a strong middle class capable of developing a strong "national" economy. This position was clearly reflective of the influence of a type of Marxism, like dependency theory, which essentially belonged to the petty bourgeoisie.

Reflecting the failings of dependency analyses, the internal logic of Bulkin's framework does not allow for significant changes in the structure of Indonesian capitalism since colonial times. It is a relatively static, un-fluid picture of Indonesian society and capitalism, forever doomed to be under the control of foreign

capital and its domestic partners. Interestingly, Bulkin was writing just as an interesting phase in Indonesian capitalism was beginning: a more open embrace of international capitalism and markets through export-led industrialization. This coincided with the rise of major state-connected conglomerates that hijacked the process of "economic liberalization" for their own interests. However, Bulkin's analysis hardly allowed for the rise of a politically and economically significant domestic bourgeoisie – trapped as Indonesia was in the structures of a peripheral capitalism dominated by foreign capital. The main contrast here is perhaps with the work of Robison, especially his *Indonesia: The Rise of Capital* (1986), which saw a capitalist revolution transforming Indonesian state and society, engendering new classes and social groups. Chief among these was the bourgeoisie. The difference is that Robison didn't assume that the bourgeoisie, or the middle class, would always have a vested interest in democratization.

### The structures of power

Better known to Indonesian academic circles than Bulkin's work is Mochtar Mas'oe'd's study of the economic and political structures of the early New Order. Never published in English, however, it too is absent from the reference lists of non-Indonesian academic works on Indonesian capitalism and society.

Of the three works considered here, Mas'oe'd's is the most theoretically eclectic and the least influenced by the Marxist tradition of scholarship on development and capitalism. Instead, it primarily engages theories of political development as represented in work on Latin America by such scholars as Juan Linz and Philippe C. Schmitter. Mas'oe'd is essentially concerned with tracing the development of the New Order's economic and political framework during its early formative period of 1966-1971, that is, until the first of a series of tightly controlled general elections held during the long Soeharto era.

The book begins with a review of different approaches to politics, arguing against those that veer toward systems-analysis (of the Eastonian kind), those that neglect the significance of interests, and those that ignore the interaction between domestic and international factors. He rejects mainstream



modernization theory, which he suggests sees an unproblematic link between economic modernization and political democratization. He argues that the capitalist path of development in the Third World showed a correlation instead with the absence of democratization and the rise of authoritarianism.

Mas'ood's own theoretical framework attempts to combine Guillermo O'Donnell's (1973) bureaucratic authoritarian state model and Phillip Schmitter's (1974) model of state-corporatism, which look at political formats dominated, respectively, by an insulated, technocratic, and authoritarian bureaucracy and by state-established corporatist vehicles of societal representation. The first, says Mas'ood, is useful in understanding the mechanisms of state controls over political life and the second, the necessity for co-optation once economic development produces new demands in society. He is aware that other scholars, notably Dwight King (1978) and Karl Jackson (1978), have attempted similar analyses of Indonesia, but Mas'ood insists that King was negligent in modifying the Latin-American theoretical framework to fit the specific Indonesian situation and that Jackson – who followed on Fred Riggs' (1966) work on Thailand's "bureaucratic polity" – underestimated the capacity of the presidential office to override the bureaucracy.

In addition, Mas'ood devotes a lot of attention to the correlation of interests in the early New Order between international capital and Indonesia's new military rulers, intellectuals, and ideologues in supporting a capitalist development path. A crucial legacy for Mas'ood was the abject failure of Soekarno's autarchic socialism *à la* Indonesia policies in helping to legitimize this path. Mas'ood also elaborates on how the embrace of capitalism went hand in hand with the emergence of party and electoral systems as well as social representation models that were both exclusionary and state dominated, rather than genuinely democratic.

Many of Mas'ood's observations had come to appear routinely in analyses of the New Order – especially those of its critics – even as Indonesian capitalism and society was transformed by the thirty years of Soeharto's reign. In that sense, they soon became somewhat commonplace, while the New Order's

growing complexities required new kinds of analyses. For example, Mas'ood's work is as ill-equipped as Bulkin's to deal with such phenomena as the consolidation of a "capitalist oligarchy," at least during the last decade of the New Order, which was premised on the fusion of the interests of politico-bureaucratic and capitalist families. This reflected both the rise of a domestic bourgeoisie and the very instrumental appropriation of the institutions of state power by powerful coalitions of interests. The result was a vast, predatory network of patronage that centered on Soeharto, beginning in Cendana Palace and extending down to the cities, regions, towns, and villages. Arguably, the constituent elements of this capitalist oligarchy are still salient in post-Soeharto Indonesia, as they regroup and reconstitute themselves within new still-predatory alliances.

Perhaps it is not surprising, therefore, that even by 1989, Mas'ood had abandoned part of the framework of his original PhD thesis. In fact, Mas'ood ends the postscript of his book by quoting the American Indonesianist Bill Liddle, who argues in voluntarist fashion that the most important variable in Indonesian politics was the leadership style of President Soeharto. This represented a drastic departure from the structuralist thrust of the thesis and perhaps reflected more exasperation with the perceived inability of theory to "keep up with events" than a thorough process of theoretical re-examination.

## Capitalism and the press

Like Bulkin's work, Dhakidae's has never been published. But it is a path-breaking work on the Indonesian press industry and is the only one of the three considered here that relied on primary data and extended periods of field research. Indeed, the data collected for this dissertation is quite astounding and includes information gathered through numerous interviews with such figures as the obnoxious Harmoko, Soeharto's long-standing Minister of Information. Its pages are filled with tables and statistics on everything from newspaper distribution in different regions to the country sources of origin of newspaper industry imports.

The author's aim is clearly to write a political economy of the mass media. This is juxtaposed against three other approaches to the mass media. The first is the socio-political history approach that looks at the role of the press in relation to the birth of nationalist movements, democratization, and the like. The second approach is found in conventional media or communications studies-type work that is primarily concerned with content analysis. The third, according to Dhakidae, is the crude Marxist type that is economically reductionist – viewing the mass media as simply part of a superstructure determined by the requirements of the economic base. In contrast, Dhakidae explores the Indonesian print media as an industry that grew rapidly with the advance of industrial capitalism – a development that changed the very character of journalism in Indonesia. The commodification of the news media, he essentially argues, has led to the death of the tradition of “political journalism.”

The origins of this political journalism are traced back to the rise of Indonesia's nationalist movement and to the early post-colonial period, during which newspapers associated with political parties thrived. The policies of the New Order state in particular, which encouraged both the commercialization and depoliticization of all spheres of life, are credited with political journalism's demise. Significantly, journalists deemed to be Left-leaning were banned by the New Order from practicing their craft. Indeed, there is much detail about the impact of state regulation on the growth and character of the news industry in Indonesia. The most important was clearly the practice of allocating press publication licenses, which became so coveted as to spur the creation of a lucrative black market involving Department of Information officials. To successfully attain one of these licenses was always a blessing for news media entrepreneurs, while revocation was tantamount to the kiss of death for the publication as well as its employees. Journalists had to be forever aware that they should practice a “free but responsible” type of journalism.

In spite of large sections on state policy, the most fascinating parts of the thesis deal with the “rise of capital” in the industry, specifically the rise of the giant *Kompas*, *Tempo*, and *Pos Kota* groups (the last owned by Harmoko himself). Key developments included the introduction of ever more sophisticated

production technologies and the rise of advertising revenue. Thus, somewhat paradoxically, the more sedate and non-controversial news reporting became, the bigger it was as a business. Dhakidae goes so far as to suggest that *Tempo* became an "advertisement magazine... became capital unto itself, being able to cut off its economic performance from its quality."

Dhakidae's work reflected a trend in the study of Indonesian political economy: as the whole of Indonesian capitalism became increasingly difficult to study due to its growing complexity, there was more focus on specific industries or groups of industries. In spite of its wealth of data and keen, often biting observations, however, one is still left with the desire for a clearer picture of the political interests and attitudes of the new species conjured up by the industrialization of the news media: the journalist as capitalist. Was there a contradiction between the imperatives of the depoliticized brand of New Order journalism and that of capital accumulation through the "selling" of political news? What about the entrance of crony capitalists into the news industry, a development that occurred a little too late to be fully dealt with by Dhakidae? Moreover, perhaps somewhat unfairly, one is tempted to ask how the study stands up to scrutiny today, as the unravelling of the New Order has been accompanied by the proliferation of overtly political newspapers, magazines, and tabloids, for which political news itself has quite clearly become commodified. Has a bastard version of the press been born by the joining of industry and politics? In the current "survival of the fittest" news industry – no longer reliant on official licences – numerous publications have now come and gone, while the big players, *Kompas*, *Tempo*, and the like, are still triumphant.

The lack of serious studies of Indonesian political economy by Indonesians was, I think, due to the New Order's political marginalization of Marxist analysis. Though certainly not all political economy studies are Marxist-inspired – and many are clearly anti-Marxist – the twin themes of capitalism and class were generally regarded as belonging to the discourse of the political Left. Ironically, therefore, with few exceptions, Indonesians have rarely dealt with some of the more pressing analytical issues associated with the rise of capitalism in Indonesia. Analyses of Indonesian politics and society by Indonesians have

often tended toward some of the most banal forms of narrow behaviorism. The fall of the New Order and the resultant opening up of political space may eventually see the production of new studies by Indonesians of Indonesian political economy.

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## Kajian Ekonomi Politik Indonesia pada masa Orde Baru

*Vedi R. Hadiz*

Artikel ini menimbang tiga karya penting ekonomi politik Indonesia yang ditulis oleh sarjana Indonesia pada masa Orde Baru. Karya tersebut memperlihatkan bagaimana langkanya kajian-kajian yang menganalisa kapitalisme dan kelas dengan pisau analisis Marxisme yang memang dilarang selama Soeharto. Tak satu pun dari karya-karya tersebut dipublikasikan dalam bahasa Inggris, walau ketiganya ditulis sebagai disertasi doktor di beberapa universitas di Amerika. Makanya, ketiganya tidak begitu dikenal di luar lingkungan kajian Indonesia. Bagaimana pun salah satu dari karya tersebut telah diterjemahkan kedalam bahasa Indonesia.

Karya Farchan Bulkin adalah kajian sejarah yang menekankan dasar sosial negara Indonesia, yang berhubungan dengan gejala "kapitalisme pinggiran" dan naik turunnya peruntungan politik "kelas menengah." Bagi Bulkin, ketiadaan demokrasi di Indonesia adalah karena absennya kelas menengah yang mampu membangun ekonomi nasional. Karya Mochtar Mas'ood berusaha menganalisa masa pembentukan awal Orde Baru beserta struktur politik dan lembaga yang muncul bersamaan dengannya. Dia memberikan penekanan pada hubungan antara kapital internasional dan penguasa militer, intelektual, dan ideologi di Indonesia yang mendukung pembangunan bercorak kapitalis. Karya Daniel Dhakidae yang membuka jalan dalam kajian penerbitan surat kabar Indonesia sebagai industri kapitalis, merupakan kajian berdasarkan data tangan pertama dan penelitian lapangan yang cukup lama. Dhakidae beragumen bahwa kapitalisme industri telah merubah wajah media jurnalisme, yang secara langsung menyebabkan matinya tradisi "jurnalisme politik."

Translated by Wahyu Prasetyawan

## Mga Pag-aaral sa Ekonomyang Pulitikal ng Indonesya sa Bagong Kaayusan

Vedi R. Hadiz

Sinusuri ng artikulong ito ang tatlong mahahalagang kasulatang Indones hinggil sa ekonomyang pampolitika noong panahon ng New Order. Ihinahain nito ang palagay na ang kasalatan ng mga ganitong pag-aaral ay sumasalamin sa pagmamarginalisa ng New Order ni Soeharto sa pag-aanalisa sa kapitalismo at uri sa pamamagitan ng pagkakawing dito sa Marxismo na ipinagbawal nito. Wala ni isa mga mga kasulatang ito ay inilathala sa wikang Ingles, bagama't isinulat ang mga ito bilang mga disertasyong pang-PhD sa mga unibersidad sa Estados Unidos. Dahil dito, hindi gaanong kilala ang mga ito sa labas ng mga sirkulong Indones. Iisa lamang sa mga ito ang naisalin sa wikang Indones.

Ang aklat ni Farchan Bulkin ay isang malawakang historikal na pag-aaral na pumapaksa sa batayang panlipunan ng pamahalaang Indones na maiuugnay sa mga katangian ng "peripheral capitalism" at sa pagtaas at pagbagsak ng pampulitikang kapalaran ng mga "middle class groups" ng bansa. Para kay Bulkin, ang kawalan ng demokrasya sa Indonesia ay maiuugat, sa kalakhan, sa di-pagkakaroon ng malakas na panggitnang uri na may kakayahang magpaunlad ng isang malakas na "pambansang" ekonomya. Ang aklat ni Mochtar Mas'ood ay naglalayong mag-analisa sa pagsibol at maagang panahon ng New Order at sa mga lumitaw na istrukturang pulitikal at institusyon. Binibigyang-pansin niya ang korelasyon ng interes sa pagitan ng *international capital* at ng mga bagong pinunong militar na Indones, intelektwal, at ideologue sa pagtangkil sa direksyon ng *internasional capital*. Ang aklat ni Daniel Dhakidae ang kauna-unahang tumalakay sa pamamahayag na Indones bilang industriyang kapitalista ay nakabase sa pangunahing datos at mahabang panahon ng *field research*. Iginigiit ni Dhakidae na ang pagsulong ng *industrial capitalism* at ang komodipikasyon ng news media ay nagbago sa pinakaesensya ng pamamahayag sa Indonesia, at humantong sa pagwawakas ng tradisyon ng "political journalism."

Translated by Sofia Guillermo

## スハルト新秩序体制下のインドネシアに関する政治経済学研究

ヴェディ・R・ハディズ (Vedi R. Hadiz)

本稿においては、スハルト体制期、インドネシア人によって行なわれたインドネシアの政治経済学的分析3冊を評論する。こうした研究は極めて少なく、このことはそれ自体、スハルトの新秩序体制下で資本主義と階級の分析が非合法のマルクス主義との連想のもとに、いかに周辺化されていたかを示すものでもある。これらの研究は全て、本来、アメリカの大学で博士論文として執筆されたものであるが、英語で出版されておらず、こうした研究の存在はインドネシア研究者以外にはよく知られていない。またこれらの研究のうち、インドネシア語に翻訳されているものは一冊のみである。

ファルハン・ブルキンの研究は、インドネシア国家の社会的基礎についての幅広い歴史研究であり、これを「周辺資本主義」の特徴として「中産階級」の政治的運命との関連で分析したものである。ブルキンによれば、インドネシアにおける民主主義の不在は、主に、強力な「国民」経済の発展を可能にする強力な中産階級の不在にある、とされる。モフタル・マスウッドは新秩序体制の形成期に注目して、その政治構造と制度がどのように作られたのかを分析する。彼の分析においては、国際資本と軍人、知識人、イデオログがインドネシアの資本主義的発展において利害の一致したことが注目される。ダニエル・ダキダエの研究は、一次資料の漁渉と長期にわたる現地調査を基にした、資本主義産業としてのインドネシア・ジャーナリズムの先駆的研究である。ダキダエは、産業資本主義の発展とニュース・メディアの商品化によってインドネシアにおけるジャーナリズムの性格が変化し、これが「政治的ジャーナリズム」の死をもたらしているとする。

Translated by Morishita Akiko (森下明子)



## การศึกษาทางด้านเศรษฐศาสตร์การเมือง ในอินโดนีเซียยุคระเบียบใหม่

Vedi R. Hadiz (เวดี ฮาดิซ)

บทความนี้วิจารณ์ผลงานการศึกษาสำคัญสามชิ้นเกี่ยวกับเศรษฐศาสตร์การเมืองของอินโดนีเซีย ซึ่งเขียนโดยชาวอินโดนีเซียเอง ในยุคนโยบายระเบียบใหม่ บทความนี้ชี้ให้เห็นว่า นโยบายระเบียบใหม่ในยุคซูฮาร์โตที่พยายามลดความสำคัญของการวิเคราะห์ระบบทุนนิยมกับชนชั้น โดยอ้างว่ามันเกี่ยวข้องกับลัทธิมาร์กซิสต์ซึ่งถือเป็นลัทธิที่ผิดกฎหมาย ได้ทำให้ผลงานศึกษาประเภทนี้มีอยู่น้อยมาก นอกจากนี้ ไม่มีผลงานใดในสามชิ้นนี้ได้ตีพิมพ์เป็นภาษาอังกฤษ ทั้งๆ ที่มันเป็นงานที่เขียนขึ้นเพื่อเป็นวิทยานิพนธ์ปริญญาเอกในมหาวิทยาลัยของอเมริกา ผลงานเหล่านี้จึงไม่ค่อยเป็นที่รู้จักนอกวงวิชาการอินโดนีเซีย ทั้งยังมีเพียงเล่มเดียวเท่านั้นที่ได้รับการแปลเป็นภาษาอินโดนีเซีย

ผลงานของ Farchan Bulkin เป็นงานศึกษาภาพรวมทางประวัติศาสตร์ที่ให้ความสำคัญกับการศึกษาพื้นฐานทางสังคมของรัฐอินโดนีเซียที่สัมพันธ์กับลักษณะเฉพาะของ "ทุนนิยมชายขอบ" และโชคชะตาทางการเมืองที่ขึ้นๆ ลงๆ ของ "กลุ่มชนชั้นกลาง" ในประเทศ Bulkin ชี้ว่า การที่อินโดนีเซียไม่สามารถมีระบอบประชาธิปไตยที่แท้จริงนั้น เนื่องมาจากการขาดชนชั้นกลางที่เข้มแข็งที่จะสามารถพัฒนาระบบเศรษฐกิจ "แห่งชาติ" ที่เข้มแข็งขึ้นมาได้ ส่วนผลงานของ Mochtar Mas'ood พยายามวิเคราะห์ยุคแรกเริ่มก่อตั้งนโยบายระเบียบใหม่กับโครงสร้างและสถาบันทางการเมืองที่เกิดขึ้น เขาให้ความสนใจกับความสัมพันธ์ทางผลประโยชน์ระหว่างกัน ในหมู่ชนข้ามชาติกับผู้นำกองทัพ, ปัญญาชนและนักเผยแพร่อุดมการณ์รุ่นใหม่ของอินโดนีเซีย ในการสนับสนุนการพัฒนาตามแนวทางของระบบทุนนิยม ผลงานของ Daniel Dhakidae ได้บุกเบิกการศึกษาวงการหนังสือพิมพ์ของอินโดนีเซียในฐานะ

ที่เป็นอุตสาหกรรมประเภทหนึ่งในระบบทุนนิยม โดยใช้ข้อมูลปฐมภูมิและการ  
วิจัยภาคสนามในช่วงเวลาที่ยาวนานเป็นพื้นฐานในการวิเคราะห์ ข้อโต้แย้งที่  
สำคัญของ Dhakidae คือ ความก้าวหน้าของทุนนิยมอุตสาหกรรมและการ  
ทำให้ชาวนากลายเป็นสินค้า ได้เปลี่ยนลักษณะของหนังสือพิมพ์ในอินโดนีเซีย  
ไปอย่างสิ้นเชิง อันนำไปสู่จุดจบของจารีต "หนังสือพิมพ์การเมือง"

Translated by Pakavadi Jitsakulchaidej

Issue 2 / October 20

**Disaster and Rehabilitation**

## Issue 2 / Disaster and Rehabilitation / October 2002

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## Disaster and Rehabilitation

*Yamada Isamu*

We stand on the brink of a new era in tropical environment management. The preceding eras of colonial rule and development-driven postcolonial government have brought world-wide environmental disaster, and in the new era rehabilitation will be key, especially in the tropical environment of Southeast Asia.

European colonial powers began to invade the environments of many countries in the eighteenth century and through the mid-twentieth century caused the destruction of tropical rain forests in favor of commercial crops and plantation agriculture. These enterprises, which brought benefit to the colonial countries, were established on the most favorable land and sacrificed local peoples' lives and cultures. Independence from colonial rule brought no change in environmental management. Needing quick income for the development of new nations, many postcolonial governments took advantage of easy access to their richest resources-tropical rain forests. After oil and gas, timber became the most valuable item exported to the developed world. After decades of this path to development, most of the region's economies have become richer, but the forest and its related environments have become much, much poorer.

Destruction intensified in the period from 1980 to 2000, with widescale forest fires and mismanagement of tropical swamp areas. The first big forest

fires occurred in Indonesia in 1983, and many were later set deliberately to clear land for large plantations. These forest fires have affected all the surrounding countries and become a critical regional issue. Peat swamp forests and mangroves have been similarly mismanaged. A 100 million ha rice-farming project has failed in Central Kalimantan and shrimp farming in coastal areas throughout Southeast Asia has left toxic and abandoned ponds in its wake. Clearly, a new type of environmental management is called for.

The 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (the Rio Summit) marked the worldwide emergence of environmental movements, some with a focus on the human rights of forest dwellers. These point the way to a new approach to environmental management. The concurrence of these movements with ongoing environmental disasters has given new power to NPO and NGO groups pushing political and international organizations toward more sustainable and harmonious development policies. With the help of these organizations, many multi-level projects have begun, including those promoting reforestation and community resource management.

Rehabilitation is not only a problem of tropical areas, but also of developed countries, which face issues of pollution, energy use, social and economic security, human rights, and demographic change. In the context of these difficult problems, tropical Asia does not look hopeless. For environmental solutions to emanate from the tropical countries, we need careful reassessment of past failures and discussion of how to create a new environment in which nature and society can be harmonious. This is an urgent issue, and we should start by pursuing knowledge about the way of life of local people who live in daily contact with the environment. These can give a good example of how to make the tropical environment harmonious and sustainable.

The era of the twenty-first century should be a new beginning for the world environment. Areas corrupted by wide-scale destruction should be carefully managed and rehabilitated, so that rich tropical areas regain their precolonial status. Most importantly, local people should profit most from this land and enjoy a culturally rich life under the warm tropical sun.

# Community Forestry and the Stewardship of Tropical Forests in Asia

*Wil de Jong*

Mark Poffenberger, editor

*Keepers of the Forest: Land Management Alternatives in Southeast Asia*

West Hartford, Connecticut, U.S.A. / Kumarian Press / 1990

M. Victor, C. Lang, and Jeff Bornemeier, editors

*Community Forestry at a Crossroads: Reflections and Future Directions in the Development of Community Forestry*

Bangkok / RECOFTC Report No. 16 / 1998

<[http://www.recoftc.org/pubs\\_interreports.html#Crossroads](http://www.recoftc.org/pubs_interreports.html#Crossroads)>

Char Miller, editor

"Forest History in Asia"

Special Issue of *Environmental History* 6 (2) 2001

Available online at <<http://www.lib.duke.edu/forest/ehmain.html>>

Christopher Barr and Ida Aju Pradnja Resosudarmo

*Decentralization of Forest Administration in Indonesia: Implications for Forest Sustainability, Community Livelihoods, and Economic Development*

Bogor, Indonesia / CIFOR Occasional Paper / Forthcoming

At the recently concluded World Summit on Sustainable Development, President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa called for an end to global apartheid between rich and poor. He pointed to the fact that 1.2 billion people live in grinding poverty and some 800 million are undernourished, while rich countries spend about USD 1 billion per day subsidizing agriculture. This subsidized agriculture prevents poor countries from accessing markets with products they can supply.

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Mbecki accused the rich countries of maintaining a "savage principle of survival of the fittest." In this world, in which power flows from control over productive resources, poor nations need to identify leverage points to use in negotiations with the rich. Home to a diverse range of environments, poor countries do have environmental assets. These are the tropical forests and rich marine resources, mangroves and mountains that are abundant locally, but scarce globally, as pointed out by contributor Jin Sato in *Community Forestry at a Crossroads*. These are assets that poor countries, in theory, could use to bargain for a bigger share of global wealth.

But to be able to use natural resources in this way, they must be kept in good condition. There has been a wide-ranging debate over the last three decades over who should hold stewardship-rights and responsibilities over Asia's tropical forests. Stewardship includes responsibility for the well-being of the forests, but also the right to benefit from their resources. On one side is the call for forest stewardship by rural communities living in or near the forest; on the other are those who are sceptical of its feasibility. In this essay I will review how the debate evolved and sketch out some of the contesting positions. My arguments will remain inconclusive, because the debate itself is ongoing. Nevertheless, I will identify some important issues that need to be put on the community forestry agenda over the years to come. Admittedly, my conclusions are personal and not without bias or the flavor of advocacy. However, I am joining a large group of writers on this issue who complement factual arguments with opinion.

## **The promise of community forestry** .....

A number of events brought the issue of stewardship of tropical forests to the forefront of the international development and conservation debate. The period from the end of World War II through the 1980s was a period of emergency and the wide adoption of International Development Assistance. The Bretton Woods Conference in 1944 created the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (now called the World Bank). The United Nations and its crucial UN Development

Program (UNDP) and Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) were established, as was the Consultative Group of International Agricultural Research (supporter of my own organization, CIFOR – the Center for International Forestry Research). These all reflect an international concern for a more equitable development of economic wealth among nations and among their inhabitants. In the 1970s an environmental component was integrated into the development discourse when the Club of Rome and later the Brundtland Report (1987) questioned the impact of the planned economic growth on natural resources and the environment. Soon this debate shifted to a worldwide concern about tropical forests and the detrimental impact their destruction might have on the world's climate, biodiversity, downstream environments, and the like.

Thereafter, the potential of trees and forests to improve incomes and livelihoods of large segments of the rural poor became prominent in the rural development debate. This led to the establishment of the International Center for Research in Agroforestry (ICRAF) and CIFOR. Since the 1980s the idea of communal stewardship over tropical forests has come to the forefront. Many became concerned about the destructive impact of corporate exploitation of tropical forests, which was generally backed up by colluding forestry departments. It seemed to make sense to put local communities in charge of tropical forests. It was expected that this would contribute to the non-destructive use of those forests and at the same time give the new stewards the opportunity to improve their lives. The concept of community forestry was born.

Community forestry has strong advocates among the NGOs that operate on the local level supporting recognition of the rights of tribal groups. These have been instrumental in achieving actual control by some communities over tropical forests, as related in David Edmunds' and Eva Wollenberg's "Historical Perspectives on Forest Policy Change in Asia." (This article is the introduction to "Forest History in Asia," the special issue of *Environmental History*. *EH* is an interdisciplinary quarterly portraying human interactions with the natural world from the perspectives of history, geography, anthropology, the natural sciences, and many other disciplines.)

FAO now has a separate community forestry program. Both the current and previous director of my own organization have stated to the media their profound believe in the need to widely transfer forest custodianship to local communities. But the concept has an equal number of detractors. All the works discussed here suggest that forestry officials are usually sceptical. Essentially, they do not believe local communities to be capable of managing forests the way forestry officials want them managed. Often, too, the private interests of forestry officials are threatened when control is transferred to local communities.

### The roots of community forestry

Community forestry advocates point out that local groups living in remote corners of countries like Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, and India have been managing forests for centuries. Quite a few researchers, myself included, have supported this argument by documenting long-term local forest management practices among largely self-contained communities. Several of the contributors to these volumes have looked back even further. *EH* provides examples of successful communal practices that existed before colonial times. The same accounts portray a history of denial of such local practices by forestry departments. In most cases this led to dispossession of communal forests. Stories are provided from India, the Philippines, China, and Nepal in *EH* and from Indonesia and Thailand in the volume edited by Mark Poffenberger, *Keepers of the Forest*. The stories follow a similar pattern everywhere. Until the late nineteenth century, colonial powers in Asia had little control over large stretches of forests. But interest surged in the colonies' rich forest resources as markets demanded new products and metropolitan governments demanded higher revenues from their dependencies. The colonial powers (and Thailand) then set up forestry departments following a western, mostly German-based, approach to forestry. Local communities, their interests, and their experience in maintaining the forest as a productive resource to meet daily needs were almost totally ignored. A long period of widespread conflict followed between officialdom and local communities over access, control, use-rights, and ownership of forests stripped from communities after centuries of custodianship.

The colonial powers eventually returned home, but essentially no change occurred under postcolonial states. The newly independent regimes embraced modernism, especially in their treatment of valuable forest reserves. Very soon, in country after country, the private interests of the power elite became the guiding principle of forestry policies and practice. It should be noted that in addition to centuries of maintaining these productive resources, people in countries like Indonesia, Thailand, and India had originally planted much of the forest that they considered their own. But state agencies claimed control over them and largely ignored demands by native inhabitants (now citizens). The picture is generally bleak, though Ramachandra Guha in *EH* points to progressive thinkers, including some amongst the colonial rulers, throughout history. Unfortunately, according to Edmunds and Wollenberg, they had minimal influence at their time.

### Community forestry and the winds of political change

The trend toward increased local stewardship over forests is not an isolated phenomenon. It coincides with a worldwide search for more effective governance, which has often led to decentralization, wherein regional and local governments get stronger mandates and authority to run affairs within their jurisdiction. For instance, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand have enacted laws since the 1990s to devolve important parts of central government authority to lower level government. The effect of decentralization on custodianship over forests, however, is not entirely clear. In *Community Forestry at a Crossroads*, contributor Maria Victoria M. Sabban provides some evidence of its impact on community forestry in the Philippines. Progressive legislation gave increased authority to lower levels of government, which has resulted in increased administrative demand on communal groups that hold stewardship over forests. Although this is partly a result of trying to incorporate communal forest control into state administration, lower level authorities have also drafted new guidelines for communal forest management because they are reluctant to relinquish control over forest areas. This has become much more obvious in Indonesia, as illustrated in Christopher Barr and Ida Aju Pradnja Resosudarmo's *Decentralization of Forest Administration in Indonesia*. Along with authority,

decentralisation since the late 1990s has given district governments the responsibility of generating much more of their own revenues. In forest rich districts, governments promote oil palm plantations and logging, both legal and illegal, to generate that revenue. The process of political reform in Indonesia since the fall of Suharto has, in fact, created legal opportunities for small communal forest concessions, something unthinkable under the previous regime. These communal logging concessions are a sad story. The process is led by opportunistic village elites in collusion with outside timber traders. The result has been a progressive destruction of Indonesia's remaining forests on a scale not seen in the previous era of corporate logging.

### **What hope for communal stewardship of Asia's tropical forests**

Although these examples suggest little hope for communal stewardship of Asia's tropical forests, several of the volumes do relate positive cases. In the Philippines, for example, Saban notes that by 1997 almost 3 million hectares of forestland in more than 600 sites nationwide were under recognized community control. The state of West Bengal has passed through stages of blame, negotiation, and true collaboration in a process leading to genuine communal stewardship of forests, or Joint Forest Management, according to Edmunds and Wollenberg. There has also been formal recognition of age-old forest production systems on the island of Sumatra, Indonesia. Despite these successes, however, Edmunds and Wollenberg note slow progress toward increased local stewardship in most places. There are quite a few reasons why they believe this is the case. It should be recognized, first of all, that fairly successful local forest management has been disturbed by years of central control. Furthermore, forest officials continue to be reluctant to give up control, even if official discourse favors the transfer of mandate and authority to local communities. This is because they generally do not believe in the capacity of communities to take care of the nation's natural treasures and frequently do not want to give up lucrative sources of income. Often, therefore, control has been transferred over low quality or degraded forests only, not the healthy resource-rich forests. As a result, communities have been given a responsibility and burden, not an asset that

contributes significantly to their well-being. The problem, however, most certainly does not lie within forestry departments and governments alone. Communities often lack the technical, institutional, and organizational skills to take up these responsibilities. And very often, transferring control to local communities just reinstates the power base of local elites.

### **An agenda for community forestry in the years to come**

To conclude, it may be useful to identify a possible agenda for community forestry over the coming years. The authors of the four volumes do point out that local communities have yet to receive true authority to take care of forests within their own territory. And handing over authority has to be considered in conjunction with two other trends. First, that forests are of increasing value to a larger number of constituencies. And second, that Asia's tropical forests are being increasingly degraded, which may limit even the interest of local communities in taking responsibility for them. There is, therefore, a great need to invest in the restoration of tropical forests that have been seriously degraded, an effort in which local communities could play an important role.

Formerly, forest departments, on behalf of colonial and postcolonial governments, contested the capture of forest benefits with local communities. Today tropical forests are valuable to many more stakeholder groups. They are valuable to people worldwide for the biodiversity they hold, the carbon they store, and the climate they regulate. Within each nation, demands on forests have increased as well. The national middle class in a country like Thailand may expect national forest resources to be dedicated predominately to their interests. Pinkaew Luangaramsi, in *Community Forestry at a Crossroads*, tells us that this sentiment actually led to protests against a community forest bill in 1996 that middle class groups feared would jeopardize their access to forests for recreational purposes.

Edmunds and Wollenberg argue that the new demands of wider groups of stakeholders will require more complicated negotiations over which rights direct users of forests hold and which they must relinquish to outside stake-

holders. Although much of the literature on community forestry calls for transferring property rights to local communities, in years to come these claims need to be specified in more detail in order to reach agreement between all interested parties. It is probable that community forestry will increasingly take the form of co-management, rather than absolute control by communities alone. This will demand more capacity on the part of the local users, who will need to understand different demands, negotiate sets of rights and responsibilities, and implement agreements.

The next question is: How attractive will stewardship be over degraded or poor quality forests? While communal control over forest areas is progressing, if slowly, it goes hand in hand with a progressive decline in the quality of forests. When communities are simply given back forests with little value left, it is not likely to be successful as a means of improving the condition of the forest and the livelihood of the people. There must be incentives for communities to assume stewardship over such forests.

This leads to the question of the role of local communities in the restoration of forests. It is increasingly evident that governments and international agencies will want to invest in restoring forests that have been degraded by logging, fire, or other causes. These are the forests that may be targeted to become community forestry areas. Therefore, agreements will need to be made between local communities and outside parties regarding the compensation local communities will receive.

In sum, although slow progress has been made in transferring stewardship over Asia's tropical forests to local communities, the issue is still very much alive. The debate and action agenda of community forestry has passed through the initial period of launching the idea to the next stage of forging interest among governments, forestry departments, and other key players. Focus now needs to be trained on the opportunities and constraints existing within the communities who will become responsible for much of what remains of Asia's tropical forests. The struggle over the next years will shift from who should control forests to how communal stewardship can become feasible and attrac-

tive to communities while meeting the demands of other constituencies. This will require intensified negotiation over rights and responsibilities, more investment in capacity-building within state forestry agencies and local communities, and new ways to determine compensation for the restoration and preservation of forests that provide national and global environmental services.



## Hutan Kemasyarakatan dan Pengelolaan Hutan-Hutan Tropis di Asia

*Wil de Jong*

Sebuah perdebatan yang sengit telah berlangsung sekitar tiga dekade mengenai siapa yang harus mengelola hutan tropis di seluruh Asia. Pengelolaan termasuk tanggungjawab untuk kelestarian hutan, dan juga hak-hak untuk memanfaatkan sumberdaya mereka. Pada satu sisi merupakan panggilan untuk mengelola hutan oleh masyarakat desa pedesaan yang tinggal di hutan atau dekat hutan; pada sisi yang lain mereka diragukan kemampuannya. Tulisan ini mengulas bagaimana perdebatan berkembang sebagai tergambar dalam empat tulisan diatas.

Hutan kemasyarakatan menganjurkan seperti yang dinyatakan oleh NGO bahwa kelompok-kelompok lokal yang tinggal di daerah-daerah terpencil di negara-negara seperti Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines dan India telah mengelola hutan berabad-abad lamanya. Beberapa pendapat memperlihatkan contoh-contoh dari kegiatan pengelolaan masyarakat yang sukses pada zaman sebelum kolonial dimana akhirnya memberi jalan untuk kepentingan komersial di akhir abad ke 19. Pada zaman kolonial juga departemen kehutanan didirikan; mereka mengingkari sejarah pengelolaan hutan oleh masyarakat lokal saat ini.

Pemerintah pasca kolonial didukung oleh organisasi-organisasi internasional tetap mempercayai praktek-praktek pemanfaatan hutan yang modern dan eksploitatif hingga perkembangan yang terjadi mulai mempertanyakan efek dari pembangunan ekonomi terhadap sumberdaya hayati dan lingkungan. Pada tahun 1980-an, ide muncul untuk meletakkan kembali masyarakat sebagai penanggung jawab hutan tropis, untuk kehidupan mereka dan kelestarian hutan. Pada tahun 1990-an, hutan kemasyarakatan muncul bersamaan dengan dengan kecenderungan menuju desentralisasi. Sayangnya, hasil yang sering muncul adalah

eksploitasi yang berlebih akibat pemerintah daerah baru dan kalangan elite desa yang bertanggungjawab mencari pendapatan melalui konsesi-konsesi kayu dan perkebunan kelapa sawit.

Meskipun ada beberapa contoh positif-hampir 3 milyar ha di bawah pengawasan masyarakat di Philippines-gambaran yang lebih nyata adalah keengganan pemerintah pusat melepaskan sumber pendapatan yang menguntungkan. Ketika mereka memberikan tanggung-jawab untuk dikelola secara lokal, hal tersebut sering merupakan hutan-hutan yang telah rusak atau berkualitas rendah, lebih merupakan sebuah beban daripada sebuah aset terhadap masyarakat-masyarakat lokal. Agenda-agenda selanjutnya harus mempertimbangkan hutan sebagai sebuah nilai yang jumlah pengelolanya terus bertambah. Oleh karena itu masyarakat lokal mungkin memainkan peran yang penting di dalam pemulihan hutan-jika mereka mendapat ganti rugi-tetapi hak-hak yang kompleks dan berbagai kepentingan menyarankan bahwa masa depan terletak pada pengelolaan bersama. Perebutan akan berpindah dari siapa yang seharusnya mengontrol, ke bagaimana penjagaan oleh masyarakat dapat layak dikerjakan dan menarik untuk masyarakat, sementara memenuhi permintaan konstituen-konstituen lain.

Translated by Andi Amri and Retno Kusumanigtyas

## *Community Forestry* at ang Pangangalaga sa mga Kagubatang Tropikal sa Asya

*Wil de Jong*

Halos tatlong dekada na ang itinagal ng mainit na pagtatalo hinggil sa kung sino ang nararapat humawak sa *stewardship* o pangangalaga sa mga kagubatang tropikal sa Asya. Kabilang sa *stewardship* ang responsibilidad para sa kagalingan ng mga kagubatan at gayundin ang karapatang makinabang sa mga likas na kayamanan. Sa isang banda ay ang panawagan na ilagay ang *stewardship* sa kamay ng mga pamayanang rural na naninirahan sa loob mismo o malapit sa mga kagubatan; sa kabilang banda naman ay ang mga hindi mapaniwala sa praktikalidad nito. Binabalikan sa sanaysay na ito ang itinakbo ng debateng ito mula sa umpisa hanggang sa kasalukuyan, batay sa apat na sulatin.

Ayon sa mga pumapanig sa communal forestry tulad ng mga NGO, ang mga lokal na grupo na naninirahan sa mga liblib na pook ng mga bansang tulad ng Indonesia, Thailand, Pilipinas, at India ay ilang dantaon nang nangangasiwa sa mga kagubatan. Nagbibigay ang ilang kontribyutor ng mga halimbawa ng matagumpay na pamamalakad mula pa sa panahong pre-kolonyal, na sa kalaunan ay pinalitan ng mga komersyal na interes noong huling bahagi ng ika-19 na dantaon. Sa panahong kolonyal din itinatag ang mga kagawarang pangkagubatan; sa kasalukuyan, ang mga ito ang sumasalungat sa pagkakaroon ng kasaysayan ng lokal na pangangasiwa sa kagubatan.

Nagpatuloy ang mga post-kolonyal na pamahalaan – na suportado ng mga organisasyong internasyunal – sa paniniwala sa “makabago” at mapang-abusong pamamalakad sa kagubatan hanggang sa lumitaw sa diskursong pangkaunlaran ang mga katanungan hinggil sa epekto ng

kaunlarang pang-ekonomiya sa likas na kayamanan at kapaligiran. Pagsapit ng dekada otsenta, lumabas ang konsepto ng pagbabalik sa mga lokal na pamayanan ng pangangasiwa sa mga kagubatang tropikal, para sa kanilang kabuhayan at para sa ikabuburi ng kagubatan. Pagsapit ng dekada nobenta, ang konsepto ng *community forestry* ay tumugma sa tendensya patungong desentralisasyon. Sa kasamaang palad, ang naging resulta nito ay higit pang pagsasamantala dulot ng paglalayong tumubo ng mga bagong-luklok na opisyal ng distrito at mga elit ng pamayanan sa pamamagitan ng mga kunsesyon sa pagtotroso at plantasyon para sa langis ng niyog.

Sa kabila ng mga positibong halimbawa – halos 3 milyong ektarya ay nakapailalim sa kontrol ng lokal na pamayanan sa Pilipinas – ang kabuuang larawan ay kakikitaan ng mga sentral na awtoridad na ayaw bumitaw sa pinagmumulan ng malaking tubo. Sakaling ibigay nga sa lokal na pamayanan ang pangangalaga, ito ay kadalasang sa mga sira o mababang uri ng kagubatan, mas pabigat kaysa sa puhunan para sa mga pamayanan. Kinakailangang talakayin sa darating na panahon na ang mga kagubatan ay napakahalaga sa parami nang paraming interes. Maaaring gumap ng malaking papel ang mga lokal na pamayanan sa pangangalaga sa mga kagubatan – kung may kumpensasyon – subalit batay sa pagkasalimuot ng mga karapatan at interes, maaaring sabihing ang kinabukasan ay nasa hatian ng pangangasiwa. Ang tunggalian ay lilipat mula sa kung sino ang dapat humawak ng pangangasiwa patungo sa kung paano isasapraktika ang *communal stewardship* at magagawa itong kaakit-akit sa mga pamayanan, habang sinasagot din ang mga pangangailangan ng iba pang mamamayan.

Translated by Sofia Guillermo

## アジアの熱帯雨林におけるコミュニティ林業と管理者

ウィル・デ・ヨン(Wil de Jong)

ここ 15 年ほど、アジアの熱帯雨林の管理を誰が行うのかという議論がなされてきた。森林の管理者は、よりよい森林を維持する責任を有するが、森林資源から得られる利益についての権利はなかった。森林の中や、その周辺に暮らす地域住民による森林管理が謳われる一方で、そういった地域住民による森林管理を疑問視する声もある。本論は、こうした議論をどのように発展させてゆくのかを考察したいと考えている。

NGO などが提唱するコミュニティ林業は、インドネシアやタイ、フィリピン、インドなどで広域にわたって移動を行っている地域集団が実践してきた森林管理をもとにしている。研究者たちは、前植民地的な共同管理が、19 世紀後半から始まった商業的対象にやがて取って代わられたと指摘している。また、植民地期に組織された森林局では、今日でも地域住民による森林管理の歴史に対して懐疑的な者が多い。

現在の政府は、経済成長による天然資源や環境に与える影響が疑問視されるようになるまで、発展論にもとづいた近代的森林開発を支持してきた。1980 年代、熱帯雨林は地域住民の生活のためにも、森林環境の維持のためにも、地域住民による管理に戻すべきだとする議論が現れた。1990 年代に入り、コミュニティ林業が地方分権化の渦中で議論されるようになる。しかし、こうした地方分権化にともない、地方行政官や村落エリートによる木材コンセッションの認可や、オイルパーム・プランテーションの開拓が拡大し、新たな開発を引き起こしてしまっている。

地方政府がしぶしぶ財源としての資源を放棄するような例もある（フィリピンでは、3 百万ヘクタールにおよぶ森林が地域住民によって管理されるようになった）。しかし、地域に管理責任を認可したものの、森林自体がすでに荒廃していたりして、地域住民の資産であるよりも重荷になっている場合もある。将来的なアジェンダは、森林の管理・運営を担う人々に対して、森林のもつ今日的価値を提示しなければならない。地域住民はそれゆえ、(もしそれが保証されればであるが) 森林の回復にとって重要な役割を担うことになる。しかし、こうした森林管理にはまだ、権利や利害関係の複雑に入り組んだ問題が横たわっている。問題は、誰が森林の管理を担うのかから、地域管理がどのように実行され、どのように地域住民を惹きつけることができるのかに変化している。

Translated by Suzuki Shinji (鈴木 伸二)

**วนศาสตร์ชุมชนและการจัดการป่าไม้เขตอ่อนในเอเชีย***Wil de Jong* (วิล ดี จง)

เป็นเวลาประมาณสามสิบปีมาแล้วที่มีการถกเถียงกันอย่างเผ็ดร้อนว่า การดูแลป่าไม้เขตรวมในเอเชียควรเป็นหน้าที่ของใคร หน้าที่ดังกล่าวรวมถึงความรับผิดชอบรักษาให้ป่าอยู่ในสภาพที่ดี ตลอดจนสิทธิในการหาประโยชน์จากผลผลิตจากป่า ขณะที่ฝ่ายหนึ่งเห็นว่าหน้าที่ดังกล่าวควรตกเป็นของชุมชนที่มีถิ่นฐานอยู่ในป่าหรือบริเวณใกล้เคียง อีกฝ่ายหนึ่งกลับไม่เห็นว่าเป็นการเหมาะสม บทความนี้จะสรุปที่มากและที่ไปของข้อถกเถียงดังกล่าวซึ่งเป็นสาระในบทความทั้งสี่บทความข้างต้น

ผู้สนับสนุนแนวคิดเรื่องวนศาสตร์ชุมชน เช่น องค์การนอกภาครัฐต่างๆ ได้ชี้ให้เห็นว่าชุมชนซึ่งมีถิ่นที่อาศัยอยู่ในบริเวณพื้นที่ห่างไกลของประเทศต่างๆ อาทิ อินโดนีเซีย ไทย ฟิลิปปินส์ และอินเดีย ได้มีการจัดการด้านป่าไม้มานานนับศตวรรษแล้ว ผู้เขียนบทความหลายคนได้ยกตัวอย่างกลวิธีการจัดการป่าไม้ในระดับชุมชนที่ประสบความสำเร็จมาแล้วในยุคก่อนอาณานิคม ซึ่งในท้ายที่สุดก็ไม่อาจจะต้านกระแสการแสวงหาผลประโยชน์เชิงพาณิชย์ที่เกิดขึ้นในช่วงปลายศตวรรษที่สิบเก้า ในยุคอาณานิคมนี้เองที่เริ่มมีการก่อตั้งกรมป่าไม้ต่างๆ ขึ้น ในปัจจุบันกรมป่าไม้เหล่านี้กลับเป็นผู้ที่คลั่งคลงต่อการจัดการป่าไม้ของชุมชนในอดีต

รัฐบาลหลังยุคอาณานิคมโดยความสนับสนุนขององค์กรระหว่างประเทศยังคงเชื่อในวิธีการจัดการป่าไม้แบบสมัยใหม่ และแสวงหาประโยชน์ต่อไป จนกระทั่งเมื่อวาทกรรมการพัฒนาเริ่มตั้งข้อสงสัยเกี่ยวกับผลกระทบของความเติบโตทางเศรษฐกิจที่มีต่อทรัพยากรธรรมชาติและสภาวะ

แวดล้อม พอในช่วงทศวรรษ 1980 ได้เกิดความคิดที่จะให้ชุมชนกลับไปมีส่วนรับผิดชอบต่อป่าไม้เขตร้อน เพื่อประโยชน์ในการดำรงชีพ และการรักษาสภาพป่าพอถึงทศวรรษที่ 1990 ได้เกิดแนวคิดเรื่องวนศาสตร์ชุมชนขึ้นควบคู่ไปกับแนวโน้มที่จะกระจายอำนาจการปกครอง แต่ผลที่เกิดขึ้นกลับกลายเป็นการมุ่งแสวงหาผลประโยชน์ที่เพิ่มขึ้น ทั้งนี้เพราะเจ้าหน้าที่ท้องถิ่นซึ่งเพิ่งจะเข้ามารับผิดชอบและบรรดาผู้ที่มีอำนาจในหมู่บ้านต่างหวังผลประโยชน์จากสัมปทานป่าไม้และการทำไร่ป่าสัมมน้ำมัน

แม้จะมีตัวอย่างที่ดีให้เห็น ดังเช่นในประเทศฟิลิปปินส์ซึ่งมีพื้นที่เกือบสามล้านเฮกเตอร์ (ประมาณเกือบ 30,000 ตารางกิโลเมตร) อยู่ในความควบคุมของชุมชน ภาพที่เห็นส่วนใหญ่ก็คือเจ้าหน้าที่ส่วนกลางยังคงสั่งเล่ห์จะสละแหล่งรายได้ที่ตรงมา หากจะยอมสละความรับผิดชอบให้กับส่วนท้องถิ่นก็มักจะในกรณีที่ป่าเสื่อมโทรมแล้ว ซึ่งกลายเป็นภาระให้กับชุมชนท้องถิ่นมากกว่าที่จะเอื้อประโยชน์ โครงการในอนาคตจำต้องตระหนักไว้ว่าขณะนี้ป่าไม้เป็นสิ่งที่มีความสำคัญและมีคนจำนวนมากขึ้นทุกทีที่มีส่วนได้ส่วนเสีย ดังนั้นหากได้รับผลตอบแทน ชุมชนท้องถิ่นอาจจะรีบหาหนทางสำคัญ ในการฟื้นฟูสภาพป่า ทว่าความซับซ้อนในเรื่องของสิทธิและผลประโยชน์เผยให้เห็นว่าอนาคตขึ้นอยู่กับการจัดการร่วม การต่อสู้จะเปลี่ยนเป้าหมายจากที่ว่าใครจะเป็นผู้ควบคุมเป็นทุกอย่างไว้ให้การจัดการในระดับชุมชนได้ผลและเป็นที่สนใจของชุมชนต่างๆ โดยในขณะเดียวกันจะต้องสนองความต้องการของชุมชนอื่นด้วย

## "Community Forest" and Thai Rural Society

*Fujita Wataru*

Anan Ganjanapan

*Local Control of Land and Forest: Cultural Dimensions of  
Resource Management in Northern Thailand*

Chiang Mai / Regional Center for Social Science  
and Sustainable Development, Faculty of Social Sciences,  
Chiang Mai University / 2000

Shigetomi Shin'ichi

*Tai nozon no kaibatsu to jumin soshiki*

(Village organization for rural development in Thailand)

Tokyo / The Institute of Developing Economies / 1996

English edition: *Cooperation and Community in Rural Thailand:*

*An Organizational Analysis of Participatory Rural Development*

Tokyo / The Institute of Developing Economies / 1998

During the last several years, the "community forest" movement has become increasingly active in Thailand. Indeed, Thai society is facing a turning point. With no firm "communal land" tradition (such as Japan's *iriaiichi*), Thailand is searching for a more sustainable mode of forest use than the cultivation of forest frontiers shared by most rural societies. Both within the Royal Forestry Department (RDF) and among NGOs, there is disagreement over the ability of local communities to manage their own forest resources in a sustainable way. Legislation on a Community Forest Bill was initiated in the early 1990s, but has still not been enacted. The two works under review here explore the implications of this question from quite different viewpoints and point to different modes of community forestry in Thailand.

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## **“Loosely structured community” and the market economy**

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Since John F. Embree's essay (1950) recognized Thai society as being more “loosely structured” than Japan's, the “loosely structured society” model has been most frequently cited in understanding lowland Thai peasant communities. Embree's suggestion was based on certain observations: that although the father was the putative head of the family, children had no strong sense of duty and obligation to their parents; that cabarets were not well managed, with each female employee appearing or not on any given night as she pleased. Though various objections have been made to parts of his argument, I think the experience of field researchers in Thai villages bears out many of Embree's observations. Monographs describing communities in various regions in Thailand have supported Embree's idea. Many arguments on Thai peasant society followed Embree, for example, a volume edited by Dieter-Evans (1969) and a work by Mizuno (1981) that represented Thai society as an accumulation of bilateral relationships between individuals. This notion has been integrated into the idea of network society, which is descriptive of many societies in South-east Asia. To design a community forest management system, the question is whether and to what extent this social feature can be changed to a more collective one.

Shigetomi Shin'ichi's *Tai nozon no kaihatsu to jumin soshiki* (Village organization for rural development in Thailand) directly responds to this question. He has carried out intensive field research in a village in Northeast Thailand, and field surveys in many villages in other regions. His major interest is not in forest management itself but in rural development. He analyzes factors affecting the formation of collective organizations that transcend bilateral relationships based on actual cases in rural areas. He argues that the transition from traditional cooperation based on bilateral relationships to collective cooperation began as an adaptation to the market economy. With the penetration of the cash economy, traditional bilateral relationships stopped functioning properly, as for example, where unpaid labor exchange was replaced by wage labor, or where it became impossible to cover the cost of funeral ceremonies with

mourners' contributions. In response, peasants formed collective organizations such as labor exchange groups, funeral ceremony unions, saving unions, and so on.

The formation of cooperative management organizations in which private resources are contributed by voluntary members is thought to be the root of collective organization. Shigetomi sees the next step as the formation of local organizations to manage resources under the auspices of rural development programs sponsored by the government or NGOs. Since the 1980s, development agencies have increasingly "discovered" peasants' powers of self-organization and have begun development projects to engage the active participation of local people. These development projects provide resources at the initial phase, but thereafter or simultaneously local people invest their own resources. Many organizations for collective management by local communities have since been formed and the model has become the norm for the management of communal resources.

Shigetomi points out that, especially in North and Northeast Thailand, such organizations of local people have succeeded when they are based on administrative units that more or less coincide with the pre-existing villages, but not on a wider basis such as the *tambon* (sub-district). He explains the success of the new cooperative organizations in North and Northeast Thailand as being based on the traditional unity of natural villages through communal rituals of guardian spirits, whose realm defines the community.

He applies this framework in his argument on cooperative management of "local communal resources," that is, resources occupied or created by communities, such as land, forest, and swamps. Local communal resources are natural resources and require a management system that includes all the residents within the surrounding area. Shigetomi's cases concern the economic management of local communal resources, not the religious management of guardians' forests. Most of his cases are communal forests in North and Northeast Thailand and communal swamps in the Northeast, where organizations for resource management have for the most part existed since the 1980s. These are areas

where natural resources, which had previously been openly accessed, have now, because of resource scarcity, been enclosed and are communally accessed.

Shigetomi's argument, based on abundant field study, is that the transition from bilateral social relationships to collective organization for the purpose of managing communal resources has occurred as an adjustment to the market economy and to resource scarcity. Therefore, the penetration of capitalism does not necessarily dissolve social unity, but may also strengthen and encourage it. Newly-formed cooperatives in North and Northeast Thailand rely on pre-existing local unity organized around Buddhist temples or guardian rituals, which overlap with the area of natural villages. However, the resultant collective organizations do not possess the same mental basis of unity that had been the core of traditional bilateral cooperation; rather, they are based on incentives of purely economic interest. Shigetomi's analysis of rural social organization thus focuses on economic factors and social structure. Anan Ganjanapan's study, on the other hand, though dealing with similar issues, emphasizes the friction between traditional cultures and modern institutions.

### **Toward the legalization of traditional culture**

Anan Ganjanapan is a leading scholar-activist of the community forest movement in Thailand, especially in the North, where the movement first began and where the network of academics, NGOs, and local people is most active. *Local Control of Land and Forest* is a collection of his recent essays. This book, which documents several case studies, demonstrates his basic idea that the "community forest" is one measure of the local community's struggle for its own rights. His argument shares a starting point with the so-called "community culture school," is within the mainstream of community forest activism, and provides its theoretically clearest framework in Thailand. Besides this book, he has written or edited several others in Thai (Anan 2001; Anan ed. 2000a; 2000b) which argue the importance of local initiatives to control local natural resources.

In contrast to Shigetomi, Anan argues that local communities have traditionally been capable of managing natural resources, and he takes the self-

sufficient community as his proto-type. He suggests that this self-sufficient community has been destroyed by such features of modernization as the cash economy and legal institutions. Within this framework, he uses cases from North Thailand to write about conflict for control over forest, land, and labor resources.

A case study of a village in Chiang Mai province is used to illustrate the impact of commercial agriculture on land and labor practices. Irrigated commercial crop cultivation in the dry season was introduced in the 1970s to complement paddy cultivation in the rainy season for subsistence. The higher cost of commercial crop cultivation – for seeds and fertilizer – changed the relationship between landlords and tenants. As tenants had difficulty accessing credit, landlords supplied the inputs and thereby tried to enhance their control over the tenants' production. In some cases, a fixed amount of the tenant's crop replaced previous proportional profit sharing. The relationship between landlords and tenants therefore changed from a kind of patron-client relationship to something closer to wage labor. Further, the limitation of farm tenancy to within kin groups has been abandoned.

Anan also discusses modern legal institutions, pointing out that modern ownership and government-issued land titles have had significant influence on local customs and religion. The modern land tenure system only acknowledges individual ownership, whereas in the lowland peasant society of North Thailand known as *khon muang*, land was customarily possessed by matrilineal kin groups. Within the modern system of land tenure, the kin group must receive land title in the name of one individual member. This is meant as an expedient, but conflict arises within the kin group when the "landowner" tries to mortgage the land or use farmland for other businesses. Further, it is reported that many villagers do not even apply for legal land title.

In North Thailand, conflict over natural resources has also created inter-ethnic problems. While lowland Thai and highland Karen had long resided in self-sufficient ways, relatively new migrant ethnic groups such as Hmong or Risu in the highland began exploitative opium cultivation in the Karen's fallow fields or the Thai's watershed forests. In other cases, Karen people lost their lands

through economic exploitation by lowland Thais and migrated into the forest area, causing deforestation.

Anan's basic thesis is that self-sufficient peasant society based on the unity of kinship or community has been destroyed by modern institutions which promote individuals and the cash economy. He suggests that customary regulation of land, forest, and community be thought of not only in terms of economic resources but holistically, as part of a community's life. Moreover, he says, farmers who desire to live such a life must insert the communal or collective idea into modern institutions and legally secure their customs and traditions.

Anan discusses the community forest within this framework, referring to customary protection of watershed forests and sacred forests or to the utilization of communal woodland in North Thailand. It is emphasized that the moral basis of local management of community forests as a customary right is the idea that *pa* (forest), standing against *muang* (city) and inhabited by spirits, frees local people from state power. Even though this moral basis has declined, and, in some cases, traditional community forests have been encroached upon by villagers individually or sold to mining companies, Anan suggests that villagers' feeling of community belonging and local culture remain, contributing to the conservation of old community forests and the establishment of new ones. More importantly, he points out that the recent revitalization of community forests is motivated by the need to guard resources against outsider invasion, such as commercial logging, enclosure of the forestland by business, and degradation of the watershed forests by hill people's cultivation. However, as local customs do not have a legal basis, village efforts to conserve forest resources have been uncertain in the face of commercial logging or the government's designation of reserved forests. Villagers have been struggling with this situation by utilizing the official authority of village committees or *tambon* councils, codifying customary rules, and organizing patrol groups. Villagers have been making efforts to formalize local customs and obtain a legal basis for them. The concept of "collective rights" has therefore been constructed by this demand for legal acknowledgement, in which peasants in North Thailand have reinforced local idioms to legitimize their own rights. Anan suggests that sustainable use of

natural resources can not be expected without full recognition of local people's collective rights to resource management as a counterbalance to the state's superior power.

## Culture and organization

The common point in the arguments of Shigetomi and Anan is that the traditional social order has declined or changed through modernization and the introduction of the cash economy and that recently, cooperative activities have become popular again. On the basis of this recent development, they consider the prospects of communal resource management by rural people in accordance with the modern state system. However, Shigetomi thinks of the regeneration of cooperation as an adaptation to the cash economy, separate from traditional mentalities, while Anan emphasizes moral value or a sense of belonging to the community in the traditional context and the need to secure its legal standing.

The essence of the difference is the premise of traditional rural society: Shigetomi assumes bilateral cooperation, whilst Anan suggests the existence of community organization that has long managed communal resources. This difference partly emerges from their respective research sites. Although Shigetomi refers to many regions, his intensive field research has been in a village in Northeast Thailand, where protection of village guardian forests, though not of other natural resources, is common. Anan's argument depends largely on cases from North Thailand, where traditional communal resource management of irrigation systems and watershed forests can be found. But Anan also reports that these traditions in North Thailand have declined, which means the social organization of the communities has not been strong enough to maintain management of their resources by themselves.

We must reconsider what kind of organization is needed to manage communal resources in sustainable ways and what culture of norms should regulate the behavior of each member. As Shigetomi points out, an organization consisting of all residents of a certain area that manages communal resources such as forests or swamps is different from a voluntary organization such as a

saving group. The resource management organization will inevitably contain members who neither agree nor conform with the expectation of sustainable use. The management system must therefore be able to enforce regulations.

Based on this framework, it seems that moral value, unity of kin groups, and the sense of belonging to a community, which Anan emphasizes but acknowledges have declined, are an insufficient cultural basis for a reliable management system. The decline shows up in the inability to enforce rules and punish breaches. On the other hand, the guardian's forests in North and Northeast Thailand have been protected and preserved through enforcement of the rules and punishment for breaches better than other communal forests in North Thailand. This means that people do have a sense of rules. But though the protection of the guardian's forest can be a symbol of unity for a community, such religious practices are totally different from the regulation of forests as communal resources.

Can we find any evidence of a willingness to follow community rules against one's own self-interest in the recent changes Shigetomi examines in communal resource usage and conservation? He devotes one chapter to an intensive case study of a village in Northeast Thailand where the development of a village cooperative organization began with the formation of a rice bank in the 1980s. The rice bank gathered 50kg of unhulled rice from each voluntary member and loaned it to members at 20 percent interest per year. Dealing with members in arrears was done through dialogue in meetings attended by all, including delinquent members. Around the same time, the cooperative shop was founded. The shop was funded and managed by voluntary members and the earned interest was distributed to them. In case of breaches of the rules, board members used moral suasion to bring violators into line. Management like this largely depended on the leadership of village headman and the social authority of elder leaders of kin groups in the village. Shigetomi highly values this kind of conflict resolution and decision-making by dialogue as being crucial to generating members' consciousness of participation. But it also means the organization was not strong enough to deal with breaches automatically by following the rules. Dependence on village headman and other elders for smooth

management shows that the organization was not autonomic but a fabric of bilateral networks with charismatic persons as the hubs.

The village's cooperative organization evolved from the management of private resources of voluntary members (the original rice bank and store) to the management of communal resources by all villagers with the assistance of NGOs. The rice bank now includes the whole village, and an aquaculture project has begun in the communal swampland. There was an unsuccessful pig-raising project in which loans became uncollectable. In the 1990s, an organization containing several natural villages was formed. The turning point was the affair of the bad fertilizer, in which the fertilizer-purchasing group, consisting of members from several villages, claimed damages for their losses and were successful in receiving compensation. Currently a farmers' group runs the rice mill and eight nearby villages engage in community forest management. Here again, Shigetomi considers the key factor to be trust in the village headman, who was leader of the collective fertilizer claim. Therefore, the character of the organization – relying on the charisma of a certain individual – has not changed. Shigetomi considers this to be the process of transition from bilateral cooperation to collective cooperative organization to expansion over the natural village boundary; he suggests that the collective organization requires members to respect collective agreements and to contribute to the organization. However, when routine procedures require collective agreement of all members each time, the organization cannot be thought of as an autonomic entity. To go back to the question asked above, the answer is clear: there is no evidence that rules are followed just because they are the rules of the community. The predominant concept underlying village social behavior is still the bilateral relationship.

### How to implement community organization

As Shigetomi's case study shows, charismatic individuals play a crucial role in even long-evolving collective organizations, making them inherently unstable. I have also encountered cases in which collective cooperation did not succeed because they lacked a well-trusted leader. Villagers often attribute their failure of cooperation or lack of community unity to the ability of their leaders. They



recognize their own selfish behavior, but think their leader is responsible. Such an unstable social system cannot be fully responsible for the sustainable management of community forests and local utilization of natural resources. But as Anan suggests, it is also true that the 1990s era of democracy has spurred local people to cooperate further in guarding their resources from outsiders. Thus, it is important that local people's collective rights be recognized by the modern legal system. Perhaps the answer lies somewhere between fully national and fully local jurisdiction over natural resources.

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So far, all property rights have been either individual or national, a situation that has enabled outsiders to exploit resources without respect for local people's livelihood. Though forest institutions in Thailand have paid a certain amount of attention to local use of forest resources by giving use permits (though within limits and following bureaucratic procedures), the forests have been principally state-owned and no systems have been elaborated to actively preserve local people's use or rights. Forest officers have therefore been essentially adversarial in the eyes of local people. But today, partnership between forest officers, NGOs, and scholar-activists must be pursued in order to strengthen local organizations which still depend on bilateral relationships. The role of NGOs in assisting local people's resource management is demonstrated in the case studies of both Anan and Shigetomi, but in fact, forest officers also participated in the establishment of community forests in the 1990s. As the policy of the forest department shifted to emphasize collaboration with local people and to encourage the establishment of community forests, NGOs played a useful role in mediating between officers and villagers. Both forest officers and NGO workers not only give advice on organization and management, but also arbitrate conflict within and between communities. I visited a community forest in a Northeast Thai village that was well managed by means of collective maintenance works and punishment of violations; the forest officer, who had been a consultant, thought that proper forest management might cease should forest officers' involvement be withdrawn.

The success of forest officers as arbitrators for the villagers rests on their social authority as well as their knowledge. It is also true that this is a kind of bilateral relationship that depends on the personal ability of each officer. On the

other hand, insofar as the new policy strengthens the officers' authority to function as arbitrators, it represents institutionalization. The integration of local people and representatives of state agencies can stabilize community forest management to a certain extent, even though the actual organization might continue to operate through bilateral relationships. The most important thing is not "rights," but the "system" which maximizes the interests of the local people in the long term. Nowadays, with the move toward decentralization, the role of local administrations, such as the *tambon* (sub-district) level, is much talked about. But, in fact, a flexible network of various actors – government officers, scholars, NGOs, and local people – is more suitable for resource management according to the reality of each local community.

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## "Hutan Kemasyarakatan" dan Masyarakat Pedesaan Thai

*Fujita Wataru*

Perdebatan seputar pemanfaatan hutan berkelanjutan di Thailand menjadi sering saat ini, tentang perbedaan pendapat bagaimana mengelola sumberdaya hutan dengan baik antara Departemen Kehutanan Kerajaan, NGO, dan masyarakat lokal. Aturan dalam sebuah rancangan hutan kemasyarakatan, dimulai pada awal tahun 1990-an, namun belum dilaksanakan. Perbedaan-perbedaan ini dipersulit oleh suatu kekuatan dimana John Embree menyebutnya "struktur yang goyah," dari lingkungan bilateral masyarakat Thai.

Shigetomi Shin'ichi berpendapat bahwa penetrasi kaum kapitalis tidak menghilangkan unit sosial, tetapi lebih memacu transisi dari hubungan bilateral menjadi kerjasama kolektif sebagai adaptasi terhadap ekonomi pasar. Desa-desa di Timurlaut Thailand telah mengembangkan organisasi kolektif seperti grup pertukaran buruh, kelompok upacara kematian, dan kelompok penabung. Dia melihat peranan usaha-usaha tersebut menuju formasi organisasi lokal akan mengelola sumberdaya hutan dibawah program yang disponsori oleh pemerintah dan NGO. Dia mengamati bahwa program-program tersebut telah sukses dimana program tersebut serupa dengan desa alam yang dikelola sekitar kuil Budha atau penjaga keagamaan. Meskipun tidak lagi berhubungan dengan agama, organisasi bersama tersebut didasarkan pada bantuan ekonomi.

Anan Ganjanapan berpendapat sebaliknya: masyarakat petani mandiri berdasarkan pada unit kekeluargaan atau masyarakat telah dirusak oleh penetrasi kaum kapitalis dan institusi hukum dan aturan kepemilikan modern. Usaha untuk menghidupkan kembali hutan kemasyarakatan harus memulihkan "masyarakat" dan nilai moralnya. Anan menganjurkan

hukum adat tentang tanah, hutan, dan masyarakat harus dipertimbangkan bukan hanya dalam kerangka sumberdaya ekonomi tetapi secara total, sebagai bagian dari kehidupan masyarakat. Dia juga menganjurkan bahwa pemanfaatan berkelanjutan dari sumberdaya alam tidak bisa diharapkan tanpa perhatian penuh terhadap hak-hak kolektif masyarakat lokal dalam pengelolaan hutan.

Sementara itu Shigetomi memandang transisi dari bilateral kedalam kerjasama masyarakat, sedangkan Anan memandang sebuah unit masyarakat yang telah lama mengelola sumberdaya secara bersama. Penulis menyatakan, tradisi bersama telah menurun, dan masyarakat tidak memiliki kekuatan yang cukup untuk melindungi pengelolaan sumberdaya mereka sendiri. Hasil penelitiannya, dan pendapat Shigetomi, menunjukkan kesuksesan organisasi masyarakat sering tergantung pada seorang pemimpin yang kharismatik untuk membimbing masyarakat melalui pengambilan keputusan dan penyelesaian konflik. Sebuah kombinasi dari solidaritas masyarakat dan hubungan bilateral dapat berlangsung.

Akhirnya, kehadiran agen pemerintah tidak harus menciptakan konflik. Di Timurlaut Thailand, pegawai kehutanan telah bekerja dengan aktivis NGO dan pemimpin masyarakat memediasi hubungan pemerintah dengan masyarakat dan melaksanakan pengelolaan hutan secara baik.

Translated by Andi Amri and Retno Kusumanigtyas

## Community Forest at ang Rural na Lipunang Thai

*Fujita Wataru*

Ang debate hinggil sa pangmatagalang gamit ng kagubatan sa Thailand ay nagsimulang uminit kamakailan dulot ng di-pagkakasundo ng Royal Forestry Department, mga NGO at mga lokal na pamayanan hinggil sa wastong paraan ng pangangalaga sa mga kagubatan. Ang mga batas na nakapaloob sa Community Forest Bill, na inihain noong simula ng dekada nobenta, ay hindi pa rin ipinatutupad hanggang sa kasalukuyan. Ang mga di-pagkakasundo ay pinasalimuot pa ng kapangyarihan ng tinawag ni John Embree na "loosely structured" at makadalawang-panig na katangian ng lipunang Thai.

Iginigiit ni Shigetomi Shin'ichi na hindi nilusaw ng pagdating ng kapitalismo ang pagkakaisang panlipunan, bagkus ay tinulungan pa nito ang transisyon mula sa makadalawang-panig na mga relasyon tungo sa kolektibong pagtutulungan bilang pag-aangkop sa *market economy*. Ang mga pamayanan sa Hilagang Thailand ay nagpaunlad ng mga organisasyon tulad ng mga grupo para sa pagpapalitan ng manggagawa, mga unyon para sa mga seremonya ng pagpapalibing, at mga paluwagan. Tinitingnan niya ang mga hakbang na ito bilang patungo sa pagbubuo ng mga lokal na organisasyon na mangangasiwa sa yaman ng mga kagubatan sa ilalim ng mga programang ilulunsad ng pamahalaan at ng mga NGO. Binibigyang-pansin din niya na ang mga programang ito ay nagtagumpay sa mga lugar kung saan natural na lumitaw ang mga pamayanan sa paligid ng mga templong Buddhist o guardian rituals. Hindi na sa relihiyon kundi sa mga insentibong pang-ekonomya nakabase ang mga kolektibong organisasyon.

Kabaligtaran naman nito ang iginigiit ni Anan Ganjapan: sinira ng pagpasok ng kapitalismo at ng mga regulasyong ligal at hinggil sa

pagmamay-ari na itinaguyod ng modernong estado ang nagsasariling lipunang pesante na nakabase sa pagkakaisa ng angkan o pamayanan. Dahil dito, ang mga pagsusumikap na muling ibangon ang mga kagubatan sa mga pamayanan ay nangangailangan ng panunumbalik ng "pamayanan" at ng mga moral na pagpapahalaga nito. Iminumungkahi ni Anan na tingnan ang karaniwang regulasyon ng lupa, kagubatan, at pamayanan hindi lamang sa usaping pang-ekonomya kundi sa kabuuan, bilang bahagi ng buhay ng pamayanan. Sinasabi rin niya na ang pangmatagalang gamit sa likas na kayamanan ay hindi maaasahan kung wala ang lubos na pagkilala sa kolektibong karapatan ng mga lokal na mamamayan na pangangalagaan ang kalikasan.

Kung saan nakakakita si Shigetomi ng transisyon mula sa makadalawang-panig tungo sa pagtutulungang pampamayanan, nakakakita naman si Anan ng pagkakaisang pampamayanan na mahabang panahon nang nangangasiwa sa mga yamang komunal. Subalit binibigyang-pansin ng may-akda na ang mga tradisyong komunal ay hindi na laganap at ang mga pamayanan ay wala nang sapat na lakas upang mag-isang pangasiwaan ang mga likas na kayamanan. Lumilitaw sa sarili niyang pag-aaral, at gayundin sa kay Shigetomi, na ang matagumpay na organisasyong pampamayanan ay madalas na nakasalalay sa isang pinunong karismatiko na gagabay sa mga tao sa paggawa ng mga desisyon at pagresolba sa mga di-pagkakasundo. Mula rito, masasabing posible ang kumbinasyon ng pagkakaisang komunal at makadalawang-panig na relasyon.

Bilang wakas, hindi kinakailangang mauwi sa tunggalian ang pagkakaroon ng mga ahente ng estado. Sa Hilagang-silangang Thailand, ang mga opisyal ay nakikipagtulungan sa mga aktibistang NGO at mga pinuno ng pamayanan bilang mga tagapamagitan sa relasyong estado-pamayanan at sa pagpapatupad ng wastong pangangalaga sa kagubatan.

## 共同体林とタイの地方社会

藤田 渡 (Fujita Wataru)

タイの持続可能な森林利用に関する議論では、国立森林局や NGO、地域社会それぞれの間で森林資源の最適な運営のあり方に対して相違がある。1990年代の初めに導入されたコミュニティ林法の法案に関する議論は未だ解決にいたっていない。こうした意見の相違は、ジョン・エンブリーの言うタイ社会がもつ本質、すなわち二者間関係に根ざした「ルースな社会構造」によるものである。

重富真一によると、資本主義の浸透は、社会体制を分解するのではなく市場経済への適応を通じて二者間関係から集团的協同に変化するのを助長した。北部タイの村落は、労働交換集団、葬儀、貯蓄組合といった住民組織を発展させてきた。これらは、政府や NGO の主催するプログラムのもと、森林資源を管理する住民組織の形成を促した。重富によると、プログラムの成功は仏教寺院や守護霊儀礼など村で形成されていた既存組織が利用されたことに起因する。しかし、住民組織は経済的インセンティブにより形成されたもので、決して宗教によるものではなかった。

アナン・カンチャナパンの議論はこれと対照をなす。親族単位や共同体を基盤とする自己充足的農民社会は、資本主義の浸透や近代国家の法制度、所有権の法制化によって崩壊した。共有林を復元しようとする努力とは、共同体をとりもどして彼らの道徳的価値観を再生させることである。土地や森林、共同体における慣習法は、経済資源という視点からだけでなく地域における住民生活全般から考察されねばならない。天然資源の持続的利用は、地域住民の資源管理上の共有権を完全に理解することなく達成することはできない。

重富は伝統的な二者間関係から集团的協同への変化を、アナンは共有資源を長期にわたって管理する共同体を提示した。しかし、私はそうした共同体的伝統が衰えており、共同体は資源の管理を担うほど強くはないことを指摘したい。重富同様、私自身の調査でも、成功した共同体組織では、行為決定や紛争解決において農民を導くリーダーが存在した。共同体的連帯や二者間関係は双方ともに存在するのである。

また、行政官の存在が必ずしも紛争を引き起こしたわけではない。東北タイの森林行政官たちは NGO 活動家や共同体のリーダーと共に、国家と地域の仲介者として森林管理の実施を担っていた。 Translated by Suzuki Shinji (鈴木伸二)



## "ป่าไม้ชุมชน" และสังคมชนบทไทย

Fujita Wataru (ฟูจิตะ วาตะรุ)

การอภิปรายถกเถียงเรื่องการใช้อป่าไม้เชิงอนุรักษ์ในประเทศไทยได้เริ่มรุนแรงขึ้นเมื่อไม่นานมานี้ เนื่องจากกรมป่าไม้ องค์การนอกภาครัฐ และชุมชนในท้องถิ่นต่างๆ มีความคิดแตกต่างกันเกี่ยวกับวิธีจัดการทรัพยากรป่าไม้อย่างมีประสิทธิภาพสูงสุด ร่างพระราชบัญญัติป่าไม้ชุมชนซึ่งได้ริเริ่มขึ้นในช่วงต้นทศวรรษ 1990 ยังคงไม่มีผลบังคับใช้ ข้อพิพาทเหล่านี้ยังมีความซับซ้อนเนื่องจากผลกระทบจากสิ่งที่จอห์น เอ็มบริเรียกว่าลักษณะโครงสร้างแบบสองฝ่ายของสังคมไทย

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ชิเกะโทะมิ ชิโนอิชิเสนอความคิดว่าการแทรกแซงของนักลงทุนไม่ได้ทำให้สังคมขาดความเป็นเอกภาพ หากแต่เอื้อให้มีช่องต่อจากความสัมพันธ์แบบสองฝ่ายมาเป็นกรให้ความร่วมมือระหว่างทุกฝ่ายในชุมชนซึ่งเป็นการปรับให้เข้ากับเศรษฐกิจตลาด หมู่บ้านทางตอนเหนือของประเทศไทยได้มีการพัฒนาองค์กรซึ่งเป็นความร่วมมือระหว่างทุกฝ่ายขึ้นมา เช่นกลุ่มแลกเปลี่ยน แรงงานสภาพางานอดอาปนกิจศพ และสภาพเงินออม ชิเกะโทะมิมิมีความเห็นว่าความพยายามเหล่านี้จะนำไปสู่การก่อตั้งองค์กรในระดับท้องถิ่นซึ่งจะจัดการทรัพยากรป่าไม้ในโครงการต่างๆ ที่ได้รับการสนับสนุนทางการเงินโดยรัฐบาลและองค์การนอกภาครัฐ ชิเกะโทะมียังได้ตั้งข้อสังเกตว่าที่ผ่านมามีโครงการเหล่านี้ประสบความสำเร็จเมื่อเกิดขึ้นที่หมู่บ้านตามธรรมชาติที่ตั้งอยู่รอบวัดในพุทธศาสนาหรือพิธีกรรมในการปกป้องคุ้มครองต่างๆ อย่างไรก็ตาม องค์กรซึ่งเป็นความร่วมมือระหว่างทุกฝ่ายเหล่านี้ไม่ใช่สถาบันศาสนานอกอีกต่อไป แต่เป็นองค์กรที่เกิดขึ้นโดยมีพื้นฐานบนแรงจูงใจทางเศรษฐกิจ

อานันท์ กาญจนพันธุ์แย้งว่าสังคมชนบทซึ่งพึ่งตนเองและมีรากฐานอยู่

บนระบบเครือญาติหรือชุมชนได้ถูกทำลายลงจากการแทรกแซงของนักลงทุนและสถาบันกฎหมายของรัฐสมัยใหม่และข้อบังคับว่าด้วยกรรมสิทธิ์ ความพยายามที่จะฟื้นฟูป่าไม้ชุมชนจึงจำเป็นต้องฟื้นฟู 'ชุมชน' และค่านิยมทางศีลธรรมของชุมชนขึ้นมาก่อน อานันท์เสนอว่าการพิจารณาข้อบังคับเกี่ยวกับที่ดิน ป่าไม้ และชุมชนที่มีอยู่ในปัจจุบันไม่ควรคำนึงถึงเฉพาะทางด้านทรัพยากรทางเศรษฐศาสตร์เท่านั้นแต่ควรคำนึงถึงว่าเป็นส่วนหนึ่งของชีวิตในชุมชนในภาพรวมด้วย อานันท์ยังได้เสนอด้วยว่าการใช้ทรัพยากรธรรมชาติในเชิงอนุรักษ์จะไม่อาจคาดหวังให้เกิดขึ้นได้หากไม่มีการตระหนักถึงสิทธิที่คนในท้องถิ่นทุกคนมีในการจัดการทรัพยากร

ในขณะที่ยีเกะโทะมิมองเห็นช่วงต่อจากความสัมพันธ์แบบสองฝ่ายมาเป็นการให้ความร่วมมือในระดับชุมชน อานันท์มองว่าเอกภาพของชุมชนได้จัดการทรัพยากรของชุมชนมาเป็นเวลานาน อย่างไรก็ตามผู้วิจารณ์ต้องการชี้ให้เห็นว่าประเด็นในชุมชนในลักษณะดังกล่าวมีการถือปฏิบัติน้อยลงและชุมชนไม่มีความแข็งแกร่งพอที่จะยังคงจัดการทรัพยากรด้วยตนเอง จากการค้นคว้าของผู้วิจารณ์และของยีเกะโทะมิชี้ให้เห็นว่า การจัดระบบชุมชนที่ประสบความสำเร็จมักจะขึ้นอยู่กับผู้นำซึ่งมีความสามารถพิเศษและชั้นนำชาวบ้านในการตัดสินใจและการแก้ปัญหาความขัดแย้ง

ในท้ายที่สุด การยื่นมือเข้ามาของหน่วยงานรัฐไม่จำเป็นต้องนำไปสู่ความขัดแย้งเสมอไป ทางภาคตะวันออกเฉียงเหนือของประเทศไทย เจ้าหน้าที่ป่าไม้ทำงานร่วมกับนักอนุรักษ์ขององค์กรเอกชนและผู้นำชุมชนเพื่อเป็นตัวกลางระหว่างรัฐและชุมชนและดำเนินการจัดการป่าไม้ที่เหมาะสม

## Illegal Logging – History and Lessons from Indonesia

*Sato Yuichi*

Illegal logging is now a common environmental issue which is debated internationally. It is said that the problem in Indonesia, Cambodia, Russia, Brazil, and certain African countries has become quite severe, with Indonesia experiencing massive deforestation between 1998 and 2001. This was also a time when Indonesian politics underwent a paradigm shift and the Asian region experienced a severe economic crisis, both of which brought significant change, or at least the appearance of change, to many areas of public life. Several significant forest issues emerged which became the subject of intense discussion among specialists, government officials, and environmental activists: forest and land fires, natural forest conversion, the heavy debt and restructuring of wood related industries, illegal logging, the recalculation of real forest value, reforestation, decentralization, the national forest program, land tenure conflict, and national park management are some examples. There were also discussions about consolidating these into a forest and wood industry policy. All of these issues are significant to the conservation of tropical forests, as well as to the environmental policy in general.

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This paper reviews the issue of illegal logging in Indonesia, looking at its history, examining various countermeasures taken against it, and offering some lessons drawn from the experience of central-level practices.

## Shocking reports of illegal logging

First, several significant reports have established the severity of the problem in recent years by addressing the magnitude of illegal logging and its impact on the natural environment, natural resources management, society, and the economy.

EIA-TELAPAK's "The Final Cut" (1999) was the first report to alert the public about the extent of illegal logging. The affected areas reported on were two famous national parks which are representative habitats of orangutans, the very symbol of tropical forests and a species in danger of extinction in the near future. The well-organized and large-scale illegal logging conducted in these areas was documented and internationally publicized with a shocking video and printed report. The report also criticized a famous businessman cum local politician for his direct participation in the logging. Government, donor countries, and NGOs picked up on this case as of the highest priority in tackling illegal logging. The following year saw the appearance of "Illegal Logging in Tanjung Puting National Park, An Update on the Final Cut Report." The results of the EIA-TELAPAK campaign were significant, quickening progress in several areas, including the Indonesian government's re-measuring of the log export ban in 2002 and the listing of an endangered tropical tree species, ramin, in Appendix III of CITES in 2001. (The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora includes in Appendix I to III lists of endangered species agreed upon by member countries, with trade restrictions increasing from Appendix I through III.)

While the increase in illegal logging was reported in various publications, the documentation was mainly of individual and discrete cases. It seemed that an overall and detailed picture of illegal logging would be extremely difficult to sketch. It is in this context that one can appreciate Neil Scotland et al.'s "Round-

wood Supply and Demand in the Forest Sector in Indonesia," which boldly analyzed government statistics and unpublished data to estimate the total quantity of timber logged. The report estimated that 21 million cubic meters of timber was legally logged in Indonesia in 1998, 2 million was provided from domestic wastepaper, and 20 million was imported, producing a total supply of 43 million cubic meters. Total demand, on the other hand, was 100 million cubic meters, of which 49 million was exported and 51 million domestically consumed. Therefore, the difference of 57 million cubic meters was the suspected volume of illegal logging or legally unreported logging in 1998. The year before, the estimated volume of legally logged timber was 30 million cubic meters and the suspected volume of illegal logging was 41 million cubic meters. This would indicate that legal logging decreased and illegal logging increased from 1997 to 1998. According to the authors, this was a high-end estimation, and the accuracy of the individual data sets was variable. Nevertheless, the reported estimation was the first and has become the standard for quantifying the volume of illegal logging.

At the same time, research by Mubariq Ahmad bolstered the common notion that organized illegal exports were growing more intensely in the border areas between Indonesia and Malaysia. "Illegal Logging: Extent, Patterns and Roots of the Problem" introduced the information that 50-80 percent of timber brought to the roughly 1000 wood processing factories in Sarawak, Malaysia, could be illegally logged timber from Kalimantan, Indonesia.

One more important estimation is of the rate of deforestation. Derek Holmes, a consultant of the World Bank, analyzed and forecast the deforestation rate in Indonesian tropical forests and prospects for the future based on study materials from the 1980s and satellite information data in the 1990s. According to his research, deforestation on average was 0.8 million hectares/year in the 1980s, 1.2 million hectares/year from 1990 to 1996, and 2.0 million hectares/year in 1997 and 1998, the dramatic increase accounted for by large-scale forest fires. (Incidentally, the latest figure from the Ministry of Forestry, announced at its forest policy workshop in 2001, was  $\pm 2.7$  million hectares/year.)

Especially shocking was the realistic prediction that the lowland forest, the crucial part of the tropical forest for maintaining the precious forest ecosystem, would nearly disappear from Sulawesi in 2000, Sumatra in 2005, and Kalimantan in 2010. Regrettably, Mr. Holmes died in Indonesia before completing the report, but Thomas Walton, coordinator of the World Bank, summarized its important points in "Coordination and Implementation of Forest Strategy in Indonesia."

A second area of concern is logging's influence on society and the economy, which has been analyzed by Agus Purnomo et al. of the World Wildlife Fund Indonesia and the organizations that cooperated in "Corporate Debt and the Fate of Our Forests." The debt carried by wood-related industries increased greatly under the Soeharto administration and was estimated by the WWF report at USD 2.6-3.6 billion. The opportunity loss, which includes trade barriers like the log export ban and the government's expenditure of Afforestation Funds for illegitimate purposes, was estimated at about USD 2.0 billion. The total amount nearly equaled the approximately USD 6.0 billion donated to Indonesia by developed countries, including Japan, in fiscal year 1999/2000. In the future, this enormous sum will have to be borne by Indonesian and donor country taxpayers.

I would also like to touch upon the indirect linkage between the development of the pulp and paper industries and illegal logging. In the 1990s, national policy promoted industrial plantations. The intention was to rehabilitate large areas of devastated forest land throughout the country, provide labor opportunities in local areas, avoid industrial logging in conservation forests, and construct a new national economy by providing material for pulp and paper industries. However, the nationwide imbalance between supply and demand for wood, combined with the corporate debt problem in wood-related industries, encouraged overlogging outside of the industrial plantation areas to supply these industries. Christopher Barr's "Profits on Paper: The Political Economy of Fiber, Finance, and Debt in Indonesia's Pulp and Paper Industries" researched this point in detail. He also discussed the linkage between corporate debt and illegal logging in "Corporate Debt and the Indonesian Forestry Sector."

Finally, logging is related to Indonesia's unemployment rate. The wood industry is high in employment absorption because it is labor-intensive. According to the presentation of Zain Masyhur of the Djajanti Group at the forest policy workshop of 2001, direct employees of the wood industry amounted to 2.5 million people, indirect employees another 1.5 million, and their families 16.0 million, totaling 20 million people. Investment in the industry has risen to USD 28 billion. If the government were to enact compulsory measures reducing the amount of logging in the current conditions of economic crisis, unemployment would increase, threatening a rise in social instability.

### **A short history of the political and economic context**

I will now provide a chronological account of the growing awareness of the problem and how it was debated from the latter half of 1997 through the first half of 2001. I will include in this chronicle the major political and economic developments of the period. Readers should feel free to find connections between these events.

Latter half of 1997: The Asian monetary crisis hit Indonesia, initiating a long economic downturn.

January 1998: A Letter of Intent was exchanged between the Indonesian government and the International Monetary Fund that became the basis of structural economic and fiscal reform. Forestry issues linked to the reform program were specified.

May: Student demonstrations demanding reform and democracy intensified. Riots took place in many cities.

July: Soeharto's long regime came to an end and Habibie's provisional political administration began.

Latter half of 1998: Frequent riots in small towns coincided with the collapsing authority of local military, police, and government. Protests included anti-

government demonstrators throwing stones at local forest offices.

January 1999: The Minister of Forestry announced the rapid increase nationwide in illegal logging.

June: The General election saw the triumph of Megawati's faction, the enactment of two decentralization laws, and the beginning of the process of decentralization.

July: The issue of illegal logging was raised at the eighth meeting of the Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI) in Paris.

August: The release of EIA-TELAPAK's "The Final Cut" began an international campaign against illegal logging in national parks. The residents of East Timor voted for independence from Indonesia.

October: The Presidential election brought Abdul Rachman Wahid to the presidency.

November: Criticism began of the Soeharto family's corruption, including forest exploitation.

January 2000: "Removing the Constraints: Post-CGI Seminar on Indonesian Forestry" was held in Jakarta. Typical cases were presented.

February: The ninth CGI meeting was held in Jakarta. The Indonesian government committed itself to forest sector reform.

March: The Donor Forum on Forest (DFE) was formed under the CGI.

May: Newspaper reports began to appear reporting large-scale illegal logging along the Indonesia-Malaysia border.

July: The Interdepartmental Committee on Forest (IDCF) was formed by the Indonesian government. The Kyushu-Okinawa G8 meeting in Japan discussed



international illegal logging.

August-October: A series of forest policy workshops was held in Jakarta, including one entitled "Control of Illegal Logging in East Asia."

October: The tenth CGI meeting was held in Tokyo. Discussion included illegal logging.

January 2001: Decentralization was legally established. Many local areas lacked sufficient preparation.

March: A preparation meeting for the East Asia Ministerial Conference on Forest Law Enforcement and Governance (FLEG) was held in Jakarta.

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July: President Wahid's administration ended and Megawati's began.

September: The East Asia Ministerial Conference on Forest Law Enforcement and Governance (FLEG) was held in Denpasar, Bali.

## Lessons

What can we learn from this short history? I actually feel that the growth of illegal logging has been closely related to the following: the worsening national economy and regional standard of living, the abuse of long-term political power and socially fixed customs, an unstable political situation, rapidly introduced democracy, and hasty and ill-prepared decentralization.

It may seem strange to cite "democracy" and "decentralization" here. These are basic government policies in the wake of a long period of undemocratic and highly centralized administration. But the success of these policies may depend on their gradual implementation. For in the current rapid transition, many questions have been raised as to whether the forest can be sustainably managed with the present level of legal preparation and personnel resources for efficient planning and implementation, not to mention the lack of confidence

and good communication between central and local governments.

A series of forest policy workshops in 2000 discussed natural forest conversion, the indebtedness of wood-related industries and their restructuring, illegal logging, the recalculation of real forest value, reforestation, decentralization, the national forest program, and the consolidation of forest and wood industry policy as mutually related issues. Japan also shared its experience in consolidation practice. This series of workshops, as well as other studies and discussions, helped to crystallize the following views, some of which represent the collective common sense of my colleagues and some of which are my own:

We should recognize that illegal logging is not a single problem, but an issue related to many others. We should also realize that while illegal logging in Indonesia is quite significant, it is not a problem unique to Indonesia. The WB and WWF-sponsored workshop "Control of Illegal Logging in East Asia" featured discussions among experts throughout the region, including China. The Cambodian case was also addressed. And further afield, Russia, Brazil, and Africa face the same situation. Indonesia's case may be exemplary of the problems in these countries.

Essentially, illegal logging is a criminal act that occurs in remote areas that are difficult to supervise and control. If we, who are not familiar with the local situation, try to investigate in that field, we would be unable to grasp the real situation. Moreover, it would be very dangerous to pursue on-site investigation. Because of the circumstances surrounding this problem, an accurate and completely detailed picture of illegal logging is extremely difficult to realize.

On the other hand, it is often said that behavior which we usually define as "illegal logging" is not in fact always "criminal." For example, if a forestry concession is granted on land that had long been used by local people, under existing laws their customary logging suddenly becomes "criminal." There is an inconsistency here between statute law and customary use and law. Mubariq Ahmad uses the Robin Hood analogy, saying that "Robin Hood stole national property and distributed it to the poor people. Is it criminal?" Still, it is also a

fact that the magnitude of current "illegal logging" is not acceptable.

While the magnitude and depth of the problem are significant, I would like to point out that we have learned positive lessons from our short history. For example, at the WB and WWF-sponsored workshop, a list of over fifty countermeasures was agreed upon by stakeholders, including the need for strong political will, public awareness, aerial and ground surveys, log tracking systems, reliable documentation and verification, information reporting systems, the creation of a third inspection body, judicial system improvement, log export ban, and so on.

So far we can cite the strong political will declared by the president of Indonesia, the listing of a precious tropical tree species in CITES, and the re-measuring of the log export ban. The feasibility of the log tracking system and information reporting system on a broad basis is also being explored. Various stakeholders have prepared concrete counter-proposals.

Further, the decision-making process has obviously utilized research and study reports, including studies on the decreasing number of orangutans and on flood control and agriculture irrigation, such as "Illegal Logging and Ecological Damage to the Leuser Ecosystem." This point is important, because scientific information usually tends to target academics, but is not often reflected in actual policy. Effective utilization of scientific information in policy-making is therefore a significant accomplishment.

In addition, the problem has quickly progressed from the field level to the central level, where it is being addressed by the Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI), Indonesia's international platform on economic and financial assistance, and the Interdepartmental Committee on Forest (IDCF), led by the government's financial coordination minister. Internationally, the problem has been taken up at the Kyushu-Okinawa G8 meeting, the East Asia Ministerial Conference on Forest Law Enforcement and Governance (FLEG), and the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD). From the first "appearance" of the problem in 1998, it has taken only two to three years for a lot of

progress to occur. For example, the Asia Forest Partnership (AFP) on illegal logging, forest and land fires, and reforestation was agreed to between Indonesia and Japan in May 2002. We should also note that the effective linking of the problem to economic, financial, and monetary subjects has become standard.

Energetic and friendly cooperation among experts in government, donor agencies, NGOs, and other concerned people has been a powerful engine for this process. I think this cooperation was cultivated in the Consultative Group on Indonesian Forestry (CGIF), which had been actively serving as a platform for information exchange among related agencies under the Ministry of Forestry from 1993. As many separate technical projects were established or renewed in the years 1998 to 2001, it became clear that greater coordination was required. Fortunately, with the assistance of colleagues in donor country governments and agencies and in NGOs, the Donor Forum on Forest (DFF) emerged as the key coordinating body in 2000.

The views expressed in this paper, "Lessons" in particular, are based on my own experience. I would appreciate hearing views from different experiences or standpoints. The problem is certainly still serious, and therefore, constructive and concrete counter-proposals and processes are required. Whether this problem can be solved or not is a touchstone for all of us.

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## Penebangan Liar-Sejarah dan Pelajaran dari Indonesia

*Sato Yuichi*

Tulisan ini meninjau sejarah terkini tentang penebangan liar di Indonesia dan beberapa pelajaran yang dapat diperoleh dari pengalaman. Selama tahun 1999-2000, beberapa laporan penting menyatakan parahnya penebangan liar di Indonesia dan menyoroti besarnya pengaruhnya terhadap lingkungan hidup, pengelolaan sumberdaya hayati, masyarakat, dan ekonomi.

Laporan dan video EIA-TELAPAK dan video, "The Final Cut," dan laporan selanjutnya menyarankan kampanye internasional menentang penebangan liar di Indonesia dan telah membuahkan beberapa hasil yang penting, termasuk pemerintah Indonesia mengkaji ulang larangan ekspor kayu pada 2002 dan pendaftaran jenis kayu tropik yang dilindungi dalam Konvensi Perdagangan Internasional tentang Tumbuhan dan Hewan yang Dilindungi, Bab III (2001). Beberapa laporan yang lain mencoba mengkuantifikasi masalah, meskipun berdasarkan data perkiraan. Scotland dkk. 1999 menduga volume kayu yang diperoleh dari penebangan liar adalah 57 juta meter kubik pada tahun 1998, meningkat 16 juta meter kubik dari tahun sebelumnya. Walton 2000 memperkirakan angka laju penebangan hutan (sebanyak 2,7 juta ha/tahun) dan menduga kehilangan hutan dataran rendah di Sulawesi, Sumatra, dan Kalimantan selama 10 tahun. Dampak sosial dan ekonomi meliputi tingginya tingkat hutang yang dimiliki oleh industri perkayuan, kemungkinan kerugiannya setara dengan satu tahun fiskal bantuan luar negeri (sekitar 6,0 milyar USD), dan cenderung meningkatkan pengangguran (langsung dan tidak langsung mempengaruhi 20 juta orang) jika pemerintah mengurangi kegiatan penebangan liar, akan mengakibatkan kerusakan sosial.

Beberapa pelajaran diambil dari pengalaman penulis di Departemen Kehutanan Indonesia (1998-2001) sebagai berikut: penebangan liar meningkat dengan cepat selama masa transisi menjelang demokratisasi dan desentralisasi, memunculkan pertanyaan-pertanyaan tentang kesiapan hukum, sumberdaya manusia, dan komunikasi antara pemerintah pusat dengan daerah. Permasalahan di Indonesia tidak unik, sehingga mungkin dapat dipelajari dan dibagi dengan Cina, Brazil, Rusia, dan negara-negara Afrika. Penebangan liar bukan masalah yang berdiri sendiri, tetapi isu yang diperoleh dari kebijakan penggabungan hutan dan industri kayu. Akhirnya, tindakan penanggulangan telah dilakukan dengan cepat dari tingkat lapangan ke tingkat pusat dan internasional, termasuk kerjasama semua pihak dan pemanfaatan yang efektif dari informasi ilmiah di dalam pembuatan kebijaksanaan.

Translated by Andi Amri and Retno Kusumanigtyas

## Iligal na Pagtotroso-Kasaysayan at Turo mula sa Indonesia

Sato Yuichi

Binabalikan sa papel na ito ang kasaysayan ng iligal na pagtotroso sa Indonesia at ang mga turo na maaaring mahalaw mula sa karanasang ito. Mula 1999-2000, inilinaw ng ilang mahahalagang ulat ang kahulugan ng iligal na pagtotroso sa Indonesia at hinarap ang lawak ng epekto nito sa kalikasan, pangangalaga sa likas na kayamanan, lipunan, at ekonomya. Ang ulat at video ng EIA-TELAPAK, "The Final Cut," at ang sumunod pa ritong ulat ay nagtulak sa isang kampanyang internasyunal laban sa iligal na pagtotroso sa Indonesia na nagkaroon ng mahalagang resulta, kabilang ang muling pagsasaayos ng pamahalaang Indones sa *log export ban* ng 2002 at ang pagpapabilang ng isang nanganganib na species ng punong tropikal sa *Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Appendix III* (2001).

Sinikap naman ng ibang mga ulat na kwantipikahin ang suliranin bagamat ang datos ay mga tantya lamang. Ayon sa Scotland et al. 1999, tinataya ang dami ng trosong nakuha sa iligal na paraan sa 57 milyon kubiko metriko noong 1998, may dagdag na 16 milyon kubiko metriko mula sa naunang taon. Tinataya naman sa Walton 2000 ang tantos ng pagkakalbo ng kagubatan (maaaring umaabot sa 2.7 milyong ektarya bawat taon) at ipinapalagay ang paglaho ng mga kagubatan sa kapatagan ng Sulawesi, Sumatra at Kalimantan sa loob ng darating na sampung taon. Kabilang sa mga epektong panlipunan at pang-ekonomya ay ang malaking pagkakautang ng mga industriyang gumagamit ng kahoy, *opportunity losses* na katumbas ng isang taong piskal na pagkakautang panlabas (may USD 6.0 bilyon), at ang malamang na pagtaas ng disempleyo (direkta at di-direktang makakaapekto sa 20 milyong tao) kung sakaling kitilin ng pamahalaan



ang ilegal na pagtotroso, bagay na maaaring magresulta sa kaguluhang panlipunan.

Kabilang sa mga aral na halaw mula sa karanasan ng may-akda sa Kagawaran ng Kagubatan (1998-2001) ay ang sumusunod: Naging mas laganap ang ilegal na pagtotroso sa mabilis na transisyon tungo sa demokratisasyon at desentralisasyon, bagay na nagtataas ng mga katanungan hinggil sa kasalukuyang antas ng ligal na pagkakahanda, *personnel resources*, at komunikasyon sa pagitan ng sentral at lokal na pamahalaan. Hindi kakaiba ang mga suliranin ng Indonesia kung kaya't maaaring may matutunan din dito ang Tsina, Brazil, Rusya, at mga bansang Aprikano. Dagdag pa, ang ilegal na pagtotroso ay hindi lamang nag-iisang problema kundi isang isyu kung saan maaaring makatulong ang konsolidasyon ng mga patakaran hinggil sa kagubatan at mga industriyang gumagamit ng kahoy. Bilang wakas, ang mga pananggalang ay mabilis na umunlad mula sa lokal na antas hanggang sa sentral at internasyunal na antas, kabilang ang pakikipagtulungan ng mga negosyante at ang epektibong paggamit ng kaalamang syentipiko sa pagbubuo ng mga patakaran.

Translated by Sofia Guillermo

## 違法伐採——インドネシアからの歴史と教訓

佐藤雄一 (Sato Yuichi)

本稿は、インドネシアにおける近年の違法伐採に関する歴史を概観することで、いくつかの教訓を提示する。1999年から2000年にかけて、さまざまな報告の中で、インドネシアにおける違法伐採の重要性と、そういった活動による自然環境や天然資源管理、社会、経済への甚大な影響力が指摘されてきた。EIA-TTELPAKの報告とビデオ、「最後の伐採」とその補足報告は、2002年のインドネシア政府による木材輸出禁止の再履行や、絶滅危惧野生動物・国際売買協定にある熱帯樹木のリスト化といった重要な諸成果を引き起こしつつ、インドネシアにおける違法伐採に対する国際的なキャンペーンを促した。スコットランドら(1999)は、1999年の違法伐採量を5700万平方メートルだと見積もり、前年度と比べ1600万平方メートル増加しているとした。ウォルトン(2000)は、森林伐採率(270万ヘクタール/年)を見積もり、10年以内にスラウェシ、スマトラ、カリマンタンの低地林が消失すると予測した。社会・経済への影響では、政府が違法伐採量を引き下げようとすると、木材産業の多額の負債、外国援助と同等の機会費用の喪失(約60億ドル)、失業問題(2千万人に直接・間接的な影響を与えた)などが浮上り、その結果として社会不安が生じるだろう。

インドネシア林業省での著者の経験から得られた教訓は以下のようなものである。違法伐採は民主化や地方分権化への急激な変化の間に増加してきており、現在の法整備や、人的資源、中央と地方との交信などについても疑問が残る。インドネシアの問題は、特殊なものではない。そうした教訓は中国、ブラジル、ロシア、アフリカ諸国でも共有している。違法伐採は単純な問題ではない。これは森林の統合と木材産業政策から生じた利益をめぐる問題なのである。最後に、対案としては、利益受給者間の協力や政策立案の中で科学的知見を効果的に用いて、すばやく現地から中央や国際レベルにまで展開することである。

Translated by Suzuki Shinji (鈴木 伸二)

## การทำป่าไม้อย่างผิดกฎหมาย: ความเป็นมาและบทเรียนจากประเทศอินโดนีเซีย

Sato Yuichi (ซาโตะ ยูอิชิ)

บทความนี้กล่าวถึงความเป็นมาในอดีตอันไกลของการทำป่าไม้อย่างผิดกฎหมายในประเทศอินโดนีเซียและบทเรียนบางประการที่อาจเรียนรู้ได้จากประสบการณ์นี้ ในระหว่างปี 1999-2000 มีรายงานหลายฉบับซึ่งทำให้เล็งเห็นความสำคัญของการทำป่าไม้อย่างผิดกฎหมายในประเทศอินโดนีเซียและความพยายามแก้ปัญหาอันเกิดจากผลกระทบใหญ่หลวงที่การทำป่าไม้อย่างผิดกฎหมายมีต่อธรรมชาติแวดล้อม การจัดการทรัพยากรธรรมชาติ สังคม และเศรษฐกิจ ในรายงานและวิดีโอขององค์การตรวจสอบสิ่งแวดล้อมและองค์กรเตลนิกที่ชื่อ "การตัดครั้งสุดท้าย" และรายงานฉบับต่อเนื่องทำให้เกิดมีการรณรงค์ในระดับนานาชาติเพื่อต่อต้านการทำป่าไม้อย่างผิดกฎหมายในประเทศอินโดนีเซียซึ่งส่งผลสำคัญบางประการ รวมถึงการที่รัฐบาลอินโดนีเซียทบทวนการห้ามการส่งออกซุงในปี 2002 และการขึ้นทะเบียนพันธุ์ไม้เขตร้อนที่ใกล้สูญพันธุ์ในสนธิสัญญาว่าด้วยการค้าพันธุ์พืชและสัตว์ป่าที่ใกล้สูญพันธุ์ระหว่างประเทศ ภาคผนวก 3 ปี 2001 รายงานอื่น ๆ นั้นพยายามที่จะกล่าวถึงปัญหาในเชิงปริมาณต่างๆ ที่ข้อมูลที่มีทำได้เพียงแค่ประมาณการเท่านั้น ในรายงานของสก๊อตแลนด์และคณะ เมื่อปี 1999 ประเมินว่าในปี 1998 ปริมาณการทำป่าไม้ผิดกฎหมายที่สงสัยว่าเกิดขึ้นคิดเป็น 57 ล้านลูกบาศก์เมตร เพิ่มขึ้น 16 ล้านลูกบาศก์เมตรจากปี 1997 ส่วนในรายงานของวัลตัน เมื่อปี 2543 ได้ประเมินอัตราการตัดไม้ทำลายป่า (สูงถึง 2.7 ล้านเฮกเตอร์/ปี) และคาดการณ์ว่าป่าไม้ในพื้นที่ต่ำของสุลาเวสี สุมาตรา และกาลิมันตันจะหมดไปภายใน 10 ปี ผลกระทบทางด้านสังคมและเศรษฐกิจ ที่เกิดขึ้นรวมถึงระดับหนี้ที่สูงของอุตสาหกรรมที่เกี่ยวข้องกับไม้ การขาดทุนที่อาจเกิดขึ้น

ซึ่งเทียบเท่ากับความช่วยเหลือจากต่างประเทศในหนึ่งปีงบประมาณ (ประมาณ 6.0 พันล้านเหรียญสหรัฐ) และการว่างงานที่อาจเพิ่มสูงขึ้น (ส่งผลกระทบต่อทางตรงและทางอ้อมต่อคน 20 ล้านคน) ในขณะที่ถ้ารัฐบาลลดปริมาณการทำป่าไม้อย่างผิดกฎหมาย ผลที่เกิดขึ้นอาจเป็นความไม่สงบทางสังคม

บทเรียนที่ได้จากประสบการณ์ของผู้เขียนขณะทำงานในกระทรวงป่าไม้ของประเทศอินโดนีเซีย (1998-2001) มีดังนี้ การทำป่าไม้อย่างผิดกฎหมายเพิ่มขึ้นในช่วงต่อที่เกิดขึ้นอย่างรวดเร็วระหว่างการเปลี่ยนแปลงการปกครองมาเป็นแบบประชาธิปไตยและการกระจายอำนาจ ทำให้เกิดคำถามเกี่ยวกับระดับความพร้อมในเชิงกฎหมาย ทรัพยากรบุคคล และการสื่อสารระหว่างรัฐบาลกลางและรัฐบาลท้องถิ่นในปัจจุบัน ปัญหาของประเทศอินโดนีเซียไม่ได้เกิดขึ้นในประเทศนี้เท่านั้น ประเทศจีน บราซิล รัสเซีย และประเทศต่างๆ ในทวีปแอฟริกา น่าจะได้รับทราบและเรียนรู้จากบทเรียนเหล่านี้ นอกจากนี้การทำป่าไม้อย่างผิดกฎหมายยังไม่ใช่ปัญหาที่เกิดขึ้นเพียงปัญหาเดียว แต่เป็นเรื่องที่อาจได้รับประโยชน์จากการวางแผนนโยบายป่าไม้และอุตสาหกรรมไม้ร่วมกัน ในท้ายที่สุดมาตรการป้องกันต่างๆ ได้พัฒนาอย่างรวดเร็วจากระดับภาคสนาม สู่ระดับส่วนกลางและนานาชาติ รวมถึงความร่วมมือระหว่างผู้รับประโยชน์ทุกฝ่ายและการใช้ข้อมูลทางวิทยาศาสตร์อย่างมีประสิทธิภาพในการวางแผนนโยบาย

## Is Sustainable Mangrove Management Possible?

*Lê Thi Van Hue*

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Vietnam's mangrove resources have decreased rapidly in area and quality during the on-going period of *doi moi* (renovation reforms), which started in 1986. Uncontrolled wood extraction, paddy area expansion, mining activities, construction of dikes, dams, and roads, and – most importantly – commercial shrimp farming have all been factors in the rapid loss of mangrove. Due to the high profitability of shrimp exports, both central and local governments provided incentives to shrimp farmers, despite knowing that shrimp farm productivity usually declines dramatically within three to four years of pond construction.

In designing my research on local management of mangrove resources, I assumed that *doi moi* reforms, including the elimination of the cooperative's monopoly on agriculture and forestry, the introduction of short-term land use rights (up to fifteen years for agriculture), privatization, and market liberalization, had affected local community access to and degradation of mangrove resources. My aim was to ask how mangrove degradation could be reversed and sustainable mangrove management emerge in the Red River Delta of Vietnam.

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My further assumption was that rapid changes in local land use systems, ownership, management practices, and institutional arrangements in response to national renovation reforms have deprived many poor households of their livelihoods, while opening up economic opportunities for others. One may ask further why renovation reforms have not solved the problem of resource degradation and over-exploitation and why uncertainty affects people in an unequal manner.

My partial answer is that communities are not homogenous, autonomous isolates, waiting to adapt to a shifting set of exogenous environments (Durham 1995). On the contrary, communities are complex, conflict-ridden institutions composed of individual households that fiercely prize their economic independence (Sheridan 1988). Differential relationships of power within and among communities mediate the exploitation, distribution, and control of natural resources. In other words, gender, age, wealth, and class all influence how local people manage mangrove resources in Vietnam.

In this paper I will briefly review the evolution of different resource management systems and the concept of community-based resource management as an alternative to either centralized management or privatization. My case study of Giao Lac, a village affected by the *doi moi* reforms, will then illustrate problems of access to and degradation of mangrove resources. Finally, I will suggest a new approach for Giao Lac village – a pragmatic melding of nationalization, privatization, and community-based management.

## Common pool resources

As Vietnam's "transitional economy" moves toward a more market-oriented approach, the state finds it increasingly difficult to finance the "social safety nets" for which the socialist economy was well known. At the same time, sustainability of natural resources is under greater pressure in some areas. Without a holistic theoretical model, state and local policies remain in a state of flux.

According to Garrett Hardin's model of the "tragedy of the commons"

(cited in Hardin and Baden 1977), common-property resources are really open access and not owned by anyone. This leads to over-exploitation and resource depletion. But Hardin misused the term "commons" and was really referring to an open access, common pool resource (Ruttan 1998). He ignored the geographical and historical prevalence of local institutions that communally managed common property, especially those designed to prevent "free-riding." He concluded that natural resources should be either privatized or controlled by central government authority to ensure sustainable use (Berkes 1989). However, the promotion of nationalization and privatization of natural resources has not solved the problem of resource degradation and over-exploitation, and further, has often deprived populations of their livelihood (Pomeroy 1992).

According to John Baden (cited in Hardin and Baden 1977), in a situation where no agency has the power to coordinate or ration resource use, action which is individually rational can be collectively disastrous. It is this which results in the "tragedy of the commons," which I argue will continue to arise in Vietnam in situations of both free access and government regulation. Though government may wish to implement state property regimes and officially regulate resource use, it unfortunately lacks the necessary organizational capacity and political will to do so (Scott 1998).

Centralized control and regulation of natural resources unintentionally creates an unsustainable open access resource where limited-access common-property resources had previously existed and operated in a functional manner (Ostrom 1990). McCay and Acheson (1987) conclude that governments should leave this role to individuals and the private sector by encouraging privatization.

### **Is privatization the only way?**

Robert J. Smith (cited in Ostrom 1990: 12) suggests that the only way to avoid the tragedy of the commons in natural resources and wildlife is to replace the common property system with a system of private property rights. Welch (*ibid.*) asserts that privatization of the commons is the optimal solution for all common-pool problems. McCay and Acheson (1987) contribute to this

discussion by pointing out that privatization internalizes costs and benefits, reduces uncertainty, and thereby increases individual responsibility for the environment and the rational use of resources. In contrast, I will argue that individuals who become private owners of natural resources try to maximize their net return by developing the resource's potential, thereby ignoring sustainable practices that would bring them long-term benefits.

Ostrom (1990) demonstrates that privatization can also mean the assignment of exclusive rights to harvest a resource system to a single individual or firm. She argues that the imposition of private property does not stipulate how that bundle of rights will be defined, who will bear the cost of excluding non-owners from access, how conflict over rights will be adjudicated, and how residual interests of right-holders in the resource system itself will be organized. Thus, far from being the solution to the tragedy of the commons, privatization has made the situation worse.

### **Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM)**

Fortunately, there are alternatives. According to Gibson and Koontz (1998), community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) is increasingly viewed as the most appropriate arrangement for promoting sustainable development of natural resources. CBNRM is based on the premise that local populations have a greater interest in the sustainable use of resources than do the state or distant corporate managers; that local communities are more cognizant of the intricacies of local ecological processes and practices; and that they are more able to effectively manage those resources through local or "traditional" forms of access (Tsing et al. 1999). CBNRM involves self-management: the community takes responsibility for surveillance and enforcement; the community establishes a property rights regime and rules of behavior for resource use. CBNRM allows each community to develop a management strategy which meets its own particular needs and conditions. Thus, it allows for a significant degree of flexibility and greater participation by local individuals. Since the community is involved in the formulation and implementation of manage-



ment measures, a higher degree of acceptability and compliance can be expected. CBNRM strives to make maximum use of local knowledge and expertise in developing management strategies (Pomeroy 1992).

Institutional arrangements, resource regimes, and property rights are at the core of community-based resource management. Accepting approaches which are participatory and decentralized would involve a major shift for national bureaucracies which are unaccustomed to sharing power. Governments should recognize that smaller organizational units, such as villages, may be better equipped and motivated to manage their own resources than higher-level authorities (Pomeroy 1992). This shift may be necessary if mangrove resources are to be managed in a sustainable manner.

### **Mangrove management in Giao Lac village: The colonial period through the war of resistance**

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Giao Lac village is a largely Catholic coastal community in Giao Thuy district, Nam Dinh province. Village land covers about 744 ha, of which 535 ha are agricultural. Giao Lac's population during the period of this study, 2000-2001, was roughly 9000. It is an agricultural rice-farming community that also engages in animal husbandry and the collection of mangrove or mangrove-related products. The village is bordered on the east by Giao An and Giao Thanh villages, on the west by Giao Xuan village, and on the north by Hong Thuan and Binh Hoa villages. It is bordered on the south by the central dike, an intertidal area, and the South China Sea. The dike is almost 3 km long. The intertidal area is more than 600 ha, of which 400 ha has been planted with the mangrove species *Kandelia candel*, *Sonneratia caseolaris*, and *Rhizophora apiculata*. There are also five shrimp ponds in this area. Four of the five ponds and all of the intertidal area belong to the district, which in turn mandates the village to manage the ponds and the mudflats.

Giao Lac village is a community with a long and rich history. Elderly villagers have experienced life under three regimes: the French colonial government, the Japanese occupation, and independent Vietnam. They have experi-

enced the great famine of 1945, the war of liberation, post-independence land reforms, the struggle in the South to unify the country and American bombing of the North, the post-1975 period of intensive collectivization, and, more recently, the *doi moi* reforms. Through these periods, mangrove management and rights of access have been shaped by both informal institutions and forest management practices.

From 1884 until 1945, the French colonial administration had authority over mangrove forests, but no one was assigned to guard them until 1940. In 1939, the colonial administration supervised the construction of the central dike in Nam Dinh province. There were mangrove forests along the dike. Giao Lac is thought to have had about 100 ha of mangrove at that time with trees of 3 m or taller. There were many kinds of water birds, such as egret, gray heron, pelican, and wild duck. There was a profusion of bees, fish, crabs, shrimp, snails, and bivalves in the mangrove forest. Due to high soil acidity, people could not grow enough rice and many had only one meal per day. In order to survive, everyone went to the forest to collect bird eggs, crabs, fish, and shrimp, as well as honey to either eat or sell at the Dai Dong market. Because everyone collected shrimp, crab, and bivalves and transport was poor, there was no effective demand for these products.

Local people also went to the forests to collect fuelwood – only the dry branches – to sell at the market for very low prices to people who made rice cakes and pancakes. The money earned from 20 kg of fuelwood bought less than 1 kg of rice. Although there had been no law against forest exploitation, no official management practice, and no guard to protect the forests for 56 years, Giao Lac villagers did not cut down mangrove trees for fuelwood or shoot birds for food. This practice continued for the period the forests were guarded until 1945. Local practice therefore amounted to effective resource conservation.

After the August 1945 revolution, most landlords ran away, and new organizations, such as the Farmers' Association, were formed. In 1949, the French returned and supported a Catholic-led insurrection against the Vietnamese government. Houses of Buddhist families were burned, and many families

relied on timber from mangrove forests to rebuild their houses when they returned. The French administration promoted the harvesting of mangrove trees for firewood, and village heads began to grant timber concessions to outsiders who hired local people to cut the forests.

In November 1953, the Viet Minh evicted the French from Giao Lac and in 1954, the entire area was liberated. Many Catholics then went to the South.

### **The cooperative period: 1956-1975**

Mutual aid groups were established in 1956. Early in 1959, the first low-level cooperative was experimentally established in Giao Lac and called Lac Hong. Later cooperatives included Lac Thanh, Lac Hung, Lac Long, Lac Tien, Lac Tien, Lac Thang, and Lac Cuong. The Giao Lac high-level cooperative was not formed until 1972-73. During this roughly twenty-year period, the village managed the forests on behalf of the district, which was responsible for mangrove tree management to protect the central dike. The local people were not allowed to go to the forests as they had before. The village's militia unit was assigned to guard the forests, and part of their job was to stop those who went illegally to the mangroves and to confiscate the "violators'" firewood. From this point, everyone tried his or her best to poach in the forests. They even cut down large mangrove trees for fuelwood, something that had never occurred before. Of course, they could not bring the fresh trees home right away lest members of the militia unit confiscate them and impose a fine. The survival strategy was to leave the trees to dry in the forests for several days, or wait for nightfall to secretly bring the trees home. Fuelwood confiscated by the members of the militia unit was taken to the Village's People's Committee. This is how "the tragedy of the commons" arose.

In the 1960s, in response to ocean encroachment and the reclamation policy of the district, Giao Lac created the 54 ha Bien Hoa pond by mobilizing the entire village to clear the forest. By then, there were still mangroves outside the pond, but very few. Sea grasses were planted in former mangrove habitats which provided the material for weaving mats and carpets for export. By 1986-

87, however, this estuary margin habitat had become too saline, and the village more or less abandoned mat and carpet production for the more lucrative enterprise of shrimp farming.

### The impact of economic reforms: shrimp and clam management

During the 1980s, a household-based economy increasingly displaced the cooperative-based economy (Le and Rambo 1999). Generally speaking, rural living conditions have improved greatly (Ngo 1993). It has been argued, however, that the positive results of the reforms are not guaranteed to continue, because private land ownership, thought to be key to further development, may lead to land fragmentation and increased rural social differentiation.

In accordance with the move to a household-based economy, the government of Vietnam shifted responsibility for natural resource management from village cooperatives to individual farm households (Nguyen 1995). At the same time, government policy has explicitly encouraged aquacultural production and export of aquatic products up to 2005 (Government Decision 1998). During the *doi moi* period, a large market for Vietnam's marine products has developed in China, and a further four shrimp ponds have been constructed by the district. Households (usually five or ten in cooperation) or entrepreneurs bid publicly for a lease to manage a shrimp pond. Typically, each pond generates profits of at least USD 10,000 per year. Although the bidding process is open to everyone, only the rich, who have sufficient capital, labor, management skills, and access to political power, are able to participate in the process. This leaves only the older pond, Bien Hoa pond, to be managed locally by the Giao Lac Cooperative.

It has been established that shrimp pond mono-cropping typically leads to a catastrophic accumulation of toxins and disease organisms that necessitate the long-term abandonment of the pond by the fourth or fifth year. The abandoned ponds are exceedingly difficult to convert to rice, mangrove, or other productive uses. For this reason, the Center for Natural Resources and Environmental Studies (CRES) of Vietnam National University, Hanoi, has

begun research to develop a more sustainable shrimp pond which, by retaining some mangrove trees, can attract roosting marine birds whose guano would provide a source of shrimp food.

In the 1990s, clam farming became another lucrative way to exploit the intertidal area. In Giao Lac most of the mollusks in the mudflats were collected by hand, but some burrowing species had to be dug up. Giao Lac's people, mainly women and girls, use a light plank or a small hoe to dig these species on the mudflats at neap tide. The mudflats were common property that everyone had access to prior to 1990. In that year, when people acquired the right to set up their own clam nets and claim the mudflats as their own, the people of neighboring Giao Xuan village began clam farming with a system of nets in the inter-tidal area. They were the first to enter this business through their connections with Chinese traders who sold to the bivalve markets in China. Where clams had once been so cheap that people substituted them for rice, they have now become a valuable commodity, rising about five times in price. One kilogram of clams presently fetches VND 5,000-6,000 (USD .35-.43 in 2000). Both the central and local governments have encouraged clam farming through National Decree 773-TTg, for example, which stipulates that open coastal areas and water fronts can be used for shrimp and crab farming. Local districts have applied this policy to clam farming.

Owners of clam farming areas have become rich very quickly by farming and trading in marine produce. The collectors, on the other hand, have suffered the impact of price fluctuations. In the early 1990s, people from Giao Xuan came to Giao Lac and farmed clams in the intertidal area before anyone in Giao Lac knew what clam farming was. The village officials measured the areas that people claimed as their farming sites, and the farmers paid rent to the Village's People's Committee. However, they used only part of the area they claimed for clam farming; the remainder was used to collect natural clams and they did not pay any tax for this "extra area." In fact, in 1999, only five of ninety-four owners paid one third to one half of the tax they owed. The mudflats, while generating significant income for their owners, were poorly managed, not fully taxed, and eventually sold off. The rice paddies, on the other hand, which generated less

income, were tightly managed and fully taxed. As a result, those who own nets on the mudflats became rich enough to buy color televisions and motorbikes. Many poor rice-growing households, although working very hard, produced only enough rice for eight months of the year.

This process of land claim excluded poor and female-headed households, who no longer had a place to dig clams and became increasingly marginalized. The poorest, especially women and girls, ended up working on resources owned by someone else, while the rich reaped the benefits of those resources. For example, some poor workers watched shrimp ponds for rich owners for no more than USD 10 a month, while others were hired to collect clams with someone else's net for USD .70 per day – clams which used to be theirs for the taking. Conflict between those who owned nets and those who lost access to resources increased to the point of physical fighting. A few months ago, a clam farm owner in Giao Xuan beat a pregnant woman unconscious while she was collecting clams in an open area that he claimed to own. The beating reflects certain rights. The rich have the right to appropriate common resources, disenfranchising the poor of those resources, while the poor don't even have the right to protect themselves when violently harassed. Charges were not filed against the man who beat the pregnant woman.

Why can people from Giao Xuan farm bivalves on Giao Lac's mudflats? The answer was given that all land beyond the dike, including the mudflats, belongs to the district, so Giao Lac doesn't have the right to exclude outsiders. After a year or two, people in Giao Lac learned how to farm clams from the Giao Xuan people. The intertidal area of 350 ha, to which access had been open to everybody, then became the property of those who had enough capital to invest in clam farming. The whole area became covered with nets and clam watch-houses.

Again, the poor were excluded from the nearby resources. Now they had to go to the ocean, not within walking distance, to collect bivalves. So ten or fifteen people collectively hired a motorboat to get there, getting up earlier and working longer. They had to spend part of the money earned to pay for the

boat. Those who could not afford to contribute toward the cost of a boat had to abandon bivalve collection and now depend fully on wet rice production, which only produces enough for seven to eight months' food per year.

### **The Danish Red Cross mangrove plantation project**

In 1997, the Danish Red Cross assisted Giao Lac in planting mangroves for the protection of sea dikes and other assets of coastal dwellers. The district cleared the clam farming site on Trong Island and enclosed an area of more than 300 ha for the mangrove plantation. As planned, one main household and three supplemental households were chosen to each plant 5 ha of mangroves. The main household was to be a poor one with sufficient labor. The other three households were selected by the Giao Lac Red Cross and local leaders. For each ha planted, each group was paid about USD 26. That was the project design. In reality, very few poor households were selected to participate. The majority were middle or upper middle income households, typically the relatives and friends of the hamlet heads.

After the mangroves were planted and grown, the quantity of marine creatures caught in the area increased, especially baby shrimp and crabs. These travel from the ocean to the mangroves for food, thus supplying seeds and larvae for shrimp and crab rearing households. As there are many shrimp, crabs, and clams among the mangroves, local people try to poach in the mangrove plantation, although they know it is not permitted. They were explicitly told by the guards that they might kill the mangroves by walking around looking for crabs and by digging up clams. In 1999, when the mangroves were two years old, the village guards, who are paid more than USD 25 per month, decided to sell tickets to local people who wanted to collect marine creatures in the mangroves. The entrance fee was USD .70 per person and the guards kept the money for themselves. This created resentment between villagers and guards, to whom protection of the mangrove forests had been transferred and who used that control to exploit the resources. The result was also highly inequitable as poorer villagers could not afford a ticket to enter the mangrove forests. Thus, a project funded by an international NGO intending to be both pro-environment and

pro-poor did provide some community-wide environmental benefits, but the income-generating benefits were largely captured by the middle and upper-middle income households.

## Uncertainty and local people's coping strategies

According to Mehta (2000: 3), uncertainty is not the same as risk. Risk is a situation in which probabilities or alternative outcomes can be calculated. Uncertainty is defined as a situation characterized by indeterminacies which cannot be calculated. Such uncertainties can be ecological and environmental hazards, political or policy changes, market behavior, social problems, or inadequacy of knowledge. How do Giao Lac's people cope with their uncertain environment, which has featured fundamental, sudden, and unpredictable changes in government policy, fundamental changes in resource ownership and access due to the enclosure of protected mangrove forests, and a sudden integration into the world market? To help cope with change and uncertainty at various levels, local people rely on the village's informal institutions-mass organizations and voluntary associations (Mehta et al. 1999).

Each hamlet often has six mass organizations: unions representing women, veterans, the elderly, and youth, as well as the Young Pioneers and the Farmers' Association. All mass organizations were created during the cooperative period and are under the control of the Party. As the cooperative's role has been downgraded over time and replaced by the household economy, the budgets of these organizations have dropped significantly. Organization membership is voluntary and each organization is now self-financing rather than relying on funding from cooperatives.

Different organizations have different contribution policies. The Young Pioneers, small children between seven and thirteen years old, each contribute 3 kg of paddy. Members of the Women's Union contribute 10 kg of paddy. These associations lend rice to poor families at 4 percent annual interest. Profits are spent on the associations' activities. The Women's Union, for instance, gets together once a year on International Women's Day, March 8. They have a party



so they can talk and sing songs together or they organize a tour to visit famous temples or places of scenic beauty. Everybody can choose an organization of his or her own to join and the poor are not excluded from these mass organizations.

There are also so-called voluntary organizations with more specific functions. Rotating credit associations include the gold association, the soldiers' association (consisting of those who joined the army on the same day), the cement, the brick, the rice, and the funeral association, among others. Each association has its own head and its own regulations. The voluntary associations are based on mutual trust – those who know and trust each other form them. Like other voluntary associations, both Catholics and Buddhists can participate in the credit associations. One person can be a member of many associations, each of which has, on average, twelve to fifteen members.

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Credit associations are more spontaneous than mass organizations and can include people from different villages. Like the mass organizations, the regulations of credit associations vary and may be for-profit or non-profit. The cement and funeral associations are non-profit organizations. Each member of the cement association, for example, contributes a sack of cement when a member builds a house. This association is based on mutual aid, a way of saving money to construct a home – an enterprise too costly if undertaken alone. The gold association, in contrast, is a profit-making organization that requires regular contributions from its members, the equivalent of USD 36 twice a year.

People have different strategies to raise money for their contributions. Some have village salaries, but the most common strategy is to raise pigs and collect clams and crabs, which are sold to traders to raise money for contributions. Joining these voluntary associations is a way to save money so that when people construct a house, organize a wedding ceremony, or sustain crop damage through natural disasters, they can avoid borrowing from local lenders at high interest rates or from the bank, whose procedures are long and complicated and which requires monthly interest payments.

## Community-based mangrove forest management

The mangroves are presently five years old and the Danish Red Cross project will end in 2005. No one wants to lose these forests again. Everyone remembers 1983 and 1986, when Giau Lac was hit by big hurricanes. The central dike was not broken, but it was severely damaged. In the 1983 hurricane, houses were blown away or collapsed and shrimp ponds were destroyed. All of this happened because there was no forest beyond the dike. But it is unclear who will manage the forests after 2005. According to village officials, the mangrove forests will be under the district's management when the project comes to an end, a system of management that disenfranchises Giau Lac's poor inhabitants. They are afraid that the district will privatize the forests by granting concessions to individuals who have capital to convert them into industrial shrimp farming areas.

According to the head of the Giau Lac Red Cross, the village should draft its own rules and institutionalize the sale of tickets to those who want to collect marine creatures in the forests. The money collected from ticket sales would pay salaries for guards, who would be nominated and publicly selected by each hamlet. This idea was rejected by all residents, as they said that the community is highly heterogeneous. Moreover, collectors do not all engage in the same activity when they go to the forests or the mudflats and would not end up earning the same amount of money. Therefore, it would be impossible to sell tickets to everyone at the same price.

All residents of the village want to draft their own rules to manage their mangroves. According to the heads of the thirty-two households interviewed, they would like to retain three guards. There are presently five guards hired to protect the forest, whose salaries are paid by the Danish Red Cross. The salaries for the new guards would be lower than at present, as they would be based on the People's Committee's standard of USD 10.70 per month. This would total USD 385.20 per year. They all said the forest itself could generate more than enough to pay these salaries. For example, the rules would allow twenty people to put grape and gill nets at the edge of the forest, for which each owner would

pay between USD 35.70 and USD 71.40 per year in rent. After paying the guards' salaries, the remaining proceeds would go to the People's Committee to be spent on roads or schools for the village. The guards would be nominated and publicly selected by each hamlet, and their terms would rotate each year. The rules would also allow the immediate replacement of an unsatisfactory guard. In order to draft and implement these rules, a committee of mangrove protection should be created. The Giao Lac People's Committee and the Giao Lac Red Cross should be represented on the committee, be included in the drafting process, and play a central role in implementing the rules.

In this way, the forests could be protected while bringing benefits to the local people, who would in turn help manage the resources in a sustainable manner. Poor, female-headed households and marginalized groups could be included in the process and have a voice in management decision making as well. In other words, this mechanism would ensure social equity, productivity, and sustainability. Nevertheless, local people face a long process of negotiation before such an approach is accepted by the provincial and national governments.

Although community-based natural resource management attracts international attention, it has not yet been widely implemented in Vietnam. The most pressing issue facing CBNRM is that of tenure rights. A 1999 government circular guides the implementation of the convention on protecting and developing forests in populated communities in the plains and mountain areas. The principle of "majority consensus" is promoted, but how such a concept is operationalized through an appropriate legal framework will determine whether Giao Lac village gains the means to effectively manage its tenure and access its resources in a sustainable manner.

Like national policy, local practices and conventions are not static, but evolve over time. In order to make good rules, the government should understand local conventions and work to adapt them rather than impose new rules from above. For example, one strategy to secure the community's enduring interest in the protection of its mangrove resources would be to enlist the active involvement of existing social and rotating credit associations.

The institutional framework for resource use in Giao Lac remains highly complex. Neither state control nor private sector control alone can provide a viable solution to mangrove resource degradation. Likewise, it doesn't make sense to propose purely "community-based resource management," as the local community itself is highly heterogeneous and outsiders also access the resources. A combination of national control, private ownership, and community-based management therefore appears the most suitable strategy in the context of Giao Lac. A central government agency would continue to manage the dike because a breach in the dike system would cause far-reaching damage to many communities. Households would manage individual shrimp ponds according to private sector principals. And the whole community (probably a cluster of villages) would oversee the management of the mangrove forests. Communities should be empowered with the right to require shrimp pond farmers to post "environmental bonds" or otherwise pay into a local fund to offset the cost of mangrove habitat destruction and to rehabilitate abandoned shrimp farms into mangrove or some other productive and communally-owned habitat.

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## Apakah Mungkin Pengelolaan Bakau Berkelanjutan?

*Le Thi Van Hue*

Tulisan ini menyajikan studi tentang potensi institusi untuk pengelolaan sumberdaya hayati berbasis masyarakat (PSHBM) di hutan bakau di Vietnam. PSHBM telah menarik perhatian dan perdebatan internasional, tetapi belum dilaksanakan secara luas di Vietnam. Ada beberapa strategi pokok pengelolaan yang telah dilakukan secara terpusat oleh pemerintah dan koperasi desa dan, sejak tahun 1980-an, pengelolaan oleh rumah tangga perorangan. Tulisan ini berpendapat bahwa nasionalisasi atau privatisasi tidak menyelesaikan masalah kerusakan sumberdaya dan pemanfaatan berlebihan. Dalam banyak contoh, privatisasi telah menghilangkan rumah tangga pedesaan dari kehidupan mereka.

Hal ini diperlihatkan dalam studi kasus yang ditampilkan di sini mengenai pengelolaan bakau di desa Giao Lac, Kabupaten Giao Thuy, Propinsi Nam Dinh. Selama masa kolonial, kegiatan lokal adalah memanfaatkan sumberdaya secara berkelanjutan walaupun tidak ada aturan secara resmi. Selama masa kerjasama (1956-1975), pemerintah kabupaten mengelola hutan bakau untuk melindungi tanggul utama. Penduduk lokal tidak lagi diizinkan untuk memanfaatkan hutan dan pemanfaatan secara ilegal dimulai untuk pertama kalinya. Reformasi ekonomi *Doi Moi* sejak tahun 1980-an telah menghasilkan ketidakseimbangan kesempatan ekonomi dan memberikan sumbangan terhadap kerusakan habitat. Hanya yang memiliki modal yang besar, keterampilan mengelola dan kekuatan politik yang telah mendapatkan lebih dari sumberdaya yang berhubungan dengan bakau-khususnya budidaya udang dan kerang. Masyarakat miskin hanya menerima sedikit, sementara kehilangan akses terhadap sumberdaya yang sangat mereka butuhkan sebagai penambah tanaman padi. Sebagai



hasil dari *Doi Moi*, rendahnya pendapatan dan rumah tangga yang dipimpin oleh wanita telah terabaikan.

Suatu kenyataan di mana sebuah proyek yang didanai oleh NGO internasional lebih berpihak pada lingkungan dan kemiskinan. Proyek ini telah membantu mengembalikan fungsi hutan bakau di sekitar desa. Namun karena proyek tersebut harus berakhir pada tahun 2005, perencanaan harus dimulai untuk sebuah sistem pengelolaan yang akan meningkatkan keadilan sosial, produksi, dan kelestarian. Tahap pertama harus melibatkan partisipasi aktif dari kelompok sosial dan asosiasi-asosiasi kredit berputar yang telah ada. Secara keseluruhan, sebuah pendekatan praktis diharapkan-dimana tiga strategi dari nasionalisasi, privatisasi dan pengelolaan berbasis masyarakat digabungkan di desa Giao Lac, seperti pemerintah mengelola sistem tanggul, rumah tangga mengelola tambak udang secara individu dan semua masyarakat menjaga hutan bakau yang berbatasan dengan tambak udang.

Translated by Andi Amri and Retno Kusumanigtyas

## Posible ba ang Pangmatagalang Pangangalaga sa Bakawan?

Le Thi Van Hue

Inilalahad sa papel na ito ang isang pag-aaral hinggil sa kakayahang institusyonal para sa pagpapatupad sa mga bakawan ng Biyetnam ng *community-based natural resource management* (CBNRM) o pangangalaga sa likas na kayamanan na nakabase sa pamayanan. Ang CBNRM ay nakaagaw-pansin sa maraming bansa at naging paksain ng mga debate bagamat hindi pa ito malawak na naipapatupad sa Biyetnam. Doon, ang mga pangunahing istrategiya ay ang sentralisadong pangangasiwa rito ng mga ahensyang pampamahalaan at mga kooperatibang pampamayanan at, mula dekada otsenta, pangangasiwa ng bawat tahanan. Iginigiit sa papel na ito na hindi nalutasan ng pagsasabansa at maging ng pribatisasyon ang suliranin ng pagkasira ng kalikasan at pang-aabuso rito. At, sa maraming pagkakataon, ang pribatisasyon ay nagresulta sa kawalan ng kabuhatan ng mga pamilya sa lalawigan.

Ito ang ipinakikita ng *case study* hinggil sa pangangalaga sa bakawan sa pamayanang Giao Lac, distritong Giao Thuy, sa lalawigan ng Nam Dinh. Halos sa buong panahong kolonyal, karaniwang gawi ang pangmatagalang gamit sa likas na kayamanan kahit na wala pang mga opisyal na regulasyon hinggil dito. Noong *cooperative period* (1956-1975), ang mga awtoridad ng distrito ang nangasiwa sa mga bakawan upang pangalagaan ang sentral na dike. Ang mga naninirahan ay hindi na pinahintulatang pumasok sa kagubatan at dito unang lumitaw ang iligal na pangangaso. Ang mga repormang pang-ekonomya ng *Doi Moi* mula sa dekada otsenta ay nagresulta sa di-pantay na pagkakataong pang-ekonomya at nagpalubha sa pagkasira ng *habitat*. Ang mga may mapagkukunan ng kapital, may

abilidad sa pangangasiwa, at humahawak ng kapangyarihang pulitikal ang higit na nakinabang sa mga likas na kayamanang kaugnay ng bakawan – laluna sa pag-aalaga ng hipon at kabibe. Pinakakaunti ang naging pakinabang ng mga mahihirap na nawalan pa ng karapatan sa mga likas na kayamanang dati na nilang inaasahang pandagdag sa pagsasaka. Sanhi ng *Doi Moi*, ang mga mag-anak na mababa lamang ang kinikita at yaong mga pinamumunuan ng mga kababaihan ay lubhang namarhinalisa.

Ito ay totoo maging sa konteksto ng isang proyektong pinondohan ng internasyunal na NGO na inasahang tataguyod sa interes ng kalikasan at mahihirap. Nakatulong ang proyektong ito na mapanumbalik ang malalawak na bakawan sa paligid ng mga pamayanan. Subalit sa pagwawakas ng proyektong ito sa 2005, dapat nang simulan ang pagpapalano para sa isang sistema ng pangangasiwa na susulong sa pagkakatantay-pantay panlipunan, produktibidad, at pangmatagalang pagmementina. Ang unang hakbang dito ay ang pagkuha sa aktibong partisipasyon ng mga samahang sosyal at pampaluwagan. Sa kabuuan, iminumungkahi ang isang praktikal na pamamaraan – na ang tatlong istratchiya ng pagsasabansa, pribatisasyon, at pangangasiwang nakabase sa pamayanan ay pagsamahin sa pamayanang Giao Lac: ang mga ahensya ng estado ang mangangasiwa sa sistema ng dike, ang mga mag-anak sa kani-kanilang mga hipunan, at ang buong pamayanan sa pangangalaga sa mga bakawang kinalalagyan ng mga hipunan at sa paligid ng mga ito.

Translated by Sofia Guillermo

## 持続可能なマングローブ林管理は可能なのか？

レ・ティ・バン・フエ (Le Thi Van Hue)

本論は、ベトナムのマングローブ林を対象に実施されている地域主導型資源管理の制度的潜在性に関する論考である。地域主導型資源管理は、国際的な注目を集め盛んに議論が行われているが、ベトナムで広範に実施されているわけではない。このシステムの目的は、国家組織や合作社、1980年以降は世帯レベルの集中的資源管理にある。本論では、国有化や私有化という観点からではなく、資源枯渇や乱獲という面から議論を進めたい。

ここでは事例として、ナムディン省ザオトゥイ県ザオラック村でのマングローブ林管理をとりあげる。植民地期を通じて、地域住民による資源利用は公的な規制がなかったにも関わらず持続性をもっていた。集団化が進んだ時代（1956-1975年）、県の行政は堤防の保護という目的でマングローブ林を管理していた。地域住民はマングローブ林の使用を禁止されたため、資源へのアクセスは不正利用になってしまった。1980年代のドイモイ政策は経済機会を広げ、それがマングローブの破壊を引き起こした。資本や管理技術、政治力をもつ者は、マングローブ林から生み出される資源（特に養殖によるエビやカニ）から利益を得るようになった。貧困層の人々は、稲作以外の副業として重要な様々な資源を失い、ほとんど利益を得ることができなかった。ドイモイ政策の結果として、低収入層や寡婦世帯は特に村の中で取り残されることになった。

環境保護や生活向上に向けた外国のNGOによるプロジェクトですら、上述のような状況を生み出した。このプロジェクトは、村を囲むマングローブ林の再生を目的としていた。村では2005年のプロジェクト終了を控え、社会的平等や生産性、持続性を考慮した管理システムを考えねばならない状態にある。こうした問題への対案の一つとしては、資金不足にある既存の社会組織や貯蓄組合への資金供出を募ることである。もう少し大きな全体案としては、国家と個人、共同体がそれぞれ協調すること、すなわちザオラック村の場合だと、国家機関が堤防を、各世帯がエビ池を、共同体がエビ池の内側や周辺にあるマングローブ林を管理することである。

Translated by Suzuki Shirō (鈴木伸二)

## การจัดการป่าชายเลนแบบยั่งยืนเป็นไปได้หรือไม่

*Le Thi Van Hue* (ลี โท วาน ฮู)

บทความนี้รายงานการศึกษาศักยภาพของสถาบันในการจัดการทรัพยากรธรรมชาติชุมชนในป่าชายเลนของเวียดนาม การจัดการทรัพยากรธรรมชาติชุมชนดังกล่าวนี้ได้รับความสนใจและเป็นที่ยกย่องกันอยู่ในระดับนานาชาติ แต่ยังไม่ได้มีการนำไปใช้อย่างกว้างขวางในประเทศเวียดนาม ซึ่งกลยุทธ์หลักๆ ยังคงอาศัยการจัดการแบบรวมอำนาจโดยหน่วยงาน ภาครัฐหรือสหกรณ์หมู่บ้าน และการจัดการโดยครัวเรือนโดยตรง ซึ่งเริ่มมีขึ้นนับตั้งแต่ทศวรรษ 1980 เป็นต้นมา บทความนี้เสนอข้อคิดเห็นว่าการโอนกิจการเป็นของรัฐหรือการแปรรูปวิสาหกิจต่างไม่สามารถแก้ปัญหาความเสื่อมโทรมของทรัพยากร

ข้อคิดเห็นดังกล่าวนี้จะแสดงให้เห็นในกรณีศึกษาของการจัดการป่าชายเลนในหมู่บ้านเกียวลัด อำเภอกีเยวทาย จังหวัดน่านดินห์ ในช่วงเวลาส่วนใหญ่ของยุคอาณานิคม ชาวบ้านรู้จักวิธีใช้ทรัพยากรแบบยั่งยืนแม้ว่าจะปราศจากการควบคุมดูแลของทางการ เมื่อมาถึงยุคร่วมมือ (1956-1975) เจ้าหน้าที่ของอำเภอก็ได้จัดการป่าชายเลนเพื่อที่จะปกป้องกำแพงกันน้ำของส่วนกลาง ชาวบ้านไม่ได้รับอนุญาตให้เข้าไปใช้ประโยชน์จากป่าอีกต่อไปทำให้เกิดการลักลอบจับสัตว์ขึ้นเป็นครั้งแรก การปฏิรูปทางเศรษฐกิจที่เรียกว่า Doi Moi ซึ่งเริ่มดำเนินมาตั้งแต่ทศวรรษ 1980 ก่อให้เกิดความไม่เท่าเทียมกันทางเศรษฐกิจตลอดจนการทำลายถิ่นที่อยู่ของพืชและสัตว์ ผู้ที่มีเงินทุน ความชำนาญในการจัดการ และอำนาจทางการเมืองสามารถหาผลประโยชน์จากทรัพยากรที่มาจากป่าชายเลน โดยเฉพาะอย่างยิ่งการทำฟาร์มกุ้งและฟาร์มหอยกานผู้ได้รับประโยชน์น้อยที่สุดได้แก่

คนยากจน ซึ่งต้องเสียแหล่งรายได้เสริมจากการทำนาข้าว การปฏิรูป  
Doi Moi มีผลทำให้ครอบครัวที่มีรายได้น้อยและมีหัวหน้าครอบครัว  
เป็นสตรีถูกละเลย

นี่คือความจริงที่เกิดขึ้นแม้จะมีโครงการที่ได้รับเงินทุนช่วยเหลือ  
จากองค์กรนอกภาครัฐสากลซึ่งมุ่งช่วยเหลือสิ่งแวดล้อมและคนยากจน  
แล้วก็ตาม โครงการดังกล่าวได้ช่วยฟื้นฟูสภาพป่าชายเลนในบริเวณ  
หมู่บ้าน แต่เนื่องจากโครงการจะสิ้นสุดลงในปี 2005 จึงควรมีการเริ่ม  
วางแผนให้มีระบบจัดการที่จะช่วยส่งเสริมให้มีความเท่าเทียมทางสังคม  
ปริมาณ การผลิต และความสามารถในการทำให้ยั่งยืน ชั้นแรกคือ  
ระดมความร่วมมือจากสมาคมและกองทุนหมุนเวียนต่างๆ ที่มีอยู่โดย  
ส่วนรวมวิธีที่ปฏิบัติได้ คือรวมกลยุทธ์ทั้งสามเข้าด้วยกัน นั่นคือการ  
โอนเป็นของรัฐ การแปรรูปรัฐวิสาหกิจ และการจัดการชุมชน โดยให้  
หน่วยงานรัฐดูแลระบบกำแพงกันน้ำ ในขณะที่แต่ละครัวเรือนดูแลรับ  
ผิดชอบบ่อกุ้งของตน ส่วนชุมชนทั้งหมดก็ร่วมกันคุ้มครองป่าชายเลน  
ที่อยู่ในบริเวณบ่อกุ้งหรือใกล้เคียง

Issue 3 / March 2000

**Nation and Other Stories**

## Issue 3 / Nations and Other Stories / March 2003

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# Towards Reinventing Indonesian Nationalist Historiography

Rommel Curaming

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The 1965 publication of *An Introduction to Indonesian Historiography* (Soedjatmoko et al. 1965) was a remarkable accomplishment in view of the comparative paucity of scholarship on other Southeast Asian countries at the time. Since then, however, only a handful of scholarly works on historiography have been published and none approximates the candidness, breadth, and depth of the Soedjatmoko volume, which was translated into Bahasa Indonesia in 1995 (Sartono 1982; 2001a; Frederick and Soeroto 1982; Alfian et al. 1992; Nichterlein 1974; Abdullah 1988a; 2001a; Reid and Marr 1979; Klooster 1985). A number of factors could account for this, but the repression of the New Order period was probably one of the more important. An atmosphere relatively free of political manipulation seems necessary for the healthy growth of scholarly projects, especially ones so vulnerable to manipulation as history writing. With the Suharto regime and many of its political restrictions now in the past, it is time to ask what difference its demise makes for the development of Indonesian

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historiography as practiced in Indonesia.

Older versions of Indonesian history are of course being challenged, but the freer atmosphere is also proving conducive to re-examining the long-established framework within which re-writing might proceed. Like most historiographies that developed in post-colonial societies, that of Indonesia is patently and intensely nationalistic. Known as "Indonesiasentris," nationalist historiography refers to the whole exercise of history writing whose primary aim and/or ultimate result, whether intended or not, is recognition and justification of the legitimate existence of Indonesia as a nation-state. Central to this project is the effort to create, maintain, and promote a national identity deemed fitting for such an entity. It is in reference to this orientation that signs of reform are appearing, prompted, among other things, by the need to purge the history-writing enterprise of its close association with the New Order. The reform has been initiated by a small number of historians who are well placed to effect possibly lasting change in the character and future development of Indonesian nationalist historiography. As the reform is still in an early stage, I will try to make sense of its emerging character and to speculate on the direction it might take, based on recent published and unpublished papers, a series of workshops held at Universitas Gadjah Mada (UGM), and interviews with a number of Indonesian historians.

### **The making of a tradition**

The Indonesian nation-state is relatively young, as is the historiography that underpins its formation. Common historical accounts trace the development of Indonesian nationalist historiography to pre-war anti-colonial, historical-literary works and speeches of early nationalists like Muhammad Yamin, Sanusi Pane, and Sukarno (Reid 1979; Sartono 1982; Abdullah and Surjomihardjo 1985). Only few of these were historical in form and intent, but the ideas propounded in them unmistakably found their way into the bedrock of nationalist historiography whose development gained impetus under the aegis of Japanese occupation (Klooster 1982). In the years following independence, the fiercely anti-colonial atmosphere furthered the development of such

historiography. In due time, it assumed a position of orthodoxy that ensured a lasting impact on the future course of Indonesian writing. It was perhaps Muhammad Yamin's works (1950; 1953) that best exemplify the general character of this early stage – romantic, ultra-nationalistic, and some would say pre-scientific. This kind of historiography may have become quickly dominant, but critiques were not lacking. Soedjatmoko stood out for his eloquent and compelling critique of the effort to make history a handmaiden of the nationalist project. In a landmark First National Seminar in 1957, the tension between methodologically sound, “scientific” history and its ideologically-informed nationalist counterparts came to the fore. Asked to speak on the philosophy that ought to inform history writing, Soedjatmoko and Yamin took clearly opposing sides. The former warned forcefully against the danger of allowing history to be used to promote nationalist projects and pushed for strict adherence to standard historical methodology (Soedjatmoko 1960). Yamin asserted in equally strong terms the need for Indonesian history to be written from a nationalist perspective and to help promote national consciousness and unity (Yamin 1957). The tension between these positions has been an enduring and defining fixture of the development of Indonesian historiography.

According to most accounts, the next stage of Indonesian historiography is best characterized by the dominance of a multi-dimensional social science approach pioneered by Sartono Kartodirdjo and heralded by the second national seminar held in 1970. Taufik Abdullah points out that the first seminar was known for “big ideas,” while the second ushered in an era characterized by the production of empirical and creditable historical output (Abdullah 2001a). Over the next three decades, the influence of the “Sartono school” proved so dominant that Asvi Warman Adam, a promising younger historian, has recently dubbed this period the “Second Wave.” It followed the first, de-colonizing wave, aimed specifically at obliterating vestiges of Dutch colonial historiography, and was succeeded by the current, third wave, characterized by the proliferation of different versions of history, including “history of the victims” written by, for, and from the viewpoint of those who suffered atrocities under the New Order regime (Adam 2000).

The multi-dimensional, social science approach has a number of major characteristics. *First*, it aims to be national and Indonesia-centric in perspective in contrast to colonial historiography that took natives, Indonesia, or places within what would eventually become Indonesia as peripheral to the historical narrative. *Second*, it is multi-dimensional in that historical events are explained as the outcome of complicated interplay among social, economic, cultural, political, religious, and other factors. This went against the tide of more conventional historians, of whom Yamin was exemplary, who gave "excessive" weight to political factors, thereby overemphasizing "big men" at the expense of the common people. *Third*, it is multi- and inter-disciplinary in approach. Theories from various social science disciplines are deliberately sought to enhance historical explanation. Again, this is in sharp contrast to the basically non-theoretical and descriptive approach of the earlier group. *Fourth*, it aims strictly to observe standard, "scientific," historical methodologies. *Fifth*, and perhaps not by design, it is seen by observers such as Kuntowijoyo, Adam, and Bambang Purwanto as apolitical, politically neutral, or, worse, politically irrelevant. (More detailed discussion of the social science approach can be found in Sartono 2001a; 1994; 1982; Abdullah 1988a; 1994; 2001a; and Abdullah and Surjomihardjo 1985.)

The standard account of the development of Indonesian historiography, as summarized above, is problematic on a number of levels. It almost entirely ignores the continuing dominance of the nationalist tradition as represented by Yamin, while exaggerating the influence of the Sartono school. In fact, the putative reign of the Sartono school is more like an image projected from a certain angle that presents a partial and misleading picture. Looking over the whole terrain of Indonesian history, trying to identify what kind of historical information circulates and is actually consumed by the general public, we may be surprised that the supposedly dominant Sartono school finds little expression in either academic books and textbooks or popular media such as newspapers and magazines, all convenient indicators of people's historical consciousness. (My concern here is academic nationalist historiography. See van Klinken [2001], who views nationalist historiography from a political vantage point and equates it with a long tradition of ideologically informed history writing in which serious academic history occupies no greater than a marginal position. His approach no

doubt illuminates the politics involved in history writing during and immediately after Suharto's regime, but I believe that in the current atmosphere, there is hope that history conforming to strict standards of historical methodology will gradually assume a position of greater importance, if not ultimate dominance.)

There are a good number of home-grown historians trained in the history department of Universitas Gadjadara (UGM) under the guidance of Sartono himself who have made a mark in the profession. There are also those trained abroad, such as Taufik Abdullah (Cornell), Joko Suryo (Monash), and Bambang Purwanto (SOAS), who are at least in principle amenable to the set of ideas and methods proposed by Sartono – ideas and methods recognized by the majority of Indonesian historians over the past three decades as the “holy grail.” Even so, political and militarized versions of history easily dominate the historical landscape. These have been written by military historians, “popular” historians of various ideological positions, and University of Indonesia (UI) historians. The presence of Sartono school adherents, such as Adri Lopian, in the UI Department of History makes it difficult to generalize, but the paramount influence of Nugruho Nutosusanto has given rise to the impression, especially among UGM historians, that it conspired with the New Order regime in installing and maintaining a state-sponsored historiography.

The situation in Indonesia is hardly unique. Accounts of the development of historiography in the Philippines reveal the similar problems. These accounts are mostly produced by historians from the Department of History of the University of the Philippines, the dominant department in the country. It has been easy for these writers to equate historiographical development in their own department with that of the whole country. It may be more fruitful to regard historiographical accounts that emanate from dominant history departments such as UGM and UP as projections of desire or wishes of the dominant group of historians, rather than as a reliable map of the whole historiographic terrain.

The *de facto* dominance of political and militarized history is easily attributed to the overpowering influence of New Order politics on historical discourses and should therefore not surprise us. However, what is of interest is the disjuncture between the standard account and what I will call, for lack of better

term, a “closer-to-reality” account. In the latter, the Sartono school is just one, and by no means dominant, of several identifiable streams of history writing. In perspective, the military-UI-popular historians share with the Sartono school Indonesia-centrism, and both contribute to the nation-building efforts of the state – the former as an active agent and the latter as a passive partner. Methodologically, military-UI-popular history diverges from the Sartono school in its avowed emphasis on “big man”-dominated political history and in its preference for descriptive, non-theoretical narrative. Politically, it proved amenable to regime-justification efforts of the state and was less than resistant to ideological influences, arguably making it a successor to nationalist historiography in the tradition of Muhammad Yamin. On the other hand, for its aspiration to “scientific” historical methodology, I am inclined to regard the Sartono school as adhering closer to the path suggested by Soedjatmoko. It thus represents a break, not a developmental progression as implied in the standard account, from the earlier tradition of nationalist historiography.

I should note, however, my unease with what seems a simplistic dichotomy between “scientific” and “politically-inclined” history. Some Indonesian scholars insist on a separation between the two (Adri Lopian, interview 29 October 2001; Soedjatmoko 1960), but it looks more complicated than that. Kuntowijoyo’s bitter critique is particularly relevant here. His recent “Indonesian Historiography in Search of Identity” stands out for sharp and point-blank criticism uncommon to Indonesian historians. It was controversial for castigating a whole generation of Indonesian historians for collective failure to perform their social function as scholars, that is, to be social critics. He claims that the neutral stance of the social science approach is amenable to whoever is in power: “history contributed nothing and contradicted nobody, history was safe for everybody” (Kuntowijoyo 2000, 81). It was precisely such neutrality, ostensibly owing to its adherence to “scientific” method, that made the Sartono school politically permissible and earned it a niche in the scheme of things as defined by New Order politics. Politics and “scientific” history cannot be separated. The combination of neutral political stance and claim to being scientific enabled the Sartono school to assume its position – as the dominant player, following the standard account, or as an important element, following the “closer-to-reality”

version-in the history of Indonesian historiography.

This effort to distinguish the Sartono school from other streams is meant as a foundation for understanding the on-going attempt to reform Indonesian historiography. It must be emphasized that the target of this on-going effort is primarily the Sartono school and only secondarily the whole of Indonesiasentris. The military-UI-popular history which constituted much of the Suharto-era Indonesia-centric output has already been discredited as the handmaiden of the New Order regime. It has since been deemed an inadequate, if not shameful, intellectual project by the reformist group that is the primary focus of this essay. The on-going reformation is taking the form of critical re-examination, but not outright rejection, of the Sartono school, aiming to purge it of its ties with political projects and make it truer in practice to its promises. And while there have been radical suggestions to throw the national-nationalist framework away altogether, there are clear indications that it will be retained.

### Sowing the seeds of reformation

In October 2001, I attended the 7th National History Conference held in Jakarta. It was the latest in a series of national history seminars/conferences begun in 1957. These meetings have been held infrequently – in recent decades, every five to six years – and as this was the first in the post-Suharto era, I hoped to see signs of change or new trends within the community of Indonesia's academic historians. But while expectations of major reversals in historical studies were bound to be disappointed, there were faint indications that change might be forthcoming. The Masyarakat Sejarawan Indonesia (MSI; Association of Historians of Indonesia) made a formal and categorical "declaration of independence" from the traditional grip of state influence or control. And among the more than one hundred papers delivered were two that stood out. These were written by the relatively young upstart historians Mestika Zed and Bambang Purwanto, who trained in Amsterdam (Vrije U) and London (SOAS) respectively. Their papers alone discussed the fundamental need to re-examine the nationalist framework long held sacred by nearly all Indonesian historians. Up against such a well-established tradition, it was no wonder that the issues



they raised were not enthusiastically taken up and that continuity rather than change dominated the overall atmosphere. I contend, however, that the "strategic" position occupied by the reformers (especially Purwanto) makes the faintly discernible elements of change significant as signs of things to come.

Mestika Zed's paper, "Menggugat Tirani Sejarah Nasional" (lit. To accuse tyranny of national history), is interesting not just for what it says but for how the author says it. With the great reluctance common to Indonesian historians reared in the tradition of intellectual restriction, he wants to send a message that is radical and revisionist in a manner so polite and oblique that his agonizing ambivalence is almost palpable.

More than half the paper discusses historiographical development in France and Great Britain and one could easily lose sight of Indonesia in the display of erudition. But the main idea, while painstakingly disguised, is clear enough: that the idea of a national history is tyrannical and oppressive and that by learning from the experience of western countries like France and Britain, Indonesians may be able to free themselves from such tyranny. I believe that he is the first Indonesian historian to suggest in a formal gathering the outright dismissal of Indonesiasentris as a framework for historical study. Towards the end of his paper, however, the author's ambivalent attitude is revealed when he allows himself to frame his closing words within the "national" framework. To my mind, such reluctance bespeaks the difficulty faced by Indonesian historians in opposing the tradition of nationalist historiography. In one sense, he may be the first of a new kind of Indonesian historian: one foot bravely crossing the line, the other stuck in the mud. In another sense, he personifies the identity crisis in which Indonesian historiography has been trapped for some time now. As Kuntowijoyo says, Indonesian historiography is in "search of identity."

If Mestika Zed is a reluctant reformer, Bambang Purwanto is certainly not. Based on his writings and my interviews with him, I can say that he has no qualms about rocking the deeply entrenched establishment of Indonesian historiography. He is fiercely critical of weaknesses in the writing of Indonesian history, including those committed by respected Indonesian historians such as Sartono and Lapien. Armed with understanding of recent theoretical

developments in historiography, he does not mince words in exposing and attacking trenchant problems in the conceptualization and methodology of Indonesiasentris in general and the Sartono school in particular. Many of his comments bring discomfort, even shock, to the old guard and he is therefore somewhat unpopular. On the other hand, his no-nonsense critiques blow a fresh revolutionary wind through the otherwise arid terrain of Indonesian historiography. After a long hiatus imposed by decades of intellectual repression, debate is finally back.

### Politics and methodology

Purwanto's critique focuses on a number of critical points. First is the persistence of colonial impulses, to the neglect of internal-local dynamics, in what is purported to be an Indonesia-centric methodology. Second is the common tendency to fall into anachronism in interpreting historical events, by which he means the interpretation of events out of their proper historical context and time-frame. Such anachronism, he argues, indicates failure to resist political, nationalistic impulses. Third is the disproportionate emphasis on "big men" and political factors to the neglect of other dimensions. Fourth, he seeks to explain these problems primarily in methodological terms, rather than through politics. Lastly, the solution he proposes is strict adherence to "scientific" historical methodology.

In "Kesadaran Dekonstruktif dan Historiografi Indonesiasentris" (Deconstructive consciousness and Indonesia-centric historiography) he sets out to explode the myth that the Indonesiasentris framework effectively eradicates the vestiges of colonial historiography and discourse. In many of these writings, he claims, the centrality of colonialism can be seen in an undue emphasis on the activities or roles of the colonizers and colonial government at the expense of internal, local dynamics (2001a).

Purwanto appreciates the pioneering work of Sartono in refocusing the lens of history away from "big men" and towards the life of the common people, and is cognizant of the enormous contribution the Sartono school has

made to the overall advancement of Indonesian historiography. He nevertheless complains about the failure of Sartono himself and the school in general to address certain fundamental problems. In his estimation, Sartono tends to remain stuck in anti-colonial themes when analyzing historical events, overlooking local dynamics that may in reality have played a greater role. For example, he cites the peasant rebellion in Banten in 1888 which Sartono sees as a reaction to colonial exploitation. He counters that some evidence shows economic growth being experienced in Banten by 1888, five years after the eruption of Mt. Krakatau, and that conflict between different social groups, not just colonial exploitation, must share the blame. He finds the same neglect of internal dynamics in Sartono's analysis of peasant unrest in rural Java (1984) and his seeming acceptance of the romantic notion of village life as a paragon of peace and order, to the extent that he overlooks exploitation that emanated from the feudal structure. According to Purwanto, Sartono seemed to regard things done by the VOC as exploitation and those done by local elites as part of the sacrifice one family member makes for another. In reality, he argues, exploitative acts committed by the VOC and later the colonial government were simply a continuation in a long tradition of exploitation of the common people.

Similarly, he finds that most Indonesian historians' reading of the novel *Max Havelaar* sees only Dutch exploitation and overlooks its depiction of exploitation committed by native elites and their cohorts. Purwanto even critiques studies done by followers of the Sartono school that carefully show internal dynamics. He argues that Lapien interprets the activities of pirates (1987) and Suhartono those of rural bandits (1989) within an anachronistic framework that too readily regards them not as criminal, but as anti-colonial, as part of a nationalist struggle against the colonizers. In reality, he says, not all of these pirates and bandits opposed the colonizers; some worked for them.

In "Ketika Sejarah Menjadi Sekedar Alat Legitimasi" (When history becomes just a tool for legitimacy), he shifts his gaze to a more contemporary historical event to identify a similar set of problems. This was apparently written to intervene in the recent heated debate over the proposal to declare, by law, that Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX, not Suharto, was the real initiator of the concerted

1949 attack on the Dutch position in Yogyakarta (Serangan Umum 1 Maret 1949). Arguing forcefully against the proposal, Purwanto raises questions about its undemocratic implications, its lack of firm scientific/historical basis, and its undue emphasis on the role of the elite in historical analysis. He charges that it reflects the persistence of an authoritarian political culture in post-Orde Baru Indonesia and the promotion of a single-mindedness that discourages differences of opinion. Moreover, he claims that it reveals a gross misunderstanding of history as a scientific enterprise with its own established process of truth claim and justification, a process that should never be influenced by political and legal intervention. Finally, he deplores the absence of the common people and overemphasis on leaders in historical accounts, as if things happen in a socio-economic and cultural vacuum.

The paper is noteworthy for its compelling assertion of the need to resist undue political influence in historical analysis and to observe "scientific" historical methodology. He rejects the popular demand to replace Suharto with the Sultan; rather than a product of conscientious and legitimate historical analysis, he says, it may just be a result of the *atah bukan Subarto* (so long as not Suharto) or *sejarah dendam* (history for reprisal) mentality prevalent in the post-Suharto period. According to him, the popular demand to de-Suhartoize historical accounts merely repeats the politically motivated move to de-Sukanoize history that was done decades earlier. In his view, replacing one set of myths with another is not acceptable. Historical accounts should be changed following the procedures and standards of "scientific" historical analysis.

Purwanto's almost singular emphasis on strict adherence to historical methodology is the centerpiece of his critique of Indonesian history. Unlike many other Indonesian historians who regard past authoritarian rule as the primary, if not only, reason for an inability to reconstruct history in objective manner, he believes "cultural and structural" weaknesses within the community of academic historians is more responsible. Specifically, he blames the "ignorance" of most Indonesian historians – their insufficient understanding and lack of skill in the use of scientific historical methods – for the vulnerability of historical accounts to the influence of politics. His reasoning is this: if the controlling impulses of

authoritarian regimes and the irresistibly nationalistic atmosphere of the post-revolutionary period is to blame, we should find the problems of anachronism, "big men," and neglect of local dynamics only in historical accounts written when authoritarian regimes had a stake in controlling historiographical production. Instead, these problems span almost the entire stretch of Indonesian history. Thus the primary source of the problem is methodological "ignorance" on the part of Indonesian historians, which makes them particularly vulnerable to political influence and manipulation.

Purwanto's "ignorance of methodology" thesis is a refreshing counterpoint to the common tendency simply to blame the politically restrictive and nationalistic atmosphere that has reigned during much of Indonesia's post-independence period. However, the single-mindedness with which the hypothesis is argued leaves Purwanto vulnerable to charges of reductionism and falls flat when applied to two of Indonesia's most respected historians, Sartono and Lapan, who are well regarded for their excellent theoretical grasp and practice of historical methodology. Purwanto has convincingly showed that even they are not immune to the "sin" of anachronism, which may be attributed to the itch of nationalism. That even such accomplished historians commit these errors suggests that good historical methodology is not sufficient to forestall them. We should recall that interpretation constitutes a significant part of historical analysis and is ultimately influenced by values shaped as much by the scholar's socio-economic, ideological, moral, and religious orientations as by academic training. In other words, the problems facing Indonesian historiography cannot be reduced to an inadequate grasp of methodology. The socio-economic and political atmosphere within which historians operate seems to be an important factor in the way they employ historical method.

### **New initiatives**

Having spelled out some debilitating problems with Indonesiasentris as it has been practiced and conceptualized, Purwanto has also begun to formulate possible alternatives. He is among the few Indonesian historians who show understanding and a sympathetic, albeit cautious, attitude towards the inroad

of postcolonial, poststructuralist, and postmodernist theories into the domain of historical studies. Some of the mainstays in his bibliography are Munslow's *Deconstructing History*, Jenkins' *Postmodern History Reader*, Attridge et al.'s *Post-structuralism and the Question of History*, and Berkhofer's *Beyond the Great Story*. Probably owing to his awareness of his colleagues' allergic reaction to anything "post," he has opted to use sparingly the terminologies and ideas of these theoretical projects. He is also very selective in borrowing; only ideas he finds readily useful in his effort to deconstruct Indonesian history have found a place in his writings. Nonetheless, I find this significant, not only as a foundation for Purwanto's critique, but more importantly as an indicator of the future of Indonesian historical studies. The "postic" fever that swept through the other social sciences in Indonesia since the early 1990s (Heryanto 1995) has finally infected history and we can only speculate how it will affect the discipline in general and the effort to reformulate Indonesiasentris in particular.

Another initiative can be seen in Purwanto's 2001 "Mencari Format Baru Historiografi Indonesiasentris: Sebuah Kajian Awal" (Searching for a new format of Indonesia-centric historiography: A preliminary analysis). This paper discusses the limitations of written documents as sources of historical information, laying the groundwork for his proposal to elevate oral history as a pillar of a "new" Indonesia-centric historiography. In his formulation, the use of oral sources can overcome the "tyranny of the archives" that presumably underlies the resilience of colonial discourse (through over-reliance on Dutch written documents) and "history without people" narratives characterized by over-emphasis on elites (whose acts populate those documents). The preliminary character of such a proposal, however, is highlighted by the limited range of problems it can address and its notable lack of freshness.

To further reform discussions, Purwanto initiated a series of workshops in 2001. These workshops were specifically designed to address Indonesiasentris as the established framework for writing Indonesian history. Workshop participants included historians from UGM and other universities (Universitas Negeri Yogyakarta, Universitas Sanatha Dharma), undergraduate and postgraduate students of history, and scholars from other social science disciplines

and from abroad. I attended the first workshop in May 2001, at which participants candidly grappled with the problems of Indonesiasentris and discussed the need to reformulate Indonesian historiography. Whether this meant abrogation of Indonesiasentris or merely reformation from within the tradition was a focal point of congenial but serious discussion. Tellingly, it was an anthropologist, a foreign scholar, and the younger participants who questioned the relevance of Indonesiasentris in this time of rapid globalization, but the call for reform rather than abrogation handily won the day. The need for some sort of national history was reaffirmed, not least due to the persistence of the state-to-state principle in global interaction.

Further, no question was raised about the usefulness of the multi-dimensional, social science approach pioneered by Sartono. In concurrence with Purwanto's critiques, it was the inappropriate application of this approach that was faulted. The traditional distaste for conventional, politics-centered, descriptive history was easily upheld. Instead, participants called for holistic understanding of events and their meaning to the people who experienced them. The contextual character of Indonesiantris as a perspective was affirmed, meaning that the penetrating lens of historical analysis will be adjusted depending on the nature and scope (micro, macro, local, regional, national) of an event. In other words, the group has tried to free Indonesiasentris from its usual role as promoter and definer of what is "national" and thus hopes to disentangle it from its burdensome association with the state nationalist project.

## Conclusion

Indonesian historiography is at a critical juncture. For all the problems of Purwanto's "ignorance of methodology" thesis, it may provide a glimpse into the long-term character and direction of Indonesian historiography in the post-Suharto era, especially in its recommitment to "scientific" historical method and its unconditional distrust of political agendas. While up to now, history in the post-Suharto period remains largely hostage to those with political axes to grind, I am optimistic that so long as the democratization process in Indonesia continues, scholarly and academic historiography can gain a prominent position.

This would not entail the demise of nationalist influence on history writing. The downfall of the Suharto regime has made possible the dissolution of nationalist historiography's burdensome partnership with the state's regime-justification efforts. This has lessened suspicion of the nationalist project, making possible its persistence and reinvention in accord with the changing character of the time. We are likely to see a creative partnership forged between the academic and the nationalist with strong antipathy towards patently political manipulation.

If the freer atmosphere of the post-Suharto period is sustained, we should also see a plurality of views nurtured and eventually naturalized. In historiography, this means the reform efforts now emanating largely from UGM will be joined by others seeking to shape the future. We should expect different streams of historiographical traditions, both academic and popular, to develop in parallel to one another. These may emerge from the University of Indonesia, as well as regional and Islamic universities. UI's History Department has been closely identified with the New Order regime and Islamic groups have been sidelined through much of Indonesia's history; it should be interesting and relevant to see how their historiographic re-orientations might proceed.

Seen from a broader historical perspective, the reformist ideas I have surveyed here are hardly new. One can easily hear echoes of Soedjatmoko, John Smail, and J.C. van Leur, not to mention Taufik Abdullah's earlier views (1988b). That these writers still look fresh – after figuring prominently in the historical discourse of other countries in Southeast Asia for decades – is a stark reminder of how little Indonesian historiography has moved in the intervening years. To transcend them, while raising the benchmark of historiographic scholarship, is the immediate and urgent task waiting to be accomplished.

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## Menuju Penemuan Kembali Penulisan Sejarah Nasionalis Indonesia

*Rommel Curaming*

Suasana yang relatif bebas dari manipulasi politik tampaknya penting untuk perkembangan yang sehat bagi sebagian besar pekerjaan ilmiah, khususnya terhadap situasi yang rentan terhadap manipulasi penulisan sejarah. Dengan rejim Suharto dan segala keterbatasan politik masa lampau, kinilah saatnya bertanya perbedaan yang dibawa oleh kejatuhannya terhadap penulisan sejarah seperti yang dipraktikkan di Indonesia.

Seperti kebanyakan perkembangan yang terjadi pada masyarakat pasca kolonial, penulisan sejarah Indonesia tidak diragukan lagi sangatlah nasionalistik. Dikenal sebagai Indonesiasentris, penulisan sejarah nasionalis merujuk kepada keseluruhan upaya tersebut dengan tujuan utama dan/atau capaian akhirnya, disengaja atau tidak, adalah penerimaan dan pengesahan atas keberadaan Indonesia sebagai bangsa-negara. Pusat proyek ini adalah menciptakan, memelihara, dan mempromosikan identitas nasional yang dinilai cocok untuk entitas tersebut.

Tulisan ini mencoba untuk menganalisa dan menunjukkan tanda-tanda jelas atas perubahan penulisan sejarah yang nasionalistik. Situasi cukup bebas pada masa pasca Suharto memberikan keadaan yang memungkinkan tidak hanya untuk mempertanyakan versi masa lampau sejarah Indonesia tetapi juga menguji kerangka yang sudah lama mapan dimana tempat penulisan ulang bisa dilakukan. Saya mengatakan bahwa sejenis perubahan adalah menggabung-gabungkan dan dikerjakan dengan cepat, di antaranya, oleh keinginan untuk membersihkan upaya penulisan sejarah dari kedekatannya dengan Orde Baru. Pendukung perubahan membuang kebiasaan lama, berpusat pada politik, sejarah deskriptif, menggugat keabsahan pendekatan ilmu sosial yang dirintis oleh Sartono, dan, walau agak ragu, mempertanyakan pentingnya penulisan sejarah yang

Indonesiasentris. Sedikitnya, mereka mencoba untuk membebaskan Indonesiasentris dari perannya sebagai pendukung dan pembuat definisi apa yang disebut “nasional” dan berharap agar mampu memisahkan penulisan sejarah dari hambatan yang berkaitan dengan proyek nasionalis-negara. Karena perubahan masih pada tahap masa awal, saya berusaha mengerti karakter yang muncul dan berspekulasi mengenai arah yang akan dilewatinya, berdasarkan terbitan baru dan karangan yang tidak diterbitkan, satu seri kerja ilmiah yang diadakan di Universitas Gadjah Mada (UGM), dan melakukan wawancara dengan beberapa sejarawan Indonesia yang mendukung perubahan.

Translated by Wahyu Prasetyawan

## Tungo sa Reimbensyon ng Pambansang Historiograpiyang Indones

Rommel Curaming

Ang isang kalagayang relatibong malaya sa manipulasyong pulitikal ay masasabing kinakailangan para sa pag-unlad ng karamihan sa mga proyektong akademiko, laluna sa isang larangang napakadaling pasukin ng manipulasyon tulad ng pagsusulat ng kasaysayan. Sa wakas ng paghahari ng rehimeng Suharto at ang mga nakaraang restriksiyong pulitikal nito, napapanahon na upang tanungin kung ano ang mga pagbabagong idinulot ng pagwawakas ng mga ito sa pag-unlad ng historiograpiyang Indones sa Indonesia.

Tulad ng karamihan sa mga historiograpiya na umunlad sa mga lipunang post-kolonyal, ang sa Indonesia ay hayagan at lubos na nasyonalista. Binansagang *Indonesiasentris*, ang nasyonalistang historiograpiya ay tumutukoy sa buong chersisyo ng pagsusulat ng kasaysayan na ang pangunahing layunin at/o nilalayong resulta, sinasadya man o hindi, ay ang pagkilala at pagtanggol sa lehitimong katayuan ng Indonesia bilang bansa-estado. Nasa puso ng proyektong ito ay ang pagsisikap na lumikha, magmentina, at magpalawig ng isang pambansang identidad na nakikitang nararapat dito.

Tinatangka sa papel na ito na kilalanin at tukuyin ang mga nakikitang tanda ng reporma makabayang historiograpiya sa Indonesia. Ang mas malayang kalagayan sa panahong post-Suharto ay lumilitaw na nakatutulong hindi lamang sa paghahamon sa mga mas lumang bersyon ng kasaysayang Indones kundi sa pagsusuri na rin sa matagal nang naitatag na balangkas kung saan maaaring maisagawa ang muling pagsusulat o "re-writing." Ihinaharap ko na mayroong nabubuong reporma na itinutulak, kabilang ng iba pang mga bagay, ng pangangailangang wakasan sa gawain ng pagsusulat ng kasaysayan ang mahigpit na ugnayan nito sa *New Order*. Isinasantabi ng mga repormista ang kumbensiyonal, nakasentro

sa pulitika, at mapaglarawang kasaysayan, at itinataguyod ang katwiran ng agham panlipunang lapit dito na pinangunahan ni Sartono, at mula rito ay tumutuloy, bagamat dahan-dahan, sa pagkukuwestyon mismo sa pangangailangan para sa *Indonesiasentris* sa pagsusulat ng kasaysayan. Anu't anuman, sinisikap nilang palayain ang *Indonesiasentris* mula sa karaniwang papel nito bilang tagapagtaguyod at tagapagtakda sa kung ano ang "pambansa" at, sa pamamagitan nito, ay ihiwalay ang pagsusulat ng kasaysayan sa mahigpit na pagkakatali sa proyektong estado-nasyonalista. Sapagkat ang repormang ito ay nagsisimula pa lamang, sinisikap kong bigyang linaw ang lumilitaw nitong katangian at magsapantaha sa direksyong maaari nitong tunguhin, batay sa mga kalalathala at hindi pa nalalathalang papel, isang serye ng mga palihan na inilunsad sa Universitas Gadjah Mada (UGM), at mga panayam sa ilang mga repormistang istoryador na Indones.

Translated by Sofia Guillermo



## 国民主義者によるインドネシア史「改革」

ロンメル・クラミン(Rommel Curaming)

政治的操作からの相対的自由は多くの学問上のプロジェクトが健全に発展するための必要条件である。それはとりわけ、操作されることで多大の影響をうける歴史の記述に当てはまる。スハルト体制が崩壊しその下で行われていた多くの政治的制約が過去のものとなった今、インドネシアで現に行われているようなインドネシア史記述の発展に、スハルト体制の崩壊がどのような意義をもつのか、問うべき時だろう。

かつて植民地であった多くのところで発展した歴史記述と同様、インドネシアの歴史記述もきわめてはっきりと、かつ強烈に国民主義的なものであった。インドネシア中心主義(Indonesiasentris)として知られている、ナショナリストによる歴史編纂が主張するのは次のようなことである。それは、歴史を書くという行為全体の主要な目的と(もしくは)その最終的な成果は、意図したものであれそうでないものであれ、国民国家としてインドネシアが合法的に存在することを承認し、正当化するものであるということだ。このプロジェクトの中心にあるのは、そのような実在(インドネシア)に一致すると思われる国民的アイデンティティを創出し、維持し、促進しようとすることである。

この論文はインドネシアの国民主義者による歴史編纂の中で見られる明白な改革への兆候を確認し、そこに焦点を絞って記述しようとする。ポスト・スハルト時代のより自由な雰囲気なかで、昔からのインドネシア史記述をみなおし、長い間、そういうものとして受け入れられてきた枠組み、そしてその中で歴史の書き直しが行われるであろう枠組みを再検証することができるようになってきている。私のみるところ、そこでの要点は、改革の中でこれまで新秩序と密接な関係をもっていた歴史記述がバネージされつつあることにある。改革主義者は従来の政治中心の叙史的歴史を捨て、サルトノ(Sartono)によって切り開かれた社会科学の手法の妥当性を支持し、いくぶんためらいながらも、歴史記述全般においてインドネシア中心主義が必要かどうかを問う段階へと移りつつある。改革主義者はインドネシア中心主義を、「国民的」なものを促進し定義するという従来の役割から解放し、そしてこのようにして歴史記述を、国家・国民のプロジェクトの重荷から解放しようとしている。改革は未だ初期段階にある。そのため、最近出版された論文、あるいはいまから出版される論文、ガジャマダ大学(UGM)で開かれた一連のワークショップ、そして改革主義を奉ずるインドネシアの歴史家数人へのインタビューをもとに、私はいまおこりつつある改革の特徴を理解し、それが向かうであろう方向を推測しようとした。 Translated by Onimaru Takeshi (鬼丸武士)

## สู่การสร้างงานเขียนประวัติศาสตร์อินโดนีเซีย แนวชาตินิยมรุ่นใหม่

Rommel Curaming (รวมเมต คุรามิง)

บรรยากาศที่ปลอดจากการควบคุมและแทรกแซงทางการเมือง ดูจะจำเป็นต่อการเจริญเติบโตของงานวิชาการส่วนใหญ่ โดยเฉพาะงานทางประวัติศาสตร์ที่ง่ายต่อการถูกควบคุมและแทรกแซงทางการเมืองอย่างยิ่ง เมื่อพิจารณาจากข้อเท็จจริงที่ว่า การปกครองยุคซูฮาร์โต และการจำกัดเสรีภาพทางการเมืองในยุคนั้นได้กลายเป็นอดีตไปแล้ว ก็ถึงเวลาที่จะต้องตั้งคำถามว่าการล่มสลายของการปกครองยุคซูฮาร์โตก่อให้เกิดความเปลี่ยนแปลงอะไรบ้าง ต่อพัฒนาการของงานเขียนประวัติศาสตร์อินโดนีเซียในประเทศอินโดนีเซียเอง

เช่นเดียวกับงานเขียนประวัติศาสตร์ส่วนใหญ่ในยุคหลังอาณานิคม ประวัติศาสตร์อินโดนีเซียมีลักษณะชาตินิยมอย่างเข้มข้นและโจ่งแจ้ง งานเขียนประวัติศาสตร์แนวชาตินิยมที่รู้จักกันในชื่อว่า อินโดนีเซียเซ็นทริส หมายถึงงานเขียนประวัติศาสตร์ที่จะโดยตั้งใจหรือไม่ก็ตาม มีเป้าหมายหลักและ/หรือผลลัพธ์สุดท้าย ที่เป็นการประจักษ์ถึงและให้เหตุผลสนับสนุนว่า อินโดนีเซียเป็นรัฐชาติที่มีสถานภาพอันชอบธรรม ทั้งนี้งานทางประวัติศาสตร์เหล่านี้มีพื้นฐานแนวคิดที่สำคัญ คือ ความพยายามที่จะสร้าง ช่างรักษาไว้ และส่งเสริมอัตลักษณ์ของชาติ ที่เชื่อว่าเหมาะสมกับความเป็นรัฐชาติแห่งอินโดนีเซีย

บทความนี้พยายามระบุและชี้ให้เห็นร่องรอยการปฏิรูปการเขียนประวัติศาสตร์อินโดนีเซียแนวชาตินิยม บรรยากาศที่มีเสรีภาพมากขึ้นในยุคหลังซูฮาร์โตไม่เพียงเอื้อให้เกิดการทำหายงานเขียนประวัติศาสตร์อินโดนีเซียรุ่นเก่าเท่านั้น แต่ยังนำไปสู่การทบทวนกรอบความคิดที่มีมานาน ซึ่งยังอาจดำรงอิทธิพลต่อการเขียนประวัติศาสตร์รุ่นใหม่ต่อไป ข้าพเจ้าเห็นว่า การปฏิรูปกำลังก่อ

ตัวขึ้น โดยถูกกระตุ้นจากความจำเป็นที่จะต้องกำจัดข่าระล้างความสัมพันธ์ที่  
ใกล้ชิดที่เคยมีอยู่ระหว่าง “วงการศึกษาระดับอุดมศึกษา” กับ “ระเบียบใหม่”  
กลุ่มนักปฏิรูปปฏิเสชประวัติศาสตร์แบบแผนแนวพรรณานาความที่มุ่งเน้น  
กิจกรรมทางการเมืองเป็นหลัก แต่เชิดชูสนับสนุนงานเขียนประวัติศาสตร์ใน  
แนวสังคมนิยมที่ซาร์โตโนเป็นผู้บุกเบิกขึ้น อีกทั้งยังตั้งคำถามเชิงท้าทาย (ที่แม้  
ว่าจะยังไม่หนักแน่นจริงจังเท่าไรนัก) ต่อความจำเป็นที่ต้องยืนยันในหลักคิด  
อินโดนีเซียเซ็นทริส ในการเขียนประวัติศาสตร์ แต่อย่างน้อยที่สุด กลุ่มปฏิรูป  
ต้องการแสวงหาทางปลดปล่อย อินโดนีเซียเซ็นทริส ออกจากบทบาทเดิมที่ส่งเสริม  
และกำหนดความหมายของสิ่งที่เรียกได้ว่า “แห่งชาติ” กล่าวอีกนัยหนึ่ง  
ก็คือความต้องการแยกการเขียนประวัติศาสตร์ออกจากความผูกพันที่เคยมีอยู่  
กับนโยบายชาตินิยมโดยรัฐ โดยที่การปฏิรูปที่กล่าวมานี้ยังอยู่ในขั้นเริ่มต้น ข้าพ  
เจ้าจึงได้แต่เพียงทำความเข้าใจกับลักษณะของการปฏิรูปที่ก่อตัวขึ้น และคาด  
การณ์ถึงทิศทางของการเปลี่ยนแปลงที่อาจจะเกิดขึ้นในอนาคต โดยอาศัยการศึกษา  
บทความ ทั้งที่ตีพิมพ์เผยแพร่แล้ว และยังไม่ได้รับการตีพิมพ์ ตลอดจนจาก  
การประชุมที่จัดขึ้นที่มหาวิทยาลัยกัตจาห์มาดา (ยูจีเอ็ม) และบทสัมภาษณ์นัก  
ประวัติศาสตร์อินโดนีเซียกลุ่มปฏิรูปบางคน

Translated by Darin Pradittatsanee with assistance  
from Somporn Puttaphakporn and Chalong Soontravanich

## Making Sense of Malaysia

Donna J. Amoroso

Cheah Boon Kheng

*Malaysia: The Making of a Nation*

Singapore / ISEAS / 2002

<<http://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg/>>

Farish A. Noor

*The Other Malaysia: Writings on Malaysia's Subaltern History*

Kuala Lumpur / Silverfishbooks / 2002

<<http://www.silverfishbooks.com>>

Two recently published and very different books by Malaysian academics preview what may become a season of assessments of the "nation-state" enterprise. The fifty-year anniversary of Malaysia's independence, four years hence, will likely stimulate the commemorative and interpretive impulse of historians. New accounts of the pivotal late colonial period have appeared, based on newly available sources (Harper 1999; Kratoska 1998) and exploring popular memory (Lim and Wong 2000). Historians are also beginning to shift their attention from the "origins" and "making" to the history and socio-political landscape of the nation-state itself. Regional collaborations within the expanding membership of ASEAN and with its East Asian neighbors play a role as well. Cheah Boon Kheng's *Malaysia: The Making of a Nation* is the first of a "history of nation-building" series resulting from workshops led by historian Wang Gungwu. Cheah, retired professor of history at Universiti Sains Malaysia and prominent scholar of Malaysian social and political history, has lived through the process of which he gives a very dispassionate account. (Volumes on the other original members of ASEAN are being written by Taufik Abdullah, Charnvit Kasetsiri, Reynaldo Ileto, and Edwin Lee.)

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Malaysia's recent past also encourages reflection about the foundations, definition, and resilience of the nation-state. The 1997 economic crisis, 1998 dismissal and subsequent trial of Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, dramatic erosion of legitimacy of the long-ruling United Malays National Organization (UMNO), and rise of an Islamist challenge to the secular, developmentalist state have coincided with and stimulated the growth of new public media (Khoo 2002). Farish A. Noor's *The Other Malaysia: Writings on Malaysia's Subaltern History* is a collection of essays written in the midst of these developments for the news website *Malaysiakini.com*. Not only is this a new kind of writing, but one that has found a public through the availability of new and independent venues on the internet. Farish is a political scientist and human rights activist who has emerged as both a "liberal Muslim" and critic of the "demonization of Islam." Writing about politics in several publications, he took advantage of "a state of radical dislocation" to focus these essays on "the reactivation of the memory of the past and to bring to light aspects of Malaysia's marginalized and subaltern histories and narratives that had been buried for so long" (v).

At this juncture, too, some of those marginalized voices are being recorded in individual, national, and regional "political memories" projects. The memoir of journalist and 17-year political detainee Said Zahari was published in Malay, Chinese, and English in 2001. (See FEATURES in this issue.) The memoir of the late Khatijah Sidek, who challenged the patriarchy of Malay nationalism in the 1940s and 1950s, appeared in Malay in 1995 and English in 2001. The stories of these and others – especially those who were detained without trial, who were exiled, and whose participation in public life was cut short – are currently being recovered to challenge conventional truths of national history (Tan and Jomo 2001; Zakiah 2000).

Such productive "dislocation" in the national narrative allows us to read the two books under review as a glimpse into an emerging "history of Malaysia." The authors are of different generations-in age, experience, and intellectual proclivity – and their discursive strategies reflect it. Although both professional academics, they seek somewhat different audiences and draw different parameters around their subject. Yet in taking their measure of the nation-state both books

display and engage the powerful socio-political discourse that has constructed "Malaysia" through state practice and academic writing.

### Contests for Malaya

With its strict focus on electoral politics, national policy, and the administrations of the country's four prime ministers, Cheah Boon Kheng's *Malaysia* offers an explanation of how the nation has evolved in practice. He begins by asking *who*: "Who would inherit power from the British? Who would receive independence?" Very pertinent questions indeed, and the way they are asked and answered reveals paradigms that originated in colonial rule and have been naturalized in the first half-century of Malaysia's life as an nation. Among these are communalism as the organizing principle of the nation-state, elite-centered narratives of the nation, and other fundamental continuities from the colonial era.

Cheah locates Malaysia's primary cleavage in the ongoing tension between Malay ethno-nationalism and a broader Malaysian nationalism, between *ketuanan Melayu* (Malay dominance) and communal power-sharing. He finds a pragmatic "give and take" that never resolves what are seen as inherent tensions, but that allows the enterprise to keep moving forward. While this might seem self-evident in even a semi-democratic parliamentary system, "give and take" is also a political position condemned by "exclusivist" Malay nationalists, so-called "ultras" who want to see the full realization of a "Malay nation." Cheah's main argument is that each of the country's prime ministers "started off... as an exclusivist Malay nationalist but ended up as an inclusivist Malaysian nationalist" (236). Each of these men was concurrently president of UMNO, the dominant Malay political party. The two roles have different imperatives: the president of UMNO must attend to communal interests, while the prime minister of Malaysia must look after the whole, leading to that balancing of interests so deplored by exclusivists. That this has happened four times in the nation's history suggests that the nation-state has developed its own logic, an imperative that makes everyone unhappy, but keeps everyone unhappy together.

A strong internal frame of reference structures Cheah's account. His

narrative begins in the postwar, pre-independence period of 1945-57, which established the constitutional, political, social, and economic form of the nation-state. It is followed by a chapter taking the argument through independent Malaya/Malaysia (1957-2001) and individual chapters on the administrations of the four prime ministers. Essentially a biography of the nation-state as self-made man, the childhood (1945-57) is that of an orphan. There are no references to structural or cultural predecessors, no "family history" to speak of. This is especially striking with respect to the components of the nation-state: "the Malays," "the Chinese," and "the Indians" appear on these pages without histories, fully-formed "communities" with self-evident interests to be advanced against each other. This will have implications for how the life of the nation is understood.

With knowledge of who the contestants are understood to be, we can return to the question, "who would receive independence?" The immediate post-war years were crucial, and Cheah argues that the Malays were cognizant of and engaged in the struggle to be born as a nation-state unencumbered initially by competition from the other communities. The postwar British plan to "impose direct rule" and replace the various legally sovereign sultanates and crown colonies with a Malayan Union providing equal citizenship to Malays and non-Malays was met solely by a "resurgent Malay nationalism." Under conservative aristocratic leadership, the Malay community successfully mounted a broad-based and vigorous rejection of the plan, while the peninsula's non-Malay residents, mostly immigrants and descendants of immigrants from southern China and the Indian subcontinent, responded with indifference. This ensured that negotiations to devise a successor state would take place almost entirely between British authorities and Malay representatives. Thus from 1946, "Malays [could] set the pace and agenda for the creation of a new 'Malay' nation-state" (2). Yet the leadership quickly retreated from its victory against equal citizenship to a position of pragmatic compromise in order to move toward self-government and independence. Cheah sees in the 1948 Federation of Malaya agreement "a major shift towards an *inclusionary* multi-ethnic nationalist perspective" on the part of an "enlightened leadership" (20).

This argument lends new insight to the familiar analytical framework of the "bargain," one of several terms that have long been used to describe the

arrangement that enshrines Malay political primacy in exchange for common citizenship, economic rights, and tolerance of non-Malay cultural and religious practices. Cheah goes on to examine competing ethno-nationalisms in the context of this bargain from independence to the present. He shows how, from the beginning, the prime minister has held the power to decide what concessions to make to the Chinese, whose most zealous articulators of the community's cultural interests, the "chauvinists," are always trumped by the enduring threat of extremist Malay violence (as in 1969) that enforces the bargain.

This argument has explanatory power, but also functions as a closed analytical system, limiting "nation building" to the political and defining the political solely in communal terms. In scholarship, as in life, the meta-discourse of communalism in Malaysia determines what questions can be asked (Mandal 2003). Was there really no contest for Malaya in 1945-46? Both communism and Malay anti-"feudalism" (a term explored below) represent long-running critiques of the colonial/national state that were at their strongest in the immediate postwar period, as Cheah's previous work has discussed (Cheah 1983; 1988). It is likewise clear from this account, as it was at the time, that the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) was fighting for independence-at the Baling talks in 1955, future first prime minister Tunku Abdul Rahman "challenged the arguments of the communists that they alone were fighting for nationalism and freedom from British imperialism. The Tunku argued that the Alliance was also doing the same" (31). CPM leader Chin Peng's offer to lay down arms in fact helped UMNO win "early" independence from Britain (i.e., before the armed insurgency had been militarily defeated). Further, Cheah points out that the communist party was not a "Chinese movement," despite its predominantly ethnic Chinese membership, because the CPM was in *ideological* opposition to the colonial government and its supporters, including other Chinese. But after 1957, the CPM figures in this account mainly in relation to communal balancing: "The communists' armed revolt was a constant reminder that dissatisfied non-Malays, particularly the Chinese, could run to the jungles to swell the ranks of the communist rebels and fight for social justice if the Alliance Government was seen to act unjustly towards Chinese and non-Malay rights" (80). And ultimately, the communist challenge is seen here as the means by which "the national government would justify the continuation of the draconian colonial Emergency



laws which infringed fundamental human rights" and because of which "freedom was not fully nurtured" (33).

Yet even in the absence of an armed communist movement, we cannot seriously doubt that the national government would have retained these laws. (The formal end of the CPM's struggle in 1989 did not result in their repeal. At present, more than eighty people are being held under the Internal Security Act without charges and beyond the reach of habeas corpus.) Apart from the regional grip of the Cold War which legitimized the repression of the non-militant left, certain socio-political fault lines presented fundamental, though less publicized, threats to the state as constituted and the nation as imagined by that state. One was manifest in the explosion of popular anger against the Malay rulers' initial acquiescence in the Malayan Union plan. The "taming" of the Malay royalty by Dato' Onn bin Jaafar, first president of UMNO, during the 1946 anti-Union, pro-Malay sovereignty campaign is cited here as "the best example of the full flowering of Malay nationalism." Cheah feels the aristocrat Onn "best exemplified these aspirations of the Malay struggle, when he coined the cry, 'Hidup Melayu!' (Long Live the Malays) ... instead of 'Hidup Raja-raja Melayu!' (Long Live the Rajas)" (17). Onn's was a skillful maneuver in which long-mounting, repressed public anger against complicit and ineffectual leadership – both royal and aristocratic – was boldly channeled against the rulers in order to mobilize and modernize Malay politics within the party framework necessary to gain independence. But once the British government had agreed to negotiations that would lead to the Federation of Malaya, further democratic pressure threatened only aristocratic control of the nationalist movement. Onn then just as adeptly tamped down popular Malay participation in politics, a policy subsequently institutionalized by UMNO-led governments (Amoroso 1998). Emergency legislation soon drafted to contain communism had a chilling effect on all dissent, and not for the last time.

### **Communalism enshrined**

As indicated here, several political contests led to the independence of Malaya and the later formation of Malaysia. As these contests were interconnected through ethno-nationalist perception and mobilization, perhaps the most basic

was the effort to uphold communalism as the organizing principle of politics and society. This is apparent in the debates surrounding the question of “Malayan” nationality that the British hoped to foster through the Malayan Union. Cheah quotes Tunku Abdul Rahman’s famous 1951 jibe, “who are these ‘Malayans?’” to introduce a useful recapitulation of the term’s history (5-15), which I will summarize even more briefly here. Perceived in opposition to *Melayu* (Malay), which provided the root for *Persekutuan Tanah Melayu* (Federation of Malaya, lit. federation of Malay lands), “Malayan” functioned as a rival root word, symbolizing the Union’s erasure of Malay sovereignty and elevation of non-Malays at Malay expense. This was largely agreed on by all sectors of Malay opinion. The radical nationalist and future PAS leader Dr. Burhanuddin Al-Helmy saw “Malayan” as a “colonial mold” that was narrower than, and destructive of, “Melayu.” On the conservative side, the Tunku always made a distinction between *bangsa Melayu* (Malay race or nation) as the nationality at the core of the Federation, and citizenship in that Federation. For this reason, as early as 1956, UMNO favored “Malaysia” as an inclusive yet Malay-centered name for the nation-state.

These words allow us to gain some understanding of the ongoing process of identity formation and the persistence of communalism. Cheah indicates the lack of a common political discourse between the Malay and English languages: Malay leaders might have used “Malayan” in addressing mixed audiences in English to describe “the country’s way of life and culture inclusive of both Malays and non-Malays” – this is, in fact, how non-Malays themselves used it – but:

“when speaking to only Malay audiences, the Malay leaders would use the Malay terms for the country, ‘Persekutuan Tanah Melayu.’ They would also use the term ‘*bangsa*’ which means both ‘nation’ and ‘race’. Delivered to Malay audiences, it would literally mean *bangsa Melayu*, the Malay race” (8).

“Malayan” was a slippery word then, having positive, inclusive connotations when used in English conversation, but evoking exclusion and destruction in a Malay-language context. In contrast, *bangsa* seems to be a sticky word and *bangsa Melayu* stickier still, agglomerating meanings that should have

been distinguished, but for the fact that UMNO thrived by keeping them stuck together. *Bangsa* triumphed over the Malayan Union in the guise of “race” – the Malay lands belong to the Malay race – and once UMNO had established itself and the Federation on this point, *bangsa Melayu* acquired the status of core “nation” of the emergent nation-state. This nation-state had a negotiated and gradually more inclusive citizenship, but in Malay discourse, citizenship was distinct from and secondary to nationality, which was based on a putatively primordial and native “race,” rather than on a commonly-held political identity or values vested in the modern nation-state (which do not preclude separately-held ethnic identities). This was a precarious basis for a nation-state that eventually featured full citizenship for its non-Malay members. The notion was challenged conceptually as well when Malaya expanded to include Sabah and Sarawak. These places had their own natives, but they were not Malay. Hence the importance of the ur-native category, *bumiputera* (sons of the soil). By that time it was too late for *bangsa* to expand its own sense as “nation,” as became apparent in 1991, when Prime Minister Mahathir introduced his vision of *Bangsa Malaysia*, leaving his Malay constituents underwhelmed and uneasy.

Actually, it was *Melayu* that had a chance of acquiring an expansive meaning, not as a *bangsa* but as a “nationality.” In 1948 a coalition of Malay and non-Malay oppositional parties presented the “People’s Constitutional Proposals” as an alternative to the communally-based polity negotiated by the government, UMNO, and the Malay rulers. Cheah writes that the Malay PUTERA with “its coalition partner AMCJA represented the first inter-racial alliance of any consequence in this post-war period” (20). But this left-leaning alliance had a different purpose – to explore the process, not of balancing communal interests, but of creating a new political community in a place with strong historical and cultural identity that had been reshaped and populated by colonial rule. Their constitutional proposals, characterized by democratic features and immediate self-government, included a “*Melayu* nationality” to be voluntarily acquired and equated with citizenship, Malay as the national language, and Malay rulers as constitutional sovereigns. This was an ambitious proposal that would have required careful nurturing – Malays along with Chinese and Indians would have to trust a new nationality not to destroy their existing *bangsa* – but it was immediately dismissed by the government and UMNO. And the first attempt

by a mainstream politician to move in this direction proved the danger of straying too openly from communalism. Dato' Onn, after proposing to open up UMNO membership to non-Malays, had to leave the party he founded; his new non-communal Independence of Malaya Party lost early elections to the UMNO-led Alliance with the Malayan Chinese Association. The lesson learned, as Cheah sums it up: "The various communities seemed to prefer communal representation to look after their own communal interests" (28).

Despite his focus on electoral politics, election results, and political parties, Cheah does not allow his narrative to be overwhelmed by details. The historian's long view shows how Malaysian politics has been ordered by Malay dominance within communalism, and his tight focus includes an integrated treatment of Sabah and Sarawak's incorporation into the social contract through their leaders' interactions with UMNO. Such communal ordering, of course, displaces the bloody fighting to internal arenas as groups struggle to articulate unified communal interests. This is the stuff of Malay politics and the crux of the dynamic Cheah explores in depth, such as factionalism within UMNO and rivalry between UMNO and the Islamic party PAS. But except for a few hints – as during the short-lived merger with Singapore, when the Tunku branded Malays there "traitors" for failing to elect UMNO candidates in the 1963 elections (100) – there is little attention to the process of creating and maintaining the borders of ethno-political identity. This account takes ethnic categories for granted, and by so doing, privileges the communal framework.

Cheah Boon Kheng's linear narrative, focused on the balancing of tensions, asserts the existence of a multicultural, tolerant Malaysia, one in which *ketuanan Melayu* is here to stay but contained by the political logic of the nation-state. Farish A. Noor subjects that view of Malaysia and its paradigmatic underpinnings to cultural and historical interrogation. Although he acknowledges the nation's success in achieving stability, he deplors its failure, which few would dispute, to create "a truly inclusive and all-encompassing national political arena and public space" (165), a logical outcome of the naturalization of communalism in the history and historiography of the nation. Farish seeks to deconstruct that historical narrative – along with its aura of inevitability – through three interconnected strategies. First, he recovers "forgotten aspects"

of the past "that have been relegated to the margins or footnotes of political history" in order to remind his readers of historical contingency and affirm "the potential for change that remains with us still" (2). Second, he restores ideological motivation to the narrative, showing how and why certain erasures occurred and offering an alternative vocabulary to discuss Malaysian politics. Third, he examines the crippling consequences of a "flat and static historical narrative premised upon ... simple essentialist notions of identity and difference" (vi).

### Lineages of leadership

In these essays, Farish systematically recovers past alternatives to present realities. He does this to counterbalance current trends in public morality ("Porn and the Sheik") and student quietism ("Fine Young Calibans: Remembering the Kesatuan Melayu Muda [Malay Youth Union]") and to complicate simplistic notions of the past ("How the Penghulu Shaitan [Chief of the Devils] Brought Islam to the Malay World"). He also draws attention to patterns in Malaysian history ("'Holy Terror' All Over Again?") and to colonial and pre-colonial precedents ("Sultan Iskandar Dzulkarnain's *Mega-projek*' [Mega-project]"). He reaches into the past most often, however, to illuminate exemplary leaders or discredit those whose failures seem prescient. The overpriced tower built by Sultan Iskandar Dzulkarnain against the advice of his ministers, for instance, wittily reminds us of "the lack of accountability and transparency ... in the feudal courts of the past" (13).

A bigger target is Sultan Idrus Shah of Perak, who was elevated to the throne in 1887, after Britain's violent early years of rule in that state. He is perhaps best remembered today for the eponymous school that produced the first generation of secular Malay nationalists, the Sultan Idrus Training College (SITC). His reputation as a progressive leader was cultivated during the long years of his reign that saw the development of tin mining in his state, the profits and control of which moved from Malay to Chinese and hence to British hands. He is also known for voicing protest against Kuala Lumpur's overweening administrative centralization, but he did not change his accommodating stance toward the colonial regime. Sultan Idrus, in short, can serve either a colonialist or nationalist reading of history. In 1913 he was awarded

the Knight Grand Cross of the Victorian Order, an occasion recounted here to highlight the Malay inertia that lay at the center of the colonial order. Farish explains how the investiture “*incorporated the native while disabling him... by reducing him to the status of passive recipient*” of an award “he could neither match nor resist” (17-18).

In contrast to the *Anglophile* Sultan Idrus stands the *Anglicized* Sultan Abu Bakar of Johor, who was certainly not accommodating to the British and who managed to keep his state out of the colonial grasp for many years. Farish shows how his choices were historically determined by the relentless critique of “Oriental despotism” issuing from Singapore and the construction of racialized economies and administrations around him. But Abu Bakar, who mixed English habits with Muslim observances, outmaneuvered his opponents for quite some time by keeping on the move in ways both “discursive” and “geographical.” Refusing to “stay put” within the “epistemic and socio-political boundaries” of the colonial order of knowledge and power, he took his game to the enemy, hiring advisors in London, traveling to foreign capitals, and bolstering his international status as a sovereign ruler. At home, he effected the administrative and economic reforms the colonial power would itself have carried out, including bringing Chinese immigrants into his kingdom and its economy (as did King Chulalongkorn in Thailand). This tale of Malay ability and resistance to colonial power is not uncritical, however; Farish notes that the Sultan never altered his autocratic style, a foreshadowing of authoritarianism to come (“The Sultan Who Could Not Stay Put,” 33-55).

More recent historical figures fill some awkward silences in official Malaysian history which, following colonial precedent, begins with the birth of UMNO in 1946. But Malaya, with its massive immigration and crucial commodity exports, surely existed in the same colonial world as, say, Indonesia or Vietnam. Although the numbers of those experiencing the wrenching changes of modernization and urbanization were smaller, they did indeed exist. Ibrahim Yaacob was a student at the SITC in the late 1920s, one of many Malay-speaking newcomers to the colonial capital in the 1930s (“freed from the shackles of court and tradition of the *Kerajaans* and in an environment where they, too, were foreigners”), a journalist, and a founder of the Kesatuan Melayu Muda in 1938.

His was the crucial generation of Malay radicals who proved the failure of the colonial "strategy of containment and policing" through education (80). They went on to articulate both the anti-colonialism and the social critique of their own society that would be necessary for nationalism to take root. Working with the Japanese during the war, Ibrahim and his colleagues tried to pursue independence in conjunction with Indonesia. Although Farish allows this effort to seem closer to realization than it was, more important is his observation that "it was the radical Leftists and nationalists who... introduced the politics of nationalism and anti-Colonialism into the country." Exiled in Indonesia, Ibrahim, like others who did the intellectual work of imagining an independent Malaya, was relegated to the footnotes by the conservative intellectuals and aristocrats who usurped the nationalist movement ("Ibrahim Yaacob and the Rise of the Malay Left," 75-110). The lesson for today: there was "a time when Malaysian youth were able and willing to question the circumstances around them even when it seemed as if all hope was lost" (69).

Farish's "other" Malaysia contains much besides political history – literature, art, and religion in particular – but undeniably makes many of its political points through stories of leadership. To this extent it intersects with Cheah Boon Kheng's Malaysia, in which the nation progresses through the characters and careers of prime ministers Tunku Abdul Rahman, Tun Abdul Razak, Hussein Onn, and Mahathir Mohamad. In leader-centered historiography, individual lives become prisms through which the nation – its successes, failures, possibilities, disappointments – is viewed. What accounts for such leader-centeredness in Malaysia's political life and historiography and what are the consequences?

As colonial Malaya filled up with immigrants (not just from China and India, but from other parts of the Nusantara), today's "Chinese," "Indian," and "Malay" communities were constructed and naturalized through census, economic recruitment and restriction, land tenure, and cultural elaboration. Sociopolitically, the British "kept the different ethnic groupings isolated along vertical cleavages of group-loyalty, while maintaining their patron-client bonds with each ethnic grouping in turn" (Farish: 22). The defense of this social structure in the transition to independence – and its subsequent strengthening by the New

Economic Policy of the 1970s and 1980s (Cheah: 144) – reinforced the vertical orientation within each group and empowered “enlightened” leaders who could balance the communally-channeled anger fomented by “ultras” or “chauvinists” with the compromise necessary to achieve viable citizenship, language, and educational policies.

There is no doubt that Malaysian politics has been dominated by the personality and power of such leaders, especially by the first and current prime ministers. But an analytical focus on the successes and failures of individual leaders perpetuates vast erasures in historiography. Among other things, it cannot explain how nationalism has (or has not) become “a state of mind, permeating the large majority of a people and claiming to permeate all its members” (Hans Kohn, quoted in Cheah: 42, n. 24). In focusing on the emotion-driven communal tendencies that pragmatic leaders must hold in check, it gives short shrift to democratizing movements from below. In privileging leaders’ pursuit of intra-communal unity, it colludes in suppressing analyses of gender, labor, the environment, and other “non-communal” concerns. Most importantly, the naturalization of leader-centered narrative effaces ideology from the analysis of politics and history. It is to this problematic that Farish addresses his most sustained argument.

Farish charges that “Malaysia today is ruled according to a neo-feudal political culture” in which “blind deference to authority” has been “re-invigorated and revived in no uncertain terms” (13). How can the words “feudal” and “neo-feudal” be applied to Mahathir’s relentlessly modernizing Malaysia? Is this a case of the political columnist’s aim for maximum reaction overcoming the scholar’s careful choice of terminology? In fact, by using this language Farish is situating himself within a current of Malay social criticism that can be traced back to Munshi Abdullah’s mid-nineteenth century condemnation of royal misrule (1970), through the radical, popular nationalism of the mid-1930s to 1940s, to more recent scholar-activists like Chandra Muzaffar (1979). In this vein, Farish reminds his readers of Malay leaders’ collusion with colonial rule. After European incursions disrupted networks of trade and wealth in the wider Southeast Asian world, ushering in a period of economic stagnation and disorder, colonial intervention on the peninsula was justified by “the notion of the disabled



native" (18) whose decaying culture required European protection. But the imposition of central authority was obscured by the cooperation and entrenchment of elites like Idrus Shah of Perak. Native disablement, which also paved the way for the wholesale importation of labor, was then cemented in two ways: through a discourse labeling Malays as "superstitious," "conservative," "lazy," "without method or order," and having "proper respect for constituted authority" (Swettenham, quoted in Farish: 24); and through legislation that decreased their ability to move about geographically:

"The net effect was two-fold: Colonial ethnographic scholarship reconstructed the Malays as a backward race of agriculturalists and feudal serfs, while the newly-imposed Colonial legislation and regulations ensured that the Malay peasantry would be kept in precisely those areas of economic activity that were deemed compatible with their 'natural' Malay character: manual labour, farming and fisheries" (26).

It was this society – defined by disability and an ossified class structure – that was the target of nationalist, reformist, religious, and other modernist critiques from the early twentieth century. By the 1930s and 1940s, the ruling class-colonial alliance was coming under increased pressure from Malay urbanization and literacy, demands for new economic and political roles by all groups, penetration of foreign media, Japanese occupation, and postwar communal violence. Reviving the language of the secular left critique goes hand in hand with restoring the contribution of the radical Malay nationalists to the historical record.

How does the change of neo-feudalism hold up in post-colonial Malaysia, where Farish sees a "combination of modern material development and antiquated cultural values" (119)? This part is more contentious but equally engaging. Farish shows how UMNO leaders have pursued a developmentalist agenda – "Malaysia Boleh" (Malaysia can do it) – while holding onto the very same stereotypes of Malay disability that characterized colonial discourse. Mahathir's influential *Malay Dilemma* (1970) and the UMNO-sponsored *Revolusi Mental* (Mental Revolution; Rahman, 1971) both "presented an image of Malays as an inherently backward, ill-educated and pathetic race that was trapped in a

dark world of superstition, blind deference to authority and lack of economic sense." Although these familiar traits are now deplored, they are still used to justify the supremacy of "a patron-class of rulers" (124). It is not at all far-fetched to see how the government's patronage policies are bolstered by "the impression that the Malays [are] somehow unable to cope with change and development without the help of the State and the UMNO party in particular" (125). Even Mahathir's recent, parting lament that his biggest regret is his failure to modernize his people bespeaks the historical agency arrogated by leaders to themselves, even as they banish political speech from university campuses and detain political opponents.

That this argument can be made for the opposition PAS as well tends to support its validity. Farish recounts the career of the independent-minded PAS veteran Ustaz Abu Bakar Hamzah to illustrate it. According to Farish, Ustaz Abu Bakar's view of Islam was not incompatible with democracy, development, and tolerance. In advancing these views, he ran afoul of his party, especially in the 1980s, when *ulama* (the religious elite) were elevated to positions of leadership. "He attacked what he regarded as the excessive dogmatism and fanaticism of PAS members" and the *ulama's* "emphasis on loyalty and blind obedience." In response, he was accused of being "a *kafir* (infidel) and *munafik* (hypocrite)" and expelled from PAS. In the "use of Islam as a weapon to silence the comments and ideas of others and to label others as 'bad Muslims'," we hear echoes of Tunku Abdul Rahman's Malay traitors ("Remembering the Other Face of Political Islam," 130-35).

## Essentialism and multiplicity

Any attempt to understand Malaysia as a nation-state will ultimately grapple with the problematic of Malay centrality in the body politic. Farish observes that media coverage of politics at times "would give the impression that this country was made up of only Malay-Muslims" (164), and a major focus of Cheah's analysis is the factionalism within the Malay community that constantly threatens its political primacy. Yet there is something troubling at this center that Farish's discussion of the colonial past allows us to understand. The story of Sultan Abu Bakar (he who could not stay put) is a sobering reminder that even the

most dynamic and privileged individuals could not escape the immobilizing power of colonial categorization for long. Despite its cosmopolitan, trade-centered, diversely-originated history, all of “Malay” society was eventually trapped within the “hierarchy of racial characteristics” that assigned Malays to agriculture and feudal domination, condemned in perpetuity to be Swettenham’s “Real Malay” who “venerates his ancient customs and traditions, fears his Rajas, and has a proper respect for constituted authority” (24). Farish’s most important argument begins – in his more academic essays – with how “the fluid, shifting world of pre-Colonial Malaya was gradually arrested in every sense, epistemically as well as physically,” leaving “the signifier ‘Malay’... eventually reduced to essentialist terms, restricting its play and movement” (25). Combined with their constructed disability – “The Malays will not work,” reported a British travel writer – and consequent need for protection, this diminishment of Malayness was perhaps the deepest, yet least recognized, violence of colonialism.

Not surprisingly, the perpetuation of communalism as the organizing principle of independent Malaya/Malaysia did little to challenge this. In fact, the Federal Constitution of 1957 enshrined a narrow, political definition of “Malay” as one who spoke the Malay language, followed Malay custom, and was a Muslim:

“Rather than accept and celebrate the fact that Malay identity was complex, overdetermined, fluid and evolving, the Federal Constitution’s precise but ultimately impoverishing definition of Malay identity invariably reduced Malayness to a stock definition, reminiscent of the colonial categories of racial identity and difference of the 19th century” (221).

Why have Malay political primacy and the efforts of its strongest leaders – one does not dispute Mahathir’s sincerity on this point – not been able to reverse the diminishment of Malayness? The logic of the nation-state, as identified by Cheah Boon Kheng, may provide an answer. Remembering his opening question, “Who would inherit power from the British?,” we realize that the Malays, as core *bangsa* (nationality), have *literally* inherited the position vacated by the British at the apex of the communal-patronage polity. Yet simultaneously, they retain their role as disabled *bangsa* (race) in need of protection, as reflected in

the recurring theme in politics and literature of "Malays in danger." This frustrated Malay dominance results in unresolved anxiety and the ever-present threat of violence that in turn justifies repressive government. One fears that as long as Malaysia remains trapped in the logic of Malay vs. Malaysian nationalism – and Cheah makes a strong case for its resilience – it will be unable to solve the problem of disabled Malay centrality.

Will the Islamist alternative show a way out? To Cheah, PAS is a non-UMNO variety of Malay ultra: "As most Muslims in Malaysia are Malays, an Islamic state is actually another form of a 'Malay nation' except that Islamic principles become the basis of its administration" (240). And from his perspective, Farish condemns the Islamist search for purity that "narrowed the scope of Malay culture and identity and reduced Malay history to a mere few hundred years [since the arrival of Islam]" (42). But although Islam has lately colluded with UMNO in denying the richness and complexity of Malay culture (and added a shallow moralism to boot), Farish also shows that this was not inevitable.

It is in his discussion of Dr. Burhanuddin Al-Helmy, third president of PAS, that the most intriguing possibilities are raised. Detained in 1965, never to reenter politics, Dr. Burhanuddin has largely been written out of history by both official nationalism and his own party which reversed his legacy. As an author of the "People's Constitutional Proposals" and its *Melayu* nationality, he "regarded national identity and cultural belonging as historically determined and ... evolving categories." He was a pragmatic intellectual, not least in his Islam, which looked to the future, not the past, and which was centered on human will and struggles in the "here and now." In the tradition of Muslim modernism that PAS has left behind, Dr. Burhanuddin sought commonalities among nationalism, Islam, and leftism. Most importantly, he recognized that "the universalism of Islam had its limits... [that it] remained a *particular* universalism that could not be entirely reconciled with other universalist discourses... [and that] negotiation with difference and alterity was the key to political action" (Dr. Burhanuddin Al-Helmy and the Forgotten Legacy of the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party," 56-62).

Unlike UMNO feudalism and PAS medievalism, these are old ideas with

current value. As a political activist and a Muslim intellectual, Farish draws from precedents like these when he looks "beneath the facade of a seemingly unitary space [to the] multiplicity of 'Malaysias' that are now coming out into the open" (4). Figures and examples from the past can reawaken the possibility of change if historians use them to reclaim traditions of fluidity, flexibility, and negotiation. These are not a different set of tools than those used to construct mainstream Malaysia. If *Melayu* nationality was a lost opportunity to continue an historical process of identity construction through nationalism, many other semantic constructs remain in play – Malaysia, ethnic harmony, tolerance – that can still be filled with new or expanded meanings and help put the Malay world back in motion.

Cheah Boon Kheng sees Malaysia as the careful containment and balancing of difference, both within and between ethnic communities. Farish Noor looks beneath hard-fought unified facades to multiplicities he seeks to recover and legitimize. Their books are instructive to read together, as Farish articulates and critiques the paradigms underlying Cheah's biography and explicitly interrogates "the story of a multiracial Malaysia we constantly tell ourselves" (4). Together these authors illuminate the importance of paradigms in writing history and history writing's discursive power in making and performing the nation.

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## Memahami Malaysia

*Donna J. Amoroso*

Peristiwa mutakhir di Malaysia—gerakan reformasi, pengadilan atas Anwar Ibrahim, berkurangnya legitimasi partai berkuasa (UMNO), dan tumbuhnya tantangan dari kelompok Islam terhadap negara sekuler, mengutamakan pembangunan ekonomi—menciptakan “ketergelinciran” bermanfaat bagi narasi nasional yang mendorong perenungan atas dasar dan definisi negara-bangsa. Kedua buku tersebut, walaupun berbeda dalam gaya, tujuan, dan sidang pembaca, mengambil tema negara-bangsa sebagai pokok pembahasan dan karenanya terlibat dalam wacana sosial politik berpengaruh yang telah dibentuk melalui negara dan praktik akademik.

Cheah Boon Kheng memberikan penjelasan bagaimana praktik berbangsa berubah secara perlahan dengan memfokuskan pada politik pemilihan, perdana menteri-perdana menteri, dan kebijakan pada tingkat nasional. Cheah menganalisis Malaysia melalui kacamata “memberi dan menerima,” menguji ketegangan terus-menerus antara Nasionalisme-etnik Melayu dan nasionalisme Malaysia umum. Pendapat utama Cheah adalah bahwa setiap dari empat Perdana Menteri negeri ini “memulai dengan...pandangan nasionalisme sempit Melayu tetapi mengakhirinya dengan pandangan nasionalisme terbuka Melayu.” Bahwa peristiwa tersebut sudah terjadi empat kali dalam sejarah nasional mengesankan bahwa negara-bangsa tumbuh dengan logikanya sendiri. “Ketuanan Melayu” (dominasi politik Melayu), pembaca menyimpulkan, tetap berada di sini, tetapi dibatasi oleh logika ini. Buku yang ditulis Cheah mengatakan dengan jelas keberadaan Malaysia yang multi-budaya dan ramah.

Kumpulan tulisan Farish Noor memiliki agenda yang berbeda—menemukan bangsa yang mungkin sudah terjadi dan mungkin masih menjadi. Dia menuliskannya dengan cara mengambil arah berlawanan dari penjelasan searah untuk menggali “Malaysia yang Lain” yang telah dipinggirkan oleh “cerita Malaysia yang multi rasial yang terus-menerus kita

kisahkan sendiri." Saat Cheah mengakui bahwa perpecahan pada masyarakat Malaysia terus-menerus mengancam keutamaan Melayu, Farish menekankan kesatuan sebagai bahasan pokoknya. Ia memperlihatkan kerusakan yang dibuat oleh "feodalisme" UMNO-ide bahwa orang Melayu tak dapat bertahan tanpa patron-penguasa-dan secara imbang juga menyalahkan gerakan Islam yang mengerdilkan budaya Melayu pada tingkat moralitas dangkal yang sekaligus menolak kekayaan dan kerumitan sejarah Melayu.

Malaysia dalam kacamata Cheah Boon Kheng adalah pengurangan secara hati-hati atas perbedaan, baik di dalam dan di antara komunitas etnik. Farish melihat tidak adanya satu identitas, tetapi keragaman yang dicarinya untuk menggantikan masa lalu dan mensahkan masa sekarang.

Translated by Wahyu Prasetyawan



## Ang Pagpapakahulugan sa Malaysia

Donna J. Amoroso

Ang mga nakaraang kaganapan sa Malaysia – ang kilusang *reformasi*, ang paglilitis kay Anwar Ibrahim, ang pag-agnas ng lehitimasya ng namumunong partido (UMNO), ang lumalaking hamon ng Islam sa estadong sekular at debelopmentalista – ay lumikha ng nakatutulong na “dislokasyon” sa pambansang naratibo na nagbibigay-daan sa mga pagmumuni-muni hinggil sa mga pundasyon at kahulugan ng bansa-estado. Ang dalawang aklat na ito, bagama’t nagkakaiba sa istilo, layunin, at mambabasa, ay kumukuha rito bilang paksa at samakatwid ay humaharap sa makapangyarihang diskursong sosyo-pulitikal na nalikha sa pamamagitan ng praktika ng estado at akademya.

Naghahain si Cheah Boon Keng ng paliwanag sa ebolusyon ng bansa sa praktika sa pamamagitan ng mahigpit na pagtutuon sa pulitikang elektoral, ang mga punong ministro, at patakarang pambansa. Inaanalisa ni Cheah ang Malaysia sa pamamagitan ng *prism* ng “give and take,” sinusuri ang naghaharing tensyon sa pagitan ng Malayong etno-nasyonalismo at sa mas malawak na nasyonalismong Malaysiano. Ang pangunahing argumento niya ay ang bawat isa sa apat na punong ministro ng bansa ay “nagsimula bilang...ekslusibistang nasyunalistang Malayo subalit naging inklusibistang nasyunalistang Malaysiano.” Sapagkat apat na beses itong naganap sa kasaysayan ng bansa, maaaring mahinuha na ang bansa-estado ay lumikha ng sarili nitong lohika. Ang *Ketuanan Melayu* (dominasyong Malayo sa pulitika), para sa mambabasa, ay nandiritto na, subalit ay nalilimitahan ng lohikang ito. Iginigiit ng aklat ni Cheah ang katotohanan ng isang multikultural at mapag-ubayang Malaysia.

Ang itinipon na mga sanaysay ni Farish Noor ay may napakaibang agenda – ang hanapin ang bansa na maaari sanang nabuo at maaari pa ring mabuo. Nagsusulat siya nang lihis sa direksyon ng linyar na paliwanag upang suriin ang “ibang mga Malaysia” na naisantabi ng “kwento ng

*multiracial* na Malaysia na palagi nating sinasabi sa ating sarili.” Kung saan kinikilala ni Cheah na ang paksyunalismo sa loob ng pamayanang Malayo ay palaging nagbabanta sa pangungunang Malayo, tinitignan ni Farish ang mismong pagpipilit na ipatupad ang pagkakaisa bilang pangunahing suliranin. Itinutukoy niya rito ang hindi mabuting epekto ng “pyudalismo” ng UMNO – ang pag-iisip na hindi kayang mabuhay ng mga Malay nang walang pinunong-patron – at, kasabay nito, ang Islamistang pag-cesensyalisa sa kulturang Malayo sa isang mababaw na moralismo na hindi kumikilala sa yaman at pagkasalimuot ng kasaysayang Malayo.

Ang Malaysia ni Cheah Boon Keng ay isang maingat na sisidlan ng pagkakaiba, maging sa loob at labas ng mga pamayanang etniko. Si Farish Noor naman ay nakakikita, hindi ng mga nagsasariling identidad, kundi ng mga multiplisidad na sinisikap niyang hanguin mula sa nakaraan at bigyan ng lehitimasya sa kasalukuyan.

Translated by Sofia Guillermo

ドンナ・J. アモロソ (Donna J. Amoroso)

改革運動(reformasi movement)とアンワル・イブラヒム裁判、政権政党 UMNO の正統性喪失、イスラム主義者の世俗的開発主義国家に対する異議申し立ての拡大など、近年、マレーシアで起こっている事件が国民の物語に重要な「配置転換」をもたらし、国民国家の基礎と定義に再考を促している。ここでとりあげる2冊は、そのスタイル、目的、対象とする読者においては非常に異なるとしても、上に述べたことを主題とするものとして、これまで国家、あるいは学問上の実践を通じて作り上げられてきた強力な政治・社会上の言説に大いに関わりの持つものとなっている。

Cheah Boon Kheng は選挙の政治、首相、国家政策に焦点を絞ることによって、実のところどのようにして国民が進化してきたのかを明らかにする。Cheah はマレーシアを「ギブ・アンド・テイク」のプリズムを通して分析し、マレー・ナショナリズムとより広い意味でのマレーシア・ナショナリズムとの間に存在する緊張について考察する。彼の議論の要点は、マレーシアの4人の首相はそれぞれ「最初は排他的なマレー・ナショナリストとして出発したものの、結局は包括的なマレーシア・ナショナリストとなった」というものである。(マレーシア)国民の歴史の中でこのことが4回おきたということ、これは国民国家がそれ自身の論理を発達させてきたことを示している。Ketuanan Melayu (マレー人の政治的優位)は定着しているが、この論理によって抑制されている。Cheah の本は、多文化的で寛容なマレーシア、という一つの現実を主張するものである。

Farish Noor の小論集はこれとは非常に異なった目的を持っている。それは、そうだったかもしれない、そしてこれからなるかもしれない「国家を探し出す」というものである。それは、「我々がたえず我々自身に語りかけてきた多民族のマレーシアという物語」によって傍らへ押しやられてきた「他のマレーシア」を探し出そうとする試みである。Cheah がマレー人コミュニティの内部に存在する派閥主義がたえずマレー人の優位を脅かしていることと述べているのに対して、Farish はマレーシアでは統一推進のために非常な努力が払われていること、これ自体に中心的な問題があると考え、つまり彼によれば UMNO の「派閥主義」による害は、マレー人はパトロン指導者がいなければ生き残ることが出来ないという考えそのものにあるのであり、同様にイスラム主義者がマレー文化を浅薄なモラル主義に単純化し、マレーの歴史の豊かさや複雑さを否定することを批判する。

Cheah Boon Kheng のマレーシアは、コミュニティの内部、そしてコミュニティの間の差異を慎重に封じ込める。一方、Farish Noor はひとつのアイデンティティではなく、過去から教い出し、現在において正当化しようとする多様性のなかにマレーシアを見ている。

Translated by Onimaru Takeshi (鬼丸武士)

## ทำความเข้าใจกับความเปราะบาง

*Donna J. Amoroso (ดอนนา เจ อะโมโรโซ)*

เหตุการณ์ต่างๆ ที่เกิดขึ้นในมาเลเซียในช่วงระยะที่ผ่านมา ไม่ว่าจะเป็นความเคลื่อนไหวของกลุ่ม รีฟอร์มซี การจับกุมไตสวนคดีนายอันวาริ อิบราฮิม ความชอบธรรมทางการเมืองของพรรครัฐบาล (พรรคอุมโน) ที่เสื่อมถอยลง หรือการที่กลุ่มมุสลิมทวีการทำร้ายความเป็นรัฐทางโลกของมาเลเซีย ที่มุ่งเน้นแต่การพัฒนาทางวัตถุ ได้ก่อให้เกิด “การเปลี่ยนแปลง” ในเชิงบวกต่อการเขียนประวัติศาสตร์ชาติ เพราะทำให้ต้องหันมาพิจารณาบทบาทของความเข้าใจเกี่ยวกับรากฐานและคำจำกัดความของชาติแห่งมาเลเซียกันใหม่ หนังสือสองเล่มนี้แม้จะมีลีลาการเขียน จุดมุ่งหมาย และกลุ่มผู้อ่านที่แตกต่างกัน แต่มีความคล้ายคลึงกันตรงที่ได้นำประเด็นข้างต้นมาเป็นหัวข้อสำคัญ และต่างก็เข้าเผชิญหน้ากับวาทกรรมทางสังคมการเมืองที่ทรงพลังยิ่ง ที่ถูกสร้างขึ้นมาผ่านปฏิบัติการของรัฐและของวงวิชาการ

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เจีย นุน เอง อธิบายถึงการที่ความเป็นชาติของมาเลเซียก่อตัวและวิวัฒน์ขึ้นในทางปฏิบัติอย่างไร โดยเน้นการศึกษาไปที่การเมืองในระบบเลือกตั้ง บทบาทของนายกรัฐมนตรีที่ผ่านมา และนโยบายระดับประเทศ เจียวิเคราะห์มาเลเซียผ่านมุมมองของ “การให้และการรับ” โดยศึกษาความตึงเครียดที่ดำรงอยู่ระหว่างแนวคิดชาตินิยมเชิงชาติพันธุ์ของชนเชื้อสายมาเลย์ กับแนวคิดชาตินิยมมาเลเซีย ประเด็นข้อถกเถียงหลักที่เจียเสนอ คือ นายกรัฐมนตรีที่ผ่านมาทั้ง 4 คน ล้วน “เริ่มต้นจากการเป็นนักชาตินิยมมาเลย์ที่กีดกันคนเชื้อสายอื่นออกไป แต่ในที่สุดก็กลับกลายมาเป็นนักชาตินิยมมาเลเซียที่รวมกลุ่มชาติพันธุ์อื่นๆ เข้าไว้ด้วยกัน” การที่เป็นเช่นนี้ถึงสี่ครั้งในประวัติศาสตร์ของชาติย่อมแสดงให้เห็นว่า รัฐชาติมาเลเซียได้พัฒนาตรรกะของตนเองขึ้น ดังนั้น จึงอาจสรุปได้ว่า เกาตัวนั้น เมลายู หรือการครอบงำทางการเมืองของกลุ่มชาติพันธุ์มาเลย์นั้น จะยังดำรงอยู่ตลอดไป แต่จะถูกจำกัดด้วยตรรกะดังกล่าว หนังสือของเจียเสนอความจริงด้านหนึ่งของมาเลเซีย ที่มีความหลากหลาย

หลายและความอดกลั้นทางวัฒนธรรม

งานรวมบทความของแฟริช นัวร์มีแนวทางที่ต่างออกไป กล่าวคือ นัวร์พยายามศึกษาความเป็นชาติของมาเลเซีย ทั้งที่นำจะเป็นอยู่ในอดีตและที่นำจะเป็นไปได้ในอนาคต เขาไม่เห็นด้วยกับคำอธิบายในลักษณะของพัฒนาการเป็นเส้นตรง และต้องการศึกษา “มาเลเซียอื่นๆ” ที่ถูกเบียดขับออกไปด้วยวาทกรรมที่ว่า “ประวัติศาสตร์มลายูเป็นเรื่องราวของสิ่งคมหลากหลายเชื้อชาติที่เรามักจะเล่าขานสืบทอดกันมา” ขณะที่เจียยอมรับว่า การที่ชุมชนมาเลย์มีการแตกแยกเป็นกลุ่มๆ นั้น มีผลด้านลบอย่างต่อเนื่องต่อความเป็นใหญ่ของชนเชื้อสายมาเลย์ แฟริชกลับพยายามแสดงให้เห็นว่า ความเป็นเอกภาพนั้นแหละเป็นประเด็นปัญหาสำคัญ นัวร์ชี้ให้เห็นถึงผลเสียอันเกิดจากแนวคิดแบบคึกคึกคักของพรรคคอมมิวนิสต์ ที่มองว่าคนมาเลย์ไม่สามารถถอยรูดได้หากปราศจากผู้นำปกครองที่คอยปกป้องอุปถัมภ์ นอกจากนี้ นัวร์ยังประณามการลดทอนแก่นของวัฒนธรรมมาเลย์โดยอิทธิพลของอิสลาม ให้เหลือเป็นเพียงคติทางศีลธรรมที่ตีเนียน เขามองว่าการกระทำเช่นนั้นเป็นการปฏิเสธความรุ่มรวยและความซับซ้อนของประวัติศาสตร์ของชาวมาเลย์

มาเลเซียของเจีย บุน เคง เป็นชาติที่พยายามรวมเอาความแตกต่างไว้ด้วยกันด้วยความรอบคอบระมัดระวัง ไม่ว่าจะเป็นความแตกต่างภายในกลุ่มชาติพันธุ์เดียวกันเองและต่างกลุ่มด้วย ส่วนแฟริช นัวร์ ไม่เห็นว่ามาเลเซียมีอัตลักษณ์ที่เป็นเอกภาพหนึ่งเดียว และกลับเห็นความหลากหลายซึ่งเขาพยายามเรียกคืนกลับมาจากอดีต และต้องการทำให้เกิดความชอบธรรมขึ้นในสังคมปัจจุบัน

Translated by Darin Pradittasance, with assistance  
from Somporn Puttapithakporn and Chalong Soontravanich.

## Exposition, Critique, and New Directions for Pantayong Pananaw

Ramon Guillermo

The Filipino language has two forms for the English word "we/us": "tayo" and "kami." In Bahasa Indonesia, the same distinction holds for the pair "kita" and "kami" (Johns 1997). "Tayo," which is described as the inclusive form of "we," refers to a collectivity composed of both the speakers and the listeners in a communication context. "Kami," which is described as the exclusive form of "we," refers to a collectivity composed only of those who are speaking and does not include the receivers of the message. The word "Pantayo" was formed by the combination of the root word "tayo" and the prefix "pan-." (Probably the first incidence of this term was as "pangtayo," used as the translation of *pronombre/pronoun* in the grammar book *Balarilang Tagalog*, published in 1910). The whole word "pantayo" could roughly be interpreted to mean "from-us-for-us." The conceptual contradictory of "pantayo" is the concept "pangkami," which was formed from the root-word "kami" and the prefix "pang-"/"pam-." "Pangkami" roughly means "from-us-for-you." The other half of the phrase, "pananaw," means "perspective." So "pantayong pananaw" would be equivalent to the rather awkward "from-us-for-us perspective," while "pangkaming pananaw"

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would mean the "from-us-for-you perspective." "Pantayo" refers to a self-subsistent dialogical circle consisting of active (speaking) subjects, while "pangkami" denotes a situation in which the speakers present themselves as an "other-directed" collective object under the gaze (and therefore the spell) of an Other.

The intellectual leader of the Pantayong Pananaw (PP) movement in the social sciences is Zeus A. Salazar. He was educated at the University of the Philippines (UP) and at the Sorbonne. His still unpublished doctoral thesis (Salazar 1968) already contained the basic ideas which would lead to his mature perspectives on cultural and historical methodology. He would continue to elaborate these ideas in an increasingly systematic, intellectualized variant of the Filipino language throughout the 1970s and 1980s. After being deeply involved during Martial Law in the massive historical and ideological project initiated by the Marcos dictatorship called *Tadbana* (Marcos, 1976), several tentative and scattered articulations of the basic approach and philosophy of PP would appear in various magazines and short book introductions until the definitive systematic exposition of PP was published in 1991 as the essay "Ang Pantayong Pananaw Bilang Diskursong Pangkabihasnan" (Pantayong Pananaw as a civilizational discourse) (Salazar 1974; 1996; 1997). The implementation of the research agenda put forward in the basic programmatic statements of PP would be further actualized in a series of monographs published in the journal *Bagong Kasaysayan* (New History). While his intellectual leadership and remarkable originality have been vital, it should be clarified that Zeus A. Salazar *is not* Pantayong Pananaw. His influence as the moving force of PP extends from his contemporaries and colleagues in the field of history and various other disciplines to several generations of former students at the University of the Philippines. Among the scholars who have produced significant publications and theses/dissertations under the auspices of PP are Jaime Veneracion, Nilo Ocampo, Ferdinand Llanes, Portia Reyes, Efrén B. Isorena, Vicente C. Villan, Mary Jane Rodriguez-Tatel, Jose Rhommel B. Hernandez, O.P., Myfel Joseph Paluga, Nancy Kimmuel-Gabriel, and Atoy M. Navarro. Meanwhile, the term "Pantayong Pananaw" has acquired several usages in the texts of Salazar and other scholars working within its parameters. Some of these are the following:

- 1) "Pantayong Pananaw" as a descriptive concept can pertain to any social

collectivity which possesses a relatively unified and internally articulated linguistic-cultural structure of communication and interaction and/or a sense of oneness of purpose and existence (ex., "The Japanese have a strong Pantayong Pananaw"). Ethnic and social collectivities (including class or gender aligned aggrupations) within a single nation can thus be said to possess PP. The relative "integration" of ethnic communities in a national collective does not arise from the eradication of their sense of PP but from the subsumption of their ethnic identity under that of the nation.

2) Works and authors categorized as PP or having affinities with PP exhibit a certain style of thought and way of speaking based largely on a critique of colonial discursive strategies which up to now still proliferate in textbooks and more scholarly works. Some of these are:

a. "Discourses of influence" which attributes the origins of both the distinguishing elements and the motive forces of Philippine history and culture to "external" influences. These are also manifested as symptoms of unease or discontent with "one's own" culture and of a constant striving to legitimize it by attributing its origin to some "more elevated" sources. The point of reference of discourses of influence is usually the originating culture while the receiving culture is merely analyzed in relation to its adequacy to or divergence from the original (ex., "Maria is beautiful because her father was half-Spanish"; "The Filipino is a jumble of traits from India, China, Europe, and America"). Discourses which focus on the purported "lack of identity" of Filipinos is an auxiliary discourse which accomplishes the preliminary act of emptying Filipino identity the better to fill it to the brim with influences.

b. "First Filipino" discourses which reduced Philippine history to a delayed repetition of western history (ex., "Juan dela Cruz was the first Filipino pilot"). Similar to this type of discourse is the constant Toynbee-like parallel-mongering between the Philippines and the West which presupposes that the western comparison would render the topic more intelligible to the reader than if it were just left to itself (ex., "Gabriela Silang was the Joan of Arc of the Philippines"). Once again, the point of reference is still "the West."

c. Discourses of the "Discovery" (ex., "There is no more significant event in Philippine history than the discovery of the islands by the great Magellan").



d. "Reactive" discourses which merely correct colonial misconceptions about Filipinos and Philippine history, thereby remaining trapped in a discursive dependency with colonial discourse (ex., "Filipinos are not like you say. We are also intelligent and civilized"). Expressions of condemnation or idealization of Philippine culture as contrasted with colonial and western values can be related to this type of discourse.

The net effect of these colonial discursive strategies would be to render the Filipino people into an heteronomous and inert entity incapable of making history but against whom history is merely made.

3) Another, more superficial, marker of belonging to the discursive community of PP would be the adoption of whole or parts of its specialized terminology, thus making these texts interlocked and intertextually related.

Beyond these surface features of Pantayong Pananaw are other more complicated features that define PP as a specific and original approach to practicing social science in the Philippines. There is no better way of expounding on these than to discuss some of the major issues which have plagued PP since its inception. These are: 1) its use of Filipino, the national language, and the relationship of PP to other schools of thought in the Philippine social sciences; and 2) problems of method revolving around the predominantly emic and hermeneutic approach of PP.

## **The question of language and the Philippine social sciences**

Practitioners of the dominant social science paradigms in the Philippines, which hew closely to American traditions and intellectual trends, have had mixed and generally uneasy attitudes toward PP. A common judgment is that the once fashionable "indigenization" movements of the 1980s have been rendered passé by the late "postmodern" 1990s, as exemplified by Pertierra's trendy exposition (1996). Despite this, PP projects itself not as a mere competitor-among-others in horizontal relation to other paradigms but as a sort of vertical sublation or *Anfhebung*, negating and containing all the others. It rejects the

pluralist representation of PP as some kind of co-equal contender with other schools of thought and presents itself as the broadest synthesis both containing and negating all previous social scientific traditions in the Philippines, all of which it conflates and at the same time *delegitimizes*, under the single term "Pangkaming Pananaw." In historiography, the latter includes even such historians with outstanding nationalist credentials as Teodoro Agoncillo (1956) and Renato Constantino (1978). Both the dominant paradigms (such as functionalism and positivism) and the oppositional paradigms (represented by Marxism) in western social sciences are resolutely grouped under this one label. PP presents a comprehensive, if sweeping, metahistory of the historical and social-scientific disciplines in the Philippines and claims for itself the future of Philippine social-scientific practice (Salazar 1991b).

PP is furthermore compelled by its own strictures against a "reactive" viewpoint and methodology to eschew *in principle* any sustained discursive exchange within the domain of what it considers to be a mere "localized" version of western social science. It refuses to enter into the parameters of a discursive domain which it considers already determined in advance by the dominant practices and perspectives of "western-oriented" social sciences. The most effective way a practitioner of conventional social sciences could enter into a fruitful dialogue with PP would be to enter the discursive domain of PP itself, above all to accept its linguistic parameters. The issue is therefore *neither a refusal of dialogue* in principle nor a blanket rejection of any theoretical engagement, appropriation, or negotiation, but the insistence that dialogue be accomplished within PP's own discursive sphere. Such an imperative could be compared to the commonplace requirement of, for example, the American or Japanese educational system that foreign students pass language exams before being permitted to participate in the academic/intellectual life of their respective nations.

PP does not consider the possibility of any existing "neutral" sphere of linguistic/discursive exchange within the social sciences. Nevertheless, theoretical and linguistic polyglots could perhaps occupy intermediate positions as transitions between spheres of discursive exchange and could even engage in the translation of concepts and theoretical entities between spheres. Gaerlan's (1995) impression that Salazar is "militantly" against translation is entirely

mistaken. Only the complex mediating *acts* produced by inter-translation could possibly constitute the ground of a genuinely *universal scientific community* (Mendoza 2001) – a community not speaking past each other's heads but one in *real conversation*. The privileging of hybridity as the alternative to the construction of national languages, as proposed by post-colonial theorists who point to the liberative appropriation by the “former colonies” of the advantageously “evolved” (Roxas-Topo 1998) English language, just completely fudges the issue. Paraphrasing Marx, we could even say that that “all we want to do away with is the miserable character of this *appropriation*, under which the ‘native’ lives merely to increase the Englishes of the world.” PP therefore does not emphasize linguistic in-betweenness but rather the commitment of the scholar to the strengthening and consistent embrace of the national discursive domain (or *poók*) in the national language. Furthermore, if the social sciences are understood as forms of liberative self-understanding rather than as alienated and alienating sciences of manipulation, their results should from the beginning be open *as much as possible* to the perusal, critique, and intervention of their purported object (e.g., the Filipinos as a “people”) before translating it “for a wider audience” is considered a priority. The active use and development of a national language is crucial in the attempt to mitigate the extremely alienated and undeniably elitist status of the social sciences in the Philippines.

### Problems of method

“Kasaysayan,” the Filipino word for history, is derived from the root word “saysay” which means “sense” or “meaning.” “Kasaysayan” is therefore a “salaysay na may saysay” or “meaningful narrative” (Navarro 2000). In his major expositions of PP, Salazar has characterized PP (within the historical discipline) as a *synthesis* of the indigenous conception of history with the historical methods developed by the western historical disciplines. A recent dissertation on Pantayong Pananaw (Reyes 2002) emphasized that “[t]he idea of history as a discipline already experienced great developments from various scientists all over the world through the years, and so, it would be such a waste to simply ignore them all. These developments became the figurative tools and/or instruments of the historian in the practice of his science. The pioneers of Bagong Kasaysayan were aware of that from the beginning and that was why they were *ready to appropriate*

*the basic methods of science* in application to a differently philosophically inspired historical narrative of Bagong Kasaysayan" (italics added). However, the question of defining the parameters of "scientific" practice and its relation to social scientific methodology in PP must still be thoroughly examined. (Many similar sophisticated analyses and important arguments have already been put to the fore in the critical literature on Sikolohiyang Pilipino [Filipino psychology] [Enriquez 1990] and the author has to apologize for repeating some of them here.)

Three important components of PP's methodology shall be discussed below:

- 1) Emic and etic approaches;
- 2) Understanding and explanation;
- 3) The problem of ideology.

### Emic and etic approaches

It might be sufficient to clarify the common charge against PP that it is a mere "nativism." According to the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (1968), "The aim of [a nativist] movement is to purge the society of unwanted aliens, of cultural elements of foreign origin, or of both." Closer acquaintance with PP's programmatic statements and corpus of writings would frustrate any responsible scholar who wanted to pin it down to fixed "nativist" or even "essentialist" positions. It should be stressed therefore that PP is not by any stretch of the imagination an outright linguistic or theoretical "nativism," although its adherents could occupy the following range of positions regarding the appropriation (*pag-aangkin*) of actual or purportedly "foreign concepts and theories":

- 1) The weakest position would consider both the appropriation of theoretical terms and the use of emic, or internally generated, terms as equally valid methods for expanding the discursive sphere of PP as long as the great majority of texts are written and all verbal exchanges are conducted in Filipino. This weakest form is has been criticized as "writing in Filipino but thinking in foreign categories."

2) The middle position would be the *privileging* or prioritization of the emic approach over the borrowing or appropriation of concepts, while not eschewing the latter in principle. The language of textual exposition shall likewise be in Filipino. Notwithstanding its relative reasonableness, difficulties with such an approach could also be observed, for example, in the Indonesian context where language planners propose such strange terms as “apurwa” (old Javanese-Sanskrit) or even “mesin hitung ajaib” (Dutch-Malay-Arabic), when “komputer” could just as well be used with much better results (Carle 1988).

3) The strongest and blatantly “nativist” position, which perhaps no one among the PP can *consciously* take, is the rigorous exclusion of any terminological/linguistic borrowing. This last position is so impossible that those who have naively taken it due to some romantic ultra-nationalism are easily and routinely attacked just by demonstrating how their own utterances and texts are inescapably involved in the process of linguistic and intellectual change and appropriation. Misunderstandings of Salazar’s position as *strongly nativist* have led some critics to charge him with inconsistency to his own principles by pointing out his borrowed concepts or by tracing his intellectual debts to European influences. Mulder (2000) even thought that PP implies that “the links with the outside world need to be cut.” In reaction to such conceptions, Ileta wrote that “the philosophy behind [Salazar’s] *pantayong pananaw* needs to be threshed out more. It could be more subtle *naman* than you portray it.... To reduce it to a form of crude nationalism gets us back to a dead-end sort of discussion” (quoted in Abinales 2000).

It would be useful to point out here that the use of internal concepts to explain socio-cultural phenomena does not necessarily entail the use of the language of origin of these concepts in the exposition itself. A case in point here would be Enriquez’ variant of Sikolohiyang Pilipino (SP) which pursued an emic approach even as the primary language of transmission tended to be English, especially in his later works (Enriquez 1994; 1995). This would lead to the assessment (Sta. Maria 1993) that PP offers a more effective and consistent route to social scientific “indigenization” than SP. Reynaldo Ileta’s famous *Payon and Revolution* (1979), a work rigorously organized around emic principles of analysis, also employed English as the language of exposition. It is therefore

sometimes called, though uneasily, a "proto-pantayo" text.

The middle position would seem to be the most acceptable for PP. However, problems arise in interpreting the concept of "privileging" emic over borrowed concepts. Perhaps the best way to understand this privileging would be to consider it as a principle oriented towards the sustained assertion of Filipino and as part of the effort to maximize its rich linguistic and semantic resources in the development of a national social scientific discourse. If this is the case, parameters for linguistic borrowing from foreign languages should be based on minimal and stringently defined assumptions regarding the determination of the "fit," "compatibility," or "appropriateness" which are usually mentioned in discussions of theoretical borrowing. Judgments regarding the "correspondence" of concepts to their objects cannot be determined in advance but can only be ascertained through unremitting processes of rigorous investigation and critique by the scientific community concerned. A process of theory construction which merely accumulated concepts with the simple intent of harmonizing them with a fixed and pre-rendered schematization of the cultural totality would render both theoretical borrowing and further scientific research superfluous. The notion that external concepts shall only be appropriated on the basis of their *compatibility* or *correspondence* with the *pre-existing* emic understanding of Philippine cultural, social, and historical phenomena can be illustrated by such commonly heard statements as: "The *sakop* [Filipino as follower or subject of a leader] by nature is authoritarian and hierarchic" (Mercado 1975). The implication of this is that non-authoritarian concepts are "foreign" and inapplicable to Filipinos. This problem can only be addressed once social scientific investigation is, once and for all, firmly distinguished from efforts such as those of Mercado (1994), Jocano (1992), or Agpalo (1996) to develop normative and distinctly reactionary "national ideologies" or Filipino *Weltanschauungen*.

It may be the case that this notion of *compatibility* rests on the assumption one uniform emic understanding of Philippine phenomena to which borrowed concepts should correspond. If so, how would one deal with the hermeneutic gap between interpreter and the interpreted? How would one construe the conflicts and errors of interpretation among interpreters of emic data? The act

of interpretation would be superfluous if a transparent and unmediated grasp of transmitted meanings were possible. Hermeneutics presupposes as a condition of its possibility an inescapable separation or degree of alienation between the interpreter and the interpreted. The complete unification of the consciousness of the social scientist with an increasingly transparent object of analysis would be none other than the end of hermeneutics itself. In addition, when the concordance of any external concept with an internal concept, or its compatibility with the whole "system of thought" thus conceived, is the basis for accepting or rejecting concepts and ideas in the social sciences, then the problematic of theoretical "nativism" rises once again on the train of essentialism.

In itself, there is not much at stake in the essentialist and anti-essentialist dispute since it mostly revolves around the caricaturing and maligning of essentialism as some kind of unqualified Platonism. Some writers have sought to defend a dynamic conceptualization of essentialism opposed to the caricatured representation of it by the arbiters of post-(whatever) theoretical fashion. Mendoza, taking another tack, defends PP along two directions: the first by disputing its alleged "essentialism" and noting that PP leads the way to a "non-essentialist alternative" for construing Filipino identity (Mendoza 2001); the second by using Gayatri Spivak's concept of "strategic essentialism" to assert the pragmatic function of essentialism within Philippine cultural politics (Mendoza 2002). Mendoza's interpretation is somewhat forced but her careful reading of PP does allow a better appreciation of it as a whole and a deeper understanding than others have thus far countenanced.

Further clarification regarding Salazar's conceptualization of cultural identity could be gained by comparing it with the African *negritude* phenomenon. Salazar's early formation within a French intellectual milieu no doubt exposed him to the main terms of analysis of the *negritude* movement. Few European thinkers have received more spontaneous unwritten positive comment from Salazar than the German anthropologist or "cultural morphologist" Leo Frobenius (1973), whose ideas were also central to the fruition of Senghor's and Césaire's conception of "negritude." The contributions of Frobenius that were perhaps most helpful for the development of Salazar's thought in an independent direction were his anti-Eurocentric historicism, his *Kulturkreislehre* (culture circles/

areas) doctrine, and his unyielding position on the priority of hermeneutics and the method of understanding (*verstehen*) in the social sciences as opposed to the "mechanistic" method of explanation (*erklären*). Radically diverging from Senghor, Salazar emphatically rejected the structure of dichotomous oppositions which Frobenius posited in his binaristic cultural typology (Wittman, 2000/2001). As Sartre had already pointed out, the negritude movement simply accepted the spurious European representation of the African as a negation of itself and then elevated this to an ideal. Salazar himself noted that this way of going about it is no different from Levy-Bruhl's conception of the so-called "primitive mentality" (Salazar 1989). The formulation of self-identity as a mere negation of the identity of an Other reduces the self to a dependent residue of the former's plenitude. Research into one's own culture(s) becomes a redundancy since knowledge of it could just as well be arrived at by a series of negations of the "well understood" cultures of the West.

Whatever may be the case, it should be obvious that *PP* has no stake in adopting either an essentialist or anti-essentialist position as a philosophical standpoint, though indeed it may superficially have more sympathy with an "essentialist" position. Instead, it should take up some kind of methodological premise or heuristic principle regarding the rate of change of cultural entities more in line with Braudel's (1973) concept of *longue duree*. Knowing its untenability, Salazar has repeatedly criticized the assertion that "culture/cultural identity does not change." As he has written, "We can understand our being, our Filipino uniqueness, in the study of history; but we cannot see our whole being in this, because what is unique in the Filipino is an historical entity-i.e., it has not been fixed or given for all time" (Salazar 1974). He would, however, contest the possibility of any thoroughgoing and massive transformation of culture within the short run, or "cultural voluntarism." While it may be hypothesized that cultural totalities in general (whether ethnic, national, or civilizational) may possess both a certain degree of internal homogeneity and long-term stability, only actual investigation into these propositions as part of a programme of scientific research, taking into account both the synchronic processes of cohesion and dispersion and the diachronic processes of integration and disintegration, can prove or disprove these hypotheses and enrich the general knowledge of cultural dynamics. The criticism that such hypotheses regarding relative cultural stability are mere



rationalizations for a reactionary backward looking "revivalism" can be answered by reference to Bloch's concept of "non-simultaneity" (Bloch 1991), which allows the conceptualization of a structured, dialectical, and multi-layered conception of temporality.

## Understanding and explanation

While Salazar may express a personal preference for hermeneutic understanding over empirical explanation, he would conceivably not contest the goal of social science in analyzing social phenomena distinct from the hermeneutic dimension. It is important in this respect that he does not deny that science is involved in the study of entities which are prior to and independent of discourse. As he asserted most emphatically, "One cannot say: the concept=phenomenon, because if it were thus then you would not need to approach the phenomenon, you would be content with the conceptual system" (Salazar 2002). This can be said to amount to an outright rejection of the idealist thesis that the concept simply "produces" its object. The implications are clear: that PP ought to broaden its disciplinary focus from its beginnings in a hermeneutically-based historical approach to allow greater scope for methodological pluralism appropriate to the different social sciences. As a point of clarification, the generally hesitant attitude of PP towards the use of causal explanation in the analysis of empirical, law-like features of social phenomena does not mean that they do not and cannot resort to detailed and even excessively meticulous analysis of facts and empirical data. However, as the Schmoller-Menger debate in economics (Small 1924; Menger 1963) has demonstrated, even the most thoroughgoing empiricism of the Schmoller type could still decline from any attempt at deriving general historical principles based on the observation of law-like behavior of social phenomena (Heilbroner 1985), just because its goal was simply to represent historical particularity and nothing more. The final lesson of that *Methodenstreit* (conflict of methods) is that the accumulation of empirical material in their particularity and the development of corresponding theoretical apparatuses to grasp historical generalities need not be opposed in principle and should in actuality support one another.

The writings of Salazar, replete with extensive exercises in semantic

exploration and diagrammatic exposition, can give the impression of an overbearing emphasis on hermeneutic methodologies and an underemphasis on empirical explanation, if not the implicit dismissal of such approaches. This does not do justice to PP's own use of such social sciences as linguistics, especially its comparative branch, which depends on such objectivistic methods as the search for empirical linguistic laws.

The question of "ideological conflict" is an instance where Salazar displays a marked tendency to minimize the value of empirical explanation. In cases where he does not dismiss ideological conflict as a mere transplantation of foreign ideologies to a "Filipino context" (Salazar 1991b), he nevertheless asserts that an existing "deeper level" of relative cultural uniformity is in fact what makes the conflict of class ideologies possible in the first place. This viewpoint both circumvents the qualitative analysis of the complex articulation of class ideologies with other ideological systems and evades the empirical question of the objectivity of class relations. The "resolution" of the latter issue evidently requires methods of empirical analysis not confined to hermeneutic or genealogical analyses of terminologies of social stratification (Kimmuel-Gabriel 1999). Much the same critique was levelled by Milagros Guerrero (1981) against Iletto's *Pasyon and Revolution* regarding the roots of peasant revolt in the Philippines.

The resort to what some rigorous emicists deem "unacceptable" quantitative "etic" concepts in the empirical analysis of social structure seems to rule out these types of social analysis altogether, as can be seen in their facetious dismissal of *dependista* theory, which they conflate with all other "theories of imperialist exploitation" as mere negative manifestations of colonial ideology. In this case, the empirical analysis of colonial/neo-colonial mechanisms of exploitation is "resolved" or "dissolved" merely by pointing out that this scientific problem is a belated manifestation of colonial ideology (*pangkami*), albeit in its negative "anti-colonial" form. (Salazar seems here to have given a unique twist to Atal's [1990] fertile notion that all "indigenization" movements in the social sciences have had to go through a "reactive phase" in which they serve as a "rhetoric of counterattack" against colonialism.) Discursive analysis thus preempts empirical investigation, requiring neither attempts at empirical

falsification nor even comprehension, much less genuine theoretical engagement with the theory of colonial/neo-colonial exploitation. It is no wonder then that such a position would be hard put to deal with or even recognize the significance of such topics as "cultural imperialism" which is consigned to a merely reactive dimension. Discontent with this deficiency in PP was included as one of the reasons why a group of "ex-PP" historians migrated to an ostensibly broader research agenda called "Kasaysayang Bayan" (People's History) (Llanes, 1999).

Putting aside issues of whether it is possible to create a purely "affirmative" philosophy which eschews all moves towards the "negative" and critical (Deleuze 1983), the practical step of striving towards social change requires acts of both affirmation and negation. In truth, a purely "affirmative" (also called "positivist") approach would not be directed towards the interests of liberation but towards the "self-affirmation" of the masses of what and where they are now, a cultural "self-affirmation" of a people living in hovels and daily on the brink of starvation and despair. Enriquez' (1995) "liberation psychology" employed another form of "hermeneutic" apparently derived from the methodology of "liberation theology" (the similarity in name seems to be not accidental) which attempted to *read* and define Philippine culture in the light of neo-colonial oppression and mass poverty and towards the direction of social transformation. This type of "hermeneutic circle" differs from that of Gadamer in that it requires the methodological unity of understanding and explanation, and interprets culture in the context of a structural analysis of social reality (Jay 1988). It also requires not just the empty and indeterminate negation of the existent characteristic of a purely reactive "negation of the negation," but the prior positive affirmation of a liberative culture (Dussel 1988).

### **The problem of ideology**

The two considerations above bring to the fore the problem of the possible divergence of social scientific explanation from the self-understanding of social agents of their own behavior. Within the current conceptualization of PP, divergences between the interpretation of social scientists and the "people" of social phenomena can only be explained by insufficient data or the "alienation" of the "elitist" social scientist from the "people." Certainly, the use of English

as the language of the social sciences underlines their tragic "distance" from the everyday lives of the Filipino people, but it is still conceivable (as it is in fact a reality in western societies) that a social science conducted completely in the national *lingua franca* could still arrive at interpretations of social phenomena which diverge in greater or lesser degree from the self-understanding of the subjects themselves. There can, as a matter of principle, be no complete unity between scientific and everyday understanding. This is not due to any *perverse* tendency of "the people" to cling to the "irrational" and "unscientific" but due to the inherent limitations which define science itself. Beyond the domains of "scientific knowledge" and the process of deepening this knowledge within history lie the ineradicable as-yet-unknown and ungrasped which constitute the very basis and rationale of scientific practice as opposed to scholasticism, or the mere ordering and codification of "the already known."

Social practice does not merely live "within" science but resides within the domain of both science and the eternal "not-yet" of science in a complex, multi-leveled, and mediated relation. Positivist scientism aims to but cannot swallow the whole of social existence within its truncated sphere. Opinions about the superiority of science to discourses on existential and theological matters misconstrue the problem by framing the interaction between discourses in an hierarchical form. The question should instead be directed at how these discourses relate or come into conflict with, reinforce or articulate with one another (Therborn 1980). The confrontation between the discourses of science and everyday life points to the need for new mediating structures between these broad domains. The aim of these mediating structures should not be to collapse one domain into another, as in scientific determinism or populist voluntarism, but, by means of preserving a creative tension, to arrive at new mediating practices which could lead to as yet unforeseeable transformations within these interacting domains. Not static self-containment but dynamic co-determination should be the goal. Following Hau's (2000) proposals for the development of adequate "ethical technologies" for the "formation of the subject of action," these technologies of mediation and "experiments in living" should transform the social sciences from elitist intellectual practices which view social subjects as mere passive objects of external manipulation into sciences for self-understanding

and critical reflection upon social reality aimed ultimately at human liberation from political and economic domination. They should function to mitigate relations of power within, at the same time that they work to erode the dominant class and power relations in the larger society. The process is far from complete, but PP has already moved several steps towards the goal of developing these mediating structures by reducing the barriers of linguistic alienation and emphasizing dialogical practices (or *talastasan*) within and among Filipino social scientists and between the former and the "people."

### **Finding new bearings for Pantayong Pananaw . . . . .**

It has been the objective of this essay to demonstrate that PP, in its current form, has not arrived at satisfactory positions on some of the problems discussed above, and thereby tends to be overly restrictive in its formulation, even if coherent and oftentimes elegant. As a social scientific research programme, it is suggested here that PP should be reformulated to give its practitioners a wider epistemological and methodological compass. Conceptions of relative cultural homogeneity and stability should be considered as testable hypotheses rather than self-evident principles guiding scientific research. Likewise, PP should maintain a position of neutrality on ontological and epistemological questions which ought to be preserved as areas for scientific research and philosophical investigations rather than "solved" by programmatic statements. These steps are fundamental if PP is to advance to broader fields of social science beyond history and historical methodology. The more inclusive discursive sphere thus created would follow and determine its own unforeseeable dynamics. It may or may not save itself from fundamentally mistaken ideas, but it would be a great mistake to foreclose debates when the field has not yet been definitively laid. To unnecessarily divide the ranks of social scientists working in Filipino this early would further weaken an already precarious struggle for the use of the national language among the intelligentsia in the period of so-called "globalization." To a certain extent, however, all of the proposals below already represent the *de facto* (if still implicit) principles currently guiding the practice of PP.

It is thus suggested that PP be explicitly reformulated along the following lines:

First, the principle of using the national language as the primary means of communication in Philippine social sciences should serve as the principal and broadest basis of unity and fruitful discursive exchange. The “pantayo” as a category of social scientific practice should thus cover a much broader, if less defined, group of practitioners.

Second, communication and translation protocols should be developed to facilitate a more productive intellectual interaction between Filipino and English language traditions in Philippine social science. Discourses of incommensurability and mutual incomprehension should be deflected into discourses of approximation where possible. PP’s determination and principled position of strength in regard to its use of the national language should allow it to be more expansive and accommodating to scholars with different linguistic preferences.

Third, the “pananaw” in PP should not be considered as pertaining to a coherent *Weltanschauung* but only as a broadly nationalist and critical viewpoint towards the development of an autonomous dynamic for the development of Philippine social sciences closely articulated with the aspirations of the Filipino people.

Fourth, efforts to develop appropriate and effective mediating structures between Philippine social science and the Filipino people, which PP has already begun, should be continually pursued and experimented upon as essential steps towards the radical restructuring of Philippine social sciences. However, progressive proponents of PP should emphasize that any such attempts at developing new methods of social and political interaction should never be idealistically understood in abstraction from the wider context of political and economic domination and exploitation. The whole point of these efforts is, after all, the liberation of the Filipino people.

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## Pantayong Pananaw: Eksposisi, Kritik, dan Arah Baru

Ramon Guillermo

Tulisan mengenai Pantayong Pananaw (Perspektif "Dari Kita untuk Kita"; PP) ini bertujuan memberikan gambaran awal tentang dimulainya sesuatu yang paling penting dan berkecenderungan kontroversial dalam sejarah ilmu sosial di Filipina. PP dimulai sejak akhir 1970-an sebagai gerakan "mempribumikan" oleh sekelompok kecil sejarawan Filipina yang dipimpin oleh Zeus A. Salazar di Universitas Filipina. Aslinya dirumuskan sebagai upaya keluar dari penulisan sejarah baik yang pro-Amerika awalnya maupun yang menentang tradisi nasionalis yang merupakan paradigma dominan pada masa 1950-an hingga 1970-an, PP sejak masa itu secara bertahap memiliki pengaruh kuat terhadap dua sisi yaitu filosofi dan metodologi pada disiplin lain dalam ilmu sosial dan kemanusiaan. Sebagai salah satu aspek dari suatu keharusan untuk mempribumikan yang berpusat-pada-budaya, praktisi PP memakai bahasa Filipino, bahasa nasional, sebagai alat utama bagi tulisan-tulisan mereka.

Tulisan ini bukanlah usaha langsung menuliskan eksposisi PP, melainkan upaya memberikan gambaran umum pada beberapa pokok perdebatan metodologi yang berkaitan dengan PP, dan pada saat yang memperlihatkan keunggulannya pada tingkat teoritis dan praktis dibandingkan dengan kecenderungan "mempribumikan" lain dalam ilmu sosial di Filipina. Pokok bahasan utama adalah mempersoalkan berputar-putarnya keberadaan metode sosial lain ketika berhadapan dengan menonjolnya pendekatan *emic* (atau dari dalam) dan hermenetika yang juga telah menjadi ciri utama karya-karya PP. Kritik terhadap PP yang mengatakannya sebagai "nativis" dan "esensialis" juga harus dipertimbangkan. Salah satu tujuan utama tulisan ini adalah memberikan kepada sidang pembaca mengenai gambaran umum, bisa jadi tidak lengkap, tingkat dan kerumitan perdebatan yang saat ini terjadi terhadap satu kecenderungan "mempribumikan" penting dalam ilmu sosial Filipina.

Upaya PP menyelesaikan keterasingan yang mendalam antara ilmu sosial Filipina dan "orang" Filipino dengan memakai bahasa nasional dan penciptaan alternatif bagi interaksi dua arah mesti pula mendapatkan catatan khusus. Akhirnya, tulisan ini menasehati ke arah pembentukan pada apa yang dipertimbangkan oleh penulis sebagai definisi yang lebih baik dan luas bagi PP sebagai praktik ilmu sosial di dalam konteks Filipina.

Translated by Wahyu Prasetyawan



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Ramon Guillermo

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Ang sanaysay na ito hinggil sa Pantayong Pananaw (PP) ay naglalayong magbigay ng panimulang sulyap sa isang direksyon na maaaring maibilang sa mga pinakaimpluwensyal at pinakakontrobersyal sa kasaysayan ng agham panlipunan sa Pilipinas. Nagsimula ang PP sa huling banda ng dekada setenta bilang isang kilusang “indigenizing” sa loob ng isang grupo ng mga istoryador, na pinangunahan ni Zeus Salazar, sa Unibersidad ng Pilipinas. Unang ibinuo bilang paglabas sa magkatunggaling tradisyong pro-Estados Unidos at tradisyong nasyonalista sa historiograpiyang Pilipino na naghaharing *paradigm* mula dekada singkwenta hanggang dekada setenta, ang PP mula noon ay unti-unting nagkaroon ng impluwensyang pilosopikal at metodolohikal sa iba pang mga disiplina sa agham panlipunan at sa humanidades. Bilang integral na aspeto ng panawagang “indigenizing” na nakasentro sa kultura, ang mga tagapagtaguyod ng PP ay gumagamit sa Filipino, ang pambansang wika, bilang pangunahing midyum ng kanilang mga sulatin.

Hindi tinatangka sa sanaysay na ito na magbigay ng direktang pagpapaliwanag sa PP, bagkus ay sinisikap dito na ihanay ang ilan sa mga pangunahing debateng metodolohikal kaugnay ng PP, habang sinisikap na ipakita ang nakaaangat na katayuan nito sa teorya at praktika sa iba pang mga tendensiyang “indigenizing” sa agham panlipunan sa Pilipinas. Ang mga pangunahing usapin dito ay ang katayuan ng ibang mga metodolohiya sa agham panlipunan sa harap ng nangingibabaw na *emic* (o internal) at mga lapit na *bermenetical* na naging katangian ng mga representatibong akdang PP. Ang mga puna sa PP bilang “nativist” at “essentialist” ay bahagyang tatalakayin. Isa sa mga pangunahing layunin ng sanaysay ay ang mabigyan ang mambabasa ng isang heneral, bagamat hindi kumprehensibo, na kaalaman sa antas at pagkasalimuot ng kasalukuyang debateng umiikot sa isa sa mga pinakamahalagang tendensiyang “indigenizing” sa agham

panlipunan sa Pilipinas. Ang pagtatangka ng PP na malutasan ang radikal na pagkawalay o alyenasyon sa pagitan ng agham panlipunan at “mamamayang” Pilipino sa pamamagitan ng paggamit sa pambansang wika at paglikha ng alternatibong larangan para sa palitang dialohikal ay binibigyang-pansin din. Bilang wakas, naghaharap ang sanaysay ng mga mungkahi tungo sa pagbubuo ng ipinapalagay ng may-akda na mas makatutulong at mas malawak na depinisyon ng PP bilang praktika sa agham panlipunan sa loob ng kontekstong Pilipino.

Translated by Sofia Guillermo.

ラモン・グィレルモ(Ramon Guillermo)

Pantayong Pananaw (「我々から我々のために」というパースペクティブ、以下PP)についてのこの小論は、フィリピン社会科学の歴史に大きな影響を及ぼし、論争を呼んだ知的傾向を、予偏的に精緻することを目的としている。PPは1970年代後半、フィリピン大学においてZeus A. Salazarを中心とするフィリピン人歴史家の「国粋化」運動として始まった。この運動は本来の1950年代から70年代にかけてフィリピン史記述における主要なパラダイムであった初期の親米的伝統と、それに反対する国民主義的伝統、その双方が決別するかたちで形成された。それ以来、PPはしたいに社会科学と人文科学の他の分野においても哲学的、方法論的に影響を及ぼした。PPの実践者は、その文化中心的国粋化運動には当り前のこととして、国語であるフィリピン語をその言語として使用する。

この小論はPPを分かりやすく説明することを目的とするものではない。この小論はその代わりPPに関わるいくつかの主要な方法論上の論争を概説し、同時にフィリピンの社会科学における他の「国粋化」傾向に対するその理論的、実践的優位について示したいと思う。その主要な論点の一つは、PPの代表的作品の特徴である圧倒的に文化的(もしくは内向きの)解釈学的方法と他の社会科学方法との位置関係に関わる。「土着主義者」、「本質還元主義者」といったPPへの批判もまた簡潔に考察される。この小論の主要な目的の一つは、いまフィリピンの社会科学の中で起こっている最も重要な「国粋化」傾向のひとつについて、近年どのような議論が行われているか、そしてその水準と複雑さについて、たとえ不完全にではあっても読者に伝えようとするにある。フィリピンの社会科学とフィリピン「人民」の間にあるラディカルな断絶を国語を使用することによって克服し、対話による相互作用が出来るような別の場を創り出そうとするPPの試みもまた特筆すべきであろう。最後にこの小論は、筆者がフィリピンの文脈の中での社会科学上の実践として、PPのより生き生きとしたより広範な定義を作り出すための提言を示すものである。

Translated by Onimaru Takeshi (鬼丸武士)

## ปินตายง ปานานอว์ : การอธิบาย การวิพากษ์และทิศทางใหม่

Ramon Guillermo (รามอน กิลเยอร์โม)

บทความเรื่องปินตายง ปานานอว์นี้ (ปินตายง ปานานอว์ หมายถึง "จากพวกเราเพื่อพวกเรา" และเรียกโดยย่อว่า "พีพี") มุ่งเสนอภาพรวมเบื้องต้นของแนวการศึกษา ที่อาจเป็นแนวโน้มที่มีอิทธิพลและก่อให้เกิดการถกเถียงมากที่สุด ในประวัติศาสตร์ของสังคมศาสตร์ในฟิลิปปินส์ พีพีเริ่มก่อตัวขึ้นในช่วงปลายทศวรรษ 1970 จากความเคลื่อนไหวในกลุ่มนักประวัติศาสตร์ชาวฟิลิปปินส์ นำโดย ซุส เอ ซาลาซาร์ แห่งมหาวิทยาลัยแห่งฟิลิปปินส์ ที่พยายามสร้าง "ความเป็นพื้นเมือง" ขึ้นในการเข้าใจสังคมฟิลิปปินส์ ในระยะแรก พีพีเป็นความพยายามที่ต้องการดึงตัวออกจากขนบการเขียนประวัติศาสตร์ของฟิลิปปินส์ที่ดำรงอยู่ในขณะนั้น 2 แนว คือ แนวนิยมอเมริกา และแนวชาตินิยมที่ต่อต้านแนวทางแรก ขนบทั้งสองนี้เป็นกระบวนทัศน์ที่มีอิทธิพลมากที่สุดในช่วงทศวรรษ 1950 ถึงทศวรรษ 1970 หลังจากนั้น พีพีได้ส่งผลอิทธิพลอย่างช้าๆ ทั้งในเชิงปรัชญาและระเบียบวิธีการของสังคมศาสตร์และมนุษยศาสตร์สาขาอื่นๆ กลุ่มพีพีใช้ภาษาฟิลิปปินส์ซึ่งเป็นภาษาประจำชาติ เป็นภาษาหลักในงานเขียน ทั้งนี้การใช้ภาษาฟิลิปปินส์ถือเป็นส่วนหนึ่งที่แยกออกไม่ได้จากขบวนการสร้าง "ความเป็นพื้นเมือง" บนฐานของวัฒนธรรม

บทความนี้ไม่ได้มุ่งให้อรรถาธิบายแนวคิดพีพีโดยตรง หากแต่พยายามแสดงเค้าโครงของประเด็นข้อถกเถียงที่สำคัญทางระเบียบวิธีการที่เกี่ยวข้องกับพีพี ในขณะเดียวกัน ก็ต้องการแสดงให้เห็นความเหนือกว่าในทางทฤษฎีและปฏิบัติการของพีพี เมื่อพิจารณาเปรียบเทียบกับแนวโน้มความเคลื่อนไหวในการสร้าง "ความเป็นพื้นเมือง" อื่นๆ ที่เกิดขึ้นในวงการสังคมศาสตร์ของฟิลิปปินส์ ประเด็นหลักในบทความนี้ คือ การเปรียบเทียบสถานะของระเบียบวิธีการทางสังคมศาสตร์อื่นๆ กับระเบียบวิธีที่ใช้ในงานที่ฐานแนวคิดแบบ

พีพี ซึ่งเน้นทั้งทัศนะของผู้ถูกศึกษาหรือทัศนะของ “คนใน” และเซอร์เมนิวติคัส นอกจากนั้น บทความนี้จะพิจารณาโดยย่อถึงข้อวิจารณ์ที่ว่า พีพี “นิยมความเป็นพื้นเมืองอย่างสุดโต่ง (nativist)” และ “มุ่งแต่จะกำหนดคำจำกัดความและคำอธิบายที่แน่นอนตายตัวให้กับปรากฏการณ์ต่างๆ (essentialist)” จุดประสงค์หลักประการหนึ่งของบทความนี้ คือ การให้ผู้อ่านเข้าใจในระดับหนึ่งถึงระดับและความซับซ้อนของข้อถกเถียงต่างๆ ที่เกี่ยวกับพีพี ซึ่งถือเป็นแนวโน้มในการสร้าง “ความเป็นพื้นเมือง” ที่สำคัญที่สุดแนวหนึ่งในวงการสังคมศาสตร์ของฟิลิปปินส์ บทความนี้ยังเน้นให้เห็นถึงความพยายามของพีพีที่จะจัดไม่ให้วงวิชาการสังคมศาสตร์ในฟิลิปปินส์ แปรแยกจาก “ผู้คนระดับชาวบ้าน” ของฟิลิปปินส์มากจนเกินไป ด้วยการใช้ภาษาประจำชาติและด้วยการสร้างทางเลือกใหม่ที่เปิดโอกาสให้ทั้งสองฝ่ายสื่อสารแบบมีปฏิสัมพันธ์โต้ตอบกันได้ ท้ายสุด บทความนี้ยังให้ข้อเสนอแนะบางประการต่อการกำหนดความหมายของพีพีที่กว้างขวางครอบคลุมและเป็นไปได้มากขึ้น ในฐานะที่พีพีเป็นปฏิบัติการทางสังคมศาสตร์ในบริบทของฟิลิปปินส์

Translated by Darin Pradittatsanee with assistance from Somporn  
Puttapithakporm and Chalong Soontravanich

# Problems in Contemporary Thai Nationalist Historiography

Patrick Jory

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There are certain periods when historical discourses and their politics – who controls them, the mode by which they are disseminated, how competing histories are suppressed – become central to intellectual or public debate. In Thailand it has been some time since history provoked that kind of interest. Nationalist historiography appears to have achieved a position of hegemony that would be remarkable were it not for the fact that it apparently arouses little opposition. How secure, then, is this political and scholarly enterprise a hundred years after it was founded?

This article briefly outlines a number of problems for contemporary Thai nationalist historiography. The first of these is the subject of these narratives itself, the Thai nation. How has the historiography of the Thai nation fared, particularly since the critique of the concept of “nation” in the 1980s provoked by works such as Anderson’s *Imagined Communities* and Hobsbawm and Ranger’s *The Invention of Tradition*? Second, what is the role of the monarchy in these narratives? How does the monarchy’s current political and cultural influence

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limit the possibilities of Thai historiography? A third problem has been the representation of ethnic and regional minorities, which has challenged the previously unproblematic understanding of a unified, culturally homogeneous nation. A new issue that has appeared since the Thailand's economic expansion of the 1990s is the effect of Thai nationalist historiography – as represented in TV dramas and movies, as well as in school texts – on relations with Thailand's neighbors, which have led to diplomatic tensions. The next problem, for the moment, concerns mainly the professional historians of the academy: the influence of postmodern theory since the 1990s and its undermining of history's truth claims. If Thai history is simply one story among countless others with no superior claim to authority over the past, how does it deserve its privileged status? Finally, there is the issue of professional history's current state of near irrelevance to the way history is popularly perceived.

### **Formulations of the nation**

In the mid-1980s Nidhi Eoseewong, the dominant figure in Thai historical scholarship over the last twenty years, published a paper titled "Two Hundred Years of Thai History and Future Directions," which proposed a model for periodizing the production of Thai historiography (Nidhi 2002a). According to Nidhi, Thai historical scholarship can be divided into three distinct periods, each of which is defined by an "identity crisis" experienced by the Thai ruling elite. The first is the Thonburi-early Ratanakosin ("Bangkok") period of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries following the fall of the kingdom of Ayuthaya to the Burmese in 1767. This catastrophic event provoked Thai intellectuals to pose questions about the weakness of the Ayuthaya state, its system of administration, and even Thai cultural "values" and sense of "identity" which may have contributed to its downfall (2002a, 6). The answers to many of these questions were to be found in history, and for this reason there was an outpouring of historical work produced by scholars within and around the Thai court during that period. But with the stabilization of the Thai state under the early Chakri kings, this surge of interest in history gradually faded.

A second "identity crisis" occurred in the aftermath of the Pak Nam crisis of 1893, when the French seized the left bank of the Mekong River and threatened

the Thai state with full-scale colonization. The Thai elite was once again forced to reassess itself and explain the weaknesses that had led to this disaster. It implemented massive reforms to the kingdom's system of provincial administration and underwent a no less massive cultural revolution in attempting to imitate the standards of "civilization" demanded by the European colonial powers to avoid being branded "barbarians." This era saw the birth of modern Thai historiography, much of it penned by or published on the authority of the "Father of Thai History," King Chulalongkorn's younger brother Prince Damrong Rachanubhab. However, with the passing of the colonial threat, the Great Powers' acceptance of an independent "Siam" into the colonial order of inter-state relations, and the subsiding sense of "identity crisis" rising from the growing familiarity of the Thai elite with western culture through western education and visits to Europe, the flood of original historical scholarship of the Fifth and Sixth Reigns began to slow. Even after the overthrow of the Absolute Monarchy in 1932 there was no radical questioning of the Thai past. Indeed, there was a new interest in western history (2002a, 23).

The third and latest period of Thai historiography, according to Nidhi, followed Sarit's coup of 1957 and the ensuing "American Era" (Anderson and Mendiones 1985). This was the era of capitalist economic development based on the advice of western economic advisers, the outbreak of a communist insurgency in Thailand and government's alignment with the United States, the escalation of the Vietnam War and establishment of U.S. military bases, and the flood of American popular culture into Thailand. At the same time, Thai students in numbers greater than ever before were funded to study at American universities. All this led to a new identity crisis for the Thai upper class, which once again asked, "who are we, and who shall we be in the future?" (Nidhi 2002a, 27). This third crisis ushered in a new era of historical scholarship which questioned existing historical knowledge – works such as Jit Phumisak's Marxist reworking of Thai history (2000), the re-reading of ancient inscriptions (Prasert Na Nakhon 1982), original work in prehistory (Srisak Vallibhodom 1981), the beginnings of the history of ethnic minorities, and general interest in the problem of "Thai identity." As in the two earlier phases, and for much the same reasons, this latest surge of interest in history and the production of original historical work began to wane in the 1980s. With the defeat of the communist insurgency



(hastened by the end of the Cold War) and a rapidly developing economy by late in the decade, the Thai state had achieved a position of greater security than at any time since the colonial threat at the turn of the nineteenth century. Growing familiarity with western culture and greater "cultural self-confidence" also helped relieve the identity crisis created by confrontation with western (particularly American) culture in the 1960s. A clear indicator of the declining interest in history was the dramatic fall of enrolments in history departments in universities around the country. (2002a, 35-6).

Thus for Nidhi, Thai historiography as it has been produced over the last two centuries originates out of a desire on the part of the Thai elite to define a Thai self that is periodically threatened by outsiders.

If the "Thai nation" is a relatively unproblematic concept in this study, it becomes more problematized in Nidhi's work from the 1990s, where, for example, he looks at the role of the state in promoting Thai nationalism through primary school textbooks (citing Anderson's *Imagined Communities*) (Nidhi 1995b, 47) or the construction of monuments. Later articles for the news weekly *Maticbon Sutsapda* also criticize conceptions of the Thai nation devised by the state (Nidhi 2002b). Yet Nidhi's consistent theme is not that the Thai nation is an empty "construction," but rather that its definition has been too narrow and that it ought to be fully representative, in particular of "ordinary" Thai men and women.

The other figure who has had a major impact on the history of Thai nationalism is Thongchai Winichakul. Unlike Nidhi, Thongchai writes and publishes in both English and Thai, and for this reason he is better known outside the Thai scholarly community. His influential *Siam Mapped* (1994), which is also inspired by Anderson's work, focuses on the construction in the late nineteenth century of a territorial conception of the Thai nation, what he terms the "geo-body." In this and other works Thongchai's approach is far more critical of the concept of the Thai nation than Nidhi's. This derives in part from his direct involvement in one of the key events of modern Thai political history, the massacre of students by security forces and village militias at Thammasat University on 6 October 1976. Thongchai's critique of the Thai nation is thus

not simply a disinterested exercise in academic analysis, but at least partly a dialogue with 1976 – the Thai “nation” has blood on its hands.

In contrast to its status in public discourse, the nation in Thai historiography is not an overbearing, oppressive, or untouchable presence. Saichon’s recent study of the concept of the Thai nation and Thai identity in the work of the chief ideologue of the Phibun era, Luang Wichit Wathakan, is yet another work that attacks these notions, or at least the manner in which they have been defined and disseminated by the Thai state (Saichon 2002). Within the community of Thai historians, therefore, the nation can be criticized, challenged, ignored, redefined, or deconstructed out of existence, with little controversy.

The same can not, of course, be said of the dominant element in current formulations of the nation, the monarchy. The monarchy’s overwhelming political and cultural presence (Jory 2001) in the Thai polity today limits what can be said about a number of key historical events, among them the overthrow of the Absolute Monarchy in 1932, the death of Rama VIII, the present king’s elder brother, in 1946, and the massacre of students at Thammasat University in 1976. These events will have to await a future era in historical scholarship for any radically new interpretation to be expressed publicly.

However, the main problem in Thai historiography is not so much what cannot be said, but that which *is* said. This is the basis of Thongchai’s critique of what he terms “royalist-nationalist history” (*prawatitai baep rachabatinijom*). For Thongchai, this is the ideology which currently dominates historical thinking in Thailand and which leaves no space in the national narrative for what should be central episodes, such as the 6 October 1976 massacre (Thongchai 2001). Thongchai’s genealogy of this mode of Thai historiography is somewhat different from that of Nidhi. Thongchai locates the origins of “royalist-nationalist history” in the Pak Nam crisis of 1893. The central theme of the new historical genre that developed after this event was the defense of “Siam’s” independence against foreigners (especially the western powers or the Burmese). The heroes of the new genre are the kings, not on account of their membership of an illustrious lineage or their supernatural powers, as in the old royal chronicles, but for their role in safeguarding (or winning back, in the case of King Naresuan)

Siam's independence. But rather than seeing in the 1893 incident the Siamese "lamb" being terrorized by the French "wolf" leading to the "loss" of part of "Thailand," Thongchai provocatively argues that the incident should be interpreted as the "big wolf" of France and the "small wolf" of Siam fighting over the "lambs" of Lao and Cambodian territories (Thongchai 2001, 59). As he demonstrated earlier in *Siam Mapped* (1994), Thai nationalist historiography has represented this incident by projecting modern notions of "nation" and "national territorial sovereignty" onto a situation in which state relations existed on the basis of feudal tribute and overlordship arrangements between otherwise "autonomous" polities. The success of royalist-nationalist historiography has been such that the representation of this event by the Bangkok aristocrats and nobility at the turn of the century has become a central myth of the Thai nation. While Prince Damrong and other members of the Thai court in the Fifth and Sixth Reigns gave birth to this new historiographical genre, it was ironically the monarchy's enemies, the promoters of the 1932 coup, who ensured the victory of this genre over all others by its dissemination in barely altered form to the Thai population through the compulsory education system and state media. The outcome has been a greater dominance of royalist-nationalist historiography than could have been imagined in the era of the Absolute Monarchy (Thongchai 2001, 62).

While one might have expected this dominant historical narrative to have been shaken by the democratic uprising of 14 October 1973, Thongchai points out an irony of Thai history that 1973 "liberated" the dormant energies not only of "the people," but also of the monarchy, which has subsequently enjoyed its greatest levels of popularity since the death of Chulalongkorn in 1910. Royalist-nationalist historiography thus became democratized. Its practitioners were no longer the aristocracy, but a new breed of bourgeois academics critical of the military regime. Yet a further irony is that within the plot of royalist-nationalist historiography, the instigators of the 1932 coup against the Absolute Monarchy, the Peoples Party, have now acquired the dubious reputation of being the originators of military authoritarian rule. In perhaps the supreme irony, Rama VII, the last absolutist ruler in Thai history, has become the officially recognized "Father of Thai Democracy"! Pridi Phanomyong, the leading intellectual within the coup group, has been rehabilitated to a certain extent, but shorn of his

socialist ideals and with his loyalty to the throne intact (Thongchai 2001, 62-3).

For Thongchai, then, "royalist-nationalist historiography" is the strait-jacket which restrains any attempt to present a revisionist interpretation of Thai history. But more than this, although the point is understated for reasons mentioned above, this version of history is directly implicated in the massacre of October 1976.

If the monarchy is an ongoing constraint on the possibilities of Thai national historiography, it might be thought that the obstacles to a representation of a more regionally and ethnically diverse nation have been coming down in recent years. For a long time, Bangkok-centric discourses of Thai national identity determined the representation of the country's regional and ethnic diversity. But with the improved national security situation of the 1990s following the end of the Cold War, Thailand's "diversity" (*khvam lak lai*) has acquired a more positive value and has finally been embraced by the state itself – up to a point. The major impetus to this change was the middle-class "uprising" of 1992 that led to the democratization of the Thai political regime and the acceptance of the legitimacy of political pluralism. The corresponding erosion of the bureaucratic polity and the increased significance of the National Assembly and elected politicians have given increased political representation to regional groups. Use of regional dialects and appeals to local cultural identity, once viewed as threats to national security, are now the normal stuff of political campaigning. The new 1997 Constitution provides numerous formal protections for cultural minorities. The tourism industry, strategically important to Thailand's economic development given its capacity to attract foreign exchange with minimal capital investment, promotes ethnic and cultural diversity as a key "resource" for the industry's further development. Perhaps most important of all, since the bourgeois revolution and the development of consumerism beyond Bangkok, Thailand's population is being conceptualized as a mass of culturally, linguistically, ethnically diverse *markets*. Companies and their advertisers will speak the language of whatever market they wish to target, thereby lending new legitimacy to such diversity, but within the parameters of the free market economy and the demands of consumerism.

The modern historiography of Thailand's cultural minorities dates from at least the 1960s, but has greatly expanded since the 1980s and 1990s in the more liberal political environment. However, as Thongchai has pointed out (1995), for the most part this historiography rarely departs from the framework created by nationalist historiography from the centre. Indeed it could be argued that "local history" (*prawatisat tbongbin*), as it is known, if anything affirms the truths of nationalist history rather than challenging them. The fact that Chiang Mai or Nakhon Sri Thammarat can claim to have existed as independent "Thai" states prior to Sukhothai, the first officially recognized state in the national narrative, is no longer controversial because Thai sovereignty over these regions has not been in question since the colonial period. However, the case of Patani is the clear exception. The historiography of the state of Patani written by local historians in both Malay and Thai are linked in spirit (if not directly politically) to the separatist movements that have sought to free Patani from Thai political control since its integration into the Thai state during the Fifth Reign and the deposition and imprisonment of its last sultan, Abdul Kadir. Davisakd has described the on-going struggle between Thai centralist and Patani local historians for discursive control of Patani's past, which relates directly to the question of Patani's sovereignty (Davisakd 2002a).

The expansion of tertiary education into the provinces from the 1960s and the changed political atmosphere and value surrounding cultural diversity has led to more research being conducted into ethnic and regional groups. Yet these studies have their own regulations regarding what can and cannot be said. In 2000 Arkhom Detthongkham from Nakhon Sri Thammarat's Ratchabhat College published an ethnographic study of the culture of bull-fighting in southern Thailand. The study is a model of what local studies should be, capturing the "flavor" of the aggressive masculine culture of the south through the metaphor of the bull-fight (Arkhom 2000). The research was picked up by the national media – this was a time when the southern-dominated Democrats Party was in government – and within days Arkhom was forced into hiding following threats by local influential figures against what was interpreted as the study's denigration of southern Thai culture. Here it is not the state, the traditional villain, but local politicians with otherwise prominent roles in the narrative of democratization and decentralization of the 1980s and 1990s who

are setting the limits to intellectual freedom.

In other cases, local histories which seek to go beyond a centrist, statist-oriented version of Thai history highlight the role of the state in unexpected ways. In 1995 Matichon Group published a master's thesis written by Saipin Kaewngamprasert on "Thao Suranari," said to be the heroine who helped suppress a Lao "revolt" in Nakhon Ratchasima (Khorat) in the reign of Rama III. A monument to Thao Suranari was constructed by the new government in 1933 shortly after its suppression of the royalist Boworadet rebellion which had used Khorat as a base – further adding to the "rebel" city's infamous reputation. The statue of Thao Suranari (or "Ya Mo" as she is more affectionately known) has since become not only a cultural emblem but also a religious landmark for the people of Khorat and, to a certain extent, the northeastern region generally. The crux of Saipin's thesis is that there is no evidence from the reign of Rama III to indicate the existence, let alone heroism, of Thao Suranari. The implication was that the cult of Thao Suranari was constructed by the government to ensure the loyalty of the northeastern region to the Thai state, a loyalty that remained in question up to the 1960s. This thesis was interpreted as a slight on the people of Khorat. Demonstrations were organized by various groups in Khorat, goaded on by local politicians demanding, among other things, that the book be burned, that Saipin apologize to the monument, and that her master's degree be withdrawn. Eventually Matichon was forced to recall the book; Saipin went into hiding and was later transferred from her school in Nakhon Ratchasima to another province. The episode has many lessons. It is an irony that what started out as a state cult has now become a crucial element in contemporary discourses of regional cultural identity. Moreover, the power of regionalism, so long suppressed by the Thai state, now resorts to the same tactics of intimidation used by the state when its foundations are questioned by academic scholarship.

### Regional relations

A new problem for Thai historiography, one that a number of Asian nations face, is the impact of nationalist history on relations with other countries in the region. During the 1990s, Thailand's economic links with its neighbors – Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar in particular – reached a level not seen since prior

to the colonial era. The impetus for these developments was Thailand's capitalist expansion fueled by record economic growth from the second half of the 1980s. A new element in Thailand's presence in these countries is its media, especially in the form of television dramas and movies. Over the last decade a number of Thai media productions, many of them with an historical theme, have led to diplomatic incidents. Relations with Myanmar, already strained over a number of security issues, deteriorated further after the Burmese regime criticized the hit 1998 movie *Bang Rajan* for its depiction of the Burmese as brutal marauders. The villagers of Bang Rajan are an icon in Thai nationalist history for having sacrificed their lives fighting the Burmese, who went on to besiege and eventually sack the capital Ayuthaya in 1767. The movie was produced in the wake of a resurgence of Thai nationalism following the economic crisis of 1997-8. The representation of the Burmese in another historical film drama, the 2002 *Suriyothai*, supposedly inspired by a dream of the Queen, is little better. In a response that same year, Burmese academic Ma Thin Win, presumably with the approval of the Burmese government, published a series of articles in *The New Light of Myanmar* critical of the sixteenth-century Thai king Naresuan, who is credited with saving the Thai "nation" from Burmese occupation. For several days Thai army radio stations broadcast a barrage of anti-Burmese commentary, even accusing the regime of slandering the Thai monarchy. The incident was only resolved after the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister were forced to intervene.

One major contributing problem is the historical textbooks on which these productions are largely based. These are written for the most part within the royalist-nationalist genre described by Thongchai that projects the national framework back onto the pre-nationalist past. The colonial nature of the pre-national Thai state – bringing into its political orbit the Lao territories, Cambodia, and the northern Malay states – is unquestioned. The textbooks are replete with often humiliating images of the Thai kingdom's subjection of its neighbors. In one famous episode, King Naresuan is supposed to have beheaded the King of Lawack (Cambodia) and bathed his feet with his blood. In another, the Lao Prince Anuwong, leader of a "revolt" against Thai rule in the 1820s and a nationalist hero in modern Lao historical discourse, is paraded through Bangkok in a cage before his eventual execution.

As Thailand's relations with its neighbors becomes more intensive as a result of the country's integration and increasing economic interaction within ASEAN, this historiography and its expression in Thailand's exported cultural products will inevitably come under greater scrutiny and pressure to respond to contemporary political and economic demands.

### Methodology and consumption

The passions that nationalist history can stir among nations are based upon history's claim to speak meaningfully of the origins of the nation. The entry of postmodernism onto Thailand's academic scene challenges this claim. In September 2002 Giles Ungkhakorn, son of one of the heroes of the democracy movement of the 1970s, Puey Ungphakorn, and a leading leftist activist-intellectual in the country, published a short article in the business daily, *Krungthep Thburakij* (September 4), ostensibly relating his attendance at a "cremation ceremony for postmodernism." The theme of the article was that postmodernism was little more than a rarified academic indulgence carried on by academics in ivory towers far removed from the struggles of the poor. Postmodernism had nothing to offer the "peoples' movements" struggling for the rights of the poor against exploitation. On the contrary, it would be a positively dangerous influence on the country's "progressive forces" if this academic "opiate" were imbibed by students and NGOs. The article set off vigorous debate among Thai academics and intellectuals both in Thailand and overseas via the internet and email, which are now challenging the popular print media as the primary site of intellectual debate. Ungphakorn had touched a raw nerve – the struggle between Marxism and postmodernism for the soul of the "critical" intellectual.

Postmodernism's history in Thailand started in the early 1980s. But it is only since the late 1990s, in the wake of the end of the Cold War and the blow this caused to Marxist-inspired critical scholarship, that postmodernism has emerged as a serious potential rival. Interestingly, political science has been the discipline where postmodernism's influence has been felt the most, and Thammasat University has been its preferred home. Chaiwat Satha-Anand was one of the first to use a Foucauldian approach in his PhD thesis, "The Non-



Violent Prince" (1981), and Foucault's influence is also apparent in his recent history of the conflict between the Thai state and separatists in Patani (Chaiwat 2002). Chairat Charoensinolan's study of the discourse of development (2000) has been the most influential work in recent years on the history of Thai economic development. Chairat also uses Foucault to criticize western discourses of development that have dominated economic thinking and policy making since the first Economic and Social Development Plan of 1961. He has since published another book on semiology, structuralism, and deconstruction and their use in political science (Chairat 2002). Another Thammasat-based political scientist, Kasian Tejapira, of the October 1976 leftist generation, has grafted a postmodern approach onto his former Marxist-oriented views, particular Baudrillard's work on consumption, semiology, and identity (Kasian 2001).

History appears to have felt postmodernism's impact less than other disciplines. The historian whose approach owes most to postmodernism is Thongchai, as is clearly evident in his *Siam Mapped*. Among the younger generation of historians, Davisakd Puaksom has recently completed a Thailand Research Fund-sponsored project on the history of western medicine in Thailand, in which he draws on Foucault's work on medical discourse and institutions and their control of the body (Davisakd 2002b).

The problem postmodernism poses for Thai historiography is its undermining of any attempt – whether liberal, Marxist, or royalist – to claim to represent a "true" interpretation of the Thai past. However, one of the major focuses of postmodern critique in the West, its questioning of reason, modernity, and the Enlightenment, has received comparatively little attention in Thai historical scholarship. While there have been attempts to show an indigenous origin for the development of reason in Thailand (Nidhi 1995a), the explanation of the coming of reason and modernity to the Thai kingdom has been dominated by the theory of the impact of western colonial power in the second half of the nineteenth century. There is much room for reinterpretation of this accepted truth.

Where postmodernism has been particularly influential in historical circles has been in its critique of the notion that historical truth may be attained

through the use of reason and the rules of evidence, or what was formerly known as the "historical method," as influenced by the positivist "scientific method." Truth in historical discourse is no more than a political construction of its author. But as Nidhi (among others) has pointed out, if all there is is "construction" and "deconstruction," what else is left to do? (Nidhi 2002b, 35). The nation can easily be written away as a constructed fiction.

While these debates may consume professional historians, academic history today has less influence in the public sphere than it has had at any time since Prince Damrong initiated professional history writing at the turn of the twentieth century. What is today consumed as history by the Thai public consists of two forms: the royalist-nationalist history taught in the schools and popularized through bureaucratic channels; and products of the commercial media in the form of movies, TV dramas, and even advertisements, which are gradually becoming the dominant mode of reproduction of historical knowledge. While the history produced by commercial media is often based closely on the officially approved history of school textbooks, as was the 2002 movie *Suriyothai*, this is not always the case. One very interesting example is a popular genre of TV drama that plays on the theme of a contemporary character who has "slipped back" into the Ayuthaya or early Bangkok era, or a historical character who has "fallen" into present-day Thailand. Recent examples include the Channel 3 productions "Nirat song phop" (Journey through Two Existences) and "Plai thian" (The End of the Candle), which is an imaginative adaptation of episodes from the classic tale *Khun Chang Khun Phaen*. While partly inspired by the international success of historical fantasy movies such as *Lord of the Rings* and *Harry Potter*, the genre also seems designed to fulfil the desire of contemporary generations to overcome the disjuncture between an "indigenous" premodern past (experienced largely through the official history of school textbooks, state ceremony, and representations of national culture) and the westernized, modern present. History presented through the media, therefore, responds to the tastes of its consumers in an increasingly competitive cultural marketplace. Whatever the case, these televised historical dramas attract a popularity and public interest out of all proportion to the more traditional history of the school textbooks.

The issue of the contemporary lack of relevance of professional history

was raised by Nidhi as early as 1986 when he argued that the very success of the professionalization of history in the universities since the 1960s was responsible for its declining popularity during the 1980s as historians grew estranged from the reading public and caught up in their "ivory towers" (Nidhi 2002a, 37). Nidhi's solution to this problem, like many other Thai public intellectuals, was to write shorter, more popularly accessible pieces for popular news-magazines and the press in the hopes of influencing a greater section of the public. An extension of this idea has been his establishment of the "Midnight University" in 1997-8, a loosely organized "open" university dedicated to a higher education free of the problems of the state system and its narrow, instrumentalist service to the state and increasingly the business sector. The university has its own website, which has quickly become a major forum for academic debate in the humanities and social sciences (*Mahawithayalai Thiangkebun* 2003).

The dominance of the Damrong school of history (or Thongchai's royalist-nationalist historiography) has from the early twentieth century relied to a great extent on the technology of print and the state's control of its dissemination through the education system and mass media. It is possible that the greatest challenge to this mode of national history will come not from new academic methodologies but from new forms of dissemination and consumption of movies, TV dramas, and internet debate by new mass markets.

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## Masalah dalam Penulisan Sejarah Thailand Masa Kini

Patrick Jory

Ada periode-periode tertentu ketika wacana-wacana sejarah dan politiknya-siapa yang mengendalikannya, cara-cara penyebarannya, bagaimana sejarah yang bertentangan ditekan-menjadi titik pusat perdebatan intelektual dan umum. Di Thailand hal tersebut telah terjadi beberapa waktu lalu sejak sejarah menimbulkan kekusaran terhadap berbagai kepentingan tadi. Penulisan sejarah nasionalis tampaknya telah mencapai posisi kuat (hegemoni) hingga tidaklah luar biasa jika mendapatkan sedikit oposisi. Kemudian, sebagaimana amankah upaya politik dan ilmiah tersebut setelah seratus tahun didirikan?

Dalam tulisan ini saya melihat pada sejumlah masalah pada penulisan sejarah nasionalis Thai. Pertama adalah masalah subyek wacana tersebut, bangsa Thai. Bagaimanakah penulisan sejarah bangsa Thai yang baik, khususnya sejak munculnya kritik atas konsep "bangsa" pada 1980-an oleh karya Anderson dalam *Imagined Communities* dan Hobsbawn dan Ranger dalam karya mereka *The Invention of Tradition*? Kedua, apa peran kerajaan dalam wacana tersebut? Bagaimanakah pengaruh politik dan budaya kerajaan saat ini membatasi kemungkinan penulisan sejarah Thai? Masalah ketiga adalah keterwakilan minoritas dari segi etnik dan minoritas, yang menantang pemahaman sebelumnya yang menerima begitu saja kesatuan bangsa dan keseragaman budaya.

Satu isu baru, muncul sejak regionalisasi pada 1990-an, adalah pengaruh dari penulisan sejarah nasionalis Thai-seperti yang ditampilkan dalam drama televisi dan film, sebagaimana juga pada buku teks di sekolah-sekolah-terhadap hubungan Thailand dengan negara-negara tetangganya, yang dalam kasus tertentu menimbulkan ketegangan diplomatik. Masalah berikut menyangkut terutama sekali kepada sejarawan profesional dalam dunia akademik: pengaruh teori "pasca-modern" sejak 1990-an dan

kemampuannya untuk meruntuhkan klaim kebenaran sejarah. Jika sejarah Thai adalah sederhana di antara sejarah yang tak terhitung dengan tidak mengklaim keunggulan atas masa lalu, apakah mereka berhak atas status istimewa? Keadaan yang menyulitkan adalah keberadaan sejarawan profesional saat ini yang hampir tak begitu penting atas cara pemahaman sejarah secara populer. Bagaimana kejatuhan disiplin sejarah secara kelembagaan, universitas dan lembaga pendidikan, mempengaruhi usia 100 tahun keturunannya, cerita bangsa Thai?

Translated by Wahyu Prasetyawan

## Mga Suliranin sa Nasyonalistang Historiograpiyang Thai sa Kasalukuyan

Patrick Jory

Mayroong mga panahon kung kailan ang mga diskursong historikal at ang pulitika ng mga ito – sino ang kumokontrol, ang paraan ng pagpapalawig sa mga ito, at kung paano isinusupil ang mga katunggaling kasaysayan – ay napapagitna sa debateng intelektwal o publiko. Sa Thailand, may katagalan na rin mula nang ang kasaysayan ay nagbunga ng ganitong interes. Ang nasyonalistang historiograpiya ay lumilitaw na umabot sa pusisyon ng hegemonya na kapansin-pansin kung hindi dahil sa katotohanang halos wala itong nakahaharap na oposisyon. Gaano katatag, samakatwid, ang pampulitika at pang-akademikong proyektong ito, isang dantaon mula nang ito’y inilunsad?

Sa papel na ito, tinitignan ko ang ilang mga suliranin ng kasalukuyang nasyunalistang historiograpiyang Thai. Ang una ay ang problema ng paksa ng mga naratibong ito, ang bansang Thai. Paano ang naging takbo ng historiograpiya ng bansang Thai, laluna matapos ang critique sa konsepto ng “bayan” na ibinunga noong dekada otsenta ng mga sulatin tulad ng *Imagined Communities* ni Anderson at *The Invention of Tradition* nina Hobsbawm at Ranger? Pangalawa, ano ang papel ng monarkiya sa mga naratibong ito? Paano nalilimitahan ng kasalukuyang impluwensyang pulitikal at kultural ng monarkiya ang mga posibilidad ng historiograpiyang Thai? Ang ikatlong problema ay paglalarawan sa mga minorityang etniko at rehiyonal na humahamon sa datu’y simpleng pag-unawa sa isang nagkakaisa, at nag-iisang kulturang bansa.

Isang bagong usapin, lumitaw mula noong rehiyonalisasyon ng dekada nobenta, ay ang epekto ng nasyunalistang historiograpiyang Thai – inilalarawan sa mga dramang pantelebisyon at pelikula, at maging sa mga aklat pang-eskwela – sa relasyon sa mga karatig-bansa ng Thailand na, sa ilang mga pagkakataon, ay humantong sa tensyong diplomatiko. Ang



sumusunod na problema ay kaugnay sa mga propesyunal na istoryador sa akademya: ang impluwensya mula dekada nobenta ng teoryang “postmodern” at ang pagkukuwestiyon nito sa mga ipinapalagay na katotohanan ng kasaysayan. Kung ang kasaysayang Thai ay isa lamang kwento sa di-mabilang na mga kwento at hindi nakalalamang ang karapatan bilang awtoridad sa nakalipas, karapat-dapat ba rito ang pribilehiyado nitong katayuan? Ang huling suliranin ay ang kasalukuyang kalagayan ng propesyunal na kasaysayan na halos walang kaugnayan sa pagtingin ng madla sa kasaysayan. Paano naapektuhan ng paghina ng disiplina ng kasaysayan sa kanlungang institusyonal – ang mga unibersidad at institusyong pang-edukasyon – ang iniluwal nito isang dantaon na ang nakalilipas, ang kasaysayan ng bansang Thai?

Translated by Sofia Guillermo

## 現代タイ国民主権的歴史記述の諸問題

パトリック・ジョリー (Patrick Jory)

歴史の言論とそれをめぐる政治—誰がそれを支配するのか、いかにしてそれは広められるのか、それと競合する歴史はいかにして抑圧されるのか—そうしたことが知的、公的な論争において中心的テーマとなる時期がある。タイで歴史がそうといった関心を引き起こしてすでにかなりの時間が経過した。そしてこの間、タイでは国民主権的歴史記述がヘゲモニーを手に入れたように見える。これはそれに対する反対がみだるところほとんどなかったという事実がなかったとすれば、大いに注目に値するものだったのであろう。さてそれではこの政治的、学問的事業は、それがはじまって100年、どれぐらい安定したものとなっているのか？

この論文において、私は現代のタイの国民主権的歴史記述が抱えるいくつかの問題を考えたい。その第一は語り自体、つまりタイ国民の問題である。タイ国民の歴史記述は、アンダーソンの『想像の共同体』、あるいはホブズボームとレンジャーによる『削られた伝統』といった作品にみるように、1980年代、「国民」という概念が批判されるようになって以来、どうなってきたのか？ 第二はこの語りの中で王制がどのような役割を果たしているかである。王制は現在、政治、文化的にタイ史記述の可能性をどのように制約しているのか？ 第三の問題は民族的、地域的少数派、統一され文化的に均質な国民というかつては何の問題もなかった理解に挑戦する少数派をどう表象するのかというものである。

1990年代の地域化以来生じてきた新しい問題は、学校の教科書の中で、あるいはまたテレビドラマ、映画の中で、タイの国民主権的歴史記述が、隣国との関係に及ぼす影響である。これは時として外交的緊張を生じさせるものである。次の問題は主に学会の専門的歴史家に係わるものである。それは1990年代の「ポストモダン」理論と、それが歴史の真実を掘り崩していることを主張していることの影響である。かりにタイの歴史が数え切れないほど多くの物語の中の一つに過ぎず、過去に対するなんの権威も主張できないとすれば、それは今のような特権的地位を享受するに値するのだろうか？ さらにまたもう一つの問題として、今日では専門家の歴史が一般の人々のもつ歴史とほとんどなんの関連も持たなくなっていることである。大学をはじめとする教育機関で「専門」としての歴史学が衰退していること、これはその100年来の成果、国民の物語にどのような影響を及ぼすだろうか？

Translated by Onimaru Takeshi (鬼丸武士)

## ปัญหาของการเขียนประวัติศาสตร์ แนวชาตินิยมร่วมสมัยของไทย

Patrick Jory (แพทริก จอวี)

วาทกรรมทางประวัติศาสตร์และการเมืองอันเนื่องมาจากวาทกรรมทางประวัติศาสตร์นั้นกลายเป็นประเด็นตกเถียงที่สำคัญของปัญญาชนและสาธารณชนทั่วไป ประเด็นที่ตกเถียงกัน ได้แก่ ใครควมคุมวาทกรรมทางประวัติศาสตร์และการเมืองเหล่านั้น วาทกรรมนี้ได้รับการเผยแพร่ด้วยวิธีใด และประวัติศาสตร์ที่เสนอเรื่องราวที่แตกต่างออกไปนั้นถูกสกัดกั้นไม่ให้เผยแพร่ออกไปได้อย่างไร เป็นเวลานานมาแล้วที่ประวัติศาสตร์ไม่ได้กระตุ้นให้เกิดความสนใจ เช่นว่านี่ในประเทศไทย การเขียนประวัติศาสตร์แนวชาตินิยมดูจะมีอิทธิพลเหนือแนวอื่น ซึ่งอาจนับเป็นเรื่องที่พิเศษไม่น้อยหากไม่เป็นเพราะว่า แท้ที่จริงแล้วประวัติศาสตร์แนวชาตินิยมเผชิญการต่อต้านคัดค้านน้อยมาก คำถามจึงอยู่ที่ว่า ลักษณะการเขียนประวัติศาสตร์แนวชาตินิยมและวาทกรรมการเมืองที่ว่านี้จะสามารถคงสถานภาพอันมั่นคงได้มากน้อยเพียงใดหลังจากที่ก่อตัวขึ้นมาได้นานถึง 100 ปี

ในบทความนี้ ข้าพเจ้าจะได้พิจารณาปัญหาต่างๆ ที่เกี่ยวกับการเขียนประวัติศาสตร์แนวชาตินิยมร่วมสมัยของไทย ปัญหาประการแรกเกี่ยวกับชาติไทย อันเป็นเนื้อหาในประวัติศาสตร์ไทยที่เขียนๆ กันมา น่าสนใจว่า หลังจากงานสำคัญของซิน อันได้แก่ *Imagined Communities* ของ แอนเดอร์สัน และ *The Invention of Tradition* ของ ฮอบส์บอมและเรนเจอร์ ได้ก่อกระแสวิพากษ์แนวคิดเรื่อง "ชาติ" ขึ้นในช่วงทศวรรษ 1980 นั้น การเขียนประวัติศาสตร์ "ชาติไทย" มีสภาพอย่างไร ปัญหาประการที่สองคือ บทบาทของสถาบันพระมหากษัตริย์ในงานเขียนประวัติศาสตร์แนวชาตินิยมเหล่านี้ อิทธิพลทางวัฒนธรรมและการเมืองของสถาบันพระมหากษัตริย์ที่เป็นอยู่ในขณะนั้น จำกัดทางเลือกของการเขียนประวัติศาสตร์ไทยอย่างไร ปัญหาประการที่สามเกี่ยว

กับการนำเสนอเรื่องราวของชนกลุ่มน้อยทางชาติพันธุ์และต่างภูมิภาค เรื่องราวของชนกลุ่มน้อยเหล่านี้ได้ท้าทายความเข้าใจเดิมที่เคยปราศจากข้อกังขาทั้งหมดก่อนที่ว่าชาติมีเอกภาพและมีความเป็นหนึ่งเดียวกันในทางวัฒนธรรม

นอกจากนี้ หลังจากที่ภูมิภาคนิยมก่อตัวขึ้นในช่วงทศวรรษ 1990 เป็นต้นมา ประเด็นปัญหาใหม่อีกประเด็นหนึ่งก็เกิดขึ้น นั่นคือประวัติศาสตร์แนวชาตินิยมที่นำเสนอผ่านละครโทรทัศน์ ภาพยนตร์ และแบบเรียน ได้ก่อผลกระทบต่อความสัมพันธ์กับประเทศเพื่อนบ้านของไทยเอง ซึ่งในหลายกรณีนำไปสู่ความตึงเครียดทางการทูต ปัญหาประการต่อมาเกี่ยวข้องกับโดยตรงกับนักประวัติศาสตร์อาชีพในสถาบันการศึกษา กล่าวคือ อิทธิพลของทฤษฎี "หลังสมัยใหม่" นับแต่ช่วงทศวรรษ 1990 เป็นต้นมา และการที่ทฤษฎีดังกล่าวได้ทำลายข้อกล่าวอ้างถึง "ความจริง" ของวิชาประวัติศาสตร์ลงไปอย่างสิ้นเชิง ดังนั้น หากประวัติศาสตร์ไทยเป็นเพียงเรื่องราวเรื่องหนึ่งในจำนวนเรื่องราวต่างๆ มากมาย โดยไม่สามารถอ้างอำนาจสูงสุดในการกำหนดความจริงเกี่ยวกับอดีตได้ ประวัติศาสตร์ไทยจะยังคงควรมีสถานะพิเศษสูงส่งอย่างที่เป็นอยู่หรือไม่ ประเด็นสุดท้ายเกี่ยวกับงานเขียนประวัติศาสตร์ที่เขียนโดยนักวิชาการ ซึ่งแทบจะไม่เกี่ยวข้องกับสอดคล้องสัมพันธ์กับเรื่องราวทางประวัติศาสตร์ที่คนทั่วไปรับรู้อยู่ คำถามจึงเกิดขึ้นว่า ความเสื่อมของวิชาประวัติศาสตร์ในมหาวิทยาลัยและสถาบันการศึกษาต่างๆ ก่อให้เกิดผลกระทบต่อเรื่องราวของชาติไทยอันเป็นผลผลิตสำคัญเดียวในรอบ 100 ปีของศาสตร์แขนงนี้ได้อย่างไร

Translated by Darin Pradittasanee with assistance from Somporn  
Puttapithakporn and Chalong Soontravanich

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# Economic Regionalization in East Asia

Urata Shujiro

Recent trends in the world economy show the processes of globalization and regionalization proceeding simultaneously. Economic *globalization*, as measured by the ratio of foreign trade to gross domestic product (GDP), soared from 25 to 46 percent from 1960 to 1999. Other globalization indicators are foreign direct investment (FDI), which grew more than 90-fold since 1970, and world trade (18-fold). Both have increased faster than GDP, which increased 10 times in the same period.

The pace of postwar globalization has been spurred by multilateral trade liberalization under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), succeeded by the World Trade Organization (WTO); unilateral liberalization of trade and investment; deregulation and privatization of state-owned enterprises; and the increasingly cheaper cost of foreign transactions brought about by technological developments in telecommunications and transportation.

*Regionalization* is the concentration of economic activities - trade in goods and services, movement of capital and people - within a particular region or

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country. An indicator of this process is the increase in intra-regional trade as a percentage of world trade and of the region's own trade. East Asian intra-regional trade as a proportion of world trade increased by more than 3 points from 1990 to 2001 (from 8.4 to 11.9 percent). In the same period, as a proportion of the region's own trade, intra-regional exports grew from 40.1 to 47.5 percent, and intra-regional imports grew from 47.5 to 56.9 percent.

Globalization entails a well-known set of benefits - economic growth, improvement in resource allocation, and the promotion of technological progress - while its costs include greater income inequality. Regionalization comes with its own costs and benefits. The advantages of pooling labor and information sharing must be offset against the costs of congestion.

### **A shift to institution-led regionalization**

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In East Asia, defined here as the area from Northeast through Southeast Asia, there has been a shift in recent years from market-led to institution-led mechanisms of regionalization. The rapid economic growth of the 1990s contributed to market-led regionalization by encouraging and rewarding liberalization in the terms of trade and investment. Since 1997, however, despite recovery from the financial crisis, most countries are not achieving their potential and see free trade agreements (FTAs) as a way to promote economic growth. An FTA, a type of regional trade agreement (RTA), removes tariffs and quotas within the signatory group. As FTAs discriminate against non-member states, they constitute an exception to the WTO rule of non-discrimination. On the other hand, an FTA represents a shallower form of regionalization than a customs union (the other type of RTA), which establishes common tariffs for countries outside the group, or a common market, which lifts restrictions on the movement of the factors of production within the group.

According to WTO reporting, RTAs have increased sharply since 1995, now numbering more than 180 globally. And they are expanding their memberships. The North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) is set to incorporate the Southern Common Market of Latin America to become the

Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) by 2005, while the European Union will expand to 25 members next year.

East Asia has been slower to establish these regional formations. If we consider that in 2000, Japan, China, South Korea, and Taiwan were the only major trading economies not yet belonging to any RTA and that these economies combined had only a 15 percent share of world trade, it is clear that the overwhelming majority of world trade took place involving countries party to some kind of RTA. Until recently, the only major RTA in East Asia was AFTA, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Free Trade Area, established in 1992, but not fully in force.

APEC, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation framework, has also liberalized trade and investment and facilitated economic and technical cooperation. But because its objectives of liberalization and facilitation are also extended to non-members, APEC is not classified as an RTA. Further, liberalization is not a requirement but depends on each country's volition. In reality, rather than forcefully pursuing liberalization of foreign trade and investment, APEC's activities are geared more towards the pursuit of economic cooperation, with the participation of the private sector, government, and academia. Another loose regional grouping that discusses economic issues, though not exclusively, is ASEAN + 3 (ASEAN's member states of Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, plus China, Japan, and South Korea).

Since 2001, however, regional trade agreements involving East Asian nations have accelerated. An FTA came into force between Singapore and New Zealand in 2001, and between Singapore and Japan in 2002. The latter, Japan's first FTA, is a wide-ranging agreement that is not limited to trade, but also covers the liberalization and facilitation of investment, services trade, and skilled labor mobility; as such, it is known as an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA).

In East Asia several FTAs are currently under negotiation, and many

more are being studied. Particularly noteworthy is the rivalry between China and Japan in pursuing FTAs with ASEAN. On November 4, 2002, China and ASEAN signed a framework for negotiation; on November 5, Japan proposed its own FTA with the regional group. ASEAN has also been approached by the United States and has itself approached India. The emergence of China as a major economic power provides the impetus for much of this activity. As a new member of the WTO, China seeks to increase and improve its relations within East Asia, while ASEAN, as a group of smaller economies, tries to maintain its bargaining power.

### **Factors behind regionalization**

East Asian regionalization through FTAs is popular for a number of broad reasons, as well as some particular to specific countries. General reasons include the global trend toward membership in regional groupings, increased access to markets, and the expected positive impact on economic growth. It is simply better to be included than excluded, especially if regionalization eventually leads to an East Asian Economic Community.

FTAs can move quickly past the slow and contentious pace of WTO negotiations with like-minded partners and can pioneer liberalization in new areas like labor mobility. For East Asia in general, the 1997 currency crisis also showed that area economies could not depend for help upon countries outside the region. This realization has led to a number of proposals aside from regional FTAs, such as the Chiang Mai Initiative, a proposal to swap currencies when liquidity is needed.

Finally, for countries such as Japan, FTAs can be useful in promoting domestic policy reform and improving business opportunities through the harmonization of systems such as technical standards for electronics products. For those advocating them, FTAs are expected to aid robust economic recovery through closer integration with countries having higher growth potential than post-industrial Japan.

But the very breadth of benefits countries hope to reap from FTAs indicates that the process is not without obstacles. Countries with differing goals must define a set of common objectives, which can be difficult to find amidst a tangle of historical issues, political and security alliances, lack of political leadership, and domestic protectionist impulses. This can be seen in Japan's negotiations with Thailand and the Philippines over labor mobility. Presently, the two developing countries' access to Japan's labor market is largely restricted to the gendered and exploitative "entertainment" sector. Both want to send workers to staff Japan's growing services and medical sectors, a move that has been resisted thus far by Japan. At the same time, WTO consistency requires comprehensive liberalization, a particular problem for Japan and South Korea, where strong opposition comes from the agricultural sector. In other words, regional and even bilateral FTAs are not immune to the problems that resist consensus at the WTO level.

Achieving the public support and common understanding necessary to pursue FTAs within a framework of East Asian regionalization will require education, advocacy, and international exchange among students, scholars, politicians, and bureaucrats. It will also demand time and public assistance to those sectors and workers disadvantaged by the liberalization of trade and investment. In the case of Japan, where even the top political leadership shows a lack of urgency and awareness of the growing importance of East Asia to the country's future, the efforts must be redoubled.

## Overseas Filipino Workers and Labor Circulation in Southeast Asia

*Odine de Guzman*

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In recent years overseas contract work has become the Philippines' prime export commodity. In the year following the 1997 Asian financial crisis, overseas Filipino worker (OFW) remittances amounted to USD 7 billion. (DER-BSP, Table 11. OFW Remittances By Country and By Type of Worker.) OFW remittance is such a vital source of revenue that since the mid-1980s the government has lauded these workers as the country's "new economic heroes" or *mga bagong bayani*. This essay highlights the growth of women's participation in the ongoing Filipino labor diaspora and underscores the government's active promotion of overseas labor migration. It discusses Filipino international migration within the context of labor circulation in Southeast Asia, comparing the experience of overseas domestic work of Filipinos and Indonesians. Finally, this essay examines two forms of involvement by the international community in current women's migration issues - the promotion of international protections and research on

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different aspects of women's migration - and includes a current reference list on the issue.

The *bagong bayani* are a diverse group. They include emigrants and contract workers, both of whom may be documented or undocumented. (NGO statistics categorize these two groups as overseas Filipinos and overseas Filipino workers.) As of 2001, overseas Filipinos numbered 2.74 million and OFWs 4.67 million, of whom 3.05 million are documented and 1.62 million undocumented (Kanlungan Center, citing the Commission on Filipinos Overseas, Department of Foreign Affairs). OFWs are further statistically classified as sea-based workers, who are largely male, and land-based workers, who are the focus of this essay.

Initially, the workers were called OCWs, or overseas contract workers, a term which is descriptive of a temporary and contractual employment status - usually fixed terms of six months to two years. Moreover, the term bespeaks the workers' lack of physical and social mobility in the receiving country, which is restricted by the terms of their contract. Because of the growing prominence of overseas work and of the sense of being neither here nor there implied by "OCW," the term has fallen out of favor in both government and media parlance. "OFW" - with the insertion of "Filipino" adding a national projection as befits new heroes - has become the preferred version.

Being heroes, however, does not mean the government can guarantee OFW welfare, despite remittances that annually amount to billions of dollars. News reports abound of victims of abuse and of the death of overseas contract workers since the early 1990s.<sup>1</sup> These include Singapore's much talked - about 1995 execution of Flor Contemplacion, who was convicted of killing a Filipina domestic worker and her Singaporean ward; the unresolved case of Mary Jane Ramos;<sup>2</sup> the case of Sarah Jane Dematera, on death row for eleven years (Kanlungan Center); and numerous others that remain unreported.

### **The feminization of Philippine overseas labor migration**

These news reports sketch the current face of Philippine overseas labor migration. It is increasingly female and services-oriented. In 1992, of the total

deployed, land-based, newly hired OFWs, 50 percent were female. This increased to 58 percent in 1995, 64 percent in 1999, and 72 percent in 2001.

The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) lists eight skill categories. In the period 1992 to 2001, the skill category "service workers" comprised an average 35 percent of the total number of deployed newly hired, land-based workers (POEA InfoCenter, NSCB). In that ten-year period, "service workers" was consistently one of the top two in terms of newly hired workers deployed. It alternated with the category "production workers," which was the top occupation of overseas land-based migrants in the 1970s and which was the top occupation of deployed workers in the years 1994, 1996, and 1998-2000. The third highest category in the same period was "professional and technical workers," which overtook "production workers" in 2001 (POEA InfoCenter).

The stereotypical gender division of labor is replicated in these skill categories. Production workers are predominantly male at 71 percent of the newly deployed in 2002, while service workers and professional and technical workers, largely nurses and overseas performing artists, are mostly female. (Dancers and musicians made up 72 percent of this skill category in 2000; 99.5 percent of all deployed entertainers went to Japan [POEA Annual Report 2000]. In 2002, 85 percent of deployed newly hired "professional and technical workers" were female.)

Fifty-two percent of the women deployed in 1992 were service workers; 59 percent in 1995; and 47 percent in 2000 (POEA 2002). From 1992 to 2001, women comprised an average 89 percent of deployed newly hired service workers. They comprised 92 percent of deployed newly hired service workers in 2000, 91 percent in 2001, and 90 percent in 2002.

The feminization of Philippine overseas labor migration, which had been male-dominated until the 1980s, belies the failure of women's empowerment in society. The increasing out-migration of women indicates a decline, or continuing limitation, in the share of work available to women in the production process; employment opportunities remain restricted and income insufficient. The majority of female OFWs are still in "traditional" reproductive work such as

domestic work and cultural entertainment, health care and nursing, where the pay is low and the nature of the work involves a higher exposure to physical, sexual, and other abuse. This in turn underscores the international division of labor, in which the Third World, or the South, does the labor-intensive and lower-paid work. It also demonstrates a persistent gendered division of labor at the global level, with the South taking on the menial aspects of reproductive work, which are thereby "feminized," secondary, subservient, and inferior to the "masculine," dominant North.

### The state and overseas labor migration<sup>3</sup>

Migration is not wholly a personal decision motivated by desire for capitalist accumulation, but also reflects the lack of development policies on the part of the government and the lack of satisfactory living and employment opportunities within the home country. Feminist activist Wilhelmina S. Orozco asserted, as early as 1985, that the government had deliberately promoted labor migration as a solution to unemployment and growing national accounts deficits. Subsequently, sociologists Graziano Battistella and Anthony Paganoni (1992, 1996), Maruja M.B. Asis (1992), Joaquin Gonzalez III (1996, 1998), and urban planner Benjamin Cariño (1995) have examined the policies and directives of government administrations since Marcos, demonstrating how the government actively promotes labor migration with provision for the welfare of the migrants often an afterthought.

The administration of Ferdinand E. Marcos was blatant in its desire to use labor migration as a solution to the nation's economic problems. The government was assertive in promoting and maintaining its warm body export. The Labor Code of 1974 formalized the Philippine labor migration program and had as its main goal the promotion of overseas contract work in order for government to reap the economic benefits of lower unemployment and workers' remittances. In 1982, the Central Bank, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Labor and Employment made the remittance of 50 to 70 percent of workers' salaries mandatory through Executive Order 857. Sanctions such as the non-renewal of passports or disapproval of new contracts were imposed on those who did not comply. Executive Order 857 was so unpopular with contract



workers that government abandoned it for more relaxed measures, like incentives to remitting migrants, the *Suwerte sa Bangko* program, the *Balikbayan* program, and the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) remittance assistance program (Gonzalez III 1996).

Government policies and regulations on labor migration up to this period were but slight refinements of the Commonwealth government's laws from 1915 to 1933, all of which focused on the economic benefits the United States government could gain from this enterprise. The Labor Code of 1974 only made the provisions in the previous laws more organized and economically viable.

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In the late 1980s, the abuse of women migrant workers started to be widely publicized. Following a temporary moratorium on the deployment of Filipino entertainers to Japan, the administration of Corazon C. Aquino temporarily banned the deployment of domestic workers on January 20, 1988. The ban was meant to protect Filipino women migrants from being abused and exploited in the foreign countries where they worked.<sup>4</sup> But as NGO activists contended, no matter how well intentioned, the ban was wrong policy: because of it, many more women would leave the country illegally and would "no longer be entitled to government protection, thus putting [them] completely at the mercy of [their] employers" (Ocampo 1988: 5). Another issue was the ban's infringement of the constitutional rights of workers to travel and find gainful employment. It was meant as leverage for negotiating better terms and conditions for the workers, but as migrant activists also pointed out, it was not binding on receiving states, who could simply turn to other developing countries for cheap labor.

NGOs proposed more concrete measures to address the abuse of overseas workers. They demanded that government "put more teeth in the country's labor laws to guarantee [the] protection of overseas domestic [workers]," compel labor attaches to do their jobs, and "enforce government-to-government negotiations for a fair deal for Filipino domestic [workers]" (C.D. Nagot, Gabriela spokesperson, quoted in Delos Santos 1988, 1; M.L. Alcuid 1988; I.L. Laguindam 1988). In a press statement, Filipina domestic helpers in Hong Kong proposed

the following (The United Filipinos Against the Ban, 1988):

- Forge bilateral agreements with receiving countries. Proposals for HK:  
(A) Repeal of the new conditions of stay for foreign domestic helpers.  
(B) Strict implementation and monitoring of the employment agency regulations. Exorbitant fees and replacement guarantees to employers must be stopped. (C) Meting out of appropriate penalties against abusive employers and agencies, from blacklisting to imprisonment. (D) Standardization of working hours to a maximum of 12 hours of daily work.
- Provide on-site protection to overseas Filipinos. Use the Welfare Fund to provide legal assistance, counseling, emergency loans, educational activities.
- Educate certain officials and staff of Philippine Consulates on the rights and welfare of migrants. Remove anti-migrant officials.
- Reorient overseas employment programs and agencies concerned to cater to interests and protection of rights of workers.
- Abide by ILO instruments pertinent to migration and migrant workers, especially Convention nos. 97 and 143, Recommendation nos. 86, 100, 151, 169.
- Institutionalize the representation of overseas Filipinos in national and local (receiving countries) policy-making bodies.
- Uphold people's right to gainful employment. Develop viable local employment programs as an alternative to cheap labor export.

Subsequently, the Aquino administration lifted the ban for selected countries, Middle Eastern countries being the last. Maruja M.B. Asis (1992) noted that although the issue of remittances was important to the government, a gradual shift toward welfare and protection was noticeable among the executive orders and legislation passed during Aquino's term. Among the most publicized of Aquino's presidential actions was Proclamation No. 276, signed on June 21,

1988, which declared December "The Month of Overseas Filipinos." In recognition of their contribution to the national economy, President Aquino called overseas contract workers the new heroes of the country or the new economic heroes. (Another version is "modern-day heroes," which gained currency in the latter part of the 1990s, which Hong Kong activists counter with "modern-day slaves.")

The epithet could not protect the migrant workers from being abused overseas. After a couple of highly publicized deaths of Filipina domestic workers abroad, the succeeding administration of Fidel V. Ramos tried to put a hold on the "new hero" syndrome. In 1996, RA 8042, the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, was implemented to show government support for the new Philippine heroes following national outrage at the execution of Flor Contemplacion. At the same time, government publicists floated the idea that Filipinos need not go abroad to get good employment.

Ramos promised economic prosperity through his Philippines 2000 program, which aimed to achieve NIC-hood (newly industrialized country status) by the year 2000. Nevertheless, remittances from overseas Filipino workers were still one of the bigger sources of government revenue.

At the end of 2000, Joseph Estrada, the thirteenth president of the Republic, called upon OFWs to be patient and continue supporting his beleaguered administration. Estrada said "the OFWs should continually remit their hard-earned dollars here to help prop up the heavily battered economy and to help in praying for his critics and political opponents" (*Manila Bulletin*, December 10, 2000). Later, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in her state visit to Singapore in 2001, was quoted as saying: "The Philippine economy will be, for the foreseeable future, heavily dependent still on overseas workers' remittances" (Agence France Presse 2001). In a keynote speech to welcoming Filipinos in Kuala Lumpur during her state visit to Malaysia in the same month, the president proffered a new name for the economic heroes: OFI, or overseas Filipino investors. In this telling, overseas Filipino workers "invested" their talents and energy in the receiving country.<sup>5</sup>

One aggressive "investment" strategy the government reportedly adopted was to deploy "at least one million people" abroad annually, or 2740 persons per day (Kanlungan Center 2001). The NGO further quotes the president as saying: "Jobs here are difficult to find and we are depending on people outside the country. If you can find work there and send money to your relatives here, then perhaps you should stay there" (*Philippine Daily Inquirer*, July 28, 2001). In keeping with the spirit of the free market espoused by Macapagal-Arroyo, the implementation period of the controversial sections of RA 8042, which provide for the deregulation of overseas employment and the gradual phase-out of the POEA, fell during this administration.

Part VII of RA 8042 reads:

SEC. 29. COMPREHENSIVE DEREGULATION PLAN ON RECRUITMENT ACTIVITIES. Pursuant to a progressive policy of deregulation whereby the migration of workers becomes strictly a matter between the worker and his foreign employer, the DOLE within one (1) year from the effectivity of this Act, is hereby mandated to formulate a five-year comprehensive deregulation plan on recruitment activities taking into account labor market trends, economic conditions of the country and emergency circumstances which may affect the welfare of migrant workers.

SEC. 30. GRADUAL PHASE-OUT OF REGULATORY FUNCTIONS. Within a period of five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act, the DOLE shall phase out the regulatory functions of the POEA pursuant to the objectives of deregulation.

Like her predecessors, Macapagal-Arroyo could only enjoin OFWs to "stay put abroad and continue to send their dollar remittances until the Philippine economy stabilizes" (Del Callar 2001). Yet at the same time, the government officially maintained that overseas employment was not a policy: "In an August 2001 meeting with a delegation of overseas Filipinos advocating for their right to vote, Labor Secretary Patricia Santo Tomas objected to any reference to 'export of labor,' saying that *people go abroad on their own volition*" (Kanlungan Center 2001; emphasis mine).

The new heroes of the country, *ang mga bagong bayani*, continue to hold a special place in government rhetoric.

## Migration within the region

Filipinos are not the only border-crossing labor migrants in contemporary Southeast Asia, though they are probably the most "encouraged" by their government and have the most organized way of dealing with the move (Azizah Kassim 1998; Jones 2000). One major receiving country is Malaysia, with about 743,641 legal foreign workers from ten countries, including the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia, and an estimated one million undocumented foreign workers. Alien labor accounted for about 20 percent of Malaysia's workforce of about 8 million and about 10 percent of its population of about 20 million in 1995 (Azizah Kassim 1998). Sidney Jones asserts that "Malaysia was the largest employer of foreign labor in Asia in 1999" (Jones 2000: 3). But Malaysia also sends labor to neighboring countries such as Singapore - where 200,000 Malaysians reportedly work (Jones 2000), some of them illegally - Brunei, Taiwan, and Japan. Azizah Kassim (1998) explains that Malaysian workers in these countries are found in domestic services, manufacturing, construction, and services, the very sectors occupied by foreign migrant workers in Malaysia. That is, semi-skilled Malaysian workers take up jobs abroad that they refuse in their home country because of relatively higher pay, while some professionals opt to stay in Brunei for the tax breaks the Sultanate offers.

Thailand also sends workers abroad, while receiving a number of illegal workers, in this case from Myanmar and southern China. They too work in the sectors occupied by Thais in foreign countries (Azizah Kassim 1998); because of their irregular status, wages are often determined by what employers can afford and sometimes by the generosity of employers. Estimates of migrants in 1998 put the number at one million, with two-thirds likely to be irregular (Jones 2000).

Thailand has exported labor to countries in the Middle East (mostly Saudi Arabia), Europe, the Asia-Pacific region, and the United States since the 1980s. Political instability in the Middle East, however, shifted Thai labor

movement toward Japan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. By the 1990s, Thai overseas labor was predominantly located in the Asia-Pacific region. In 1993, 85 percent of total overseas Thai labor was in the region, with 32 percent based in Singapore, Brunei, and Malaysia. The major destinations of 191,735 deployed Thai labor migrants in 1998 were Taiwan, Singapore, Brunei, Japan, Israel, Malaysia, and Hong Kong (Battistella 2000: 13).

As of 2000, Singapore was home to approximately 530,000 foreign workers. Officially, the workers could be recruited from Malaysia, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Macao, South Korea, Thailand, India, Bangladesh, and the Philippines. The largest group of foreign workers in the country was Malaysian, while the second largest was Filipino; there were also reports of the presence of a considerable number of Indonesians and mainland Chinese. Foreign workers occupied the following sectors: domestic services, which registered approximately 100,000 workers; construction (200,000); shipyards; services; and hotels. Of the 530,000, around 80,000 were highly skilled and worked in finance, business, commerce, and manufacturing (Battistella 2000: 12).

Brunei has been importing labor since the mid-1980s; the foreign workers based in Brunei coming from Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines as well as from India and Bangladesh. In 1988, the largest foreign worker group was Malaysian with 18,418 workers, followed by Thai at 9,941 workers (Azizah Kassim 1998). Currently, Brunei's private citizens are "dependent on migrant workers for 74% of [their] manpower" [needs] (Jayasankaran 2003).

Like its Philippine counterpart, the Indonesian government under the New Order started "sending migrant workers overseas as one of strategic ways to overcome unemployment and to increase foreign exchange" (Eko Susi Rosdianasari 2000: 93). From the late 1960s to the early 1990s, Indonesia processed over 700,000 overseas workers' papers, the majority of which (like Thais and Filipinos in the 1970s and 80s) were for the Middle East. Twenty-four percent went to Malaysia and Singapore; however, this number did not include the over half a million believed to be in Malaysia undocumented (Azizah Kassim 1998). By 1997, as noted by Graeme Hugo, the Malaysian Immigration

Department was impelled to raise estimates of Indonesian workers residing in the country to 1.9 million after nearly 1.4 million resident Indonesians voted in the 1997 Indonesian elections. (The year before, about 300,000 undocumented workers had been legalized.) This estimate was far greater than most others - for example, those based on a 1993 amnesty in Peninsular Malaysia when half a million Indonesians came forward (Hugo 2002). Overall figures as of 1999 indicated an estimated three million workers without "any formal document" - most from East and Central Java, East and West Nusa Tenggara, and South Sulawesi - while statistics from 1994 to 1999 showed 1,461,236 labor migrants leaving Indonesia each year.

A projected 36 million Indonesians were expected to be affected by underemployment toward the end of 2000 when a 2 percent (per annum) economic growth rate was expected.<sup>6</sup> Eko Susi Rosdianasari (2000) asserted that the Workers Department therefore aimed to deploy 2.8 million workers between 1999 and 2004, even as laws and government policies continued to lack measures to protect migrant workers. The government expected a return of up to US\$12 billion in remittances from this enterprise.<sup>7</sup>

Indonesians' top countries of destination are Saudi Arabia and Malaysia, followed by Singapore, Taiwan, Japan, Hong Kong, Brunei, and Korea. Indonesian labor migrants are mostly found in domestic work and in factories, industries, hotels, hospitals, and plantations, while a hefty 70 percent of all overseas Indonesian migrant workers are women.

### **Filipino and Indonesian women in foreign households**

While the majority of Filipino and Indonesian women labor migrants end up in domestic work, it is considered to be risky and sending governments do not have strong bilateral agreements with receiving states on the protection of these women. As noted earlier, numerous Filipino women have met misfortune in varying degrees in their quest for economic upliftment as overseas domestic workers. Media reports in Indonesia have likewise exposed the abuses experienced by women migrant workers, many of whom are domestic workers. The abuse begins in the home country, at the hands of a *tekong* (middleman/

illegal recruiter) and *calo* (small company or individual recruiter), and continues in the employer's home in the form of non-payment of wages, long working hours, subjection to cultural taboos, or physical and sexual abuse. The protection of domestic workers is made difficult because of the location of the work in the employer's private residence, where the lines between the employee's work and private time/space are blurred.

It is made even more difficult in Indonesia when "maids are not [considered] workers" and "continue to be regarded as the private property of households" (Ati Nurhati 2000: 91, 90). Because of the general assumption that domestic workers have low education and that "they sleep and eat for free," their salaries are low and are not governed by minimum wage laws. In fact, "[a]s 'part of the family,' a maid's wage is not public business" (*ibid.*, 91). The notion that a domestic worker's welfare, including salary, lies beyond the scope of public business partly originates from the capitalist division of labor into the productive and reproductive spheres, where the notion of work is a "production process that contributes to capitalist accumulation and exchange" (Eviota 1992, cited in Cheng 1996: 110). In contrast, domestic work falls within the "process of reproduction, essential to the survival of the family and society, [but] does not directly lead to the process of accumulation and exchange"; thus, it is not customarily considered work, and it converts the status of domestic workers into non-workers (*ibid.*). To a certain extent, women domestic workers fall within the ambit of the private on account of gender relations in society. Patriarchal societies deem women's proper place to be the home, while men rightly belong in the public arena.

A review of most government policies and legislation on the protection of migrant workers shows that domestic workers' specific labor problems are not factored in at all (Palma-Beltran and Javate-de Dios 1992; Heyzer 1994, also cited in Jones 2000; Goldberg 1996). Even so, many women leave because domestic workers at home earn only 15-20 percent of what they can earn abroad. In real terms, however, the enormous recruitment fees and other travel expenses increase their family's living expenses, sometimes exponentially.

Indonesian domestic workers in Malaysia are offered between USD 90



and USD 150 per month with recruitment fees to be deducted from the first three months. But there are numerous reports of more deductions than agreed upon and failure to receive full or any salary at all (Jones 2000; Ati Nurbaiti 2000; Eko Susi Rosdianasari 2000). Yet for USD 100 a month, many a rural woman would take the risk of illegal detention, torture, and even death, strengthened by the hope that one's own fate will be different. (The bulk of reported abuse of Indonesian domestic workers is in Saudi Arabia, with many physically and sexually abused.)

Aside from the often-marginalized position of migrant workers in receiving countries, workers also fall into hierarchical categories within migrant groups, which can be imposed upon them by local society. In the hierarchy of overseas domestic workers in Malaysia, for example, Filipinos are on the top rung. Indonesians fall into a lower salary range because they usually have a lower level of education, are not yet knowledgeable about the use of "modern" household equipment, and are not proficient in the English language.

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But regardless of foreign language proficiency, overseas domestic workers are almost always unjustly considered "potential prostitutes" by local officials and laypeople who tend to prejudge foreign workers (Jones 2000: 65); in fact, even in their home country, unmarried Indonesian women leaving to work as domestic workers are imagined as "social misfits who could not get husbands or who had personal problems at home that prompted them to leave" (64-65), despite the financial support they send back. Of course, recruited domestic workers every now and then unwittingly do end up in prostitution. The multi-million dollar business of trafficking in women thrives upon deceiving, or convincing, unsuspecting women and families about the rewards of overseas work. Once the migration process has started, where a worker actually ends up is determined by the recruiters and their allies. Sydney Jones asserts that in the case of Indonesian women, the high demand for overseas domestic workers in Malaysia facilitates the recruitment of women legal and illegal recruiters conscripting women for housework or for the brothel (65).

## **International protections for migrant women . . . . .**

The incessant circulation of labor within the region attests to the interconnectedness of economies and unevenness of economic development among the neighboring countries, but it also intimates contiguous human relationships, harsh or otherwise. At the international level, the term "migrant" covers a broad spectrum of people on the move. It is commonly used to refer to people who journey to another country in search of work. The International Labour Organization (ILO) defines migrants "as those who migrate from one country to another for the purpose of being employed there," which assumes that they are legally permitted to stay and work in the receiving country and implies that their movement is voluntary. However, migrants and migrant workers do not always migrate by choice. As the experience of many Asian women shows, a large number of migrant workers are forced by socio-economic circumstance or by recruiters or deceived into believing that they will be legally employed, but end up without legal status in receiving countries. The Beijing Platform for Action recognizes the following categories of migrant women: refugees, the internally displaced, migrant workers, immigrants, and victims of trafficking.

International Covenants seek to address the various injustices experienced by people in general. Typically, they are non-binding yet important in that states are encouraged, sometimes pressured, to act in accordance with international standards and the terms of the conventions. Among the United Nations documents that have significant language for the protection of migrant women are the following:

**The Vienna Declaration and Program of Action, 1993**, the first international document to "raise women's rights as human rights and treat them as warranting equal recognition and treatment as those rights more traditionally defined" (Goldberg 1996: 176). The Vienna Declaration asserts women's rights as "an inalienable, integral and indivisible part of universal human rights." Part I, par. 24 of the document recognizes migrant workers as "being among 'those persons belonging to groups which have been rendered vulnerable' and demands that 'great importance must be given to the promotion and protection of [their] human rights'" (177).

**The Copenhagen Declaration and Program of Action, 1995.** Pamela Goldberg (1996) asserts that while the Copenhagen Declaration is replete with language addressing women's issues, it does not particularly address the needs of migrant workers and has "nothing concerning migrant women specifically" (*ibid*). The document does refer throughout to "vulnerable and disadvantaged groups," among which women migrants and women migrant workers have been "consistently identified in other documents," which makes the phrase "vulnerable and disadvantaged groups" applicable to migrant women. The brief attention given to migrant workers "stresses the need for intensified international cooperation and national attention to the situation of migrant workers and their families (par. 63) and calls for the equitable treatment and integration of documented migrants, particularly, migrant workers and their families (par. 78)" (*ibid*).

**The Cairo Declaration**, which resulted from the International Conference on Population and Development in 1994, strongly promotes the protection of women and migrant women. Principle 12 states: "Countries should guarantee to all migrants basic human rights as included in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights"; chapter 10 deals entirely with the issue of international migration. Additionally, the document promotes issues of gender equality, equity, and empowerment of women, including the directive for states "to pay special attention to protection of the rights and safety of those who suffer from [degrading practices, such as trafficking in women, adolescents and children and exploitation through prostitution], crimes and those in potentially exploitable situations, such as migrant women... (par. 4.9)." Parts of chapter 10 attend to the particular issues of refugees and undocumented migrants, who were first distinguished from documented or regular migrants in the Copenhagen Declaration. The Cairo Declaration urges states to "cooperate in... safeguarding the basic human rights of undocumented migrants" (par. 10.17). Moreover, it advocates that governments

"adopt effective sanctions against those who organize undocumented migration, exploit undocumented migrants or engage in trafficking in undocumented migrants, especially those who engage in any form of international traffic in women, youth and children. Governments of countries

in origin, where the activities of agents or other intermediaries in the migration process are legal, should regulate such activities in order to prevent abuses, especially exploitation, prostitution and coercive adoption (par. 10.18)."

**The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action**, from the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women, held in Beijing in September 1995, is by far the most cognizant among UN conference documents of the issues of concern to women migrants (ibid). In addition to ensuring the rights of women and the girl child, the Beijing Declaration articulates a commitment to "address the structural causes of poverty through changes in economic structures, ensuring equal access for all women, including those in rural areas, as vital development agents, to productive resources, opportunities and public services" (par. 26). Goldberg cites the articles in the Declaration that commit to safeguarding the rights of women migrant workers thus:

"In its section on Violence Against Women (par. 112-130), the Platform for Action recognizes '[s]ome groups of women, such as... women migrants, including women migrant workers' as being 'particularly vulnerable to violence' (par. 116). It calls for states to '[p]rovide women who are subjected to violence with access to the mechanism of justice, and, as provided for by the national legislation, to just and effective remedies for the harms they have suffered and inform women of their rights in seeking redress through such mechanisms' (par.124[h]); and urges states to '[t]ake special measures to eliminate violence against women, particularly those in vulnerable situations... including enforcing any existing legislation and developing, as appropriate, new legislation for women migrant workers in both sending and receiving countries' (par.126[d])."

Moreover, the Platform for Action recognizes the contributions of migrant workers, including domestic workers, as it strongly recommends the enactment or reformation of national policies to guarantee the protection of migrants' human rights, including protection from abuse and exploitation by their guarantor (par.148[h]; ibid).

**The International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families**, one of the few legally

binding documents pertaining to international labor migration. The Convention required more than a decade of lobbying before it was ratified as an instrument of international law. Adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 1990, it only came into force on July 1, 2003, with the ratification of the Convention by Guatemala, the twentieth ratifying state. The slow ratification of the Convention illustrated the rather ambiguous position of many states regarding the protection of migrants. Although governments acknowledged the need to protect migrants, binding themselves to such protection was a different matter. It was a combination of non-government organizations and civil society groups worldwide, along with the UN agencies, which tirelessly lobbied their governments to ratify the document. Nonetheless, the Convention demonstrates the international community's recognition of and respect for the human rights of migrants and their families; more important, it declares the international community's commitment to the comprehensive protection of the rights of these people in the economic, social, political, and cultural dimensions of relocation and reintegration.

Lori Brunio, chairperson of the Coalition for Migrants' Rights (CMR) in Hong Kong, has this to say about the ratification of the Convention: "For foreign domestic workers like us, having an international treaty like the MWC that clearly recognizes and protects our rights affirms our dignity and gives us more courage to fight against abuses, violence and discrimination. Even if the place where we work (Hong Kong) has not ratified, the MWC gives us indisputable basis for saying that we should be respected and treated fairly as human beings" (Asian Migrant Center 2003).

Other international documents that can be cited to ensure the protection of the human rights of women and migrant workers are: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (The People's Movement for Human Rights Education 2003).

The International Labour Organization, which works "on the principle

that all human beings irrespective of race, creed, or sex, have the right to pursue both their material well-being and their spiritual development in conditions of freedom, dignity, economic security, and equal opportunity;" (quoted in Goldberg 1996, 175) has since 1949 approved conventions that address issues related to women workers and migrant workers. Among them are: the Migration for Employment Convention (Revised), 1949 (No. 97); the Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Conventions, 1975 (No. 143); the Forced Labour Convention (No. 29); the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention (No. 87); the Equal Remuneration Convention (No. 100); the Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention (No. 111); the Minimum Age Convention (No. 38); and the Resolution concerning the Conditions of Employment of Domestic Workers, 1965 (Goldberg 1996; The People's Movement for Human Rights Education 2003).

Although these international covenants are not always legally binding and are not solutions in themselves to the issues of migrants and labor migration, they are important nonetheless in pressuring both sending and receiving states to ensure the protection of migrants and to adhere to a set of laws that are accepted to the international community.

### Research on Filipina migrant workers and academic debate in the West

Western academic interest in the phenomenon of female labor migration from the Philippines may be seen in various essays published in academic journals based in North America. One fine example is the volume edited by Filomeno V. Aguilar, Jr., and published in the Philippines by the Philippine Social Science Council. *Filipinos in Global Migrations: At Home in the World?* (2002) is a collection of essays previously published in international journals which are not readily available in the Philippines. Aguilar's introduction, "Beyond Stereotypes: Human Subjectivity in the Structuring of Global Migrations," contextualizes the recent phenomenon of labor migration within the history of "formal and informal structures and networks of migration" as well as the socio-political forces that determine and affect migration on the global plane. The collection, by way of the introduction, also asserts that migrants are "not passive victim[s] of structures,

but [are persons] with human agency and subjectivity who [are] able to navigate through and negotiate with formidable structural forces" (Aguilar 2002: 2).

The following essays in the collection are significant for this review: "From Registered Nurse to Registered Nanny: Discursive Geographies of Filipina Domestic Workers in Vancouver, B.C.," by Geraldine Pratt, examines discursive constructions of "Filipina" as these are lived out by Filipinas in Vancouver. Using poststructuralist theories of the subject and discourse analysis, the essay looks into how workers come into an understanding of their conditions, given the restrictions placed on them by their work and immigration status. Five other essays present valuable research on overseas Filipino domestic workers: "Sexuality and Discipline among Filipina Domestic Workers in Hong Kong," by Nicole Constable; "Domestic Bodies of the Philippines," by Neferti Tadiar; "Stress Factors and Mental Health Adjustment of Filipino Domestic Workers in Hong Kong," by Christopher Bagely, Susan Madrid, and Floyd Bolitho; "Romancing Resistance and Resisting Romance: Ethnography and the Construction of Power in the Filipina Domestic Worker Community in Hong Kong," by Julian McAllister Groves and Kimberly A. Chang; and "At Home But Not at Home: Filipina Narratives of Ambivalent Returns," by Nicole Constable.

Based on her doctoral dissertation, Nicole Constable's *Maid to Order in Hong Kong: Stories of Filipina Workers* (1997) draws from the insights of Michel Foucault and Antonio Gramsci on power, resistance, and accommodation to demonstrate that household workers do not just passively give in to the authority of the employer and to their poor working conditions. By centering on human agency and assuming individuals to be free agents in society, it argues that these workers subvert and resist the dominant power relations around them. *Maid to Order* looks at power and resistance as these are performed by Filipina domestic workers in Hong Kong.

*Servants of Globalization: Women, Migration and Domestic Work* (2001) by Rhacel Salazar Parreñas is an ethnographic account of the lives of Filipino domestic workers in Rome and Los Angeles. These workers do the menial tasks that local women have renounced for more "productive" work. The book

analyzes, at the level of the subject, the costs of labor migration to women who "leave behind their families to do the mothering and care taking work of the global economy in countries throughout the world."

A book that is outstanding in spelling out interconnections between migrant labor, sending and receiving countries' migration programs, and globalization and the impact of these on the lives of individual workers is Bridget Anderson's *Doing the Dirty Work? The Global Politics of Domestic Labour* (2000). This study includes research on Filipina domestic workers based in Europe and analyzes the dynamics of class and race in the global market. Despite the common denominator of gender, this incisive research scrutinizes the politics of race in paid domestic work in the West as it challenges feminist principles of equality, even the notion of "sisterhood."

Two studies from the Institute of Social Studies at the Hague are available in research centers in the Philippines: Mary Alice P. Gonzales' *Filipino Migrant Women in the Netherlands* (1998) and Marilen Abesamis' "Romance and Resistance: The Experience of Filipina Domestic Workers in Hong Kong" (1999).

The current phenomenon of female labor migration has also spawned academic debate that largely centers on the efficacy of postmodern theories in feminist research on the plight of Filipina labor migrants. In "Imperialism, Female Diaspora, and Feminism," Delia Aguilar interrogates the significance of such theories as well as posing a challenge about the state of the women's movement in the United States.

Notwithstanding the importance of analyzing the impact of the current wave of labor diaspora on the level of the individual, international labor migration is undoubtedly a development concern. At issue is the unequal distribution of resources and opportunities at the national and global levels, which forces people to migrate. Undeniably, the current wave of international migration is intricately linked to the existing economic model of globalization that fails to improve the life chances of the great majority of people.



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Migrant Forum in Asia (MFA), Regional Secretariat, c/o Unlad Kabayan, 9-B Mayumi St., UP Teachers' Village, Quezon City, Philippines. [mfa@pacific.net.hk](mailto:mfa@pacific.net.hk), <<http://www.migrantnet.pair.com>>

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<sup>1</sup> See, for example, *Today's* article on Anita Fernando and Marivic David, 28 September 1996; J.T. Burgonio, "Jailed Pinay home to hero's welcome," *Philippine Daily Inquirer* (hereafter *PDI*), August 17, 2001, p. A6; Fernando del Mundo, "RP's new heroes subjected to abuse," *PDI*, January 7, 2002, pp. A1 & A15; AP, "HK man convicted for scalding RP maid," *PDI*, March 20, 2002, p. A4; Dennis Estopace, "NGO calls for gov't to address trauma of forced OFW repatriation," *Cyberdyaryo*, <[http://cyberdyaryo.com/features/f2002\\_0426\\_02.htm](http://cyberdyaryo.com/features/f2002_0426_02.htm)>, Aug 17, 2002; A.D. McKenzie, "Literature: Eating Curses, Breathing Humiliation," *IPS: The Philippine Migration Trail*, <<http://www.ips.org/migration/1304.html>>, Aug 17, 2002.

<sup>2</sup> Rhea delos Santos, "Overseas Filipino Workers: Migrant Workers Act fails to protect overseas Filipinos workers," *IBON Features* (IBON Foundation Inc., 2002), <<http://www.ibon.org/news/if/01/28.htm>>, Jan 26, 2003.

<sup>3</sup> Some parts of this section are revised and updated data from my essay published in *Women and Gender Relations in the Philippines: Selected Readings in Women's Studies*, vol. 1, ed. Jeanne Frances I. Illo (Quezon City: Women's Studies Association of the Philippines, 1999).

<sup>4</sup> See David Lazarus, "Factors that led to Manila's ban on maids," *New Straits Times* (March 1, 1988); "Ban on maids may be lifted if...", *Malay Mail* (March 2, 1988); "Ban on Filipina maids may affect lifestyle," *New Straits Times* (February 29, 1988); "Cory defends ban on Filipino maids," *New Straits Times* (Feb. 9, 1988); Felix delos Santos, "Ban on maids assailed," *Philippine Star* (Feb 1, 1988); F.T. Ocampo, "The ban on domestics," *Philippine Daily Inquirer* (Jan 29, 1988) all compiled in Centre for Migrant Workers 1988.

<sup>5</sup> Based on reports of members of FGCC, a Christian Ministry based in Kuala Lumpur, who attended the welcome dinner in honor of the president.

<sup>6</sup> *Business News*, 14 June 2000, quoted in Eko Susi Rosdianasari.

<sup>7</sup> *Immigration Laws* 1995; Paul Jacob, news reports from *Straits Times*, April 19, 1995 and *Xinhua News Agency*, April 18, 1995.

## Tenaga Kerja Filipina dan Sirkulasi Pekerja di Asia Tenggara

*Odine de Guzman*

Saat ini, tenaga kerja Filipina (OFW) menjadi bagian amat penting bagi masyarakat dan ekonomi negeri ini. Pemerintah menyebutnya OFW (semula adalah *overseas contract workers*, pekerja kontrak luar negeri, OCW) sebagai pahlawan negara - mba bagong bayani - terutama karena kiriman uang dari mereka menjadi bagian penting pendapatan. Terminologi OFW mencakup beragam kelompok tenaga kerja Filipina yang mengais rejeki di luar negeri: mereka dapat saja warga Filipina yang menjadi penduduk permanen di luar negeri atau pekerja kontrak, tercatat atau tidak tercatat. Berdasarkan kompilasi statistik, mereka dapat dikategorikan sebagai warga Filipina yang menetap di luar negeri atau OFW. Sepanjang 1999, terdapat 2,8 juta warga Filipina yang menetap di luar negeri dan 4,2 juta OFW, di antara mereka 2,4 juta tercatat dan 1,8 juta tidak tercatat. OFW lebih jauh diklasifikasikan sebagai pekerja yang bekerja di laut, kebanyakan laki-laki, dan yang bekerja di daratan, dengan jumlah pekerja perempuan yang meningkat. Tulisan ini menyentuh pertumbuhan partisipasi perempuan dalam diaspora pekerja Filipina dan upaya pemerintah mendorong migrasi pekerja ke luar negeri.

Laporan media mengenai nasib tenaga kerja di luar negeri menyandingkan perubahan pengalaman migrasi antarbangsa Filipina. Statistik mengkonfirmasi kecenderungan yang berkembang dengan dominasi-perempuan dan berorientasi-jasa. Migrasi tenaga kerja Filipina juga terjadi dalam konteks yang lebih besar di wilayah Asia Tenggara, tempat di mana orang bisa mencari kerja yang lintas-batas dan tempat di mana negeri tertentu dapat mengirim dan menerima migran. Patut dicatat adalah kecenderungan berkembang dari perempuan Asia dari negeri berkembang mengambil pekerjaan yang melelahkan negeri tetangga yang lebih maju. Pekerja perempuan dari Filipina dan Indonesia, contohnya, mendominasi

pekerjaan sektor domestik di Malaysia yang lebih makmur. Ketika “nilai” mereka dalam sektor jasa tidak sama, pengalaman dalam hal eksploitasinya sama. Perbandingan yang sama adalah pengalaman perlakuan buruk yang diterima pekerja domestik perempuan Filipina dan Indonesia di beberapa negara Timur Tengah. Pada beberapa titik dalam sejarah program ekspor tenaga kerja, kedua pemerintahan Indonesia dan Filipina telah dipaksa untuk memberlakukan penghentian tenaga kerja dalam upaya untuk memberikan perlindungan kepada pekerja dari majikan jahat.

Membesarnya persoalan perlakuan-buruk yang diterima pekerja dan meningkatnya *trafficking* perempuan telah menjadi perhatian komunitas antarbangsa. Dua bentuk pelibatan antarbangsa dalam isu migrasi perempuan dianalisis di sini: promosi perlindungan antarbangsa dan penelitian di negara-negara Barat atas beberapa aspek berbeda dari migrasi perempuan.

Negara anggota PBB yang menaruh perhatian tidak mengenal lelah melobi untuk memperoleh jaminan proteksi atas hak-hak migran pada tingkat antarbangsa. Salah satu dokumen hukum yang mengikat atas migrasi tenaga kerja antarbangsa, International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (Konvensi Antarbangsa atas Proteksi terhadap Hak-Hak Pekerja Migran dan Anggota Keluarga), memerlukan waktu lebih dari satu dekade lobi sebelum itu diadopsi oleh PBB pada 1990. Dalam dunia akademis, penelitian yang dilakukan ahli yang berpusat di Barat mengevaluasi bagaimana migran Filipina mengkompromikan biaya perasaannya untuk hidup dalam kehidupan transnasional, seperti juga mekanisme “bertahan” yang mereka praktikkan setiap hari. Walaupun bersifat wacana, penelitian ini menyumbangkan analisis terhadap pengaruh globalisasi atas kehidupan sehari-hari.

## Mga Overseas Filipino Workers at Sirkulasyon ng Paggawa sa Timog-silangang Asya

*Odine de Guzman*

Sa nakaraang mga dekada, ang mga overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) ay naging mahalagang sektor sa lipunan at ekonomiyang Pilipino. Kinikilala ng pamahalaan ang mga OFW (na kung tawagin dati ay "overseas contract workers" o OCWs) bilang mga bagong bayani sa pangunahing dahilan na ang kanilang mga padalang salapi o remittance ay mahalagang pinagmumulan ng rebenyu. Ang terminong OFW ay kinapapalooban ng iba't ibang grupo ng mga Pilipinong nagtatrabaho sa ibayong-dagat: maaari silang maging emigrant o contract worker, dokumentado o hindi. Ayon sa mga nalikom na istatistiko, kinakategorya ang mga ito bilang emigrant at OFW. Noong 1999, mayroong 2.4 na milyong emigranteng Pilipino at 4.2 milyong OFW, na ang 2.4 milyon ay dokumentado at 1.8 milyon ang hindi. Dagdag pa, ang mga OFW ay ikinaklasipika bilang nakabase sa dagat, na ang karamihan ay kalalakihan, at nakabase sa lupa, na ang paparaming bilang ay kababaihan. Itinatampok ng sanaysay na ito ang paglaki ng partisipasyon ng mga kababaihan sa nagaganap na diaspora ng lakas-paggawang Pilipino at ang aktibong pagsuporta ng pamahalaan sa migrasyon ng paggawa patungo sa ibayong-dagat.

Pinapatingkad ng mga ulat sa media hinggil sa sinapit ng mga overseas migrant worker ang nagbabagong katangian ng karanasang Pilipino sa internasyunal na migrasyon. Kinukumpirma ng mga istatistiko na ito ay unti-unting dinodomina ng kababaihan at tumutuon sa serbisyo. Ang migrasyon ng lakas-paggawang Pilipino ay nagaganap din sa loob ng mas malawak na konteksto ng sirkulasyon ng paggawa sa rehiyong ASEAN kung saan parami nang paraming tao na naghahanap ng trabaho ang tumatawid sa mga hangganan at ang ilang mga bansa ay nagpapadala at tumatanggap ng mga migrante. Kapansin-pansin din ang dumadalas na pag-ako ng mga kababaihang Asyano mula sa mga di-kasing-unlad na bansa

sa mga nakakabagot na aspeto ng gawaing reproductibo sa mga mas maunlad na bansa sa loob ng rehiyon. Halimbawa, dinodomina ng mga manggagawang Pilipino at Indones ang sektor ng domestikong paggawa sa mas maunlad na Malaysia. Samantalang ang kanilang "halaga" sa industriyang pangserbisyo ay hindi pantay, ang kanilang karanasan sa pagsasamantala ay magkahawig. Maaari rin itong ihambing sa malawakang karanasan ng pang-aabuso sa mga manggagawang kababaihang Pilipino at Indones sa mga bansa ng Gitnang Silangan. Sa maraming yugto sa kasaysayan ng kani-kanilang programa sa pagluwas ng lakas-paggawa, ang dalawang pamahalaan ay napilitang nagpataw ng moratorium sa pagpapadala ng mga manggagawa sa panghahangad na protektahan ang mga ito mula sa mga abusadong amo.

Ang lubha ng problema ng pagmamaltrato sa mga migrante at ang dumadalas na pagtrapik sa kababaihan ay nakatawag-pansin sa internasyunal na pamayanan. Dalawang porma ng internasyunal na pakikisangkot sa mga usapin ng migrasyon ng kababaihan ang tinatatalakay dito: ang pagpapabayaw ng mga proteksyong internasyunal at pananaliksik sa mga bansang kanluranin hinggil sa iba't ibang aspeto ng migrasyon ng kababaihan.

Ang mga nababahalang kasaping-estado ng United Nations ay mahigpit na nangampanya para sa mga garantiyang mangangalaga sa karapatan ng migrante sa internasyunal na antas. Isa sa ilang dokumento hinggil sa migrasyon ng paggawa na may pwersa ng batas, ang Internasyunal na Kumbensyon Hinggil sa Pangangalaga sa Karapatan ng Lahat ng Migranteng Manggagawa at Kasapi ng kanilang Pamilya, ay inabot ng mahigpit isang dekada ng pangangampanya bago ito tinanggap ng United Nations noong 1990. Sa akademya, ang mga pananaliksik ng mga iskolar na nakabase sa Kanluran ay sumusuri sa kung paano kinakayanan ng mga migranteng Pilipina ang emosyonal na gastos ng transnasyunal na pamumuhay at gayundin ang mga mekanismo kung paano nila isinasapraktika ang pang-araw-araw na "pakikibaka." Bagamat diskursibo, ang pananaliksik ay ito ay may ambag sa pagsusuri sa epekto ng globalisasyon sa mga aktwal na buhay.

## フィリピン人移民労働者と東南アジア域内の労働循環

オーディーン・デ・グスマン(Odine de Guzman)

ここ数十年、海外で働くフィリピン人労働者 (overseas Filipino workers: 以下 OFWs) はフィリピン社会と経済の中で重要な部門となった。彼らからの送金が歳入の重要な源泉となっているため、政府は以前は OCWs (overseas contract workers) と呼んでいた OFWs を国の新しいヒーロー (mga bagong bayani) と認定した。OFW という言葉には海外で働いているフィリピン人の様々な集団が含まれている。移民や、文書で契約を結んだ労働者もいればそうでない者もいる。統計上、彼らは移民で OFWs であると分類される。1999 年の統計によれば移民は 280 万人で OFWs は 420 万人いることになっている。そして 420 万人の内、240 万人が文書で契約されており、180 万人がそうではない。そして、大半が男性である海で働く労働者と、女性の比率がますます高まっている陸で働く労働者というように、OFWs は統計上さらに細かく分類されている。進行しつつあるフィリピン人労働力の拉致の中で女性の比率がますます高まっていることと、政府が積極的に海外への労働力移動を促進していることに本稿は焦点を当てる。

海外に移住した労働者の運命はフィリピン人の国際移動の性質が変化しつつあることを示しているとメディアは報じている。統計から確実にいえるのは、ますます女性が移動の主流となり、志向する業種もサービス業が増加してきているということだ。フィリピン人の労働力移動も、ASEAN というより大きな文脈の中で起きている労働循環の枠の中で生じている事象である。ASEAN の中で職を求める人々は、ますます国境を越えて移民を受け入れかつ送り出している特定の国々へと渡っていく。注目すべきことは比較的發展が遅れている国から来たアジアの女性が、地域の中でより発展が進んでいる国のなかでみじめな家事活動をますます引き受けつつあるという傾向である。例えばフィリピン人やインドネシア人の女性労働者はより繁栄しているマレーシアの中で家事労働部門に携わっているのである。サービス産業の中での彼女たちの「価値」は平等でないにもかかわらず、搾取の経験は似たようなものである。中東諸国で働くフィリピン人とインドネシア人の女性家事労働者に、広範に見られるような虐待経験は同じように比較する

ことが出来る。労働力輸出プログラムの様々な時点で、どちらの政府も虐待癖のある雇用者から彼女たちを守るべく、労働者の配置にモラトリアムを設定しようとしてきた。

移民虐待問題の衝撃と女性の移動が増加し続けているということが国際社会の注意をひきつけることとなった。女性移民問題に対する国際的な関心は次の二つの形態をとった。1つは国際的な保護を促進することであり、もう1つは西洋諸国で女性移民の様々な側面についての研究がなされたことである。

国連加盟国の中で関係のある国は、国際レベルで移民の権利を保護する保証を作り出すべく抜け目なくロビー活動を行ってきた。国際労働移民に関する数少ない法的に拘束力を持つ文書の1つに、全移住労働者とその家族の権利保護に関する国際条約があるが、この条約が国連で1990年に採択されるまでに10年以上におよぶロビー活動が必要であった。学問の世界では、西洋に拠点を置く学者たちがフィリピン人移民がいかんして異境の生活で生じる感情的な負担を克服するのか、またどのような仕組みで彼らが毎日の「抵抗」を実践しているのかを研究している。たとえ散漫なものであろうとも、この研究はグローバル化が実生活に及ぼしている影響を分析するのに貢献するものである。

Translated by Onimaru Takeshi (鬼丸武士)

## คนงานชาวฟิลิปปินส์โพ้นทะเล และการหมุนเวียน แรงงานในภูมิภาคเอเชียตะวันออกเฉียงใต้

*Odine de Guzman* (โอดิน เดอ กูซมาน)

ในช่วงหลายสิบปีที่ผ่านมา คนงานชาวฟิลิปปินส์โพ้นทะเล หรือที่เรียกกันว่า OFW (overseas Filipino workers) ได้กลายเป็นภาคที่มีความสำคัญต่อเศรษฐกิจและสังคมของประเทศฟิลิปปินส์ รัฐบาลฟิลิปปินส์ถือว่า พวกเขา OFW ซึ่งก่อนหน้านี้เรียกกันว่า คนงานสัญญาจ้างโพ้นทะเล หรือ OCW (overseas contract workers) เป็นวีรบุรุษยุคใหม่ของประเทศ ด้วยเหตุผลหลักเพราะว่าเงินที่คนเหล่านี้ส่งกลับประเทศนั้นเป็นแหล่งรายได้สำคัญของประเทศ คำว่า OFW มีความหมายครอบคลุมคนงานชาวฟิลิปปินส์โพ้นทะเลหลายๆ กลุ่มด้วยกัน ซึ่งได้แก่ ผู้ย้ายถิ่นฐานหรือคนงานที่มีสัญญาจ้างทั้งที่ขึ้นทะเบียนและไม่ได้ขึ้นทะเบียน จากหลักฐานทางสถิติที่รวบรวมไว้ พวกนี้จะถูกจัดประเภทเป็นผู้ย้ายถิ่นฐานและ OFW ในปี 2542 มีชาวฟิลิปปินส์ที่เป็นผู้ย้ายถิ่นฐานเป็นจำนวน 2.8 ล้านคน และผู้ที่เป็น OFW 4.2 ล้านคน ซึ่งในจำนวน 4.2 ล้านนี้ 2.8 ล้านคนขึ้นทะเบียนไว้ ขณะที่อีก 1.8 ล้านคนไม่ได้ขึ้นทะเบียน นอกจากนี้แล้ว ในทางสถิติยังจัดประเภทพวกเขา OFW ออกเป็นคนงานที่ทำงานในทะเลเป็นหลัก ซึ่งส่วนใหญ่จะเป็นชาย และคนงานที่ทำงานบนแผ่นดิน ซึ่งนับวันจะมีแต่สตรี บทความนี้เน้นถึงบทบาทที่เพิ่มขึ้นของสตรีในกระบวนการแรงงานย้ายถิ่นที่กำลังดำเนินอยู่ และบทบาทที่แข็งขันของรัฐบาลฟิลิปปินส์ในการส่งเสริมการย้ายถิ่นของแรงงานโพ้นทะเล

รายงานของสื่อต่างๆ เกี่ยวกับชะตากรรมของแรงงานย้ายถิ่นโพ้นทะเลได้เน้นประสบการณ์ที่กำลังเปลี่ยนไปของการย้ายถิ่นไปอยู่ต่างประเทศของชาวฟิลิปปินส์ สถิติยืนยันว่าผู้อพยพนับวันจะเป็นสตรีมากขึ้นทุกทีและมักจะทำนงบริการ นอกจากนี้การย้ายถิ่นของแรงงานชาวฟิลิปปินส์ยังเกิดขึ้นในบริบทที่กว้างขึ้นของการหมุนเวียนแรงงานในภูมิภาคอาเซียน โดยผู้ที่แสวงหางานจะพากันเดินทางข้ามชายแดนและบางประเทศก็มีการรับและส่งออกแรงงานย้ายถิ่น ที่นำส่งภาค



ก็คือแนวโน้มที่เพิ่มมากขึ้นว่า สตรีชาวเอเชียจากประเทศที่ด้อยพัฒนากว่าจะ  
หลังไหลเข้ามารับทำงานที่จำเจน่าเบื่อในประเทศที่พัฒนากว่าในภูมิภาคอาเซียน  
 อาทิ คนงานสตรีชาวฟิลิปปินส์และชาวอินโดนีเซียจะยึดหัวหาดทำงานบ้านใน  
ประเทศมาเลเซียซึ่งมีค่าจ้างสูงกว่า แม้ว่า "ราคา" ของคนงานเหล่านี้ในอุตสาหกรรม  
บริการจะไม่เท่าเทียมกัน แต่พวกเขาต้องเผชิญกับการถูกเอารัดเอาเปรียบ  
คล้ายๆ กัน สตรีชาวฟิลิปปินส์ และชาวอินโดนีเซียที่ทำงานบ้านอยู่ในประเทศ  
ตะวันออกกลางก็เผชิญเคราะห์กรรมที่ไม่แตกต่างออกไป หลายต่อหลายครั้ง  
ตั้งแต่เริ่มโครงการส่งออกแรงงาน รัฐบาลของทั้งสองประเทศจำต้องยับยั้งการ  
ส่งออกคนงานเหล่านี้เพื่อปกป้องคนเหล่านี้จากการเอารัดเอาเปรียบของนายจ้าง

ปัญหาใหญ่เรื่องการเอารัดเอาเปรียบผู้อพยพ ตลอดจนการลักลอบค้า  
สตรีที่เพิ่มจำนวนขึ้นทุกทีได้เรียกร้องความสนใจจากประชาคมนานาชาติ  
 บทความนี้จะวิเคราะห์บทบาท 2 รูปแบบของประชาคมนานาชาติในการจัดการ  
กับปัญหาสตรีย้ายถิ่น ซึ่งได้แก่การส่งเสริมการคุ้มครองในระดับนานาชาติ  
และงานวิจัยในประเทศตะวันตกเกี่ยวกับปัญหาสตรีย้ายถิ่นในแง่มุมต่างๆ

สมาชิกองค์การสหประชาชาติที่วิตกกังวลในเรื่องนี้ได้รณรงค์อย่างแข็ง  
ขันให้มีการออกเสียงสนับสนุนการคุ้มครองสิทธิของผู้ย้ายถิ่นในระดับนานาชาติ  
อนุสัญญานานาชาติว่าด้วยการคุ้มครองสิทธิของแรงงานย้ายถิ่นและครอบครัว  
ซึ่งเป็นหนึ่งในบรรดากฎหมายไม่ก่ฉบับที่เกี่ยวข้องกับแรงงานย้ายถิ่นระดับนา  
ชาติ ใช้เวลากว่า 10 ปีในการรณรงค์กว่าจะได้รับความเห็นชอบจากสหประชา  
ชาติในที่สุดเมื่อ พ.ศ. 2533 สำหรับในหมู่นักวิชาการ งานวิจัยของนักวิชาการ  
ที่อยู่ในโลกตะวันตกศึกษาว่าผู้ย้ายถิ่นชาวฟิลิปปินส์ต่อรองและจัดการกับแ  
งมุงทางอารมณ์ที่ต้องเสียไปกับการมีชีวิตแดนเช่นผู้ย้ายถิ่นในประเทศอื่นอย่างไร  
ตลอดจนกลไกที่พวกเขาต้องใช้อยู่ทุกเมื่อเชื่อวันในการ "ต่อต้าน" กับการ  
เอารัดเอาเปรียบ แม้งานวิจัยนี้จะเหมือนกับเล่าเกร็ดชีวิตของผู้คนต่างๆ แต่  
ก็มุ่งที่จะให้ข้อมูลการในการศึกษาผลกระทบของโลกาภิวัตน์ที่มีต่อชีวิตที่เป็น  
อยู่จริง

## Recent Research on Human Trafficking in Mainland Southeast Asia

*Supang Chantavanich*

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Human trafficking from mainland Southeast Asia in the modern period started in the 1960s in connection with the presence of United States troops in Indochina. The foreign male clients of the sex trade at that time were American soldiers using Thailand as a rest and relaxation area, with some also seeking temporary partners or "rental wives." After the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Indochina in 1975, some women remained in the sex trade in Thailand, serving male tourists who came on "sex tours." Others began working abroad, especially in Germany, Scandinavia, Hong Kong, and Japan. Agents facilitated the migration and employment of women through "international human trafficking networks." A key problem has been the inability of women migrants to anticipate and control the conditions of their labor. "Some women entered the trade willingly. Others were deceived into believing they would have work and/or opportunities abroad unrelated to the sex trade" (Chantavanich et al. 2001:7-8). Further, although some women knew that they would become sex workers, they were not aware of the working conditions they would encounter.

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Six recent research reports on human trafficking will be summarized below to illustrate current trends and problems faced by migrants.

***The Migration of Thai Women to Germany: Causes, Living Conditions and Impacts for Thailand and Germany***

Supang Chantavanich, Suteera Nittayananta, Prapairat Ratanaolan-Mix, Pataya Ruenkaew and Anchalee Khemkrut

Bangkok / Asian Research Center for Migration, Chulalongkorn University / 2001

[This study was conducted in 1997-98; the English version of the report was published in 2001. Findings are mainly from 1997-1998.]

Thai women migrants to Germany draw upon five main sources of assistance in their migration process: friends and immediate relatives; husbands; boyfriends; marriage agencies; and Thai and international employment agents. Women being assisted by their friends and family are less likely to be cheated, and the assistance seems to be much safer than that received from husbands and boyfriends. Unfortunately, many of the women who receive help from sources other than close family or friends are often deceived in some aspects of the migration.

The free flow of Thai women migrants to Germany is enhanced by the lack of efficient control over trafficking within Thailand and internationally, together with lack of government policies to regulate the migration of women who are not laborers. Women migrate for both marriage and for employment, the latter including commercial sex work and other jobs.

Thai women can be decision-makers in the migration process: they understand the implications of their decisions and make them independently. However, some women are also victims of economic and social exploitation. Women therefore often fall partly into two categories: they exercise some decision-making power, but are also exploited and cheated. Those who migrate to Germany for marriage are usually in a stronger decision-making position; the women who migrate for employment often lack information and are deceived

from the start.

Until recently, Germany has had relatively relaxed immigration laws which has made it easy for Thai women to enter the country. Recent changes have made the process of migration to Germany much more complex. The costs of migration have also risen, resulting in larger numbers of illegal Thai migrants. In Thailand itself there are few regulatory systems and procedures for administering the migration process, especially for Thais who migrate independently rather than through employment recruitment agencies.

### *Chinese Women in the Thai Sex Trade*

Vorasakdi Mahatdhanobol. Translated by Aaron Stern, edited by Pornpimon Trichot

Bangkok / Chinese Studies Center, Asian Research Center for Migration, Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University / 1998

Thailand is a major destination for Chinese women both deceived and willingly entering the Thai sex trade. It has been well-known for some time that Thailand has a large commercial sex market and that a variety of services are available. Women are the market's most important commodity, and Chinese women are one of the market's offerings. The methods used by underworld groups or gangs to lure women into the sex trade differ little from those used to deceive northern Thai women roughly thirty years ago, when Thailand was in an era similar to China's current stage of economic change.

The ease with which people can pass across borders creates the opportunity for criminal activity and makes trafficking Chinese women easy, despite differences in language and culture. These same differences make it more difficult for women to flee. It is possible to describe the ways the gangs moved women from place to place:

First, the gangs used one of two methods. Either an intermediary known by the women or a gang member contacted the woman directly. Second, they convinced the woman to leave her home, and third, led her across the border. Fourth, the woman was swapped between the Chinese, Burmese, and Thai

gangs, and fifth, the woman was handed over to a person in Thailand before being taken to the sex establishment. The gangs had clear procedures for deceiving and transporting the women.

The gangs had a strong network of people. At each of the different points along the routes used to transport women, the gangs had connections with people of various nationalities. When the women arrived in Thailand, the network was evident from the way they were delivered to the sex establishments. The persons delivering the women knew how many women each establishment desired.

The gangs had a single objective, to deceive Chinese women into the Thai sex trade. The gangs focused on this goal and showed little interest in the women's appearance or backgrounds. Under the gangs' practices, there were no detailed conditions for choosing which women to traffic.

Though illegal, the gangs' activities were very systematic, well-organized, and well-coordinated. Further, they were coordinated horizontally, not vertically, i.e. not conducting their activities as a single organization. If such an organization existed, it had a very loose structure.

### **"Pitfalls and Problems in the Search for a Better Life: Thai Migrant Workers in Japan"**

Phanee Chunjitkaruna

*In Thai Migrant Workers in East and Southeast Asia 1996-1997*

Supang Chantavanich, Andreas Germershausen, and Allan Beesey, editors  
Bangkok / The Asian Research Center for Migration, Institute of Asian Studies,  
Chulalongkorn University / 2000

In 1996-1997, the author found that the prime reason for Thai women to migrate to Japan was to earn fast money in order to have a more comfortable lifestyle. This was a reflection of change in village value systems following the Thai government's adoption of the western ideology of development and capitalism. Japanese border controls were regarded as a barrier both by Japanese employers and the foreign workers themselves. Therefore in order to enter

Japan, Thai workers may have to pose as tourists and overstay their visas. But to guarantee entry, most Thai workers depended on high-cost brokers and the criminal underworld (the Japanese *yakuza* or the Chinese Snake Head gang).

The smuggling of unskilled foreign workers across borders has become an international business. Brokers and organized crime work closely within transnational networks to arrange each stage of the smuggling operation, from preparing travel documents and taking workers to Japan, to finding them jobs and extracting payment after arrival. Most Thai workers borrow a lot of money from relatives or loan sharks to pay the brokerage fees and, once they arrive in Japan, face years of work to pay off this debt. Some unscrupulous brokers have also seduced and taken Thai women to Japan, where they are detained and forced to work as prostitutes in "snack bars" or brothels. These underworld groups keep the women's passports and air tickets and watch them at all times so they cannot escape. If the women refuse to cooperate, the *yakuza* may increase their debt or sell them to a brothel.

Because ordinary Thais are often ignorant of the immigration rules of both Japan and Thailand and the brokers are purely concerned with profit, a considerable number of Thai workers with illegal status have encountered problems in Japan. These include deportation by Japanese authorities, communication difficulties, hospital treatment, exploitation and discrimination by employers or native Japanese, liabilities, fraudulent practice, and poor accommodation.

However, despite the difficulties many illegal Thai workers have coping with life in Japan, they are likely to continue working and living there. The reasons they prolong their stay affirm that their main purpose in coming to Japan was to earn money. Failure to earn enough money to buy consumer goods upon returning to Thailand would be considered a "loss of face" which could be damaging to the social standing of themselves and their families.

Moreover, female Thai workers who have engaged in prostitution find it difficult to go back to their villages since all values have not changed; prostitution is still regarded as shameful. According to these traditional values, "good

women" must be virgins before marriage. Thus women who have been employed in the sex industry - whether deliberately or under duress - will usually face criticism from their community and may be unable to marry. Other female workers stay because they wish to marry Japanese men or have children of Japanese nationality in the hope of gaining legal status and social welfare benefits.

But most Thais working in Japan remain to pay off the debt and bondage incurred when they received assistance from the brokers. Initially hoping to earn fast money to pay off their debts and save enough to return to Thailand, many Thai workers chose to put up with demanding work, unfair payment, and no provision of welfare. Consequently, these workers are voluntarily turning themselves into a segregated, marginalized, and discriminated against ethnic group.

330 In order to continue working and living in Japan, they adapt by using a Japanese name at their workplace and tend to stay inside their apartments for fear of deportation. Simultaneously, they maintain contacts within their ethnic groups and networks as well as their families in Thailand. As a marginalized people in Japan, illegal Thai workers are likely to retain their identity and depend on their ethnic group. Despite the fact that their lives in Japan are tough, they manage by depending on friends, relatives, brokers, the underworld, and NGOs when encountering problems.

***Thailand-Lao People's Democratic Republic and Thailand-Myanmar Border Areas: Trafficking in Children into the Worst Forms of Child Labour. A Rapid Assessment***

Christina Wille

Geneva / International Labour Organization / 2001

Read online at: <<http://www.ilo.org/public/english/region/asro/bangkok/library/pub1.htm>>

Although trafficking is often considered a single process of transportation from place of origin to place of work, this study found that it occurred in only about one third of the cases. Recruitment directly from a child's village was most common for girls and Laotians. In the majority of these cases, however,

foreign children were recruited for labor exploitation within Thailand after having made separate arrangement to enter the country. It was not uncommon for minors to know about a particular workplace in Thailand and approach an employer or recruiter upon entering the country.

In most cases the minor or minor's family took the initiative to obtain details on work opportunities outside their village. Fellow villagers and friends were the most common sources of information about particular jobs and general work opportunities, and in the majority of cases minors or their families knew someone who could arrange their transportation and/or recruitment. Parents rarely appeared to be the main driving force behind the decision for a minor to leave for work. In over one-third of the cases, the decision was taken jointly by the parents and child. But the most common decision-making process reported by minors was that they had made the decision to leave on their own; many did not even inform their parents because they expected them to disapprove. Minors expressed a wish to see the world outside their village, and still others left to escape an unhappy or difficult home life or family situation. The majority of the parents of the children had no information or only partial information on their child's situation.

In cases where the minors arrived in Thailand before they began to work, it was most common for them to arrange the travel themselves. This was particularly common for boys and Laotians. For girls and ethnic minorities, it was more common to be accompanied by a family member who made most of the arrangements. In the less frequent situation, where the minor travelled to Thailand having already been recruited for a particular job, different types of actors organized the transportation. Most commonly these were trusted friends of the family. In almost half of the cases, the transporters were linked to an organized network of transporters, recruiters, and employers. It was less common for these minors to arrange their own transportation or for family members to be the main transporters, and strangers accounted for only about a quarter of the transporters.

In most cases minors were recruited into the worst forms of child labor in the town where the work was located, and most minors made their own way



to these localities. Some had been recruited to a particular job before entering Thailand and children recruited at the border site for transportation to work elsewhere in Thailand were rare. The majority of minors had entered the worst forms of child labor within one month of arriving in Thailand. In some cases children had carried out some other kind of work before entering the worst forms of child labor. Some children carried out temporary work in agriculture or helping Thai families with odd jobs such as food preparation, dishwashing, or babysitting.

In over half of the cases where recruitment took place, no profit was made in the transportation or recruitment process. In the small number of cases where a profit was made upon the recruitment of a child for work, usually the child became the possession of the employer at least until a certain amount of profit was made. In other cases, the family paid a fee for the transportation and job placement of the child.

Although the majority of the minors believed they had not been tricked or coerced into work, many children said they had only been told part of the truth and half of the children said that they knew almost nothing about the nature of the work they would be doing or the conditions under which they would be working. More specifically, the children reported very low levels of awareness about working hours, working conditions, living conditions, and the degree of freedom they would have while living and working in Thailand.

***Small Dreams Beyond Reach: The Lives of Migrant Children and Youth Along the Borders of China, Myanmar and Thailand***

Therese M. Caouette

A Participatory Action Research Project of Save the Children (UK) and the UK Department for International Development / 2001

Read online at: <<http://www.savethechildren.org.uk/labour/small%20dreams%20beyond%20reach.pdf>>

The majority of cross-border migrants from China and Myanmar into Thailand were young, came from rural areas, and had little or no formal education. Along all the borders, young people began migrating on their own at about the

age of thirteen. Some children under that age also migrate on their own, though most are accompanied by parents or relatives.

The decision to migrate is complex and usually involves numerous overlapping factors. Children and youth did not give one reason exclusively, but an explanation that included economic survival, war, refuge, government policies, personal problems, and envisioned opportunities abroad. The majority of migrants first explained their move to find work as necessary for their daily survival.

Migrants travelled a number of routes that changed frequently according to their political and economic situation. The vast majority crossed without documentation and even those with travel permits often stayed beyond their expiration or did not abide by the restrictions placed on their visit, with the ultimate result of being identified as illegal immigrants.

Generally, migrants leave their homes not knowing what kind of job they will find abroad and even when they think they know, they often find it is not what they expected. The actual jobs available to migrants were very gender specific. Migrant girls and women sought jobs in factories, shops and restaurants, sex work (direct or indirect), the entertainment industry, or as domestic workers (cleaning and care taking). Male migrants found jobs in the fishing and agricultural industries or as manual day laborers or construction workers.

Though the living and working conditions of cross-border migrants vary according to the place, job, and employer, nearly all study participants noted their vulnerability to exploitation and abuse without protection or redress. The study revealed extensive debt-bondage, sexual abuse, illegal confinement, confiscation of documents, arrest and extortion, forced overtime, few basic resources, and poor accommodations that were overcrowded, insecure, and often violent. Sexual abuse was commonly reported among girls and young women, particularly among those involved in sex work and domestic service.

Trafficking of persons, predominantly children and youth, was common at all sites. The majority of young women and children were trafficked into sex

work, marriage, domestic work, or begging. It was found that the majority of girls from migrant communities along the Thai-Myanmar border left their border villages for jobs further inside Thailand. Typically, girls were recruited during the fifth and sixth grade. Trafficking into marriage was also frequently reported by girls and young women from minority communities in Northern Shan State, who often were forced into marriages deeper in China. Many domestic workers from Myanmar also reported being trafficked into domestic work and forced into arrangements and conditions without their knowledge or agreement. Trafficking of young children and babies was reported from Myanmar into China.

Migrants frequently considered their options and opportunities to return home. For many, the decision to return revolved around issues of security and logistics. Discriminatory attitudes towards those who have migrated, especially girls and young women, made the reintegration process extremely difficult, often resulting in further migration.

Though many acknowledge that growing numbers of children and youth migrate with or without their families, there is little awareness of their concerns and needs and extremely few interventions undertaken to reach them.

#### **"Return and Reintegration: Female Migrations from Yunnan to Thailand"**

Allan Beesey

In *Female Labour Migration in South-East Asia: Change and Continuity*

Supang Chantavanich, Christina Wille, Kannika Angsuthanasombat, Maruja M.B. Asis, Allan Beesey, and Sukamdi, editors

Bangkok / Asian Research Center for Migration, Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University / 2001

This study depicts the movement of women from selected villages in one county of Yunnan into Thailand. It shows that many have traveled to Thailand to work wherever there was a demand. The service industry is a major employer, especially the sex industry, although other work is available. Some women have journeyed just to the north of Thailand, an area of traditional trading networks with kin and cultural networks.

There is limited research in Thailand which can track or quantify the movement of Yunnanese into the country. Women in sex work constitute a visible migratory movement which has attracted publicity and some research. This is some evidence that men are migrating as well, but villages in this study area did not provide much evidence of this. Other border villages in other counties and prefectures may provide a different picture.

When the political situation in the area became more stable in the late 1980s, traffickers were quick to take advantage of people wanting to travel to Myanmar and Thailand. The migration of women from the southern prefectures of Yunnan began through traffickers assisting individual women and often cheating or luring them through fake offers. Since the mid-1990s women appear to be making more informed choices. Through their own experience or the experience of others, they are more autonomous and less dependent on traffickers or other assistance, and they may be working in less exploitative working conditions. For some, however, the monetary rewards in compensation for migration are limited, so they may be disappointed. The opportunity to earn a good income has declined since the financial crisis in Thailand. However, if they learn something from the experience, as many say they do, then the monetary rewards are an added bonus or part of the realization of two goals.

It may appear remarkable that since the early 1990's, trafficking through deception and violence has been transformed into a voluntary movement of women who are often fully aware of the nature of the work they are accepting. Despite the highly stigmatized nature of the occupation, women can rise above the stigma by sharing their earnings and gaining prestige in their village. This shift from trafficking to voluntary movement and to the work gaining acceptability is well documented for northern Thailand. There also appears to be a reduction in negative attitudes toward returning women as it becomes increasingly common in certain villages. This represents a dramatic change since the early 1990s.

## Conclusion

Evidence from research on human trafficking and irregular migration in Southeast Asia illustrates some "shift" in the notion of trafficking. The shift

can be observed in three aspects of the definition: the nature of recruiters and transporters; the process of trafficking; and exploitation in place of destination.

It is found that there are certain safe recruiters - siblings and close friends - whose service will not result in human trafficking. Those are cases of fortunate predecessors who want their sisters or best friends to have the same opportunities, such as marriage to a good foreign husband or work with a kind employer. The use of force, kidnapping, coercion, and abduction are becoming less common in recruitment. Only trafficked babies are clearly kidnapped. The use of false information about employment, working conditions, and difficult situations which victims may encounter are more frequently identified. Travel agencies and mail-order bride services are a disguised form of recruitment which legally operate internationally. With regard to transporters, they are facilitators for crossborder migrants who want to circumvent restrictive and complicated immigration regulations. Human smuggling is the relevant term for these transporters. The case of human smuggling has become more frequent because many migrants are voluntarily trafficked. In many cases, trafficked persons approach recruiters to seek information about migration. Ethnic minorities are new targets of recruiters and transporters.

There are many steps in the trafficking process, especially if the trafficked person originates in a remote area. It seems that the type of carrier or means of travel is less significant, while the border crossing or passing of immigration control is more important in the transporter's role. Trafficking networks coordinate horizontally across borders in their operation. The use of fraudulent travel documents is commonly found. Popular destinations for trafficking are locations where immigration control is lax and few migrants disembark.

The nature of exploitative conditions in Southeast Asia differs from that described in the Trafficking Protocol. Apart from slavery or debt bondage and sexual exploitation, trafficked persons encounter illegal confinement, confiscation of documents, arrest and extortion, forced overtime, and poor, overcrowded, insecure, and violent living conditions. Servitude and the removal of human organs are not found. Trafficking of girls and young women into marriage and domestic work are identified, as is that of babies and young children. It is vital

to note the increasing cases of women voluntarily and knowingly migrating into the sex trade and becoming revictimized. Identified victims do not want to be assisted and sent back home.

The realities of human trafficking in Southeast Asia indicate new characterizations of the phenomenon. Shifts are reflected in the act of recruitment (from coercion to deception), in the trafficking process (from forced to voluntary and from being approached to approaching recruiters themselves), in the targeted victims (from girls and young women to boys and men too), in transportation (from abduction to facilitation across borders), in the type of recruiters (from professional agents to villagers, distant relatives, and friends), and, finally, in exploitation (from mainly sex work to various worst forms of labor). Such shifts will contribute to redefining the concept of trafficking to reach better characterizations and to confirm that the definition of trafficking can continue to develop into a more inclusive stage.

## Penelitian Mutakhir Mengenai Trafficking Manusia di Asia Tenggara Daratan

*Supang Chantavanich*

*Trafficking* manusia dari daratan Asia Tenggara pada periode modern dimulai sejak 1960-an berkaitan dengan kehadiran tentara Amerika Serikat di Indocina. Setelah tentara Amerika Serikat keluar dari Indocina pada 1975, banyak perempuan yang tetap berada pada perdagangan seks in Thailand; yang lainnya mulai bekerja di luar negeri, khususnya Jerman, Skandinavia, Hong Kong, dan Jepang. Agen-agen memfasilitasi migrasi dan lapangan pekerjaan perempuan tersebut melalui "jaringan antarbangsa *trafficking* manusia." Masalah kuncinya adalah ketidakmampuan perempuan migran mengantisipasi dan mengendalikan kondisi tenaga mereka.

Bukti riset mutakhir mengenai *trafficking* manusia dan migrasi tidak teratur di Asia Tenggara menggambarkan beberapa "pergeseran." Pergeseran ini bisa dilihat perekrut, penyedia jasa transpor, proses *trafficking*, dan jenis eksploitasi di tempat tujuan.

Perekrutan: Jika perekrutnya cukup dikenai – seperti saudara dan teman dekat – tidak akan berakhir dengan *trafficking* manusia. Penggunaan kekuatan, penculikan, pengambilan paksa, dan paksaan sudah sangat berkurang. Dalam banyak kasus, pihak yang hendak melakukan *trafficking* mendekati perekrut untuk mencari keterangan mengenai migrasi. Pemakaian keterangan palsu mengenai pekerjaan dan kondisi kerja menjadi lebih sering diidentifikasi.

*Trafficking*: penyedia jasa transportasi adalah fasilitator bagi migran pelintas-batas yang ingin menghindari aturan imigrasi yang ketat dan rumit. Penyelundupan manusia merupakan terminologi yang tepat karena

migran secara sukarela menyediakan diri. Tampaknya cara transportasi tidak begitu penting ketimbang melintas batas or memotong kontrol imigrasi. Jaringan *trafficking* memiliki koordinasi secara horisontal di sepanjang perbatasan dalam operasi mereka. Pemakaian dokumen palsu sering ditemukan. Tujuan populer *trafficking* adalah lokasi-lokasi yang kontrol imigrasinya lemah dan ada banyak migran yang pergi ke sana.

Eksploitasi: selain eksploitasi seksual, perbudakan atau pembayaran utang, orang yang di-*trafficking* menghadapi masalah berupa kurungan, pengambilan paksa dokumen, penangkapan dan pemerasan, lembur paksa, dan kondisi kehidupan yang berat, miskin, sesak, tak aman dan kasar. Perbudakan dan penghilangan organ manusia tidak ditemukan. *Trafficking* atas gadis, perempuan muda yang siap menikah, termasuk juga kegiatan yang terjadi di dalam rumah seperti *trafficking* atas bayi dan anak kecil juga dapat diidentifikasi. Juga sangat penting untuk dicatat bahwa jumlah perempuan yang sukarela dan mengetahui akibat bermigran untuk perdagangan seks meningkat dan biasanya mereka menjadi korban kembali. Korban yang bisa diidentifikasi biasanya tak mau dibantu dan dikirim pulang ke negeri asal.

Translated by Wahyu Prasetyawan



## Bagong Pananaliksik sa Pagtatrapik sa Tao sa Punong-lupang Timog-silangang

*Supang Chantavanich*

Ang pagtatrapik sa tao mula sa punong-lupang Timog-silangang Asya sa kasalukuyang panahon ay nagsimula noong dekada 60 kaugnay ng pagkakaroon ng tropang Amerikano sa Indotsina. Matapos ang pag-alis ng mga pwersang E.U. sa Indotsina noong 1975, ang ilang mga babae ay nanatili sa sex trade sa Thailand; ang iba naman ay nagsimulang magtrabaho sa ibang mga bansa, partikular sa Alemanya, Scandinavia, Hong Kong, at Hapon. Pinadali ng mga ahente ang migrasyon at pagpapatrabaho sa mga babae sa pamamagitan ng "international human trafficking networks". Isang susing problema ay ang kawalan ng kapangyarihan ng mga babaeng migrante na malaman nang maaga at mapanghawakan ang kanilang kalagayang-paggawa.

Ang mga ebidensya mula sa bagong pananaliksik hinggil sa pagtatrapik sa tao at di-regular na migrasyon sa Timog-silangang Asya ay nagpapakita ng bahagyang "shift" sa konsepto ng pagtatrapik. Ang "shift" na ito ay maobserbahan sa katangian ng mga rekruter at tagahatid, ang proseso ng pagtatrapik, at ang pagsasamantala pagdating sa destinasyon.

Pagrekluta: Nalaman na mayroong mga maaasahang rekruter – mga kapatid at malapit na kaibigan-na ang serbisyo ay hindi nagreresulta sa pagtatrapik. Ang paggamit sa dahas, pagkidnap, pagpilit, at pagtangay na lamang ay hindi na karaniwan. Sa maraming pagkakataon, ang mga biktima ay lumalapit sa mga rekruter para humingi ng impormasyon hinggil sa migrasyon. Subalit ang paggamit ng maling impormasyon hinggil sa trabaho at kalagayang-paggawa ay mas madaling natutukoy.

Pagtatrapik: Ang mga tagahatid ay tumutulong sa mga migrante na

nais makaiwas sa mga mahigpit at masalimuot na regulasyon sa imigrasyon. "Human smuggling" ang masasabing ginagawa ng mga tagahatid na ito sa panahong parami nang parami ang mga migranteng boluntaryong nagpapatrapik. Maaring tignan na ang paraan ng paglalakbay ay hindi kasinghalaga ng pagtawid sa hangganan o pagpuslit sa kontrol sa imigrasyon. Ang mga network sa pagtatrapik ay mayroong koordinasyong tumatawid ng mga hangganan sa kanilang operasyon. Ang paggamit sa mga pekeng papeles panlakbay ay karaniwan. Ang mga popular na destinasyon para sa pagtatrapik ay ang mga lugar kung saan ang kontrol sa imigrasyon ay mahina at kakaunti lamang ang mga migranteng bumababa.

Pagsasamantala: Maliban sa pagkaalipin dahil sa utang o debt bondage at pagsasamantalang sekswal, ang mga taong itrinapik ay nakakaranas ng ilegal na pagkakapiit, kumpiskasyon ng mga papeles, pagkaaresto at ekstorsyon, sapilitang pagtrabaho nang labis sa oras, at mahirap, masikip at marahas na kalagayan sa buhay. Walang mga kaso ng pang-aalipin at pagtanggap ng organo ng tao. Natutukoy naman ang pagtatrapik sa mga batang babae para sa kasal at domestikong paggawa, gayundin ang sa mga sanggol at paslit. Mahalagang bigyang-pansin din ang pagdami ng mga kaso ng mga kababaihang boluntaryo at buong-kaalamang lumuluwas para sa sex trade at muling nabibiktima. Ang mga natutukoy na biktima ay ayaw magpatulong para makauwi.

Translated by Sofia Guillermo

スパン・チャンタヴァニッチ(Supang Chantavanich)

現代の東南アジアでの人身取引は、米軍がインドネシアに駐留していたことに関連して1960年代に始まる。75年に米軍がインドネシアから撤兵したあと、タイで性産業に従事し続ける女性もいれば、主にドイツやスカンジナビア諸国、香港、日本といった国で働き始めるものもいた。女性の移民や雇用についてはエージェン트가「国際的な人身取引ネットワーク」を通じて手引きしてきた。女性移民について鍵となる問題は、彼女たちが自らの労働条件を事前に予想したり管理したり出来ないことにある。

東南アジアの人の取引や不法移民についての最近の研究が示しているのは取引の観念がいくぶん「変化」してきていることである。変化はリクルートや輸送の性質、取引の手順、目的地での搾取の三点に見出せる。

まずリクルートの仕方である。リクルートが兄弟や親友といった必ずしも人身取引に帰着するわけではない安全な人間によってなされていることが分かっている。暴力や誘拐、威圧によるものはあまり見られなくなっている。多くの場合、取引される人間は移民についての情報を求めてリクルーターに接近する。しかし雇用や労働条件について嘘の情報を利用することはより頻繁に確認されている。

次に取引の手順についてである。輸送業者は制限が多く複雑な移民規制の裏をかきたい移民者の助けとなるものである。より多くの移民が自発的に取引に関わるようになって、輸送については「人の密輸」という表現が適切になっている。移動の手段は国境を越えることや入管を飛び越えることに比べればあまり重要ではない。取引ネットワークは取引に際して国境の内側と外側を同様にサポートする。不正入手した旅券を使うことは一般的である。取引先としてよく使われるのは入管がいい加減でほとんど移民が上陸しないような場所である。

最後に搾取についてである。奴隷や債務者、性産業に従事するものはともかく、取引された人は非合法的に監禁され、書面を押収され、逮捕とゆすりにあい、強制的に残業させられ、その生活環境は貧しく、人が過密すぎており、安全とはいいがたく、暴力に満ちたものである。奴隷化や肉体を傷つけることは見出されていない。結婚や家事労働のために少女や若い女性を取引することは確認されており、赤ん坊や子供の取引も確認されている。ますます多くの女性が自発的に自覚した上で性産業に就くために移民し、搾取されるようになっていることは注意しておく必要がある。しかし、確認された被害者は助力を受けることや故郷へ送還されることを望まない。

Translated by Onimaru Takeshi (鬼丸武士)

## งานวิจัยใหม่ ๆ เรื่องการค้ามนุษย์ในเอเชียตะวันออกเฉียงใต้

*Supang Chantavanich (สุปางค์ จันทวานิช)*

การค้ามนุษย์จากภูมิภาคเอเชียตะวันออกเฉียงใต้ในยุคปัจจุบันเริ่มต้นขึ้นในช่วงปีพ.ศ. 2503-2513 พร้อมๆ กับการเข้ามาของกองทัพสหรัฐอเมริกาในอินโดจีน หลังจากที่สหรัฐอเมริกาถอนกำลังทหารออกไปจากอินโดจีนในปี 2518 ผู้หญิงบางคนยังคงค้าประเวณีอยู่ต่อไปในประเทศไทย ขณะที่บางคนก็เริ่มออกไปค้าประเวณีในต่างประเทศ โดยเฉพาะอย่างยิ่งในประเทศเยอรมนี ประเทศแถบสแกนดิเนเวีย ฮองกง และญี่ปุ่น ตัวแทนต่างๆ อำนวยความสะดวกในการย้ายถิ่นและการจ้างงานผู้หญิงโดยผ่านทาง “เครือข่ายการค้ามนุษย์ข้ามชาติ” ปัญหาสำคัญประการหนึ่งคือ การที่ผู้หญิงเหล่านี้ไม่อาจทราบล่วงหน้าถึงสภาพการทำงานและไม่สามารถควบคุมสภาพหนี้ได้เลย

หลักฐานจากงานวิจัยที่ดำเนินการไปเมื่อเร็วๆ นี้ในเรื่องการค้ามนุษย์และการย้ายถิ่นอย่างไม่เป็นไปตามกฎเกณฑ์ในภูมิภาคเอเชียตะวันออกเฉียงใต้ แสดงให้เห็นถึงการเปลี่ยนแปลงบางอย่างทางความคิดเรื่องการค้ามนุษย์ การเปลี่ยนแปลงดังกล่าวนี้จะเห็นได้จากลักษณะของผู้ที่มักชักชวนให้ย้ายไปทำงานต่างประเทศและผู้ที่เขาเดินทางไปต่างประเทศ ขึ้นตอนการค้ามนุษย์และการกดขี่ เอาเปรียบที่เกิดขึ้นในประเทศปลายทาง

การชักชวนให้ย้ายไปทำงานต่างประเทศ: เราได้พบว่ามีผู้ชักชวนให้ย้ายไปทำงานต่างประเทศกลุ่มหนึ่งที่ไว้ใจได้ ไม่ได้ค้ามนุษย์ กลุ่มนั้นคือญาติพี่น้องและเพื่อนสนิท ส่วนการใช้กำลัง การลักพาตัว การบังคับ และการล่อลวงนั้นพบน้อยลง ในหลายๆ กรณีบุคคลที่ถูกหลอกไปขายเป็นผู้ติดต่อกับผู้ชักชวนเองเพื่อขอข้อมูลในการย้ายถิ่น ปัญหาการให้ข้อมูลเกี่ยวกับการจ้างงานและสภาพการทำงานที่เป็นเท็จกลับพบได้บ่อยมากขึ้น

การข้ามพรมแดน: ผู้ที่พาเดินทางไปยังต่างประเทศคอยให้ความช่วยเหลือบุคคลที่เดินทางข้ามเขตแดนที่ต้องการหลบเลี่ยงกฎระเบียบการเข้าเมืองที่เข้มงวดรัดกุมและซับซ้อน การลักลอบข้ามพรมแดนเป็นคำที่เหมาะสมกับผู้พาบุคคลเดินทางข้ามเขตแดนเหล่านี้ หากพิจารณาว่าการข้ามพรมแดนที่เกิดจากความยินยอมของบุคคลที่เป็นสินค้าเองนั้นมีมากขึ้น ดูเหมือนว่าวิถีการเดินทางมีความสำคัญน้อยกว่าการข้ามเขตแดน หรือการหลบเลี่ยงการควบคุมการเข้าเมือง เครื่องช่วยการข้ามพรมแดนประสานงานกันในระดับนานาชาติตลาดเขตแดน มีการพบการใช้เอกสารการเดินทางปลอมอยู่เป็นประจำ จุดหมายปลายทางที่มีการข้ามพรมแดนคือบริเวณที่มีการควบคุมการเข้าเมืองหละหลวม และมีบุคคลจำนวนมากไม่น้อยสามารถเดินทางข้ามเขตแดนได้สำเร็จ

การกดขี่เอาเปรียบ: บุคคลที่เป็นสินค้าในการข้ามพรมแดนนั้น นอกจากจะตกอยู่ในสภาพของทาส เป็นหนี้เป็นสิน และถูกบังคับให้ขายบริการทางเพศแล้ว ยังต้องเผชิญกับการจำกัดพื้นที่ที่ผิดกฎหมาย การถูกยึดเอกสารสำคัญต่างๆ การถูกจับกุมการถูกบังคับขู่เข็ญ การถูกบังคับให้ทำงานเกินเวลา และสภาพความเป็นอยู่ที่แออัด ไม่ปลอดภัย และทารุณ ส่วนการใช้งานเยี่ยงทาสและการตัดอวัยวะในร่างกายออกไปนั้น เราไม่พบหลักฐานว่าเกิดขึ้น มีการพบการค้าเด็กผู้หญิงและหญิงสาวเพื่อไปสมรสกับชาวต่างชาติ และทำงานเป็นคนรับใช้ในบ้าน เช่นเดียวกับกับการค้าทารกและเด็ก เราตั้งข้อสงสัยเกตอย่างมีนัยสำคัญว่ากรณีของผู้หญิงที่เต็มใจเข้าสู่การค้าทางเพศและกลับเข้าไปเป็นเหยื่อในการค้าลักษณะนี้ซ้ำแล้วซ้ำเล่านั้นมีเพิ่มมากขึ้น นอกจากนั้นแล้ว ผู้เสียหายที่ได้รับการพบตัวกลับไม่ต้องการรับความช่วยเหลือ และไม่ต้องการกลับสู่ถิ่นฐานเดิม